(TAB F) ESTABLISHMENT OF INSCOM GRILL FLAME TASK FORCE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410008-7
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
3
Document Creation Date:
November 4, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 18, 1998
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 20, 1979
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410008-7.pdf | 114.59 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410008-7
TAB
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410008-7
Approved For Release 81~MET n1A DP96-00788R001200410008-7
SUBJECT: Establishment of INSCOM GRILL FLAME Task Force (U)
1. (S) In response to DCG-I comments concerning the size of the recommended
task force for project GRILL FLAME, the following information is submitted
to provide additional data upon which to make a decision.
a. I want to re-emphasize that the recommended action calls for the
establishment of at k~force not a TDA unit. If the project develops and
proves worthwhile, Then the FY82 POM submission that we have made should
take care of establishing a TDA unit at the appropriate time.
b. Project Manager (PM) - Operations Officer: It is essential that one
individual be available and responsible for mana ing the day-to-day activities.
The PM, on an average, is unavailable 40% of the time. Working group meetings,
both DA and DOD, and liaison with other elements working in this field keep the
PM fully occupied. The project needs someone to interface with the various
intelligence elements they are working with. The Operations Officer, among
other responsibilities, must maintain the unit's scheduling activities and
insure that any given requirement is being "attacked" with the proper resources.
c. Analyst Positions: We have carefully selected the individuals involved
to insure that we would have representation from each of the disciplines. Each
of the analysts will have several roles within the task force: all are
individuals who will be doing remote viewing; all are individuals who are being
trained as interviewers thereby giving us the capability of doing multiple
sessions at the same time. We realize that there is an element of danger in
having analysts also doing remote viewing. However, internally we have taken
the necessary steps to insure that proper compartmentation is maintained and
by doubling up on functions we are able to keep down man-power requirements.
d. Secretary Position: Plain and simple - one secretary cannot keep up
with the work-load. We have training reports over 1 month old still waiting
to be typed (current secretary has worked paid overtime and has given consider-
able free time in an effort to reduce this back-log). The current operational
task (Iran) has generated enough work to keep two secretaries busy without
even considering other aspects of the program. In fact, when a second
secretary has not been available it has meant that reports that might contain
meaningful information have been delayed'up to a week from reaching the customer.
As a reminder, each session is completely taped and all reports typed verbatim;
which adds up to a lot of required typing support.
e. Training Officer/NCO Positions: TAG training officer is essential to
the development of the program and he also serves as one of the primary
interviewers. The NCO doubles as a remote viewer. He also helps in collating
the data obtained from the sessions and is responsible for maintaining the
training charts, briefing aids and our weekly status summaries. Basically,
he serves as the senior administrative chief and assists in developing training
procedures. Also, he is responsible for maintaining all equipment that belongs
to the element.
-r,ai
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410008-7
Approved For Release 2c8l E/GRi TP96-00788R001200410008-7
2. ( W) Summary: I have carefully scrubbed and re-scrubbed this proposed
task force and feel that the request is justified in keeping with current
man-power constraints and yet providing INSCOM with the necessary assets to
fully explore and develop this potentially tremendous intelligence collection
program. According to various officials (Dr. Laberge, Dr. Verona among them)
it's our program which is leading the way for the Intelligence Community.
With the high visibility it has, INSCOM can not afford to "fail" for want
of proper support. Request that our rather modest task force requirements
be approved as originally given.
CHAD B. WHITE
Colonel, GS
ADCSOPS-HUMINT
SECRET
Approved For Release 2001/04/02 : CIA-RDP96-00788R001200410008-7