NFAC ORGANIZATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801130004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 11, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/18: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801130004-5 STAT
11 March 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligenc
FROM: John A. Bross
SUBJECT: NFAC Organization
WZ_
1. I had a long talk with Dick Lehman Monday about his organizational
oroblems. There are a number of NIO vacancies, the most recent of which is
occasioned by Bob Gates' transfer to the DCI office. In addition to existing
vacancies, there are more coming up.
2. Dick wants to know whether he should go ahead with recommendations
to fill these vacancies. He is not clear whether the NIO structure is here
to stay or whether the DCI contemplates possible organizational changes. If
the DCI is prepared to accept the NIO concept, does he perhaps have candidates
of his own to fill one or more of the NIO positions.
3. On the latter point, the DCI said something to me about a Soviet
expert, presently working on Time or Fortune, who might be qualified to fill
Bob Gates' position. I did not have a chance to explore this idea or any
alternatives any further before his departure on Friday last.
4. On the organizational front there are obviously alternatives ranging
from the elimination of the NIO structure entirely and the reconstitution of
the Board of National Estimates to a reversion to Bill Colby's original concept
of a group of NIOs who are regarded as micro-DCIs, dealing with all aspects of
community problems in their geographic area and reporting directly to the DCI.
5. Both of these extremes seem undesirable to me. The Board concept,
I think, proved too rigid. The Board itself tended to become isolated from
the decisionmaking process and the requirements of policymakers. The staff
tended to become a competing element amongst many other analytical components
of the community and certainly was the occasion of a great deal of friction
in CIA. Members of the Board maintained that they could not function without
the staff. Neither the Board nor the staff was organized (or really could be
organized) to deal immediately and responsively with policymaking levels of
the government--the Assistant Secretaries of State for geographic regions,
for example.
6. On the other hand the Board did represent diverse views and a breadth
of experience. Review by the Board ensured that each estimate was subjected
to careful scrutiny by a group of people of proved competence, mature judgment
and different backgrounds and perspectives.
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7. The NIO concept has the advantage of considerable flexibility. The
geographic NIO provides a point of contact with the regional bureau in State
and with other components of the intelligence community. It also provides a
central point within CIA to whom the DCI can turn for all-source intelligence
coverage of a particular geographic area. This is, of course, a great advantage,
particularly in times of crisis or when intelligence effort is required on
short notice. It also helps to ensure that intelligence coverage tracks with
developing political situations and changing requirements: The greatest
practical problem with the NIO system is the difficulty of finding appropriately
qualified people to fill the positions.
8. If the NIO arrangement is continued, a question remains as to where
in the organization NIOs should be located. A number of NIOs reporting directly
to the DCI or the DDCI seems to me a loose and confusing arrangement. The DCI
and DDCI obviously should have direct access to the NIOs but some intermediary
level of management, supervision, guidance and support seems to me desirable.
(For a discussion of NIO location see Bruce Clarke's memorandum to the DDCI,
attached.)
9. A basic issue, of course, is whether to continue the present NFAC,
doubled hatted, arrangement. Opinions on this are obviously, to some degree
influenced by personalities.
10. An element in the problem is the perceived need for an analytical
mechanism supporting the DCI in his community as opposed to his Agency role.
Personally, I think this is pure mythology. The law provides that CIA will
collate, analyze and disseminate information affecting the national security.
Obviously, an essential step in its performance of this responsibility is the
necessity of making sure that all components of the community are given an
adequate opportunity to express their views and to formulate dissents on
particular issues. It is a basic responsibility of CIA to identify conflicting
views. This can be accomplished by a mechanism which is completely integrated
in CIA and does not logically call for the establishment of a component which,
for the sake of appearances, is segregated from line components of the Agency.
In the budgetary review and collection guidance fields the establishment of some
purely, or essentially, community staff function seems realistic and desirable
but not in the purely analytical and estimating field.
11. For these reasons I do not believe that any particularly useful
purpose is served in having NIOs or a NIC report directly to the DCI simply
to create the appearance of a community-oriented component. There may be
other reasons for setting up an estimating establishment to deal with community
problems which is separate from the other analytical elements of CIA. This
may be desirable in order to give the national estimating process an appropriate
level of prestige, authority and visibility.
12. On balance I find the NIO concept a useful one. I would like to
see arrangements for pulling together relevant data on Soviet developments
improved. This might involve the collocation of elements of OPA, OER, and
OSR in some new bureaucratic unit. The same result might be achieved by a
council on Soviet developments established to improve the focus on Soviet
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estimates. It might be achieved by the selection of a particularly strong,
qualified and senior individual to act as an NIO with appropriate assistants.
13. Obviously, the reconstitution of a USIB-type board will help the
whole situation a lot and create a forum in which community views can be
expressed and the whole estimating process invigorated.
14. I think that the whole question should be the subject of at least a
preliminary discussion with the DCI as soon as practicable after his return.
15. My recommendations are:
a. To fill the immediate NIO vacancies which includes a qualified
replacement for Gates.
b. Live with the existing organization at least until Gates has
had a chance to settle in and Nitze has had a chance to complete his
preliminary survey.
c. The ultimate choice seems to me to boil down to:
(1) Recreating the Board.
(2) Continuing the present NIO organization with perhaps
a strengthened National Intelligence Council and/or a reorganized
Soviet component.
(3) The role of the SRP also requires a decision.
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