TALKING POINTS CHALLENGES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801130025-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 69
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 15, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

STAT
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DDI #4944-82
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
15 June 1982
NOTE FOR: EA/ADDI
FROM : C/F S/Planning Group
Here are the talking points for the DDI.
Give me a call if you need anymore. These
points were taken from DCI and DDCI
speeches over the past two years.
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JUN 1 5 1982
TALKING POINTS
CHALLENGES IN INTELLIGENCE
I. State of U.S. Intelligence Today, and how we got in this
condition.
- Intelligence service has fallen behind badly having
lost 50% of its manpower and 40% of its funds during the
1970's.
A. 1950's period of "what does the US need to know"
0 a time of great investment. Developed encyclopedic
knowledge about all countries (fewer countries then).
Investment in technology produced U-2 for collection in
denied areas.
B. 1960-1970s period of "what can you do without"
o Intelligence Community, like Defense Department, was
asked: "Is it cost-effective."
o Vietnam War diverted resources from the basic task of
assembling encyclopedic intelligence knowledge.
o Compounded by adverse balance of payments problems.
Resulting in reduction of US presence abroad. State
Department draws down political and economic reporting
officers abroad.
o Budgets were predetermined. Focus of 70s on verifying
treaties. Decision made to take advantage of new
collection technology, at the expense of giving up.
manpower dollars.
o Lessened intelligence because of expenditure ceilings,
paralleled by failure to think about what kind of
challenges would affect US interest in the 1980s.
o Impacted on human collection and analytical assessment
for large areas of the world.
C. Period of Congressional investigations
o brought benefit in that new look at intelligence
problem revealed the extent of draw down of Intelligence
Community's capabilities.
oRecognized that both dollars and people needed to
fulfill requirements of what we need to know.
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D. Where do we stand today
? Systems built to verify treaties have great
capabilities to provide indications and warning.
? Do well following military developments, order of
battle, the equipping, the state of training of our
principal adversaries.
? Less well in political and economic areas. Result of
lack of resources devoted to those problems. Difficulty
in knowing intentions of foreign leaders.
? Lack of basic encyclopedic data base. Again, drawn
down over long period and reliance on our allies to
provide such information.
II. Challenges before us.
0 While rebuilding to answer today's requirements we must
identify and assess the vulnerabilities we have to face
in the mid-to-late 1980s and the 1990s.
A. Soviet Union, with major weapons systems directed against
the US, remains our number one concern
B. Warsaw Pact forces gaining on NATO forces in quantity and
quality.
C. Soviet ability, directly or through proxies, to project
power over long distances.
? Invasion of Afghanistan
? Soviet weapons and transport of Cuban troops to Angola
and Ethiopia
? Soviet weapons, training and money enabled Vietnam to
impose its will on Laos and Cambodia.
D. Destabilization, subversion and the backing of insurgents
around the world.
? Targets close to natural resources and the choke points
in the world's sea lanes.
? We have established a Center for the study of
Insurgency and Instability which uses a wide range of
techniques and methodologies to provide advance warning
of instability end.potential for destabilization in order
to protect us from being caught by surprise.
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E. Terrorism
o Soviets provide funding and support for terrorist
operations via Eastern Europe and its client nations like
Libya and Cuba.
o Working with the intelligence services of friendly
nations, we are developing a network to track terrorist
organizations and train local quick reaction and rescue
forces to fight terrorism worldwide.
F. Exploitation of indigenous religious and political and
other regional tensions.
0 Shia and Sunni Moslem tensions
0 Arabs and Jews
0 moderate and radical Arabs
o. black and white in Africa
G. Technological revolution in Western society.
o The accuracy, precision and power of Soviet weapons are
based on Western technology.
o A Technology Transfer Center has been established to
identify and help fight the free ride on our R&D.
H. The Soviet space and laser program could produce a
technological breakthrough that could tip the balance of
power.
I. Soviet Economy
o burden of enormous military expenditures
o cut rate oil to Eastern Europe
o agricultural inefficiencies
o billions of dollars to Cuba and Vietnam
J. Complex Automatic Information Systems
o The glut in data, with the result that important
information is not only harder to find but also harder to
sort.
The need for support structures, including`
communications, that span the earth when and where we
need them.
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L. Finding and retaining the highest caliber people, while
developing and maintaining our professional skills, such
as foreign languages.
III. o After years of directed searching, and finding intelligence
capabilities that we could do without, we have become too
lean.
o Basic areas need attention and strengthening:
collection, production, counterintelligence, covert
action, and support.
o Rebuilding will not occur in just a few weeks; but we
hope to be better in the 1980s as we attack these
challenges of: What we need today, and what we will need
in the latter half of the decade.
-4- k
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? ( V
E'
?he Brookings Institution L -
1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.W./WASHINGTON D.C. 20036/CAILES: EROOKINST/TELEPHONE: [phone]
Advanced Study Program
% ., n
May 5, 1982
Vice Admiral Bobby R. Inman, U.S.N.
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
Our final Fxecutive Leadersh4p. FORUM. of the year will be held J 15-18,
1982. This brings together senior business executives and senior government
(career) executives from various agencies, to examine at first-hand with - -?
policymakers, the issues and policies in NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.
We invite you to speak to the group on the following topic (tentative,
subject to your suggestions):
8:00-9:30 a.m. Topic: ISSUES AND TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE
Friday morning, June _J&,1282 IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Breakfast Meeting
Brookings, Room 103-S
Sessions will be informal and off-the-record. Speakers are asked to
speak for 10-30 minutes, and then reserve the remainder of the time for
questions, discussion, and exchanges between participants.
We very much hope that you will be interested in assisting in this
educational program, and that your schedule .permits. it. In the event that
you cannot come, would one of your senior deputies be able to help us? I
will be glad to discuss details with your office. I can be reached in
Washington, D.C. at:`797-627.9 or 797-6280, except for the period.May 11-21,
when I will be in Williamsburg, Va. at: [phone], ask for Bubeck,
with Brookings Conference.
Yours,
Leadership Forum Chairman
Senior Staff Member, ASP
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ACCOMPLISHMENTS TO DATE
I. Attitudes
-- After ten years of cuts, pervasive attitude at all levels "what car) we
can we do without" versus "what do we need to accomplish our mission."
With new support from Administration, Congress and public this being
turned around.
After ten years of attacks, pervasive timidity, don't stick your neck
out, play it safe. Under Casey, this too changing. People becoming
more imaginative, striking out in new directions, more boldness in
analysis, more creativity in clandestine service.
II. Analysis
-- New, forceful leadership--John McMahon.
-- New emphasis on quality of analysis (alternative interpretations,
broader perspective, future oriented, more policy relevant, more
timely, greater attention to leverage and vulnerabilities, greater
i
realism).
Significant change in role of NFIB%ow:substantive matters. Greater
collegiality and involvement of NFIB in discussion of substantive
intelligence issues.
Changes in National Estimates process to make them more relevant,
timely, and pointed.
Resolution of major analytical dispute with Department of Defense
over past several years--agreement to collaborate jointly on net
assessments following projection of major military estimates.
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-- Cessation of publication of unclassified analysis. Statistical/
reference material still to be produced, but disseminated by NTIS
and Library of Congress. Effort to get other agencies to actually
issue the reference materials.
IV. rgariiza fon
After years of major shakeups and reorganizations, there have been no
significant reorganizations of line functions 'in the Agency since
January 9.
I i
L L
C.C i C- . C. . i a r /A C Vs J ~ ~ , Ll ~ ~) 7 O Y~
1,r ~' ~r.'. -1iti~. 1 4 z. ?k ~'Y~~ . t__ ~ E C r'). t..,,_ l.'~ r r~
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Overall emphasis: Movement of personnel from staff positions to line
Purposeful effort to have lower profile more consistent with intelli-
places
positions.
This underlay disestablishment of Office of Public Affairs and Office
of Legislative Council, both believed to be overstaffed and in latter
case not sufficiently efficient, responsive to Members, or capable of
ensuring high quality presentations.
In OLC, kept best and most experienced liaison officers under former
deputy to Hitz. Support and administrative functions reduced, no less
effective--better organized--better disciplined. Level of representation
from DDO and NFAC on Hill for briefings upgraded significantly to ensure
better quality support.
Those aspects of Public Affairs relating to "outreach" and "flacking
CIA and its leadership" eliminated. Background briefings for journalists
ended except in instances where journalists are traveling to interesting
oLC4OPA
Overall, 20 percent of totalAstaff being transferred
gence organization.
back to line positions.
Separation of NIC from NFAC to ensure proper treatment of alternative
views and full consideration of other agencies' positions. Gives DCI
independent view not possible from within NFAC, where NIC becoming
just another production office.
Establishment of first permanent planning staff for CIA not associated
with budget office.
Changes in organization of IC Staff to streamline and make more efficient.
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-- DCI and DDCI, for their part, contemplate no additional major changes
in organization.
V. General
-- Enormous improvement in CIA working relationship with other intelli-
gence agencies, Department of State and Department of Defense.
-- New Executive Order, more positive about role of intelligence while
retaining necessary restrictions and road map relating to responsi-
bilities.
FUTURE PLANS
-- Planning now well underway for rebuilding and repairing drawdowns
of decade. Future will see implementation of these plans as resources
become available.
May experiment with new organizational forms for analysis, perhaps
experimenting with regional organization in some areas to improve
integration of political, economic and military analysis.
-- Move analysis into twenty-first century with implementation of SAFE
System and other analyst tools.
-- Renewed emphasis on acquisition of agents, counterintelligence, covert
action and capability to carry out paramilitary functions"as 'needed
,''by NSC.
improved recruitment', more highly targetted on specialized, needed
.skills.
Growing problem of retention, at all levels, of those with skills of
value in private sector. (Damage of pay cap, the very possible large-
scale retirements this winter in absence of hope of lifting pay cap.)
- - N e.4 tke'L.,i.4 c k. s
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More experimentation with forms of analysis, moving on subjects heretofore
not high priority--societal change, mineral resources, food, etc.
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a
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
The relating of intelligence efforts and activities to.policy
needs and processes and the completion of national estimates and
clearing them through the Intelligence Community has been unacceptably
confused, ineffective and slow. I am not being adequately staffed
to meet the number and variety of requirements which are placed
upon me for briefings and for participation in policy deliberations.
This is partially because the corps of National Intelligence
Officers (NIO) has been allowed to run down in number and partially
because I have not been in close enough touch with the NIOs to satisfy
the degree of my interest and participation in intelligence estimates
and policy processes.
To correct this, I am restructuring the role of the NIOs
and the procedures for having the National Foreign Intelligence
Board (NFIB) and its constitutent members make their inputs into
national estimates prepared by the CIA.
National Intelligence Officers will report directly and function
as staff to the DCI and DDCI. They will constitute the National
Intelligence Council (NIC). The chairman of the NIC (C/NIC)
will function as chief of staff in directing and coordinating the
work of the NIOs.
Although the Director NFAC (D/NFAC) and the C/NIC will report
independently and directly to me, I will expect there to be the closest
possible collaboration between them in causing NFAC's intelligence production
to become the basis for national estimates and in meeting the other intelligence
needs of the NSC, its members and the DCI and DDCI.
The NIOs will continue to be the DCI's principal representatives
in policy forums, and will continue to support the DCI in his role as
member of the NSC and the DDCI as' Intelligence Community representative
to the SIGs--working through D/NFAC and NFAC for assistance.
The DCI, DDCI, D/NFAC and C/NIC will meet weekly to review the
status of national estimates and other major intelligence products,
to determine what new estimates are required and to assign the drafting
of the estimate. These drafting assignments will normally go to NFAC,
but, when appropriate talent or special expertise is available or for
other special reasons, drafting may be'assigned to NIC or to other
members of the Intelligence Community.
CONFIDENTIAL
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The Agency assigned drafting responsibility will prepare terms
of reference which will be circulated by the appropriate NIO to
constitutent members of the. NFIB for comment. All NFIB agency heads
should review this outline and respond within 48 hours.
A draft estimate, with the comments of the appropriate NIO,
and of NFAC if the draft is prepared elsewhere, shall go to the
DCI/DDCI for approval. The appropriate NIO will maintain liaison
between the drafting unit and other members of the Intelligence
Community in order to reflect their views on the estimate and
minimize delay in reflecting the views of other members of the
Intelligence Community in the estimate. The NIC may meet or obtain
the alternative views of scholars or others outside the Intelligence
Community when it appears that this will improve the range or the
quality of the estimate.
All estimates except for the large military estimates such as
11-3/8 and 11-4, are to be coordinated by representatives of the
Community within three working days after approval of the draft by
the DCI. These representatives should be the senior line managers
of each agency's component having primary substantive interest in the
subject of the estimate. Either by telephone or in a meeting, agencies
will present corrections of fact or alternative text where there is a
disagreement with the draft. Alternative text will be approved by the
agency head. The NIO will be responsible for revising the draft to
accommodate corrections and for the inclusion of alternative text
in the body of the draft. The holders of alternative views will
be identified by agency.
The DCI will authorize circulation of the revised draft to NFIB
principals for consideration at the next meeting of the NFIB. All
changes agreed at the NFIB will be completed within 48 hours following
the meeting and the final estimate provided to the DCI for his approval
not later than three days after the NFIB meeting. Agency views or text
will not be included in an NIE if received more than 48 hours after an
NFIB meeting.
The NIC will have a small support group to help prepare materials for
interdepartmental meetings and papers, including NSCs and SIGs, as well
as to assist NIOs in their drafting responsibilities. It is my intention
that the NCI should be staffed by people of extremently high calibre from
within the government and from the outside.
I believe that it is important to expose a small number of our very
best analysts to the creative talents of the senior officers chosen as NIOs.
The broad perspective, fresh thinking, judgment and wisdom of these officials is
a valuable training and educational experience for some of our best young people.
Through the NIOs, the analysts also can significantly enlarge their familiarity
with a wide range of outside specialists and people with broad foreign policy
experience--an invaluable asset and a useful investment for the the future.
NFAC and other intelligence organizations from which analysts attached to the
NIC are drawn can only benefit from the service in a rotational arrangement.
This should help enormously in building a small cadre of analysts in the
Community, and especially in NFAC, who have the capability to approach
major issues with a geostrategic perspective and drafting skills honed by service
in a small but intellecutally highly charged and very demanding environment.
2
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Production of National Estimates
12 June 1981
--Plan estimates production schedule
--*Coordinate Community research in support of future estimates
--Initiate and manage production of specific estimates
--*Identify and negotiate for'drafters of above
--Coordinate estimates within Community
--Advise the DCI on the substance and Community politics of
estimates in progress
*In the political and economic fields, the NIO will have to depend largely
Production of Other National Intelligence
--Advise the DCI and D/NFAC on NFAC production for national
requirements.
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Staff for DCI
12 June 1981
--*Represent DCI in IG's
--*Accompany DCI's representative to SIG's
--*Prepare DCI for NSC's
--*Prepare and back up DCI for other substantive appearances
(Congress, etc.)
-- Provide think-pieces for DCI
--*Keep DCI informed on trends and events
-- Preside over working group of senior Community referents
-- Link working group to policy Community
-- Coordinate DCI-level substantive actions involving more than one
Community agency
-- Advise DCI on Community capabilities
-- Operate national warning system
-- (?Represent DCI in public fora?)
*For these functions the NIO will be almost entirely dependent on NFAC
analysts and product. In this role he will act as the DCI's coordinator,
transmitting DCI requests to NFAC and shaping the response to meet DCI
needs. He will work with NFAC in a manner mutually agreed with D/NFAC.
Efficient performance will depend on maximum cooperation between C/NIC
and D/NFAC.
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1. National Estimates/Estimative Process
The most important task for any DCI is to bring the
full resources of the Intelligence Community to bear on
the critical issues of national security policy. The
established mechanism for accomplishing this is the
National Intelligence Estimate.
The NIE does not, however, exist in a vacuum. It must
be intimately linked to the policy process. It must
answer a question that the policy office has asked, or
is about to ask, or should have asked--in all cases one
with which he is immediately concerned.
When I became DCI, I expected that the production of
estimates would be one of my primary concerns. I
found, however, that while the foundations for a re-
vitalized national estimates process had been laid with
the creation of the National Intelligence Council, much
more needed to be done. A number of mutually rein-
forcing tendencies had to be reversed.
The input of intelligence to the policy
process had become very much ad hoc. To a
considerable degree, the advantages of an
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orderly assembly of knowledge and judgment
and a systematic exposure of divergent views
had been sacrificed in an effort to keep up
with a policy process that had itself become
frenetic and ad hoc.
Because the formal estimate was no longer
integrated into policy formulation, it was
viewed as less important by Community manage-
ment. In CIA, the National Intelligence
Council was part of the Directorate of Intel-
ligence (NFAC) and did not report directly to
the DCI as ONE and the NIOs had in the past.
A parallel attitudinal change was evident in
the other agencies. The lack of senior
managerial involvement was reflected in a
deterioration of the National Foreign Intel-
ligence Board. It met irregularly and in-
frequently, and its deliberations were often
characterized by acrimonious debates over
procedural issues. Substantive discussions
gave way to sterile repetition of staff
positions.
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Because NFIB did not energize the production
of estimates, the machinery had slowed down,
making it even less responsive to policy
needs. The period from inception to publication
had grown to several months at a minimum, and
sometimes even years. In one notorious case,
an estimate on Sino-Soviet relations conceived
in 1976 was completed in June of 1980.
The number of estimates produced had decreased
sharply even as the turbulence of the nation's
foreign affairs had increased. While 50-60
NIEs and SNIEs had been produced annually in
the relatively placid 1950s, nine were produced
in 1978 and eleven in 1979. While the National
Intelligence Council had raised the total in
1980 to nineteen, there was a long way to go.
Finally, the most important deficiency we
found was an absence of
the estimates produced.
reasons, organizational
analysts had fallen out
thinking strategically.
each situation or issue
strategic context in
For a number of
and attitudinal,
of the habit of
They tend to treat
in isolation, rather
than seeing in it the interplay of global
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political, economic, and military forces.
Thus an estimate on the Horn of Africa seemed
to treat the Ethiopia-Somalia rivalry as if
the two countries were the. only actors involved.
The thrust of Soviet policy, the significance
of Sudan, Chad and South Yemen, the threat to
US interests in the region as a whole were
virtually ignored. An estimate on Cuban
foreign policy in Latin America contained no
reference to the Soviet Union and its relation-
ship with Cuba.
We have done a great deal to put this situation right:
I have brought the National Intelligence Council back
under my direct supervision. Over the last eighteen
months, it has been almost fully restaffed.
I have made it clear to my colleagues on NFIB that I
view NFIB as the central forum for Community concerns,
that I want its members to involve themselves personally
and deeply in the substance of estimates as they are
formulated, and that I value their assistance in im-
proving the product. This has produced a sharp change
in atmosphere; our meetings are no longer adversarial
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and our discussions no longer sterile. This change was
perhaps symbolized a few weeks ago when I asked General
Williams, Director of DIA, to chair the Board in. my
absence.
In mid-81 NFIB agreed to and issued new guidelines for
the production of estimates. These were designed to
reduce radically the time of estimate production, to
enable--indeed to force--early substantive engagement
of the NFIB principals, and to restore order to a
process that had become chaotic.
I have used my position as the President's senior
intelligence officer to focus our estimates on the
truly important issues, seeking to demonstrate that a
reinvigorated Community can meet policy needs in a
systematic way.
We have insisted that terms of reference be broadened
to include strategic considerations and external forces,
that they in all cases treat US interests and, where
important, Soviet goals and activities.
I believe we can show some results from these steps.
The number of estimates produced rose to 28 in 1981 and
to 17 in the first four months of 1982, as compared to
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11 in all of 1979. More important, the preparation of
3NIEs--estimates produced in a few days or weeks in
response to quite specific policy issues--has increased
strikingly. In 1979, 3 of 11 were SNIEs; in 1981, 18
of 28; so far in 1982, 13 of 17. This is strong evidence
that our estimates are more relevant and more useful to
the policy officer.
This shift to the SNIE has by itself resulted
in a sharp reduction in preparation time. We
can now meet the deadlines imposed by policy
formulation, however short. Usually we have
two or three weeks, but twice in the last
year we have turned out estimates in about
three days, on the consequences of Sadat's
assassination
The machinery still runs somewhat
more ponderously for our longer-range NIEs,
but these, especially the military series,
are usually scheduled well in advance.
In search of a less quantitative measure of performance,
I asked the Senior Review Panel last fall to review our
production since the first of the year to determine
where it had been deficient in providing support in
major policy issues. The results were quite reassuring.
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The Panel, speaking both of estimates and of DDI (NFAC)
production as a whole, found "effective performance--
with a few notable exceptions."
The Panel identified twelve major issues. To
summarize:
o On US strategic arms improvements, theater
nuclear forces, arms for Saudi Arabia, Libya,
arms for China and Taiwan, and grain exports
to the USSR, the Panel found our production
timely and of high quality.
o On Pakistan, Southern Africa, and economic
aid to Poland, it noted some specific de-
ficiencies of coverage or timeliness.
o On Central America, the Panel stated its
belief that performance had steadily improved.
Initially "fragmentary, locally-centered, and
tangential," it had become analytically
integrated, focused on critical issues, and
accurate in projecting general trends. There
remained, however, "persisting weaknesses" in
certain areas.
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o On the Siberia-Western Europe pipeline, the
Panel foi.nd assessments timely and accurate
as far as they went. "Only following DCI
guidance on possible lines of policy-maker
interest was the analysis extended and
intensified. . ." on the critical issues.
This illustrates the essential requirement
for feedback from the policy to the Intelligence
Community.
o Finally, on the Sudan the Panel found that no
estimative analyses had been produced.
While I take some comfort from these indications that
we have made progress, there is clearly a long way to
go. I would like to see the link between estimates and
policy institutionalized as it was in the '50s and
'60s. We need free two-way communication on a daily
basis between the policy office and his analytic opposite
number. We need to be more conscious of gaps in our
knowledge and our coverage and to do something about
them. We must learn to ask ourselves the questions
today that the policy officer will ask us, or ought to
ask us, tomorrow, and build the capabilities to answer
them. We need to overcome the analysts' reluctance to
use his imagination and judgment when his evidence runs
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out, to speculate, to dare to be wrong. Too often we
report and assess when we should estimate and project.
We need to give greater attention to alternate hypotheses,
to make it clear to our reader that there are other, if
less probable, outcomes than the one we choose, unpleasant
surprises against which we must guard. Intelligence is
a game of uncertainty; we can deal with it better.
Let me address two issues in many peoples' minds:
integrity and competitive analysis. First, the concept
of the national estimate as the pinnacle of national
intelligence production is intact. The principles laid
down by Beedle Smith, Bill Langer, and Sherman Kent
have stood up well over three decades. Their standards
of courage, objectivity, relevance, accuracy, and
independence have not been watered down and I do not
intend to water them. We have tinkered with the production
machinery a little, but our efforts are directed toward
enforcing those standards more firmly.
Second, I believe as strongly as my
predecessors in the need to present
differing judgments whenever they exist,
whether among the agencies of the Community
or within them. That NFIB has become a
more constructive and less combative
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body does not mean that it automatically
tends to consensus. NFIB certainly does
not--nor should it--always achieve
consensus. "Agency views are as wide-
ranging and strongly defended as ever.
-- In this regard, much as been said of the necessity for
competitive analysis in intelligence. I have found
that there exists in the estimates process a lively
competition, among the agencies of the Community,
reflected in the dissents to our estimates. It is
healthy, and it works on any issue to which several
agencies bring significant analytic strengths. Where
it is weakest, on political and economic issues, we
need stronger capabilities outside CIA.
The competition works because the formal estimates
process imposes rules on it and provides an umpire, the
NIO, to enforce them. All information must be shared;
agencies must work to a common and agreed terms of
reference, differing views must be brought out and
presented in a systematic way. This is why it is
important that the major intelligence input to policy
remain the national estimate. Without such rules,
input becomes fragmentary, one-sided, and ad hoc. It
is to get away from that kind of chaotic bureaucratic
free-for-all that we are trying to rebuild.-
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II. MI Organizational Changes
--Turn now to efforts to revitalize, improve DDI and
quality of analysis in CIA.
-- For nearly 20 years the Directorate of Intelligence was
organized along purely functional lines. Political
scientists, economists, military analysts, geo
graphers, etc., were in separate offices. Long-
standing problems with this structure.
-- Imposed difficulties in preparing integrated analysis
on problems involving more than one discipline.
Encouraged narrow approach to broad problems, limited
perspective.
Requirements grew more diverse which compelled us to
develop substantial capabilities for dealing with a
range of economic problems and analysis of non-Soviet
regions, both of which made the functional structure
less and less sensible.
-- Bureautically, completely out of step with the rest of
the government and even the rest of our own agency.
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-- Coordination among offices time consuming, often
resulted in compromises, sapping vitality, insight from
analysis.
-- With my strong support, then Director, NFAC, John
McMahon, reorganized the directorate along regional
lines.
-- Offices of Economic Research, Strategic Research and
Political Analysis were dissolved and in their place
was created five regional offices: European Analysis,
Soviet Analysis, East Asian Analysis, African Latin
American Analysis, Soviet Analysis, East Asian
Analysis, African Latin American Analysis, and Near
East and South Asian Analysis. An Office of Global
Issues was also established to ensure coverage of
topics that naturally cut across geographic lines.
-- This long overdue change provides the institutional
stage for a major improvement in the quality of
analysis. Political., economic, and military analysts
working on the same country or region now are part of
the same office and can bring together, for the first
time, their diverse specialties in the form of
genuinely integrated multidisciplinary analysis.
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-- Many entrenched bureaucracies and vested interests
needed to be overcome. Proceeded because needed to be
- Already bearing fruit--improved quality and
perspective, more straight-forward.
III. Quality of Intelligence in DDI
Sixteen months ago found analytical organization beset
by
.Superiority complex, arrogant and yet timid.
?Scared of being wrong.
?Highly paid group of historians and statiticians--
looking back rather than forward.
?Resentful of different interpreations of evidence.
?Defensive against outside criticism.
.Too isolated from consumers as well as from our
clandestine side and outside experts.
?Only one explanation for any given set of evidence
or circumstances.
?No political/military analytical capability.
?Often failed to focus on problems from the
perspective of US interests; issues unimportant to US
consumed as much time as important ones.
?Performance on future trends and intentions poor,too
vague.
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?Primitive in multidisciplinary analysis.
?Analysts failed to perceive events in strategic
context. (e.g. Afric6*, Latin America)
-- Reorganization created essential bureaucratic climate
for improvement in capabilities and quality of
intelligence. It also provided a structure conducive
to enhanced cooperation between the DD1'and DDO, a goal
I have pushed. (For the first time, career DDO officer
heading DDI analytic office--Ames.)
-- Upon McMahon becoming Executive Director, named DDI
careerest Robert Gates to DDI position.
-- With my strong support and guidance, comprehensive
program to improve quality of intelligence underway in
the DDI, to wit:
?Revamped approach to research program providing for
research on issues of importance and relevance to US
Government. For first, broad coherent program based
on key problems and wide range of assets in and out
of government.
?Each office required to develop aggressive program
of contacts, conferences and seminars with outsiders
on important subjects tying into research plan.
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*To take advantage of most experienced and
knowledgeable people in US, have begun aggressive
program of acquiring highly qualified consultants who
will review and critique DDI drafts in areas of their
speciality. Especially interested in people who have
different perspective.
*Outside training now requireci for every analyst
every two years to refresh and expand substantive
knowledge and broaden perspective by exposing them to
different and new people and new ideas.
?A new program established of one-year rotational
tours in policy agencies for very promising middle-
level managers to help them understand how the policy
process works and how agencies use intelligence.
*For first time, each office now required to develop
and maintain a production file on each analyst that
over time will enable supervisors to gauge whether
the analyst is improving as well as overall accuracy
and quality of his or her work.
?Current intelligence to be presented in two distinct
parts beginning with a recitiation of facts/evidence
and then a separate conments section thereby ending
the confusion between what is fact and what is
analysis.
?In face of often weak analyst skills in effectively
using intelligence sources, senior management
encouraging development of skills in tasking and
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using various sources (SIGINT, imagery, I-L.MINT).
Skill in this area now included as a specific item
for evaluation in aniual fitness report (for the
first time in DDI history).
*All senior managers in directorate now aware that
quality of intelligence and in particular its
accuracy the foremost element on which their
performance will be judged. For first time, senior
managers required to review all substantive
publications issued by their office.
?Provided for the first time that those holding
unorthodox or minority views be heard by senior
managers by sending memorandum directly to DDI
setting forth alternative views not included in
Agency publications or other formal channels.
-- With my support, additional organizational change since
October to enhance quality and protect research work.
Product Evaluation Staff created to provide the first
completely in-house evaluation capability in the DDI.
Also monitors resources devoted to research to ensure
that senior management aware of costs imposed by
current support, briefings, and other responsibilities.
-- While the reorganization and policy initiatives to
enhance the quality of analysis provided the framework,
f
the new structure exposed long-standing resource
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scarcities and weaknesses in certain geographic and
functional areas. Noticeable gap existed in the Third
World, terrorism, technology transfer, foreign
industrial competition, and the Soviet economy.
-- We are remedying this through a long-term rebuilding
and strengthening of analytical capabilities.
*For the first time in nearly 20 years we are
expanding the size of our analytical staff.
?We are stepping up efforts to get analysts abroad
under a number of programs to enhance language skills
and knowledge about the culture and society of the
area they cover.
*We are increasing funding not only for external
research but also for training analysts and
increasing their exposure to outside contact and
review.
-- Integrity and objectivity of analysis ensured by
quality of senior DDI managers, who, believe me, not
afraid to speak their minds; exposure of analysis to
Community scrutiny and criticism; integrity of DCI and
DDCI; and ready availability of analysts to respond to
HPSCI and SSCI questions and scrutiny.
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IV. Relevance
Attitudes are already beginning to change. 'Unlike
recent past, analysts understand that poor work and
lackadaisical thinking no longer tolerable. Standards
are being imposed. Standards have been raised, made
consistent and imposed across the board.
Substantial feeling within the Directorate of
Intelligence of a tightening up and imposition of these
higher standards producing a higher quality product.
Analysts and managers know that they will be judged on
the quality of their work--its accuracy, timeliness,
relevance, cogency, and style.
There are already promising signs of change even though
many of our changes are only a few months old.
?There has been a noticeable change in the number of
multidisciplinary papers, the use of special sources
in DDI reporting, and the quality of finished
intelligence.
?This years DDI research plan, which I, DDCI, and
ExDir reviewed in detail and approved, shows much
more thought and cohesion than ever before. The full
range of resources have been taken into account in
focusing on the theme issues developed either
directorate wide or by individual offices. This
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year's plan also reflects greater top-down research--
that is increased direction from upper management on
issues that matter.
*The use of outside contacts is already on the
upswing. For example, conferences on such topics as
the Yarnal pipeline, Poland, Soviet defense
expenditure, Soviet subsides for Eastern Europe and
industrial competition have already been held.
Additional conferences and seminars are planned.
*Arrangements have been worked out for ten rotational
assignments in policymaking agencies. Individuals
have been selected or are already on assignment in
over half of these slots.
?Production files have been established and the
distinction is being made between fact and analysis
in our current intelligence.
-- The quality and usefulness of analysis has also been
strengthened by the relationship between other NSC
members and myself. Agency analysts are informed of
their current interests and concerns which are then
reflected in current intelligence support and policy
support. Examples include analysis of Soviet economy
relevant to possible sanctions in response to Poland,
assessment of US-Sino relations, and analysis of trends
in Central America and Cuba.
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-- The success of all of these organizational,
philosophical, mcnpower and budget initiatives hinges
crucially on such contgcts and feedback. Unless we get
analysis properly focused on the right issue and into
print in a timely manner, all of this effort is for
naught. A paper that arrives late or that misses the
real issue simply wastes taxpayers' money.
-- In the last 16 months, enormous strides have been made
in both upgrading the quality of our analysis and
estimates and in improving their relevancy and
timeliness. This is no small achievement. However,
sustaining this progress and deeply ingraining it into
this Agency's culture requires constant attention and
constant access at the NSC level. In all of these
areas I am told by career professionals that I have
made a substantial difference.
-- It is only by developing this responsive mind set,
rebuilding lost analytical capability, and acquiring
the new skills needed in the years ahead that this
Agency can give the nation the quality intelligence
information it needs through the remainder of the
Century.
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I. National Estimates/Estimative Process
The most important task for any DCI is to bring the
full resources of the Intelligence Community to bear on
the critical issues of national security policy. The
established mechanism for accomplishing this is the
National Intelligence Estimate.
The NIE does not, however, exist in a vacuum. It must
be intimately linked to the policy process. It must
answer a question that the policy office has asked, or
is about to ask, or should have asked--in all cases one
with which he is immediately concerned.
When I became DCI, I expected that the production of
estimates would be one of my primary concerns. I
found, however, that while the foundations for a re-
vitalized national estimates process had been laid with
the creation of the National Intelligence Council, much
more needed to be done. A number of mutually rein-
forcing tendencies had to be reversed.
The input of intelligence to the policy
process had become very much ad hoc. To a
considerable degree, the advantages of an
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orderly assembly of knowledge and judgment
and a systematic exposure of divergent views
had been sacrificed in an effort to keep up
with a policy process that had itself become
frenetic and ad hoc.
Because the formal estimate was no longer
integrated into policy formulation, it was
viewed as less important by Community manage-
ment. In CIA, the National Intelligence
Council was part of the Directorate of Intel-
ligence (NFAC) and did not report directly to
the DCI as ONE and the NIOs had in the past.
A parallel attitudinal change was evident in
the other agencies. The lack of senior
managerial involvement was reflected in a
deterioration of the National Foreign Intel-
ligence Board. It met irregularly and in-
frequently, and its deliberations were often
characterized by acrimonious debates over
procedural issues. Substantive discussions
gave way to sterile repetition of staff
positions.
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Because NFIB did not energize the production
of estimates, the machinery had slowed down,
making it even less responsive to policy
11.
needs. The period from inception to publication
had grown to several months at a minimum, and
sometimes even years. In one notorious case,
an estimate on Sino-Soviet relations conceived
in 1976 was completed in June of 1980.
The number of estimates produced had decreased
sharply even as the turbulence of the nation's
foreign affairs had increased. While 50-60
NIEs and SNIEs had been produced annually in
the relatively placid 1950s, nine were produced
in 1978 and eleven in 1979. While the National
Intelligence Council had raised the total in
1980 to nineteen, there was a long way to go.
Finally, the most important deficiency we
found was an absence of strategic context in
the estimates produced. For a number of
reasons, organizational and attitudinal,
analysts had fallen out of the habit of
thinking strategically. They tend to treat
each situation or issue in isolation, rather
than seeing in it the interplay of global
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political, economic, and military forces.
Thus an estimate on the Horn of Africa-seemed
to treat the Ethiopia-Somalia rivalry as if
the two countries were the-only actors involved.
The thrust of Soviet policy, the significance
of Sudan, Chad and South Yemen, the threat to
US interests in the region as a whole were
virtually ignored. An estimate on Cuban
foreign policy in Latin America contained no
reference to the Soviet Union and its relation-
ship with Cuba.
We have done a great deal to put this situation right:
I have brought the National Intelligence Council back
under my direct supervision. Over the last eighteen
months, it has been almost fully restaffed.
I have made it clear to my colleagues on NFIB that I
view NFIB as the central forum for Community concerns,
that I want its members to involve themselves personally
and deeply in the substance of estimates as they are
formulated, and that I value their assistance in im-
proving the product. This has produced a sharp change
in atmosphere; our meetings are no longer adversarial
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and our discussions no longer sterile. This change was
perhaps symbolized a few weeks ago when I asked General
Williams, Director of DIA, to chair the Board in..my
absence.
In mid-81 NFIB agreed to and issued new guidelines for
the production of estimates. These were designed to
reduce radically the time of estimate production, to
enable--indeed to force--early substantive engagement
of the NFIB principals, and to restore order to a
process that had become chaotic.
I have used my position as the President's senior
intelligence officer to focus our estimates on the
truly important issues, seeking to demonstrate that a
reinvigorated Community can meet policy needs in a
systematic way.
We have insisted that terms of reference be broadened
to include strategic considerations and external forces,
that they in all cases treat US interests and, where
important, Soviet goals and activities.
I believe we can show some results from these steps.
The number of estimates produced rose to 28 in 1981 and
to 17 in the first four months of 1982, as compared to
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11 in all of 1979. More important, the preparation of
SNIEs--estimates produced in a few days or weeks in
response to quite specific yolicy issues--has increased
strikingly. In 1979, 3 of 11 were SNIEs; in 1981, 18
of 28; so far in 1982, 13 of 17. This is strong evidence
that our estimates are more relevant and more useful to
the policy officer.
This shift to the SNIE has by itself resulted
in a sharp reduction in preparation time. We
can now meet the deadlines imposed by policy
formulation, however short. Usually we have
two or three weeks, but twice in the last
year we have turned out estimates in about
three days, on the consequences of Sadat's
assassination
The machinery still runs somewhat
more ponderously for our longer-range NIEs,
but these, especially the military series,
are usually scheduled well in advance.
In search of a less quantitative measure of performance,
I asked the Senior Review Panel last fall to review our
production since the first of the year to determine
where it had been deficient in providing support in
major policy issues. The results were quite reassuring.
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25X1
25X1
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The Panel, speaking both of estimates and of DDI (NFAC)
production as a whole, found "effective performance--
with a few notable exceptions."
The Panel identified twelve major issues. To
summarize:
o On US strategic arms improvements, theater
nuclear forces, arms for Saudi Arabia, Libya,
arms for China and Taiwan, and grain exports
to the USSR, the Panel found our production
timely and of high quality.
o On Pakistan, Southern Africa, and economic
aid to Poland, it noted some specific de-
ficiencies of coverage or timeliness.
o On Central America, the Panel stated its
belief that performance had steadily improved.
Initially "fragmentary, locally-centered, and
tangential," it had become analytically
integrated, focused on critical issues, and
accurate in projecting general trends. There
remained, however, "persisting weaknesses" in
certain areas.
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o On the Siberia-Western Europe pipeline, the
Panel found assessments timely and accurate
as far as they went. "Only following DCI
guidance on possible lines of policy-maker
interest was the analysis extended and
intensified. . ." on the critical issues.
This illustrates the essential requirement
for feedback from the policy to the Intelligence
Community.
o Finally, on the Sudan the Panel found that no
estimative analyses had been produced.
While I take some comfort from these indications that
we have made progress, there is clearly a long way to
go. I would like to see the link between estimates and
policy institutionalized as it was in the '50s and
'60s. We need free two-way communication on a daily
basis between the policy office and his analytic opposite
number. We need to be more conscious of gaps in our
knowledge and our coverage and to do something about
them. We must learn to ask ourselves the questions
today that the policy officer will ask us, or ought to
ask us, tomorrow, and build the capabilities to answer
them. We need to overcome the analysts' reluctance to
use his imagination and judgment when his evidence runs
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out, to speculate, to dare to be wrong. Too often we
report and assess when we should estimate and project.
We need to give greater att#ntion to alternate hypotheses,
to make it clear to our reader that there are other, if
less probable, outcomes than the one we choose, unpleasant
surprises against which we must guard. Intelligence is
a game of uncertainty; we can deal with it better.
Let me address two issues in many peoples' minds:
integrity and competitive analysis. First, the concept
of the national estimate as the pinnacle of national
intelligence production is intact. The principles laid
down by Beedle Smith, Bill Langer, and Sherman Kent
have stood up well over three decades. Their standards
of courage, objectivity, relevance, accuracy, and
independence have not been watered down and I do not
intend to water them. We have tinkered with the production
machinery a little, but our efforts are directed toward
enforcing those standards more firmly.
Second, I believe as strongly as my
predecessors in the need to present
differing judgments whenever they exist,
whether among the agencies of the Community
or within them. That NFIB has become a
more constructive and less combative
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body does not mean that it automatically
tends to consensus. NFIB certainly does
not--nor should it--always achieve
consensus. Agency views are as wide-
ranging and strongly defended as ever.
In this regard, much as been said of the necessity for
competitive analysis in intelligence. I have found
that there exists in the estimates process a lively
competition, among the agencies of the Community,
reflected in the dissents to our estimates. It is
healthy, and it works on any issue to which several
agencies bring significant analytic strengths. Where
it is weakest, on political and economic issues, we
need stronger capabilities outside CIA.
The competition works because the formal estimates
process imposes rules on it and provides an umpire, the
NIO, to enforce them. All information must be shared;
agencies must work to a common and agreed terms of
reference, differing views must be brought out and
presented in a systematic way. This is why it is
important that the major intelligence input to policy
remain the national estimate. Without such rules,
input becomes fragmentary, one-sided, and ad hoc. It
is to get away from that kind of chaotic bureaucratic
free-for-all that we are trying to rebuild.-
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II. CAI Organizational Changes
--Turn now to efforts to revitalize, improve DDI and
quality of analysis in CIA.
For nearly 20 years the Directorate of Intelligence was
organized along purely functional lines. Political
scientists, economists, military analysts, geo
graphers, etc., were in separate offices. Long-
standing problems with this structure.
-- Imposed difficulties in preparing integrated analysis
on problems involving more than one discipline.
Encouraged narrow approach to broad problems, limited
perspective.
Requirements grew more diverse which compelled us to
develop substantial capabilities for dealing with a
range of economic problems and analysis of non-Soviet
regions, both of which made the functional structure
less and less sensible.
-- Bureautically, completely out of step with the rest of
the government and even the rest of our own agency.
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-- Coordination among offices time consuming, often
resulted in compromises, sapping vitality, insight from
analysis.
-- With my strong support, then Director, NFAC, John
McMahon, reorganized the directorate along regional
Offices of Economic Research, Strategic Research and
Political Analysis were dissolved and in their place
was created five regional offices: European Analysis,
Soviet Analysis, East Asian Analysis, African Latin
American Analysis, Soviet Analysis, East Asian
Analysis, African Latin American Analysis, and Near
East and South Asian Analysis. An Office of Global
Issues was also established to ensure coverage of
topics that naturally cut across geographic lines.
This long overdue change provides the institutional
stage for a major improvement in the quality of
analysis. Political,, economic, and military analysts
working on the some country or region now are part of
the same office and can bring together, for the first
time, their diverse specialties in the form of
genuinely integrated multidisciplinary analysis.
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-- Many entrenched bureaucracies and vested interests
needed to be overcome. Proceeded because needed to be
Already bearing fruit--improved quality and
perspective, more straight-forward.
III. Quality of Intei'ligence in MI
Sixteen months ago found analytical organization beset
by
.Superiority complex, arrogant and yet timid.
?Scared of being wrong.
*Highly paid group of historians and statiticians--
looking back rather than forward.
?Resentful of different interpreations of evidence.
?Defensive against outside criticism.
.Too isolated from consumers as well as from our
clandestine side and outside experts.
.Only one explanation for any given set of evidence
or circumstances.
?No political/military analytical capability.
?Often failed to focus on problems from the
perspective of US Interests; issues unimportant to US
consumed as much time as important ones.
?Performance on future trends and intentions poor,too
vague.
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?Primitive in multidisciplinary analysis.
?Analysts failed to perceive events in strategic
context. (e.g. Afric6, Latin America)
-- Reorganization created essential bureaucratic climate
for improvement in capabilities and quality of
intelligence. It also provided a structure conducive
to enhanced cooperation between the Wl'and DDO, a goal
I have pushed. (For the first time, career DDO officer
heading DDI analytic office--Ames.)
-- Upon McMahon becoming Executive Director, named DDI
careerest Robert Gates to MI position.
-- With my strong support and guidance, comprehensive
program to improve quality of intelligence underway in
the DDI, to wit:
?Revamped approach to research program providing for
research on issues of importance and relevance to US
Government. For first, broad coherent program based
on key problems and wide range of assets in and out
of government.
.Each office required to develop aggressive program
of contacts, conferences and seminars with outsiders
on important subjects tying into research plan.
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*To take advantage of most experienced and
knowledgeable people in US, have begun aggressive
program of acquiring highly qualified consultants who
will review and critique IDI drafts in areas of their
speciality. Especially interested in people who have
different perspective.
?Outside training now required for every analyst
every two years to refresh and expand substantive
knowledge and broaden perspective by exposing them to
different and new people and new ideas.
?A new program established of one-year rotational
tours in policy agencies for very promising middle-
level managers to help them understand how the policy
process works and how agencies use intelligence.
?For first time, each office now required to develop
and maintain a production file on each analyst that
over time will enable supervisors to gauge whether
the analyst is improving as well as overall accuracy
and quality of his or her work.
?Current intelligence to be presented in two distinct
parts beginning with a recitiation of facts/evidence
and then a separate comments section thereby ending
the confusion between what is fact and what is
analysis.
?In face of often weak analyst skills in effectively
using intelligence sources, senior management
encouraging development of skills in tasking and
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using various sources (SIGINT, imagery, -,MINT).
Skill in this area now included as a specific item
for evaluation in anpual fitness report (for the
first time in CDI history).
*All senior managers in directorate now aware that
quality of intelligence and in particular its
accuracy the foremost element on which their
performance will be judged. For first time, senior
managers required to review all substantive
publications issued by their office.
?Provided for the first time that those holding
unorthodox or minority views be heard by senior
managers by sending memorandum directly to DDI
setting forth alternative views not included in
Agency publications or other formal channels.
With my support, additional organizational change since
October to enhance quality and protect research work.
Product Evaluation Staff created to provide the first
completely in-house evaluation capability in the WI.
Also monitors resources devoted to research to ensure
that senior management aware of costs imposed by
current support, briefings, and other responsibilities.
-- While the reorganization and policy initiatives to
enhance the quality of analysis provided the framework,
the new structure exposed long-standing resource
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scarcities and weaknesses in certain geographic and
functional areas. Noticeable gap existed in the Third
World, terrorism, technology transfer, foreign
industrial competition, and the Soviet economy.
We are remedying this through a long-term rebuilding
and strengthening of analytical capabilities.
?For the first time in nearly 20 years we are
expanding the size of our analytical staff.
?We are stepping up efforts to get analysts abroad
under a number of programs to enhance language skills
and knowledge about the culture and society of the
area they cover.
?We are increasing funding not only for external
research but also for training analysts and
increasing their exposure to outside contact and
review.
Integrity and objectivity of analysis ensured by
quality of senior MI managers, who, believe me, not
afraid to speak their minds; exposure of analysis to
Community scrutiny and criticism; integrity of DCI and
DDCI; and ready availability of analysts to respond to
hf'SCI and SSCI questions and scrutiny.
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IV. Relevance
Attitudes are already beginning to change. 'Unlike
recent post, analysts understand that poor work and
lackadaisical thinking no longer tolerable. Standards
are being imposed. Standards have been raised, made
consistent and imposed across the board.
Substantial feeling within the Directorate of
Intelligence of a tightening up and imposition of these
higher standards producing a higher quality product.
Analysts and managers know that they will be judged on
the quality of their work--its accuracy, timeliness,
relevance, cogency, and style.
There are already promising signs of change even though
many of our changes are only a few months old.
?There has been a noticeable change in the number of
multidisciplinary papers, the use of special sources
in DDI reporting, and the quality of finished
intelligence.
?This years MI research plan, which I, DDCI, and
ExDir reviewed in detail and approved, shows much
more thought and cohesion than ever before. The full
range of resources have been taken into account in
focusing on the theme issues developed either
directorate wide or by individual offices. This
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year's plan also reflects greater top-down research--
that is increa::ed direction from upper management on
issues that matter.
*The use of outside contacts is already on the
upswing. For example, conferences on such topics as
the Yamal pipeline, Poland, Soviet defense
expenditure, Soviet subsides for Eastern Europe and
industrial competition have already been held.
Additional conferences and seminars are planned.
?Arrangements have been worked out for ten rotational
assignments in policymaking agencies. Individuals
have been selected or are already on assignment in
over half of these slots.
?Production files have been established and the
distinction is being made between fact and analysis
in our current intelligence.
The quality and usefulness of analysis has also been
strengthened by the relationship between other NSC
members and myself. Agency analysts are informed of
their current interests and concerns which are then
reflected in current intelligence support and policy
support. Examples include analysis of Soviet economy
relevant to possible sanctions in response to Poland,
assessment of US-Sino relations, and analysis of trends
in Central America and Cuba.
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The success of all of these organizational,
philosophical, manpower and budget initiatives hinges
crucially on such contg,cts and feedback. Unless we get
analysis properly focused on the right issue and into
print In a timely manner, all of this effort Is for
nought. A paper that arrives late or that misses the
real Issue simply wastes taxpayers' money.
-- In the last 16 months, enormous strides have been made
in both upgrading the quality of our analysis and
estimates and in improving their relevancy and
timeliness. This is no small achievement. However,
sustaining this progress and deeply ingraining it into
this Agency's culture requires constant attention and
constant access at the NSC level. In all of these
areas I am told by career professionals that I have
made a substantial difference.
-- It is only by developing this responsive mind set,
rebuilding lost analytical capability, and acquiring
the new skills needed in the years ahead that this
Agency can give the nation the quality intelligence
information it needs through the remainder of the
Century.
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I met with your Office Directors this morning and we
discussed questions that you might have as a result of what I
have discussed. I think that they will be prepared to address
many of your questions, but if the spirit moves any of you at
this time, I would welcome that opportunity.
Q. Bob, would you elaborate some more on the center for
instability as far as size, staffing, and how this is going to
relate to the offices that already handle countries like El
Salvador.
A. I think that the size of the center will be kept fairly
small. I anticipate somewhere between
people
working on instability, a similar number on insurgency, and then
the terrorism group will be incorporated pretty much as is. So
that would be a total of somewhere on the order of
people. I believe that the
problem, particularly in
instability and insurgency, is that there are so few working on
these problems and in the case of insurgency no one looking at
the problem in a generic sense. What aspects of insurgency are
common to Third World countries across the board, for example? I
believe it is generally recognized that one of the casualities of
the reorganization was the disbanding of the group under
which was working on the instability question. It is my
notion that the center will form a core of people who are
specialists in the general subjects of insurgency, instability
and terrorism and that they will have very close working
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relationships with the regional specialists on these subjects so
that there is an interaction between those two groups and also
with the DDO.
Q. Can you tell us what you perceive will be the
relationship now between the DDI and the NIO?
A. The relationship between the DDI and the estimative
function of the community, has a long history, and there are, I
think, still a number of you who were around in the grand days
when Sherman Kent and R. Jack Smith used to have some of their
titanic battles that put anything in recent times in the shade.
There is and I think always will be a creative tension between
those doing estimative work who are not a part of the line
structure of the DDI and the DDI itself. On the other hand, my
experiencei having been in both camps, is that the relationship
is fundamentally not an institutional one but an individual
one. The relationships between some of your offices and some of
the NIOs are very good and very close. There is a sharing of
information, a collaboration on priorities, a running
interference for one another that I think has well served both
institutions. There are other instances where the cooperation
isn't so good. Our objective will be to try and improve the
cooperation where it is lacking and to sustain the good
relatonships that exist. The fact is that this Directorate
probably.-provides something on the order of 75 or 80 percent of
the analytical and drafting support that the National
Intelligence Council requires. So they need us and to the extent
that they have close relationships already extant with the policy
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makers and with the rest of the Community, we can make valuable
use of them, and that's how I see that relationship. I do not
see an antagonistic relationship. I do not see a great deal of
tension. I believe that a very productive relationship can exist
between the two.
Q. Picking up on your theme for accuracy and timeliness of
publications. Have you given any thought to the problems that
sometime occur with other agencies that will probably delay
publications of basic data while they are producing all sorts of
intelligence instead of just publishing their regular
information? If you want to abstain, I'll forgive you.
A. I think that the easiest way to deal with that is simply
to say that when you have a problem with another agency,
difficulty getting information, or getting coordination on papers
or whatever you are after, that the easiest way to deal with that
is first of all to try and work it out within the bureaucratic
structure, your office chief or your division chief, but I would
not be hesitant if all of that fails to work to ask me to take it
up with General Williams or General Faurer, or Hugh Montgomery or
to pursue, if that doesn't work, having the Director or Deputy
Director pursue the subject. Without any specific cases to base
it on, the best way I can answer your question is to give you the
way that I would approach it. When I was at the NSC, one of the
things that bothered me the most was an attitude on the partaf
various institutions around town, or the lack of an attitude
around town that everybody was working for the same government.
Working from the NSC sometimes left one feeling that one was at
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the U.N. and frankly I don't have very much patience with turf
questions or disputes within or between agencies over relatively
trivial matters. I believe that when those matters are dealt
with often at a senior level that they can be taken care of and
those problems can be ironed out, but I think people have to
understand that that usually involves give on both sides. Very
few bureaucracies are enthusiastic about unconditional
surrender. Anything else?
Q. One of the things that I think would be useful would be
your conTnents on information flow to the Congress vice the
Executive Branch and how you see that in the DDI.
A. One of the significant changes over the years has been
the increase in the flow of information from the Intelligence
Corrunity to the Congress. It seems to me that is a fact of life
and particularly to the extent that we now have two oversight
committees as opposed to eight or more. It seems to me that we
have an obligation to keep particularly those two committees as
well informed as we possibly can. The demands on this
Directorate for briefings on the Hill on a wide range of topics
has become increasingly burdensome, and I think everyone
recognizes that. Nevertheless, for the people who vote us our
money and those who oversee our activities, it seems to me
imperative that we respond to those requests and that when we do
so, we put-our best foot forward. It requires a substantial
expenditure of resources to do so, but I believe we have no
alternative.
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Q. What is the priority in the Directorate for analysis in
international economic interactions, the economics system as
interact in most industrialized countries? Be it high, medium,
low and if it is medium or high, what analytic devices and
bureaucratic systems do you have in mind to try and manage that
kind of analysis given the fact that we are now basically a
geographically oriented directorate?
A. When I first met with the office directors on Monday, I
told them that apart from the overall monitoring of soviet
strategic strength, which we obviously have to do, my two highest
priorities were first, as I mentioned in my remarks, Third World
instability and Soviet exploitation of that instabilty and
second, the international economic situation in the decade
ahead. We have a Director who is intensely interested in the
international economic situation, in vulnerabilities and in
capabilities and potential competitors to this country in foreign
economic strategies and so forth. It seems to me that we must
consider as a very high priority the work that we do in the
economic sphere. I think that to a certain extent we are better
prepared to do that today than we were before the
reorganiaiton. We still have in the Office of Global Issues a
corps of people working on international economic problems per
se. But then in addition to that we have people looking at
economic issues from a more specific regional aspect, and it
seems to me that the mixture of these two and particularly the
development of greater expertise in the latter, positions us well
to begin meeting the needs that we are going to face in the next
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several years. So the answer to your question is that I believe
it has very high priority and I believe that we are
organizational) y well-structured to deal with it.
Q. In your experience with the high-level policy makers,
did you encounter many of them who understood foreign areas well
enough to know what they needed to know about them?
A. For me to stand up here and assert that Henry Kissinger
and Zbigniew Brzezinski did not understand foreign area matters
would be silly. I think that most of the people that I worked
for downtown had a better understanding than most people gave
them credit for. They tended to be preoccupied in the crush of
daily events with things that-- for people who were at a greater
remove--seemed to have very narrow focus and perspective and
seemed to reflect a lack of understanding of the complexities of
international issues and area problems in general. But when you
have to make decisions, you end up having to reduce problems to
their simplest elements, and you can't just keep saying "on the
one hand, but on the other hand." So often, I think, in the
course of making those decisions, some of these officials
appeared to have a more superficial understanding than they
actually did. I think that our effort must be directed, not only
at identifying the complexities, but also in helping them to
understand what the basic issues are so that we help simplify the
policy problem for them. To the extent we can do that, I think
we render a useful service.
Q. Whatever some of the memos from the 7th floor stated,
moving the Soviets outside the building has made it extremely
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difficult to coordinate and produce intelligence and, perhaps,
more importantly, to have an intellectual interchange with
analysts. It think that's extremely important. Is there any
chance we can get them back into the building?
A. All those who are prepared to occupy half as much office
space as you now have raise your hand. I am fully aware of the
costs that are imposed by the Soviets being Most of my
oldest friends in the Agency are in the Soviet office and they
keep me fully informed of the lack of mail boxes and the distance
and all of the other
hardships. There are many things that seem to be by themselves
trivial inconveniences, but add up to be really relatively
unpleasant working circumstances. My sense is that the working
spaces themselves are satisfactory, and even very good, 25X1
especially compared to some parts of Headquarters, but that the
travel time, the lack of food facilities, and just the general
physical and intellectual inconvenience of being separated from
this building imposes a real cost. That's a lot of words simply
to tell you I don't have an immediate answer to the problem. One
of the things that I would like to have done would have been to
come in and said my first priority is to bring the Soviets back
into this building at any cost. First place, we don't have the
money to pay that cost. I'm going to be looking into ways to try
and mitigate the costs to which you refer and improve things
until such time as we can get them back. But I fully appreciate
the problem.
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Q. Are any new initiatives being taken to help us identify
and know about policy decision points so that our work can be
more timely?
A. I think one of the most persistent problems that all of
us have faced as analysts over the years is this problem of feed-
back from the policy makers. Not only on our own materials but
in terms of what they are up to, what they are negotiating. We
wrote some awfully embarrassing memoranda in the summer of 1971
indicating that the Soviets would not sign a SALT agreement and
that the Chinese would never agree to do things with the U.S.
which if we had been more fully informed would have saved a
considerable amount of egg. All I can say is that I don't
believe that at any time I was at NSC this Agency had better luck
in having access to the people who make the decisions and to the
memoranda of conversations of meetings at high-levels and so on
than we do now. The way that the National Security Council meets
is different than it was in the last two administrations. You
don't have subordinate cabinet officials regularly attending
meetings and thereby getting feed-back. I think you will recall
that in the Carter administration when the NSC met there was
almost never any feed-back from that level meeting. Most of the
feed-back that we got was from meetings at a lower level, the
policy review committee and the special coordination committee.
So we hate a change of-system, and all I can say is that I will
do my best to try and keep at least your senior managers as well
informed as I can and as well informed as I am about what
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decisions are being taken down town and what is going on. We'll
just have to keep plugging away at it.
Q. Could you philosophize a little bit on the relationship
between the need to maintain a sense of adventure and the
pressure to be right.
A. I guess if I had my druthers, I would prefer to lean
forward and occasionally be wrong than to rarely lean forward and
perhaps boost our average of being right. There are certain
things that try as we might over the years to educate policy
makers, in the abstract the policy maker will understand when you
tell him that we cannot predict the date of a military
movement. Once they are ready, they are ready and they can go
whenever they want. We can't predict the date of a coup--usually
the subject'of a coup doesn't know the date himself, and he's
usually got pretty good sources, certainly a lot better than
ours, so that puts us in a bit of a tough spot. Senior policy
makers understand these things in the abstract, but as I
mentioned in the article last year when that National Security
advisor has to wander down the back hall of the White House at
6:00 in the morning and tell the President that he's just been
surprised by the loss of another major ally the abstract doesn't
seem to work very well. I really believe where we need more of a
spirit of adventure is opening up intellectually in the
Directorate and trying to widen our horizons in terms of sources
that we contact and the people that we know and the way that we
address problems. To try and look at developments and try to see
something coming before it is right on our front doorstep and
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that's where I think especially we need to be more adventurous.
But I think what I refer to when I talk about a spirit of
adventure is more the intellectual approach that you bring when
you sit down to begin analyzing a subject. That it isn't just
"what do I have to grind out for the NID today" or "what do I
have to do for the daily publication in the office," or "I have
to write this research paper and get it out because they've been
after me for two and one half years to publish something." I
think we need a more energetic and adventurous spirit when we
approach the problems that we deal with. Most of you are dealing
with things that I think you find exciting and challenging. I
don't think that you would be where you are or doing what you are
doing if you didn't feel that way, and I think it just needs to
come through more in our writing.
Q. What about the possibility of extensive language
training for analysts who are not going abroad? Secondly, your
idea of courses for analysts would seem to be a windfall for
local universities and colleges which they shall certainly
appreciate. Many of the faculty on these local campuses are very
strong but many are visibly weak. Is there a possibility of
bringing in faculty from universities--lets say in 1,000 mile
range or something of the sort--to teach courses either at
Headquarters or nearby? This would be of great value to people
A. I thought about the possibility at least of doing more
in the way of arranging courses here at Headquarters, but one of
my principal objectives in this is to try and get people out of
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this building and talking to different and new people. People
with different perspectives and different ideas on things, people-
that you may find totally outrageous but who might strike a spark
of some kind, plant a seed of doubt of an idea. So, I am
generally unenthusiastic about doing very much with courses here
at Headquarters for that reason. As far as a local windfall is
concerned, I think that one three-hour course when you consider
all of the possibilities for such training in the area is not
going to make any one university feel very good about its balance
sheet. Any others? Thank you very much.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801130025-2
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801130025-2