AFTER-ACTION REPORT (IRANIAN CRISIS 23-25 APR. 80)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: STARGATE
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP96-00788R001000340008-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 4, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2000
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 2, 1980
• Content Type: MFR

NOT RELEASE
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ORCON
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755
SUBJECT: After-Action Report (Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr 80)
2 May 1980
1. (U) Purpose: This report covers the period 23-25 April 1980 during
which this office provided increased operational support to the Iranian
hostage situation at the specific request of Special Operations Division
(SOD), JCS. The request from the JCS was relayed to INSCOM via Mr. Jackie
Keith (Chief, ICC, INSCOM) who took the request directly to the CG, INSCOM.
2. (S/NOFORN) Support Required: The JCS tasking specifically requested
that:
a. We increase the number of operational sessions and that we attempt
multiple targeting sessions;
b. We take measures to preclude having to abort sessions (if at all
possible);
c. We provide them information on a timely basis using format found
at Incl 1.
3. (S) Facilities: In order to accomplish the tasking mentioned in paragraph
2, it was decided to rent space in a nearby hotel for the required period of
time. Initial planning estimated that we might be required to provide JCS
support for ten days. Reservations were made at the Best Western Motel (3440
Fort Meade Road, Laurel, Maryland; Telephone: [phone]) for five days
beginning 23 April 1980. We rented three separate rooms which provided us
with the necessary flexibility (two rooms used for operational sessions and
the other as a control/administrative area; plus we used the operational room
that we have in Building 4553) needed to carry out the multiple sessions
simultaneously.
4. (S/NOFORN) Operations: We moved into the motel shortly after 1300 hours,
23 April 1980 and conducted our first sessions at 1500 hours, 23 April 1980.
Our operations plan originally called for us to conduct 9-10 sessions per day;
however, I terminated operations shortly after 0200 hours, 25 April 1980 when
the news reached us that the attempt to rescue the hostages had been aborted.
The termination of our activities was concurred with by LTC Bob Morrell, SOD,
JCS.
CLASSIFIED BY: Director, DIA
REVIEW ON: May 2000
EXTENDED BY: Director, DIA
REASON: 2-301c (3 & 6)
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IAFM-OPS-HU-SA 2 May 1980
SUBJECT: After-Action Report (Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr 80)
a. Operations Completed` During the period 23-25 April 1980 we
completed 20 operational sessions. Spot reports on all sessions were called
in within an hour of their completion (individual sessions) and short
summaries were provided to JCS within 24 hours of completion for 12 of the
sessions and typed reports were provided for the other 8 sessions due to the
data being reported.
b. Lessons Learned: On the whole, it appeared to be. very effective
operating from the expanded environment -- basically because it provided us
with the operational flexibility and an atmosphere fairly free from outside
noise. However, there are still some factors we need to look at and they
are listed below:
(1) CON - Altering the normal work cycle of remote viewing personnel
may not be beneficial to the remote viewing process. Personnel rapidly became
tired working the expanded hours even though they were afforded plenty of
time for rest and relaxation. It appeared that some people were not able to
hold or achieve their normal level of concentration.
(2) CON - Scheduling of a large number of RV sessions was a problem
for all personnel concerned. The typist couldn't keep up so we went with the
abbreviated formats which increase the margin of error, especially for the
analysts. The interviewers were scheduled to work from 0700 until after 0200
each day. Obviously, if we had continued for the whole ten days, we would
have had difficulty in maintaining an effective work-force.
(3) CON - If we find it necessary to run this type of operations in
the future, then we should reserve at least one more room. This would allow
the remote viewers to have a break/rest area free from the distractions found
in the Admin area. And, of course, keeps the RVers from accidentally overtaking
any discussions concerning the project they are working on.
(4) CON - It was very obvious that the Project Manager carried too
much of the administrative and operational burdens on his shoulders. This
short exercise once again pointed out the need that the project has for an
Operations Officer. We had to stop all other projects in order to properly
support and control this task.
(5) CON - Security was of some concern since we were operating off
the confines of a military installation. Although no problems were encount-
ered, we were very concerned that the increased traffic in and out of the
motel might attract attention.
(6) CON - The overlay problem due to a lack of remote viewer isolation
continued to be a hindrance. We have now been working on the Iranian hostage
situation for over five months. Project personnel, like everyone else,
have been engulfed by the news media concerning the Iranian situation. It
appears as though some of the RVers were not successful in being able to
separate the various levels of consciousness and it might be that pure
imagination took hold.
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IAFM-OPS-HU-SA 2 May 1980
SUBJECT: After-Action Report (Iranian Crisis 23-25 Apr 80)
(7) PRO - The commonality of mission importance seemed'to achieve
a psychological "high" for group identification and may have helped improve
mission performance.
5. (S) Summary: As previously mentioned, we have been working on this
problem for over five months. There is no way any project personnel can be
isolated from news concerning the Iranian situation. We have now completed
over 120 sessions on this tasking and have submitted approximately 90 reports.
Yet, even though we are still in a training mode, we have received very little
feedback concerning the value of our efforts. I feel that they (the reports)
must be of some value to the tasking agency (JCS) or else they wouldn't continue
to give us additonal requirements. However, we still do not know how, why,
when, etc., our reports have aided. I strongly believe that someone from the
decision-making branch of INSCOM should. press SOD, JCS for a written assessment
of our effort -- even though this assessment, by necessity, will be incomplete,
we should at least have our policy makers made aware of how their resources
are being used and why they are being continually tasked.
. ,.r.,- ,S. &/am
1 Incl MURRA'B. WATT
as LTC, MI
Project Manager
APPROVED:
CHAD B. WHITE
COL, GS
ADCSOPS-HUMINT
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2. DTG
3. TGT: - ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE,
- DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT,
- GULF, HOTEL, INDIA,
- JULIET, KILO, LIMA,
- MIKE, XRAY, YANKEE,
NUMBER 1 - THRU 53
(SEE ATTACHED LIST)
4. KEY QUESTIONS:
A. ALPHA TGTS: WHICH HOSTAGES IF ANY DID YOU OBSERVE
IN THE TARGET LOCAL?
B. NUMERIC TGTS: WHICH FACILITY DID YOU FIND THE TARGET?
FOLLOW-ON QUESTIONS:
(a.) DESCRIBE THE FACILITY WHERE THE TARGET WAS.
(b.) WERE THERE OTHER HOSTAGES?
(c.) DESCRIBE ANY GUARDS YOU SAW.
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