Q&A SESSION WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER FOLLOWING REMARKS AT NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, WASHINGTON DC TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1984 - 1:30 PM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00788R001200100002-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 1998
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: NOTES

'Q&A S~A qft For Release 2.001)/08107 : CIA-RDP96-00788 R001200100002-7
Secretary o e ease aspar e n erger
Following remarks at National Press Club, Washington, D.C.
Tuesday, May 1, 1984 - 1:30 PM
Mr. John Fogarty, President of NPC: Thank you, Secretary Weinberger.
We do have a lot of questions and let's get to them.
Q: Do you believe that by staying away from talks the Soviets are attempting
to diminish the reelection chances of President Reagan?
A: Well, that certainly is a possible interpretation of the frustrating problems
we've had in trying to continue to pursue the arms reduction talks, either at the
intermediate level or at the strategic level. We're even having trouble securing a
very minor but important agreement to upgrade and improve the Hotline that hasn't
really had the latest technological advances built into it for 25 or 30 years. I
hope this is not why they're staying away, but it is certainly subject to that
interpretation. I would much rather have the talks resume and continue without any
reference to the election or the reelection campaign.
Q: What advances do you foresee in Soviet offensive strategic capabilities to
counter U.S. strategic defense while the latter is being developed?
A: There have always been arguments that you shouldn't try to develop
anything new or work on it because it will be provocative or that it will lead the
Soviets to conclude that they must attack before you get the defense and so on.
They have been working on it, as I've said for many years, since roughly 1967 and I
just think that it is vital that we try to develop it.
The President has said this technology will be shared. The important
thing is to bear in mind that the Soviets have made no such offer, and it would be
a far more perilous world if they secured it first. But for all the other reasons I
think it's vital that we pursue it because I think ultimately it is by far the
best way to maintain the peace.
Q: Why are the Russians constantly sending subs into Swedish waters? Do you
view this as a provocative act?
A: I don't think it can be viewed any other way. I think they do it because
they regard that area as a potentially important battlefield. It's one that they
are gathering intelligence about in a somewhat unconventional way, but I think it is
bound to be provocative and it certainly has caused the Swedish government to take
all the precautions that it can to try to prevent it and to safeguard their own
defensive capabilities.
Q: This one's on the MX and generally tt}e questioner points out that last
year the MX got through the House by just nine votes. They're wondering how
you plan to get it through the House this year and then they talk a little bit
abd'ht the compromise from cutting the number of missiles from 40 to 30 and then
they ask is that a good compromise from your viewpoint?
A: Well, it's a compromise which would delay the ultimate regaining of
modernization of our nuclear strategic triad. We have, as I say, been debating the
MX for something like 12 years. What we have sought, what the Scowcroft Commission
recommended strongly, was the acquisition of an adequate, modernized, deterrent
force. Not to be used first or anything of the kind but to make sure that the
Soviets are aware of our retaliatory capability and that we would have a missile
with the accuracy and the yield to destroy Soviet hardened targets. And it is
important that-we regain that capability.
I don't have any idea what the vote will be. I have never predicted what the
Congress would do or would not do, but I know that the basic plan, the ultimate
need, remains the same and if it is delayed or slowed down it will simply mean
that the whole program will cost more than it would cost now, more than it has
to cost and it will be delayed longer than it should be.
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don't have any need to do that and we're therefore anxious to maintain the conditions
that have produced such a fine result with the volunteer system at the moment.
This is not to say that there can not be and indeed should not be a continual
examination of all aspects of the military budget including military retirement.
I would be somewhat surprised if there was a full examination of this in the Congress
this year. There have been various suggestions made and these suggestions are
before the Congress, but I haven't seen any indication in the comparatively short
period of time remaining in this session that there will be any consideration of
these major changes this year.
Q: On Law Day, what is your opinion of the United States government's refusal
to go before the World Court on the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors?
A: Well, on Law Day, is a good day to present the, formal, legal arguments as to
why the World Court has no jurisdiction over this matter, particularly in view of
the previous non-adherence of Nicaragua, and in view of a number of other factors as
to whether or not these matters are within the purview of the Court. These matters
have all been set forth in formal legal briefs by the State Department and I think
that the arguments that are made are justified, the position that we have taken.
Q: Do you agree with Knight Kidder's recent series of articles on the B-i bomber
that "Three U.S. Presidents and their defense policy makers have rejected manned
bomber production" because manned bombers are obsolete and the B-1 was put into
production by President Reagan and Congress only as sort of a pork barrel project?
And related to that, did President Carter's decision to go full speed ahead with
the so-called Stealth manned bomber indicate that he did indeed see a role for
manned bombers in the future?
A: Well, the answer-to the first question is no. I don't think it's a pork
barrel and I do think there is very much a role for manned bombers. It is our hope
and belief that it is essential to improve our conventional strength as well as
regaining a modernized nuclear deterrent. The B-1 helps with both of those and
helps very much particularly in view of the fact that the newest B-52 is 26, 27
years.old now and does not have and will not have the ability to penetrate Soviet
air defenses nor indeed even in view of some of the Soviet capabilities to get off
its bases. So I think it is absolutely essential that we proceed with the B-l.
I think the questioner's assumptions are somewhat wrong with respect to the desires
of the prior Presidents. I put the money for the B-1 into the budget in 1971, I
believe it was, and'I didn't encounter any opposition from the President at that
time nor did I encounter any opposition from his successor. It was only in 1977
when the B-1 was supposed to have rolled off the lines that it was cancelled by
President Carter. I think we need it and I also think that the advanced technology
bomber is another very important aspect of our 'deterrent capability. Again, I
think that the decision of the President on October 1, 1981, that we needed to
proceed with both of these and the Scoweroft Commission's unanimous recommendation
that we should indeed proceed with both, both of those decisions were correct.
Q: Would the U.S. declare areas of space American territory in order to
implement the space defense system much like we have extended the territory offshore?
A: What is this?
Q: Would the U.S. declare areas of space American territory?
A: No, I don't think there would be any attempt to do that nor any need to do
that. If the space defense system works, and if we can develop it as we want to,
there wouldn't be any need to extend our territory offshore. We would have destroyed
the Soviet missiles long before they got anywhere near our shores and we would try
to develop a system that would do that but there wouldn't be any need to declare'
any portion of space American territory.
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But we-also think it is essential to the national security that we not have to
escalate'any kind of-a nuclear-conflict and that we therefore should Out and do
Out,'- as:I say, around-85%, 86% ,of our-budget into conventional capabilities:
That's the proportion that we have and that's the proportion roughly that would
run all through the - President's-five-year defense program if all of the sums that
he has requested or appropriated.' That is''roughly the division, about 14%, 13%
strategic and the balance-conventional.
Q: The Soviet Union has been engaged in psychic research for years. How
serious is-the-Department of Defense and the CIA's counter commitment to investigating
parapsychology-'y 'in'defense? -
A: Well, we look at everything that we think will be useful and would help us.
I wouldn't-be prepared to characterize the capability of the Soviets in this area.
It'is certainly true they've been-working on it for some time and it's important that
we Work on it and be aware of any late developments and be prepared to avoid anything
in the nature of a breakthrough. But I don't think I would want to go any further
than that, not because it's all that. classified, but simply because that's roughly the
level at which we work.
A: Well, what were doing first of all is developing a submarine that will
carry a missile that will have for the first time the accuracy and the yield to
destroy Soviet hardened targets. This is what is essential to develop our own
capability to deter attack. It is an important, critically important part of the
triad. We have now with the Ohio class submarines coming on at the rate of about
one a year or a little better than that and with the D-5 missile that will be
available in 1989, -- we-tried to get it a,year earlier but we found out it would
Bost a-billion dollars more just: to get that year, and contrary to what you may
have-heard,*I do believe in austerity so we didn't do that. But this is the
principle way in which we have improved the submarine part of the triad. In order
to do"that"we do need, as I said, the bigger submarines and naturally we try in
every way we can to make them quieter and make them more effective. We also work
on the submarine communication as indeed we do on the command, control, communications
of all parts.of the triad. But primarily it-is in those ways that we are now
modernizing and improving the submarine leg of the triad.
Q: I think you still have some doubters out there. In the event of a Soviet
first-strike would they not try to shoot down our space defense station before
launching their missiles against the`U.S.?
A:- Well, in the event of a Soviet first strike, I don't really know what they
would do. What we have to do is develop a capability that will deter them from ever
making that first strike. There are any one of a number of different patterns or
strategies that they may follow if they are determined to make a first strike.
It seems to me the important thing is for us to acquire the capability of destroying
their incoming missiles before they-get-into the continental air space or
into-the atmosphere. `'I think that can be done and I think it is essential that
we work to do it. I don't think we can stand around wondering what the Soviets
might do because if they conclude that they could make a first strike they would
have a great many targets and our whole desire, our whole purpose, our whole aim,
is to develop a capability that will continue to deter them in one way or another
from making that strike.
Q: What steps are you taking to modernize submarines that were not taken y
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