A PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MANAGERS OF SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE ACCOUNTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120064-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 64
• Publication Date: March 12, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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12 MAR 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT A Proposal for National Intelligence Managers of
Substantive Intelligence Accounts for the DCI
1. In a separate paper I suggested some changes intended to
improve the estimative process, particularly in the strategic area.
However, the existence of this estimative function presupposes
incomplete or inadequate raw intelligence and analysis. Our primary
goal should be to acquire the highest possible quality of raw
intelligence, and to quickly accomplish meaningful, useful analysis.
Only then should we resort to the estimative process. My own
experience leads me to believe that this is not an unrealistic goal
and, despite obvious asymmetries in ease of collection, is closer
to the Soviet approach to the intelligence business. In order to
achieve this goal, however, there is a need for a centralized manage-
ment'approach with individualized responsibility for, or ownership
of, all elements of substantive intelligence areas (e.g., all collection
and analysis related to'Soviet strategic forces). This need derives
from the existing fragmented approach to intelligence which is
a reflection of our strong functional organization. This paper,
therefore, proposes a change in the top level management of this
Agency and the Director's Intelligence Community staffs in order
to provide the DCI/DDCI with the support necessary to assure
accountability for results in substantive intelligence areas.
I believe this change would result in improved intelligence
collection and analysis, and in turn provide a better basis for the
estimative process, when it is needed.
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2. A premise of this proposal is that the CIA's powerful
functional organization has outstripped the potential ability of
any DCI and DDCI to effectively guide the CIA toward the solution
of our most critical national intelligence problems. The CIA's
current situation can be characterized as budget driven versus goal
oriented, as rewarding activity versus rewarding results. Most
importantly, there is no effective means for constructive evaluation
of overall results, of progress toward solution of major intelligence
problems. There is a need to strike a better balance between the
administrative and substantive involvement of the functional line
managers. The Executive Committee and Goals Program provided a
valuable forum for the DCI/DDCI and his principal CIA line managers;
however, their substantive involvement to date has been minimal.
Certainly none of the existing coordinating, guiding, or evaluating
staffs which overlay the basic line organization, provide the
DCI with adequate management support to assure effective execution
of this Agency's primary responsibilities. Although they nominally
support the DCI, these staffs in general lack adequate bureaucratic
clout relative to managers of the functional line organization.
3. Beyond this inherent limitation, each element of this
large staff overlay has its own special characteristics, mostly
weaknesses:
National Intelligence Council/National Intelligence Officers
o They are divorced from the realities of collection
activities in DDO, DDS&T, and other agencies by
their organizational subordination to D/NFA and their
limited individual experience in intelligence collection.
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o They are divorced from the intelligence community
through their subordination to D/NFA. Other agencies
view the NIO's as representing CIA/NFAC and not the
DCI in his central role. This was evidenced early
on by the creation of departmental NIOs and continues
for the most part in the attitudes of departmental
representatives in the estimate/major paper co-
ordinating process.
o They are divorced from the line analytical organization
in NFAC despite their role in trying to steer NFAC's
new research and production plan. This situation
results from the inherent competition between staff and
line functions, as well as particular personnel choices
in the NIO and AG groups.
o They are being staffed in such a way as to create a cadre
of "professional. estimators "but with people with narrow
intelligence backgrounds. This approach suffers from
a lack of understanding of the vital need for relevant
intelligence experience as a prerequisite to the
estimative process. The lack of such experience
poses a fundamental limit on the quality of the
estimative product. This staffing policy also causes
a morale problem by creating a barrier to the natural
and reasonable growth of broad based career officers
within NFAC and other directorates.
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Collection Taskin Staff
This group has grown well beyond its originally intended
function of guiding and coordinating the more mechanical
aspects of collection tasking. Instead it has attempted to guide
overall strategies (e.g., SIGINT Committee and COMIREX) and guide
more subtle efforts within CIA and NSA which it does not understand
or appreciate. In these cases the staff is an ineffective middleman.
o There is understandable reluctance to provide information
on sensitive operations to this large group with its
high personnel turnover. This factor makes many of their
overall strategies questionable, if not irrelevant.
o This group is divorced from the analytical/estimative
effort and.must create collection strategies based on
indirect substantive guidance. Subtle strategies are
beyond their capability by virtue of lack of access and
limited staff experience/ability.
EXCOM Staff
o This small staff has been responsive and effective in
providing the DCI/DDCI with independent views and/or
background information to support their leadership
of EXCOM meetings, the Goals Program, Inspector General
report follow-up, and other ad hoc tasks.
Comptroller
The budgetary mechanism is not a substitute for intelligence
problem oriented interdirectorate planning. Unfortunately, most
planning remains budget initiated and centered. An "effective"
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Comptroller can reinforce this situation at the expense of the
DCI/DDCI's role in establishing policy and guidance for integrated
long-range planning.
DCI Substantive Committees (e.g., STIC, WSSIC, etc.)
o As a body these committees remain weak and have
sapped the NIO role, since they are a holdover from
the pre-NIO structure and therefore represent a redun-
dant interagency forum. Their tasking of NFAC and
other community analytical resources constitutes
an unnecessary burden. Although they do allow an alternative
forum, such "escape valves" for dissent perpetuate an in-
adequate community representation in the NIC forum.
Various Special Groups, Committees in Support of Sensitive Collection
o These groups, while sometimes effective, are basically
ad hoc and weaken centralized management in areas where
risk/gain are often extremely high. They are manned by
individuals who are already wearing double or triple
hats organizationally. Their existence derives from the
need for high security against a backdrop of DCI committees,
tasking staffs, and other bodies that are so large as to
threaten that security.
Special Assistants for...
o Their effectiveness has been a mixed bag, with best
results where their function is of narrow scope or
short duration. Their existence further supports
the thesis that many recent DCIs have groped for a
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mechanism to manage substantive topics of particular
interest across CIA directorates or between agencies.
Senior Review Board
o In the strategic intelligence area, this is a non-
resource because of particular staff qualifications.
o Organizationally they are captive to NFAC and therefore
not likely to give an independent view. If they should
do so, they are dependent on D/NFAC to provide follow
through.
o They cannot effectively influence working level supporting
analysis and research.
4. In summary, much of the large staff overlay to the basic
CIA and intelligence community organization has 1) an inherent
basic weakness, 2) specific individual weaknesses, 3) represents
a large body of middlemen who weaken centralized management and
4) complicate tight security. On the other hand, this overlay
was created by a number of DCIs based on a clear perception of
the need for interdirectorate and interagency direction on particular
topics.
5. The alternative management approach proposed here is intended
to provide high quality support to the DCI/DDCI in executing their
role within CIA and centrally, but constructively, for the Community.
This proposal is simply to create a small group of national intelligence
managers whose role would be to manage complete substantive accounts
for the DCI and disband or streamline many of the staff elements
discussed here. The existence of a small number of intelligence
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goal oriented managers reporting to the DCI/DDCI would, I believe,
create a matrix management scheme capable of restoring the needed
balance between substance and administration, between line functions
and intelligence problem solutions.
6. This proposal is a direct consequence of my experience over the
last six years in a role for which Mr. Colby as DCI created a National
Intelligence Officer for Special Activities (NIO/SA). This experience
was both enjoyable and highly rewarding in that our pilot efforts were
generally viewed as productive and effective. Our success was, I
believe, in a large part attributable to the basic need for someone
to constructively champion particularly important topics in the name
of the DCIacross directorates within CIA and between agencies in the
Community. Our charge was to improve collection in a few critical
areas relative to the Soviet Union. While the other NIO's evolved
into a'relatively narrow role as production coordinators, the NIO/
SA's.special interests and contributions naturally expanded into the
analytical/estimative area. So in effect, our role evolved into
something very similar to the role proposed here for the national
intelligence managers. In fact, the NIO/SA was renamed the Special
Assistant for Strategic Intelligence. Our scope of interest for the
DCI was broad, our viewpoint was independent of the line organization,
and our staff was small: the NIO, his assistant, and a secretary.
7. The proposed national intelligence managers would provide
the following specific support to the DCI in each of their substantive
areas: 1) assist the DCI/DDCI in defining goals and priorities
with principal intelligence consumers, 2) assess and evaluate
national intelligence research and production within NFAC and
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the community in relation to these consumers' goals and priorities.
This would specifically include responsibility for assuring that
the viewpoints of other agencies are adequately represented in
estimates or other major products, 3) evaluate the effectiveness
of collection elements in providing timely, relevant data for
the analytical process. Based on uncertainties in finished
intelligence: 4) define analytical and collection gaps with particular
attention to guidance of CIA activities, and 5) create an intelligence
community-level strategy for tasking existing analytical and collection
resources and supporting the development of new capabilities,
with particular emphasis on CIA activities, 6) provide specific
recommendations for DCI/DDCI level guidance in executing this
strategy.
8. The proposed group of managers could probably be supported
by one assistant and one secretary each, and by the DCI Administrative
Staff. They would require no group head. While nominally subordinated
to an Executive Director, they would have direct access to the DCI/
DDCI as needed to fulfill their responsibilities. They would, for
example, attend relevant meetings of the EXCOM (Fig 1), etc.
An option for implementing this proposal would be to start out in
one critical area, such as Soviet strategic capabilities, e.g.,
a Special Assistant for Strategic Intelligence. If the national
intelligence managers were to be established to support the DCI,
then some of the present DCI staff structure could be eliminated
or streamlined. This is particular true of those staff elements
who act as middlemen between collectors and analysts, often confusing
and discouraging direct interaction. The National Tasking Staff,
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POSTULATED MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION
'CHIEF
OF
STAFF
NSC Excom ..-
Coord' Staff Secretar. Admin.
SAMPLE EXCOM COMPOSITION FOR
SUBSTANTIVE INTEL PROBLEM
Public
Affairs EEO
DDNFA
DDS&T
D/CIA
DD/CIA
EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
General
Comet Counsel
DDA
Insp.
General
Legis.
Counsel OPPPM NIM's
Chairman DCI or DDCI
Full Members* and/or) Alternates
DDO
DDS&T
DDNFA
DDA
Exec. Director
NIM for subject
Staff 'Support
EXCOM STAFF
*Attendance limited
(plus) Optional
C/SE etc. ad hoc
DIODE etc." 11
WOMB, etc." If
It If
ADDO
ADDS&T
ADDNFA
ADDA
Comptroller
ANIM
by topic and/or security at DCI/DDCI discretion
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for example could probably be eliminated and necessary mechanical
aspects of the COMIREX and SIGINT Committees returned to collection
organizations. The NIC could be streamlined by limiting its role
to providing the drafting function through the Analysis Group
and managing the mechanical aspects of the estimate/major paper
production process through the NI0's. Most current NIO's should
not be considered candidates for the proposed positions because
of the the greatly changed role. In fact, there might be an advantage
in first streamlining the NIC, then creating the new positions
with a different name, such as National Intelligence Managers.
STAT
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