STATEMENT BEFORE THE INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00788R001500160012-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 8, 1975
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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0~ '-'"STd
INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE
..HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
CHARLES D. ABLARI? I w'0
GENERAL COUNSEL
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
L1 y ,tfAR Y
i i.1 9F
C4 65 S E ARMY WAR COLLEGE
~. u
ARMY review(s) completed.
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Mr. Ablard was appointed General Counsel of the Army on.
19 February 1975. In this capacity he serves as legal counsel to
the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries. and
,,their staffs.
Mr. Ablard was born on October 25, 1930, in Enid, Oklahoma.,
He received ,a Bachelor of Business Administration from, the
University of Oklahoma in 1952, an LLB from the University of
Oklahoma in 1954, and an LLM from the George Washington University
Law Center in 1959. He has been admitted to practice before the
Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
the U. S. Court of Military Appeals and several lower federal courts..
Immediately after he graduated from law school in 1954, Mr.,
Ablard served as a judge advocate in the Air Force with duty
assignments at Maxwell AFB, Oklahoma, and Itazuke, Japan.
From 1958 to 1960 Mr. Ablard was the Judicial Officer anal.
Chairman of the Board of Contract Appeals of the Post Office
Department. Mr. Ablard was in the private practice of law in:
Washington, D. C. from 1960 to 1963.
From 1963 to 1969. Mr. Ablard served as the Vice President
and Counsel of the Magazine Publishers Association and the
American Association of Magazine Editors, in Washington, D..C..
In 1969 Mr. Ablard became General Counsel and Congressional
Liaison-of the United States Information Agency, Washington, D.C.
. ,
where he served until 1972. Mr. Ablard served as Associate: Deputy
Attorney General in the Department of Justice from 1972 until 1974.
During 1974 Mr. Ablard was a Visiting Fellow of the Center of
International Studies, Cambridge University, England.
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:
It is a privilege for me to appear before your subcommittee
this morning to discuss the Army's Drug Testing Program; a subject
which quite properly warrants your review. I am accompanied by
Lieutenant General Richard Taylor, The Surgeon General of the
Department of the Army. We welcome the opportunity to testify
within the limits of our present knowledge.
Current interest in the history of Army drug testing using
human subjects was prompted in part by the Rockefeller Commission
Report's disclosure that an unidentified Army civilian. employee had
committed suicide several days after having been administered LSD..
This individual was, of course, later identified as Dr. Frank. Olson..
OnJuly 21, 1975, the Acting Secretary of the Army directed
the Army Inspector General to conduct a comprehensive investigation.
to establish the totality of historical facts and circumstances surround-
ing the Army's participation in drug testing,, focusing particularly upon
the testing of hallucinogenic drugs on human subjects. The Secretary
also suspended all human testing, and ordered all volunteers to be
returned to their regular duty assignment. The Inspector General's
investigation which also encompasses the allegations concerning the
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Chief of the Medical Research Division, is currently in progress.
Although substantial investigatory effort has already been expended,,.
.rincluding formal interviews of over 55 witnesses, numerous informal,
interviews of other individuals, and review of thousands of pages of:
documentation, the bulk of this investigation remains to be completed..
In'the course of this investigation, one fatality has been identified as
having occurred in connection with one of the contracts let by the
Army for drug testing. This was Mr. Harold Blauer, who at the
time of his death was a patient at the New York State Psychiatric
Institute. The Department of the Army announced this information
shortly after it was learned on 7 August 1975.
As the time period of the investigation dates back to the late: 1940's
many of type most knowledgeable witnesses are either deceased or
have not as yet been located, and the memory of many of those who
have been located is incomplete or imprecise. In addition, nuthero a
pertinent records have not as yet been located, and many may have
been routinely destroyed under standard procedures for destruction.
of all records. In my testimony today I will attempt to summarize
the information that has thus far been developed as a result of the::.
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Inspector General's investigation. However, I wish to emphasize
the problems that I have just noted with regard to locating knowledge
able witnesses and pertinent documentation, we have not as yet been
that because this investigation is still in progress, and because
able to reconstruct a complete account of the Army's participation in
drug testing. There are substantial gaps in our knowledge, and much
of the information that we have been able to assemble is incomplete.
For this reason, there are many questions to which we simply do
not have the answers at the present time.
Before discussing the specifics of the program, I believe it.
appropriate to provide inbofar as security considerations permit,.
the factors which mandated that a program be initiated, and what
we perceived as the objectives of such a program.
Starting in the early 1950's, intelligence reports which were
received indicated large purchases by other governments of possible
l
hallucinogenic agents which could be used as chemical warfare
material. These reports also cited documented studies of research
conducted by these countries in the 1940's and 50's with various
psychochemicals, as well as references to the capture by U`. U.S. or
U.S. allies of foreign agents who were carrying syringes of fluid to
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facilitate control of captives. Furthermore, on October 7.1, 1951,
after communication with several European medical personnel
concerning the effect of "ego-depressant drugs," a civilian doctor
sent a report to The Surgeon General. In it he related reports:
of the utilization of drugs by foreign agents and indicated the need
for further research to determine the possible effects -such. drugs.
could have on national security.
This information presented a serious threat -- it indicated that
a major portion of our deterrent forces could be rendered-helpless
and defenseless -- by drugs which were odorless, colorless and
tasteless. It also reflected that our most sensitive security matters
could be unknowingly compromised. . But perhaps of even greater
significance, it indicated that an alternative to nuclear weapons might
be available; a weapon which might render, large forces helpless but
only temporarily -- and without any permanent damage to those forces
and none to their surroundings. These matters were covered in.
testimony by Major General William M. Creasy, -former Chief
Chemical Officer, U. S. Army, before hearings of the House Committee
on Science and Astronautics on June 16, 1959, wherein he discussed.
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at great length the possible use of chemical agents as a substitute:
.for nuclear weapons.
The program initiated at that time therefore had three' specific
,''objectives: to determine what hallucinogenic drugs might provide an,
effective alternative to more drastic weaponry; to ascertain, the
potential application of such drugs in intelligence operations;
and finally, to attempt to develop an antidote to such drugs should.
they be used against U. S. or Allied forces.
Once decisions were made at levels above that of the Department:
of the Army to proceed with the testing of psychoactive and otter drugs,
the Chemical Corps, then a separate technical service of the Army,.
headquartered at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, entered into a series
of contracts with various universities, state hospitals, and medical,
foundatioiqs. Unfortunately, many of the early contracts are. unavailable.
Our best information is that many of these contracts were routinely
destroyer] some time ago. However, we have located some documer~tasn,
all of which indicates that the Army's primary interest was in acquiring
the results of investigations and experimentations being conducted.. by
these civilian research organizations.
Our review has encompassed a total of fifty-two contracts,
starting from the early 50's and continuing to the 70's. I should. like
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to stress that of the fifty-two contracts of which we have knowledge,
only a small number (13) involve testing compounds which might be
described in a broad sense as hallucinogenic or delirient. The 39
remaining contracts can all be placed into three categories: first,
tests of various anticholinergic agents, such as atropine, and basic
research into organophosphates, in a constant effort to refine anti-
dotes to organophosphate nerve poisons; second, tests of various
common drugs in medical use, such as morphine, and other analgesics
as well as miscellaneous non-psychoactive drugs; and, third, non-drug
tests of physiological functions, such as lung function or skin permeability.
In the interest of time, I have not prepared detailed remarks on these
contracts, but I have pertinent documents should you have any questions.
Turning to the research on hallucinogenic drugs, we discovered
9 such contracts. The first two of these were negotiated in 1951 with
the New York State Psychiatric Institute, a leader in the field of the-
use of h1lucinogenics in the diagnosis and treatment of the mentally
ill. The subjects were psychiatric patients. The records are ambiguous
concerning the matter of the consent of the patients. The drugs util_
ixed included LSD, :mescaline, and others: In the course of one of
these contracts, a subject, Mr. Harold Blauer, then a _patient at the
New York State Psychiatric Institute, was administered a dose of a
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Mescaline derivative which proved fatal. Details of Mr. Blauerts
death have already been made public and are available to the committee
and are appended to my statement. The Blauer death is the subject:
of a pending claim by the two daughters against the Army.
A 1955 contract with Tulane University involved the administration.
of LSD, Mescaline, and other drugs to mental patients who had there--
tofore had electrodes implanted in their brains as a part of their
medical treatment unrelated to an Army contract. The electrodes
were utilized-to study the effects of the drugs on the brain's functioning.
The methodology used might be subject to some criticism on the ground
that a range of compounds was administered to at least one patient
without apparent relation to therapy or diagnosis. However, work
on the brain chemistry of mental illness was still pioneering work
in 1955, and perhaps it is not surprising in the cool light of analysis
20 years later that some of the techniques then employed now appear
less than perfect.
The five remaining contracts were with the University of
Washington, the Research Foundation for Mental Hygiene, Inc., the
University of Maryland and the Institute for Behavioral Research.
Four of the five studied LSD, the remaining one studied many -
compounds including amphetamines. They covered the time period
1953 to 1965. None of them appears remarkable, but, again, I have
more complete information should you desire it.
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Although the medical profession has had ethical codes and
procedural safeguards on the use of human beings in drug experimen:-
tation for over a century, I must in all candor admit that they appear
not always to have been followed in these tests. These standards
require, for example, that the individual be informed as to all aspects
of the nature, methods and effects of the experiment, that he give his
voluntary written consent before any testing and that he be free' to
withdraw from the experiment at any time. The Surgeon General
will elaborate on these matters in his testimony. These are the
obligations of the attending physician, or the researcher conducting
the experiment. Our records, admittedly incomplete, do not reflect
that these procedures were necessarily followed by the research
organizations with whom we contracted. To insure compliance with,
these requirements, the Army has, since at least the early 60's,
followed the practice of requiring contract clauses setting stringent
controls over the use of human beings in experiments. Such a
clause is present, for example, in our contract with the Institute
for Behavioral Research.
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Chemical Corps Testing of LSD
Based upon the results obtained under early contracts with
civilian research organizations, military-related testing of
hallucinogenics was initiated. Insofar as we have been able to
determine, Army in-house testing of LSD on human subjects corn-
menced some time in 1955 and was conducted intermittently through
1967 using military and Army civilian personnel recruited from, the
Army areas within the United States. Most of this testing was conducted
at Edgewood.?Arsenal, Maryland.
In addition, available information indicates that a number of field
tests were conducted at certain other Army installatiai s. The purpose
of these field tests was to determine. the effects of LSD administration
on the ability of soldiers to perform various normal military functions.
For example, in December 1957, 16 men were tested under LSD.
influence during operation of a radar van at Aberdeen Proving Grounds,
Maryland. During this same period, at Edgewood Arsenal, 40
individuals were tested under LSD influence in the performance of such
activities as rifle assembly and disassembly, masking and skin
decontamination procedures, a volley ball game, and close order drill.
Films were made of the latter test and used as a demonstration -
vehicle within the Army as to the effects of LSD.
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In September, 1958, field tests were condor ted at Fort Bragg,
North Carolina. One of these tests involved administration of LSD
to 20 Special Forces personnel engaged in a guard post exercise and a.
'bimulated interrogation exercise.
In another series of tests at Fort
Bragg, 59 men from the XVIII Airborne Corps Field Artillery were
tested under LSD influence while engaged in 'a meteorological su.rvey,
a ground survey, a 40 mm artillery crew drill, and fire direction
center and forward observer exercises. These latter tests were
also filmed.
Available information also indicates other field tests. involving
personnel of the advanced officers courses at the Chemical Corps
School, Fort McClellan, Alabama; four members of an. instructor
class at Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, in 1959; and approximately
34 members of an infantry advanced course at Fort Benning, Georgia,
in January, 1960.
Available records characterize all of the LSD test subject.sc,
both at Edgewood Arsenal and at the field locations, as volunteers.
However, as I will discuss later in connection with testing of LSD,
for intelligence purposes, it is not certain-how much advance information
was imparted to each prospective subject regarding the possible-effects
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of LSD or the exact nature of the experiments to be conducted, ov
whether some coercion may have been brought to bear upon prospective
subjects by their superiors in order to obtain their participation.
Testing of LSD for Intelligence Purposes
During the period 1958 through 1962 a series of experiments
were conducted specifically designed to evaluate potential applications
of LSD to intelligence operations. In particular, these experiments
focused upon the possible use of LSD as an aid in intelligence interro-
gations. In this regard it was desired to determine whether, as a
result of the administration of LSD, a well-trained and experienced
intelligence agent could be rrade to divulge classified information that
could not be obtained from the agent solely through use of conventional
questioning.
A series of clinical experiments were performed during the period
1958 through 1960 at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland. These experimert s,
which were conducted as a joint project of the U. S. Army Intelligence
Board and the Medical Research Directorate of the Armyrs Chemical
Warfare Laboratories, used as subjects military intelligence personnel
made available by the U. S. Army Intelligence Center. Subjects were
specifically selected for a high degree of security conditioning and
intelligence experience. In addition, preliminary mental and physical
examinations were a prerequisite to acceptance into the program.
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Available records indicate that approximately 31 Army
intelligence personnel participated as subjects in the program.
Because these records are incomplete, there are significant.
,.,unanswered questions as to whether participation in the program, was.
truly voluntary by today's criteria. Planning documents indicate that
prospective subjects were to be advised generally as to the nature of
the program, and that they could terminate their participation at any
time. In particular, prospects were to be advised. that the project
would consist of a series of mental and physical tests of human reaction
to a specific material which would be administered under in-patient
clinical conditions. Prospects were not, however, to be informed
as to the exact properties of the material to be administered or its
potential intelligence application, nor, in connection with certain of the
experiments, the time, 'location, or method of administration. This
information was withheld in order not to prejudice experimental
results by suggestion. Planning documents also indicate that each
prospect who agreed to participation in the program was to 'sign a.
statement indicating in part that the general nature of the experiments
had been explained to him from the standpoint of possible hazards
to health; that he understood that the experiments would be so
conducted as to avoid all unnecessary physical and mental suffering
and injury; that he would be at liberty to request that the experiments
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be terminated at any time; that he recognized that in the pursuit of
certain experiments transitory discomfiture may occur; and that _
there had been no coercion, undue moral suasion or other adverse
pressure brought to bear in his volunteering; and that he had done
so of his own free will. Available records do not indicate, however,
whether these procedures were in fact followed in each case, or
exactly what information was imparted to the prospective subjects.
The experiments at Edgewood were conducted by qualified
medical personnel of the Chemical Warfare Laboratories under
controlled clinical conditions.
Project officers of the U. S. Army
Intelligence Center provided technical advice and assistance in the
structuring of experiments. In addition to a number of standard tests
of mental and physical abilities related to performance of intelligence
tasks, conducted so as to compare pre and post drug administration
results, the experimentation program included certain structured
situations wherein the applicability of the drug for intelligence purposes
was assessed. In these situations an attempt was made to overcome
the security training and experience, principally interrogation.
resistance, of the subjects by exploitation of the effects of the drug.
The structured situations consisted of: (1) Simulated social:. receptions
where LSD was administered surreptitiously to the subjects (in cocktails);
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(2) Simulated stress situations wherein subjects were given, polygraph
examinations after administration of LSD; and (3) Administration of
LSD in conjunction with confinement in an isolation environment.
In each situation medical personnel were present at all times...
Observation reports by those supervising the experiments, as well.
as subjective reports by the subjects themselves, were used in
assessing the effect of the drug. In general, it was found that use of
LSD, either alone or in con junction with conventional interrogation
techniques, could be effective in reducing the resistance to interrogation
of well-trained and experienced intelligence personnel.
In view of the results of the clinical experimentation at i' dgewood
Arsenal, and in recognition of. the limited -capability fo structure?
realistic interrogation situations in a laboratory environment using
volunteers, a proposal was submitted by the U. S. Army Intelligence
Center, in coordination with the Chemical Warfare Laboratories, to
conduct field experimentation in conjunction with actual. interrogation
situations. This proposal was approved by the Army's Assistant Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, and subsequently two series of field tests
were conducted.
Available records indicate that on 10 April 1963, the Deputy
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence directed that no further field
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testing of LSD be conducted. No records have been found to indicate
that any Army intelligence testing of LSD has been performed since
that time.
Available records indicate that approximately 600 individuals
were administered LSD during the course of the Army in-house testing
programs at Edgewood Arsenal and at.the field test locations There
is reason to believe, however, that these records may not be complete,..
and that the total number of participants may have been somewhat
higher. Hence, a priority effort is continuing as part of the Inspector
General's investigation in an attempt to compile a complete listing of
participants in the LSD testing programs. The names of all of the
participants thus far identified have been forwarded to the Army's
Surgeon General for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive
follow-up medical evaluation program on'all individuals who can be
located. This effort, which is currently underway, will require the
assistance and cooperation of at least two other agencies, the National
Academy of Sciences - National Research Council Medical Follow-up
Agency and the Veterans Administration.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks.. I have
attempted to describe within the structure of security considerations
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tij
and the right of privacy of the individuals involved the external factors
which caused our government to initiate a testing program; the manner
in which the program was conducted; and the actions we have recently
initiated in an attempt to insure that the participants in the program,
have and will continue to receive appropriate medical treatment.
Mr.. Chairman, as I indicated at the outset, the Inspector General
investigation has not been completed. As soon as any additional
information is developed, it will be provided to you.
I will be pleased to attempt to respond to any questions you may
have.
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