GEN. DOZIER AND THE INTERNATIONAL TERROR NETWORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 30, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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the
oriesm krone
CAM lime after mdaappisg &tt. Gee.
jam, to oor-the first American they
have'Mid a (thee an in all these yea s-
Italy's Red Bres Issued a lengthy coin
munique explaining why. Four liner were
dewsted to their apttve. s
high NATO f'iutit in "the A~lrecupa-
tion $m*." 'I'he eemataleg 11 pages of-
wed an tmbsually- revealing glhpse of the
Red faded' tt~w atpttlde )gM'IsRentlont;
We aow haveve It ft" 40 bos'se's mouth
that there really Is such a thing as an In.
teraoattotnpl tam neuronic: that the most
elite of its binressitern EII W are
mobilizing to " to ... the puking
heart of lmpgtiali d crates 4ovolutba:
NATO"; that the Ui. their supreme tar
get, and Soviet Riwla the pfivfl"ed recip-
lent of their fav rs.'
The comm due spealW of tldt ae"rork
as an "atgaaYtsgea of C suminibt cone
bat," whose mob batWions sildreang
"NATO's heartland is Western luespe"
are mentioned by mine: the OWN'
in Ital", the Red Army P'aetlest
Meidwf Gang) In Wet Germany,"the Pro-
visional IRA to Li*eta Ireland, the
res ricted by "the sulfsc optic of aae
tionallam," are at last Moving on "to a
larger sphere of war" against the West.
there will be no revolution 1" the sloe
Its authors make no effort to disguise
their lmatedlate strategic objectives. They
state bluntly that the U.S. is trying to
thrust cruise and Pershing missiles upon
its subalterns in NATO, and build a neu-
tron bdgab, so as to bargain with the Soviet
Union " trorn a ,position of strength." That
effort must be blocked at all costs, every-
where In Western Europe and especially In
West Germany, "whose geographical posi-
tion makes it an ideal base for a land at-
tack on Soviet Russia." There lies the give-
away phrase.
Directly after this comes a telltale ref-
erence to Italy, "key link In the NATO
chain from Spain to Turkey," and thus
next in importance as "an area of intensi-
fied conflict."
Between ' thern, therefore, Italy and
West Germany are singled out for special
terrorist attention as "front-line states,"
and understandably so: They happen to be
the only two NATO states on the Continent
committed firmly to the installation of
cruise and Pershing missiles.
"War on imperialist war! War on
NATO! War on the strategic centers of the
American military machine!" the commu-
nique concludes, lest anyone might still
miss the point.
with their MW
is no reference to Sow* occupation armies
either, whether In tar-off Afghanistan or
next-door Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East
Germany and Poland-particularly Poland.
Martial law was lmposcd in Poland and the
brutalsoppressloil of. Polish workers be-
gan, just tour days before Gen. Dozier was
kidnapped in Verona. You would never
know it from reading the Red Brigades'
Communique Number One an People's
Prisoner James Lee Daer.
ugly 111"" tgom in suet timing
aid $m e* e y- swage antis lute. U WS
Wft a "W LOW
wIeoee Qvgr. fps
' ." tthatrs>w raM
What -the Id A
,am
t
w Me fppa ct, a m i pt and a
wave of law mars
eldly anti-A' etlega'/sWbsiat Ia Furope.
This Is certainly
everybody who is
The Wall Street Journal
29 December 1981
and
Its efforts to turn their,
in that regard than. we. Mist':
. , have expected.
Their kidnapping of Gen. Deafer, deputy j
commander of NATO's land fortes in
southern Europe, was an early salvo in the.,
network's new tactics for warfare, but.iwt
the first. Three months before Me?wet kid-,! napped by terrorists in Italy, their counter-
parts in Germany had fired a Soviet-made
RPG-7 rocket at the armored car .Of Gen-
eral Kreuser, who commamda .lI U.S.
forces in Europe. Their u, 8:,tsdesed
him by inches. It was kemehed only a
few weeks after 11 closely spaced bomb
attacks an American military talations
in Germany: The Harder-MebnlisE: Uaag.'s,
first display of serious violence linen 1977.
Everything points, theft "'rails ilNell'~
hood of renewed, proq~acteJ and bitter ter- 'f
rorlat warfare in Eulopyt;*here tp.mp l o I
Brigades and Baader-Manhof Ga* (It not.
perhaps, the IRA Provos- and Hstgnus- th
ETA) were as good as dead. Why would
they die, when thsp'can evidently, gannet on
1 bountiful, ongoing sustenance?
This does net so" well. fse' Gen. Do-
tier. Anybody farm tar with the Red Bri-
tactics would have seen dgOagh the
gades'
cruel hoax of his announced eneaudm 1
before Christmas. The Red Brigades would
scarcely kill him off before milking the last
drop of propaganda value out of his captiv-
ity, and that part of their program has just
begun. Punctually, within days of .his ab-
duction, the slogan "Yenki Buoia" was
added to Rome's rich collection of graffiti.
That means "Yankee hangman,".. though
the odd way Yankee is spelled suggests a
non-Italian author. We have been there be-
fore, in the worst days of the "Yankee-Go-
Home" Cold War. For reasons more sinis-
ter than mere historical accident, we may
he getting there again.
Claire Sterling lives in Rome. Her most
recent book is "The Terror Network"
(Holt, Rinehart & Winston).
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-NEW YORJ< WEDNESDAY, JUNE 11, 1980-
WASHINGTON-History will mark
the events in lean, Afghanistan and
Nicaragua in 1:179 as a turning point in
the urvasable war between radical and
moderate for
d for control of the oil
and destiny of the Middle East and
control of Central America and Mexi.
co.
In the Middle East, the Outcome of
the Process nuw gaining momentum
might include the replacement of the
royal families in the oil st
ates of the
Arabian Peninsula by radical anti. First: Palestinian t
Western regimes. Amon e1TOrn O, ianiza.
such a a change could be theme effects of 'ng the Palestine Liberation rg eliand oil supplie5 as tes
of Israel el t ooh believe that after the ruling elites
tes
America from Europe fulcrum to divide On era Arabian Peninsula are replaced
which depend on thatgion and for mom Japan, able tforce he~e Palestinians will be
re
than i0 Percent of their oil cor>rump` Israel: entire west to abandon
Second, the radical Govern,
,ion. While encouraging radical de- nienm of Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iran
stabilization in the Persian Gulf area degree. and, 10 Some ,
the Soviet Ur ion could use a diplomacy view, hu ey w ould remain Iraq. sham ttia
the to
of conciliation with Europe and Japan the dmtocracies even hostile
Intended to end any tneaaangtti al use without the pre.
li.nce with n me:-iea. - t of Israel because their leaders be.
The Sandinista victory iu N icarrwua sieve much of the Marxist mythology
about `nestem ,evils...
last
July ercou.-aged lrfttst terrorists' Sovielt Un;ot and its clie fiThird. the
t nt
govern.
saults against the Gv.?ern ter of El menrs, among them goSalvador and t;ustemala; the--'r Mn. aim tr do tilt Southern Yemen's,
tine to gain force and might succ, nshAng ma r arR fmssible, short of
soon. That in turn would open ico M . that will bring the
to the pull"" tit Dol ion t her u co al closer to their cnniml.
leftist terror and to
iDe des at beh for s `ur the three destabilizing
nation by a cualitaon of reformist, adi dude President Anwar e!-
,&I and Cornm` mist groups opposed - Swint and the oil regimes on the Ara.
lrs PPosed to
the current rel;tme. bias Peninsula along with Yemen and
become an l might then Oman. The (allure to meet the May 26
ran -next-door. Mexico
United St..trs deadline for corriplcang ritrz fts idig ur thtoward the Mid- for Palestinian autonomy could be the
the policy Central America.Mex?
'co region must begin with a realistic cite for Palestinian terrorists to work
understanding that the invisible with Libya and with Egyptian
radicals
cal war that u raging could be last. In po. In scary to replace Mr. Sachs.
Central
America, ,Last this requires addl. losqueiber, the attack on the
clonal rt for peaceful reform and Great Mosque in Mecca was Itntnedia(e late Ji ,ton against tr?throwin the aimed at
and Cuban extremist Arabia g Monarchy in Saudi
supported terrorism. In the Kuwait, 134hrain, Abu Dhabi,
Middle East, aWestern Qatar and the United Arab Emirates
tan' Power 1; adequate equa mill' However are even more vulnerable, since their
alone will not Preserve this Palestinian and Shiite Moslem minori.
aloe, t th" will n cony giour intermits fiats add up to about halt the
luadica forces ineacb state. The pi .ctical aponlation
Pproach to
Radicalism
Abroad
By Constantine C. Menges
destabilization in the small ad states
might axnbine prey and threats
from neighboring Iran or Iraq with in.
~ ~l up-heavala encouraged by radl.
simulmneotisly. Soviet proxies aright
be active. After the summer Olymp=
have ended. Cubans and East Germans
ought help Communist Soutbm Yemen
or Libya make use Of We bmdrr6 of
modern tanks. armored Pe 1 tar.
nera, mobile artillery and mobile air-
defense missiles already stockpiled in
ecountrie&
What should be done' Rather than
waiting Passively for destabilization to
strike one country after another, a
tatialition of democracies and Islarnk
aatiotas must take the offensive against ?.
radical and terrorist oetworitrt. OoG
ades of repreasioo of Islam inside the
Soviet Union, and the brutality in Al.
S . j
should be used to show M.
less peoples the consequences of Soviet
dominance. There should be a solntdtfn ,
Ptvvrding Ihr Palestinian autonomy
based as democratically to au.
thonry and for the scatrlty of Israel.
This will be poissibie only if the radical
forces are contained.
It is an illusion to believe that and.
Will! other than the disappearance of
Israel would satisfy any of the three
radical forces. The democracies must
use conservation of energy, technology
and unity to establish real economic
cvunterpr.,sures to the Organization of
um Exporting Countries. And (I.
raallylly. , them must be a concerted but pn.
vase proposal to the Soviet Union: Stop
yaar indirect war against the moderate
governments of oil states or there will
be a complete cessation of economic
trAnsactiorrs with many of the demo-
crat is na tions.
Constantin, C. Menges, editor
a w.
lernotional Strote>;ic issues,'. of
letter, is author of news'
gle for Democracy ToPaday.? . The Strug.
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The destiny of the Middle East is being decided in Tehran.
The Turning Point
by Constantine Christopher Menges
History will mark the seizure of the American embassy American embassy on November 4 carried a large
in Iran as a turning point in the invisible war between banner reading in English: "We do not intend to bother
radical and moderate forces for control of the destiny you." That deception worked nicely. The Marine
and the oil of the Middle East. Either the United States, guards were told not to shoot the apparently "unarmed
the other democratic nations, and the moderate Arab students," and within hours the unlucky Americans
governments will cooperate against extremism and inside were captives. Who organized this action? Were
terror, or there will be a fundamental change in the these simply university students trying to liven up a
global balance in the next few years. dull post-revolutionary weekend? Definitely not. We
The 400 men marching toward the gates of the know they were well organized and led. Did Khomeini
or his Revolutionary Council instigate this? Perhaps,
Constantine Christopher Menges is with the Hudson but the delay before the Iranian government endorsed
Institute. His latest book is Spain: The Struggle for the takeover suggests Khomeini took credit after the
Democracy Today (Sage). fact for his own reasons. There is a strong possibility
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that the embassy was captured by members of the
radical left groups that are working hard to take the
revolution into its next stage: the replacement of the
mullahs by radical Marxists, Communists, and PLO-
trained clergy with the Islam of Khomeini as the outer
covering. Neutral visitors to the besieged embassy
report that "student" leaders speak Arabic rather than
Farsi to one another. When the PLO arrived to take
possession of the former Israeli embassy last February,
Yasser Arafat boasted about the years of political and
military training the PLO had given to young Iranians
who form the leadership of the Marxist guerrillas who
helped to bring down the shah. The skill and discipline
of the terrorists in the embassy suggests that their
training has gone well beyond what any university
teaches. On October 31 Radio Moscow said in Persian
that "we are witnessing fresh, dangerous plots and
intrigues against the Iranian Republic.... Great
significance attaches to the slogan 'death to US
imperialism."' The clandestine Soviet transmitter,
broadcasting from Baku as the National Voice of Iran,
charged that the US embassy was the "center of
corruption and anti-Iranian conspiracies."
The prompt PLO mediation offer also adds to the
suspicion of radical left auspices. Quite possibly the
intention was to repeat the successful maneuver
against the Egyptian embassy in Turkey earlier this
year. There a covert, PLO-trained group took the
embassy employees hostage for several days while a
PLO mediation team negotiated their release. A
grateful Turkish government then permitted the PLO
to open an office in Ankara. A replay of this routine
may be what the Tehran terrorists had in mind until the
Ayatollah Khomeini jumped in and used the episode as
a way of rekindling the fervor of his revolution.
The shah was overthrown by the collapse of his
military, brought about by a coalition of three forces:
the traditionalist Islamic clergy; the modern, mostly
democratic opposition; and the communist left, joined
by various radical guerrilla groups. In recent months
Khomeini has spoken out more and more frequently
against communism and the Soviet Union, because he
correctly believed Russia was supplying help and arms
to the Kurds, Azerbaijanis, and fedayeen guerrillas who
were challenging his power. The assassination of two
of his closest associates by terrorists, the growing
power of the Marxist armed groups, and mounting
economic problems all reminded Khomeini that the
Communists were a greater threat than the United
States. For the moment, the surprise raid on the
American embassy has changed all that. Again, the
United States is "our number one enemy" according to
the ayatollah. He says he has seen enough "documents"
to convince him that the embassy was a "nest of spies,"
just as Radio Moscow had proclaimed. The more
moderate figures, the last remnants of the secular
opposition to the shah, have been removed from power;
Khomeini and his Shi'ite fundamentalists now face
opposition only from the radical left groups and their
separatist friends. The most likely result is that a pro-
Soviet government will emerge from the dust of ethnic
conflict, dissatisfaction, austerity, and above all the
political warfare waged by the* radical coalition.
Two strands of history converge to explain how this
has happened. After the Bolsheviks in Russia helped
overthrow the czar, then replaced the social democratic
regime of Kerensky and won the civil war, their first
task was the pacification of the Islamic groups of
Central Asia. This was accomplished in two stages.
First, the Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turkomens, Uzbeks,
Tadjiks, and other Islamic peoples were promised full
independence to prevent them from being lured away
from the Soviet sphere. Then, as Soviet power was
consolidated, there was a period of forced collectiviza-
tion accompanied by mass famine and repression
leading, by the early 1930s, to total domination of these
Islamic populations. Separate republics were created to
prevent the rise of any pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic
movements within the USSR. Almost all Islamic leaders
were murdered in the purges of the 1930s and the
immediate postwar period.
Despite this campaign of internal war against Islam,
Moscow's foreign policy made extensive use of
nationalist and Islamic symbolism to counter the
influence of the leading Western powers in the Middle
East, especially Iran. During the 1920s the Soviets
welcomed and helped new nationalist leaders such as
Kemal Attaturk in Turkey and Reza Shah Pahlavi,
father of the recent shah of Iran, as a way of
counterbalancing London. But the growing power of
the Soviet-supported Communist parties and the
Communists' use of ethnic minorities as a fifth column
made Iran and Turkey turn back toward the West in the
1930s.
Beginning in 1944, with victory against Hitler
assured, Moscow began a new effort to gain influence
in the Middle East. The new Soviet ambassador to
Palestine was a Moslem who went every Friday to pray
at the Mosque of Omar. Spies were recruited from
Soviet Islamic groups and a Kurdish separatist move-
ment aimed at Turkey and Iran was encouraged.
The first Soviet-backed revolutionary Iranian
government was created in 1920, after Russian forces
landed in Pahlavi, a port on the Caspian sea. The British
forced a withdrawal, but left the treaty of 1921 which
gave Russia the right of intervention if foreign troops
threatened the integrity of Iran (a treaty which the
Soviet ambassador repeatedly brought to the attention
of the Iranian military in 1978 and which Khomeini
finally abrogated on November 5).
In 1944 the Iranian Communist party organized
massive street demonstrations in the northern cities
such as Tabriz and Tehran to support the Soviet
demands for oil concessions. By 1945 the Soviet Union
had large military. forces in Iran, and the government
was unable to oppose Moscow. Then, in 1946, two
contrived revolutions resulted in the creation of
20 The New Rrnublic
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secessionist communist governments based on the
Azerbaijani and Turkomen ethnic groups. Moscow
quickly recognized them as sovereign, and even was
kind enough to send Red Army divisions to protect
them from the shah. It required the threat of war by the
United States and Great Britain to force the withdrawal
of the Soviet troops and the return to more subtle
forms of political warfare.
In the 1960s, Islam became a weapon in the Soviet
struggle with China along the central Asian border.
Many Islamic ethnic groups, such as the Uyghurs,
Kazahs, and Turkomens, live there. Both rival com-
munist states have encouraged Islamic separatism in
the other's territory. To prevent this, the Chinese
communist regime has required intermarriage with
ethnic Chinese and called attention to the decades of
Soviet repression of Islam. The Soviets have welcomed
Islamic refugees from China's cultural revolution. This
is one reason for the sudden softening of the harsh
Soviet rule in its central Asian domain during the
1960s. The ethnic languages were given more scope, a
few more mosques and Islamic theological schools were
opened (although all participants had to be cleared by
the KGB), and inventive theorists began to define an
"Islamic Marxism" that could form a bridge to the third
world and its oil.
Radical Islamic fundamentalism is the other strand of
history that is once again visible in Iran. The opening of
the Middle East to Western influence and power in the
last century began a still unfinished process of cultural
shock, adaptation, and often violent resistance.
Khomeini can speak for and represent the dedicated
minority in Islam which takes an orthodox and literalist
view of the Koran, and therefore opposes the eman-
cipation of women, banks that charge interest,
television, movies, many material comforts, and the
secular state. This minority believes these innovations
"corrupt" the proper relationship with Allah. Of
course, this tension between traditional and modern or
religious and secular values is a universal phenomenon
and will be understood by orthodox Jews, devout
Christians, and everyone over the age of 50 who has
felt the pace of social change or raised children. What is
unique to the Middle East is that traditional Islamic
radicalism is so strong that it could surface again in
recent years, even after having been dominated for
decades by secular governments in Turkey, Iran,
Pakistan, and Egypt.
The new historical ingredient that has made this
reemergence possible is the rise of the Palestinian
terrorist organizations, which can use hatred for Israel
as a way of building an anti-Western coalition spanning
the spectrum from Islamic fundamentalism to Marx-
ism. This has occurred in the last 12 years and coincides
with the withdrawal of British power, the success of
Soviet-supported military groups in creating radical
regimes in Libya, Syria, Iraq, Algeria (though there is
some change in the last two), the use of force to install
communist governments in South Yemen, Afghanis-
tan, and Ethiopia, and worldwide economic strains
caused by OPEC's oil price increase.
The next stage of the drama probably will involve the
use of fundamentalist Islamic rhetoric in efforts to
destabilize the remaining moderate, pro-Western oil
states of the Arabian penninsula. This is a strategic
objective shared by the three currents of radicalism.
The PLO believe that getting rid of those pro-Western
governments will permit the oil weapon to be used
against any friend of Israel. The Islamic, radicals
proclaim that "Islam has no kings," and see the Arabian
regimes as too modern and close to the West despite
their genuine religious conservatism. The Soviet Union
hopes to exploit the emerging Arab radicalism to
separate Europe and Japan from the United States and
thereby substantially lessen the capacity of the
democracies to resist its power throughout the world..
The conservative Arabian oil states face the threat of
covert action by all three radical forces. Instability also
is inherent in the influx of hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian and Yemini workers, some of whom are
trained revolutionaries. Palestinians occupy influential
places in the technocratic elites, including the army of
Kuwait. The Palestinian and Shi'ite minorities com-
prise a large part of the population in the pro-Western
oil states: Kuwait, 55 percent; Qatar, 42 percent;
United Arab Emirates, 50 percent; Bahrein, 75 percent;
Saudi Arabia, 15 percent. In Oman, adjacent to Saudi
Arabia, the guerrilla war supplied by communist South
Yemen, Cuba, and East Germany has gained new force
in recent months. Nearly half the population is Shi'ite.
Equally threatening is the recent surprise announce-
ment of large-scale Soviet military aid to a second Saudi
Arabia neighbor, North Yemen, a country which has
suffered two major assassinations, one coup, and one
old-fashioned conventional invasion from communist
Yemen within the last two years.
These diverse but converging radical threats mean
that the Arabian elites must choose some strategy for
survival. This is the turning point defined by the
seizure of the Americans in Iran. Until now the Saudis
and others have tried to have both ways-stay friends
with the Americans and still appease the Palestinian
radicals. This has meant a tough anti-Israeli stand and
financial payments to the PLO. But the seizure of the
holy places in Mecca and Medina has shown that a
radical movement can mount a well-planned attack in
the heart of Saudi Arabia. That, along with clandestine
radio accusations and Khomeini's public statements
holding the United States and its "corrupt colony"
Israel responsible, caused violence to erupt on the
streets of Saudi Arabia, as well as Pakistan and Turkey.
If the Arabian leadership continues to appease the PLO,
or worse, decides to seek safety through increased
support for radicalism, the path ahead is clear and the
shah can tell the royal families just how the
revolutionary upheaval feels as it comes from
all sides at once.
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STAT
SPECIAL EDITION -- TERRORISM -- 29 DECEMBER 1981
USA TUDAY
November 1961 ages 4U-4Z
T HE attempted assassination on
May 14, 1981, of Pope John Paul 11
by an individual known to be a convicted
terrorist again raises the issue of the role
of political violence in our time. Pres.
Reagan and Secretary of State Haig com-
mendably have identified terrorism as one
of the foremost priorities of the Ad-
ministration, and they courageously have
pointed a finger at the Soviet Union for at
least partial responsibility for the terrorist
specter that stalks civilized communities.
Whether Mehemet Ali Agca had the
support of an international terrorist
organization or of the Soviet Union or its
surrogates is not yet clear. However, there
are preliminary indications that he might
not have acted alone and that he may have
spent time recently in Soviet satellites
known to support the most outrageous
atrocities. That Agca at one time was a
member of a "right-wing" terrorist group
in Turkey-the Grey Wolves-is known,
but Agca's self-proclaimed adherence to
the Marxist-Leninist and Soviet-
supported Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine, his disappearance into
West Germany and possibly Bulgaria in
1979 and 1980, and evidence of financial
and operational support for his assault on
the Pope all suggest a more complicated
story than that of a lone psychopath.
Moreover, I can see no reason why a
right-wing and anti-communist terrorist
would want to kill one of the world's most
effective anti-communist leaders; I can
understand, however, why the Soviets and
their surrogates would want the present
Pope out of the way.
Western citizens may find it incom-
prehensible that one of the world's super-
powers, the Soviet Union, is involved in
something as lurid, bloodthirsty, and
dangerous to social and international
stability as terrorism. Yet, the evidence
for deep and long-standing Soviet com-
plicity is clear. At recent hearings before
the Subcommittee on Security and Ter-
rorism of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, William Colby, former Director of
the CIA and a lifelong intelligence officer,
was emphatic in affirming Soviet support
for terrorism. The Soviets, Colby
testified, "have employed their proxies and
surrogates of Cubans, East Germans,
Czechs and others to extend this direct ef-
fort aimed not only at the 'imperialism' of
America and its allies but at a variety of
less despotic states than their own, from
Mexico to Uruguay, to Colombia, to
North Yemen, to Morocco, to Puerto
Rico."
The evidence for Soviet support of ter-
rorism does not come only from the
authoritative statements of experienced
professionals like Colby (as well as his
former colleagues at the CIA such as
James J. Angleton and Ray S. Cline). The
evidence for it is apparent also in the
publicly known record of terrorist ac-
tivities and operations, through captured
documents and weapons, known instances
of training, defectors' statements, and
communications among terrorists, and it
47
also is apparent in the ideology and
strategic concepts of the Soviet state. It is
by understanding these concepts and the
role of terrorism in them that we can
understand why the Soviets support ter-
rorism and what they hope to gain from
it.
The goal of Soviet communism is the
destruction of the democratic and
capitalist orders of the West and their
replacement by their own ideological,
totalitarian regime. "The International
Party," says the national anthem of the
Soviet Union, "shall be the human race."
Other tyrants from Genghis Khan to
Hitler have shared this goal of world con-
quest, but those despots generally sought
to achieve their goal through simple, brute
military aggression. It is the hallmark of
communism that it will avoid military
conflict if possible and seek power
through indirect and subversive means.
What the Soviets want is not war, but, as
Winston Churchill observed, "the fruits
of war and the indefinite expansion of
their power and doctrines."
To achieve the goal of world domina-
tion, the Soviets historically have worked
through surrogates and satellites-persons
or groups that are under the control of the
Kremlin, but who appear to be indepen-
dent and non-communist. Thus, they are
able to enlist the support of genuinely
non-communist elements who have been
duped into cooperation. In this way, the
Soviets today make heavy use of Cubans
and CONTINUE East Germans-DbothNEoXfTwPhAomGEare
USA TODAY / NOVEMBER 1981
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SOVIET SUPPORT OF TERRORISM. .Continued
under Soviet domination-to advance
their own power in southern Africa.
Similarly, the Communist Parties of the
free world and their front groups are able
to attract non-communists by their
espousal of the right slogans-peace,
disarmament, social justice, etc. Finally,
the Soviets are clandestinely funding and
providing support'for a number of ter-
rorist and insurgency movements around
the world. These movements are frequent-
ly composed of persons who are not
Soviet communists (more often, they are
Marxists of the Maoist, Trotskyist, or
"New Left" orientations) and who
sometimes are not Marxist at all and seek
to correct what they perceive as racial op-
pression, economic exploitation, or im-
perial domination.
The way in which the Soviets justify
their support of terrorism is through the
use of Marxist codewords. Just as they
call their own totalitarian regime
"peoples' democracy," so they call ter-
rorism "national liberation." After
World War 11, the Soviets gave massive
support to terrorist movements for "na-
tional liberation" in Greece, the Philip-
pines, and Indochina, among other states.
Since at least the mid-1960's, the Soviets
have been supporting terrorism under the
name of national liberation in Latin
America (through Cuba and, more recent-
ly, Nicaragua), in the Middle East
(through the Palestine Liberation
Organization and its components), and in
Africa (through surrogates such as Libya,
Algeria, Mozambique, and Angola). The
"People's Democratic Republic of
Yemen," located on the southern coast of
the Arabian peninsula, has been a Soviet
colony for some years and is virtually one
large training camp for terrorists active in
Africa, the Middle East, and Western
Europe. In the latter, the Soviets have given
assistance to the Red Brigades of Italy and
the IRA through Czechoslovakia and the
PLO, to the West German "Baader-
Meinhof gang" through the PFLP and
Libya, and to ETA in Spain through
South Yemen.
There has been a considerable amount
of confusion in the media about the Soviet
role in terrorism since the discussion
began in January, 1981. It has been said,
for instance, that no one has shown that
the Soviets control or mastermind ter-
rorism. However, some distinctions must
be made. It is true that the Soviets do not
generally direct terrorist operations
themselves-the murder or kidnapping of
individuals, for example-and it is prob-
ably true that the members and most of
the leaders of terrorist groups do not
regard themselves as loyal or subservient
to Moscow. Yet, it is also true that some
terrorist organizations could not operate
without the material assistance they
receive from the Soviets, and it is
therefore unlikely that such groups would
29 D CEMBER 1981
undertake activities that the Soviet Union
finds objectionable. Sam Nujoma, the
leader of SWAPO in Southwest Africa,
admitted his organization's dependence
on Soviet aid in 1977 when he told an
audience in Moscow that, without Soviet
help, "we would have been unable to
achieve the results we have today." The
PLO also is heavily dependent on the
Soviets for weaponry and training, and
Yassir Arafat is reported to confer with
the Soviet ambassador to Lebanon, a
KGB officer named Anatoly Soldatov, on
a regular basis.
One of the terrorists of the PLO who
has admitted receiving training in the
Soviet Union itself is Muhammed Abu
Kassem, also known as "Hader." In
1978, Hader took part in a sea-borne raid
on the Israeli resort town of Eilat. It was
the plan of the terrorists to storm the
beach-filled with tourists at that
time-with boatloads of explosives. For-
tunately, they were intercepted and cap-
tured by.the Israelis before they reached
the shore. Hader admitted that, in the
Soviet Union, "we went through six
months of military training . . . the
military training we received there was
just excellent." The Soviets, of course,
did not direct the raid on Eilat, which by
no conceivable stretch of the imagination
could be described as "guerrilla warfare"
or "national liberation," but ultimately
they bear considerable moral and practical
responsibility for giving Hader and his
comrades the skills with which to carry it
out.
Why then do the Soviets support these
outrages? The complete answer lies deep
in the ideology and psychology of com-
munism, but a more immediate answer
can be inferred from the strategy of the
Soviets in the global context.
In Soviet doctrine, the U.S. and the ad-
vanced economies of Western Europe are
"imperialist" states that continue to
dominate and exploit the underdeveloped
world economically. Israel, we are told by
their propagandists, is an outpost of
Western imperialism, as is South Africa.
The economies of Latin America are said
to be exploited by the multinational cor-
porations. Only by destroying the
economic base of the U.S. in the Third
World can America itself be prepared for
revolution. Only if an economic crisis in
the advanced economies is precipitated by a
denial of necessary resources can the
workers of those economies be mobilized
into revolutionary consciousness.
Soviet strategy, therefore, proceeds
from this conception of the dependence
on Third World resources for the "im-
perialist" economies of Europe and
America. By attacking through "national
liberation movements" the economic
foundations of American global power,
the Soviets hope to be in a position to
deny the U.S. and its allies access to the
raw materials and lines of communication
necessary for American military and
economic superiority.
A correlation between the areas of
Soviet-supported terrorism and areas of
immense strategic and economic value can
be observed. In the Middle East, the
answer is obvious: the target ultimately is
the oil fields and the pro-Western states
that shelter them. In southern Africa, the
target is the vast resources of raw
materials-uranium, cobalt, chromium,
gold, etc.-as well as the Cape route to
the West. In Central America. the targets
are the bauxite and oil of the Caribbean
basin, but also the access of the Gulf ports
to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
through the passage of the Panama Canal
and the Carribbean. In Western Europe,
it is noteworthy that almost every country
that has been a target of Soviet-supported
terrorism has been an active member of
NATO-Great Britain, Italy, West Ger-
many, and Turkey. Spain is not yet 'a
member of NATO, but may become one,
and at any rate now has U.S. bases on its
soil. Greece and France have been spared
the worst excesses of terrorism, and
neither is an active member of NATO. It
is interesting to recall also Ladislav Bitt-
mann's statement that the first priority of
the Soviet-controlled Czechoslovakian in-
telligence service (for which Bittmann
worked until his defection) is the disrup-
tion of the Western alliance in Europe.
The ideology of terrorism, while dif-
ferent in many respects from that of or-
thodox Soviet Marxism, nevertheless
relies heavily on Marx and Lenin, and
especially on Lenin's doctrine of im-
perialism and national liberation. Almost
all terrorism of the left expresses solidarity
with the "liberation movements" of the
Third World, and indeed the terrorists of
Europe and the underdeveloped regions
have had more than casual connections
with each other.
Soviet support of terrorism is therefore
not superficial. It grows out of the heart
of Soviet ideology and strategy and con-
nects with the global strategy of the
U.S.S.R. in its conflict with the West.
Moreover, it is almost inconceivable that
the terrorists of the last decade could have
inflicted as much physical and psycho-
logical damage and suffering as they have
without the training, weaponry, logistical
assistance, and propaganda support given
them by the Soviets. Terrorism, therefore,
should not be understood simply in terms
of "random" or "mindless" violence, but
as "directed" attacks, with particular
targets and goals, and it is only when we
comprehend the strategic nature and pur-
poses of Soviet complicity in terrorism
that we can begin to respond effectively to
it.
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July 1980, Volume 1, Number 4.
PRESSURES FOR A SHIFT TOWARD UNDECLARED NEUTRALISM
IN GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY: A STRATEGIC POLITICAL FORECAST
For the United States, West Germany is a major business and trade partner, as well as a vital military
and political ally. Although the Federal Republic of Germany has criticized what it considers the inability
of the Carter Administration to develop coherent economic, foreign, or military policies, most conven-
tional analyses do not anticipate any serious change in West Germany's political relationship to the West.
Yet, there may be additional political and economic forces which might lead it to some degree of de-
facto neutralization, with serious consequences for U.S. Interests not only in Europe, but
also In Central America and the Persian Gulf.
THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF THE U.S.-GERMAN RELATIONS- A FUTURE
OF CONTINUITY
In any alliance of democratic, soverign nations there are bound to be periods of stress, tension and un-
certainty. Those who have followed German foreign policy closely since the emergence of the Federal
Republic on the ruins of defeat in 1949 are most likely to see the current problems and trends as part of
the inevitable swing in relations.
Each period of apparently growing distance or disagreement between Germany and the U.S., its prin-
cipal ally, was overcome either as a result of compromise or renewed Soviet intimidation. In 1955 the
first German Ostpolitik of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1949-63) caused some concerns which
melted in the heat of the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary and the 1959-62 period of Soviet ultimata and
threats about Berlin. From 1966 to 1969 the Grand Coalition government was formed by the Christian
Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) which had held power since 1949 and the Social Democratic Party (SPD).
Its foreign minister was Willy Brandt who subsequently became Chancellor (1969.74) of the Social
Democratic led government which has been in power since 1969. In the mid 1960's, a number of eco-
nomic disputes including those connected with the issue of German payments for the U.S. forces stationed
there as well as the U.S. interest in "building bridges" to Eastern Europe (President Johnson's speech in
1966) were causing irritations until the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Nevertheless, that aggression only briefly interrupted the efforts of the U.S. to begin the SALT negotia-
tions. It also seemed to have convinced the German Social Democrats that Soviet domination of Eastern
Europe including East Germany would not soon yield to any form of liberal political evolution. In 1%9,
the new SPD-led government began the second Ostpolitik-an effort to trade explicit acceptance of
the war imposed loss of German territory to Poland and recognition of the communist government in
East Germany for Soviet guarantees of the security of West Berlin and increased emirgation opportunities
for Germans living in the communist sphere. This German initiative at first caused problems with the
newly installed administration of President Nixon and raised rumors and accusations of Rapallo (the
1922 Soviet-German agreement used as the symbol of a sudden nationalist turn to the East). After a
brief period of misunderstanding, there was a great deal of coordination with the U.S., France and the
United Kingdom as Germany moved toward a "redefinition of security as encompasing both defense and
detente".
Phis entire diplomatic process became complementary to the American pursuit of detente and strategic
weapons control. The results were the 1971 Four Power Treaty on Berlin, the 1972 SALT agreements,
the beginning of the mutual force reduction negotiations and the Helsinki treaties of 1975 which codified
the status-quo in Europe.
This entire opening to the East in the opinion of one author permitted Germany to reconcile four
foreign policy purposes described as: "a leading actor in the world economic system; the barrier
state in defense of Western Europe; one of the leading powers of the European economic community;
induced by its geostrategic position.... exposed West Berlin, and its links with the East Germans, to act as
a bridge and force of mediation with Eastern Europe". In fact, the strong German economy and the con-
tinuing commitment of the government to the European Economic Community have played a construc-
tive role in Western Europe. Germany has often been willing to contribute a more than proportionate
economic share to overcome problems with the EEC. The government of Chancellor Schmidt (1974-
present) provided significant economic and political help to prevent a communist party takeover of
Portugal in 1974-75 and it has recently agreed to play a similar economic role in Turkey which is in great
economic difficulty and faces a Soviet-supported terrorist assault (see June, 1980 ISI).
In military terms, Germany provides the core for the NATO defense of Central Europe with
its 495,000 man army. In 1977, the NATO members agreed to an annual real defense budget in-
crease of 3% until 1983 in an effort to close the large military gap (e.g., 11,000 tanks for NATO
So pared to 28,000 plus for the Warsaw Pact). Germany failed to meet that commitment and
I
N
T
E S
R T
N R I
A A S
T T S
I E U
O G E
N I S
A C
L
A FORECASTING
TOOL FOR BUSINESS
Editor:
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Published by:
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Phone: [phone]
Cable: "SAGECO, WASHDC"
For further information
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services of SAGE, contact:
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President
ISI is sold by subscription
at $190 per year; $ 30
for each extra copy
mailed in the same en-
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Copyright 1980 by SAGE
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Reproduction or com-
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hibited.
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currently spends the lowest share of its GNP on defense among major NATO members. However. the 1980 German military budget for
procurement of weapons and supporting equipment increased by 7 7% and is part of a major modernization program to cost $77 billion This
will add 1,800 new tanks to bring the German level to 5,000 (compared to 900 first line tanks the United Kingdom has in Europe) and a major
increase in anti-tank missiles to 100.000. German military doctrine has been shaped by the Soviet preponderance in both nuclear and conven-
tional weapons. The modernization program represents a response to the imbalance of conventional forces.
The Soviet Union has developed the SS-20, a mobile, ballistic missile with a range of 3.000 miles carrying three highly accurate, independ-
ently targeted hydrogen bombs. So far about 120 have been deployed in western, central and eastern Russia covering Europe, the Middle East
and parts of Asia. It is estimated that a total of 250 to 300 missiles will be deployed at the rate of about 50 per year. According to one author "it
dramatically alters the European balance and must be regarded as an instrument for intimidation. Even more important. the SS-20 is accom-
panied by an array of new, shorter range systems, the SS 21, SS-22. SS-23 deployed in East Germany and Poland". In addition, about 160
supersonic Backfire bombers have been deployed and its 5.500 mile range permits nuclear attacks on targets throughout Western Europe.
None of these Soviet nuclear weapons are limited by either SALT treaty. They pose a new threat to Western Europe and especially Germany
as the forward country because. in theory, the firing of mobile missiles from Eastern Europe could decouple the territory of both superpowers
from a European conflict In more practical terms, these new Soviet regional nuclear weapons increase the coercive political
impact of its existing lead in conventional arms and the massive Soviet strategic build-up which has matched and partially sur-
passed U.S. strategic forces.
In 1977, Germany took the lead in seeking a NATO response to the Soviet regional nuclear missile build-up. By December 1979. when
NATO decided that it would add 572 new missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union. Germany had become so intimidated by Soviet pres-
sures that it agreed to accept some of these new missiles only if other non-nuclear NATO members on the European continent also agreed.
Chancellor Schmidt stated bluntly. "We Germans are not prepared to be alone in taking the risks". This condition was met and Germany
agreed to accept all 108 Pershing II and about 400 cruise missiles in 1983, the earliest pratical deployment date.
After that NATO meeting. the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan with 100.000 soldiers and set off a new round of East-West crises. Chan-
cellor Schmidt did support the U.S initiated boycott of the Moscow Olympics. However, in sharp contrast to previous times of Soviet
aggression, the first six months after the invasion have not brought about a more unified Western position In April 1980, Chancellor
Schmidt suggested a postponement of a firm decision on the deployment of the new NATO missiles until further negotiations
with Moscow revealed whether it might agree to stop deployment of its new missiles. This proposal had not been coordinated with the Carter
Administration and seemed to undercut the only,- tangible NATO response to the Soviet regional nuclear build-up On June 10th. Moscow re-
jected the Schmidt proposal. Nevertheless on the eve of the June 22 Western summit meeting. President Carter wrote Schmidt a letter
which urged him not to bring the proposal up in his June 30 meeting with President Brezhnev. The German Chancellor termed the Carter
letter "astonishing" but the differences were ostensibly resolved in their personal meeting on June 21. Again. many observers would say- the
new missile flap and its resolution demonstrates the solid character of the German American connection.
It is no secret that the failure of the Carter Administration to act on behalf of its strategically important ally, the Shah of Iran in 1978, as
well as its slowness in responding to the new Soviet SS-20 missiles, its various unilateral weapons cuts and the abrupt reversal of position on the
neutron bomb in 1978 all led to German concerns about U.S weakness and vascillation. That in turn had the effect of encouraging the Ger-
mans and other Europeans to attend to their own relations with Moscow, e.g., the Brezhnev visit to Bonn in 1978. In January 1980,
the tough rhetoric adopted by President Carter and the economic sanctions called for against the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan
produced in Europe, not least in Germany. a concern about U.S overreaction and the rekindling of the "Cold War". Paradoxically, that also
had the effect of causing Chancellor Schmidt and his government to complain about frantic American actions and seek ways of maintaining
their Ostpolitik and a dialogue with Mosocw. such as Schmidt's June 30 meeting there.
Here too, there is a comfortable sense of the alliance as usual Consider the words of Alastair Buchan in 1960: "... if the U.S. reacts forcefully
to any threat to the interest of NATO . or shows she is taking energetic steps to maintain a strategic balance of power. there is an outcrop of
protests against American bellicosity. On the other hand, if she advocates the kind of detente which has clearly been uppermost in President
Eisenhower's mind ... it is suggested the U.S. is prepared to sacrifice European interests or is approaching a more neutral attitude toward the
security of Europe as she herself becomes more vulnerable" This conclusion written two decades ago illustrates why so many experts and
policy makers see the current ebb and flow of cooperation and distance in NATO and in particular between Germany and the U.S. as more of
the same manageable process. For the moment this may be true, but there is cause for deep concern.
ALTERNATIVE EMPHASIS ANALYSIS: SERIOUS EROSION OF THE U.S.-GERMAN ALLIANCE
The neutralization of West Germany has been a Soviet objective since 1945. If there is further movement in that direction, it will
likely occur through a cumulative series of small changes and actions rather than as the result of a sudden change like the Hitler-Stalin pact of
1939 or Rapallo in 1922. The historian, Fritz Stern. recently noted that "to focus on the remote possibility of a radical renversement may be to
blind people to the incremental changes taking place".
Three Internal German political trends are working toward the undeclared and perhaps unintentional neutralization of Germany:
changes in public attitudes about the U.S. and USSR: a rise in business and conservative nationalist groups who have a stake in good economic
relations with the communist bloc and want a more nationalist foreign policy: and a growing number of SPD leaders who want to avoid conflict
with the ever more powerful Soviet Union at almost any price. There is in addition a radical group in the SPD, estimated at about a third of
the activists, which is very hostile to the U.S., and generally supportive of the Soviet experiment. Many of these radicals from the 1960's,
now in Parliament and party jobs. endorsed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The increasing radicalization of most of the democratic social-
ist parties in Europe-including the British labor party and those in Holland, Denmark, Sweden, as well as Germany-is likely to have an ever-
growing negative impact on the political cohesion of the NATO alliance.
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Three main shifts in public attitudes form the background for the right and left wing preSsL. 2s toward neutralism. The first is the accep-
tance by Germans that there will be no return of the territories lost in the war: 10% felt this way in 1953 and 80% agreed in 1970. In a sense,
the Ostpolitik of the SPD ratified A change which the public had already made. Secondly, there has been a dram itic drop in the proportion of
Germans who feel threatened by Moscow: from 65% in 1952 to 28% in 1971. Third, there has been a reversal of judgement about whether
the U.S. or the USSR is more powerful: in 1953, 34% chose the U.S. as the most powerful compared to 10% for the USSR; in 1975, the USSR
was perceived as more powerful by 37% and the U.S. by 12%. While these perceptions might lead many to argue for a stronger bond to the
U.S., they encourage others to use accommodation and economic incentives for dealing with the Soviet Union. There are, in fact, three
arenas where German and U.S. perceptions and actions may grow ever more divergent if the SPD-led coalition remains in power
relations with the Soviet Union; Israel and the Arab oil producers; and Central America and the Caribbean.
A DEVELOPING DIVERGENCE IN U.S. AND GERMAN POLICIES ON THE SOVIET UNION
For the last two years the Soviet Union has followed a mixed hard and soft line toward the Schmidt government. In 1978, it unleashed a
vitriolic propaganda campaign against Schmidt when he decided to accept the neutron bomb in order to counter the Warsaw Pact superiority
in armor. In the fall of 1979 Moscow coordinated a campaign of threats and promises aimed at preventing Germany from agreeing to provide
bases for the new NATO nuclear missiles. The promises included a token withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and expanded
energy exports. The threats and actions included an unannounced cut-off of titanium needed for aircraft production, East German
threats to West Berlin (the first in a decade) and the possibility of more rapid Soviet missile deployment. In November, the German foreign
minister, a member of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the coalition partner had to bluntly tell the Soviets that "no threats will prevent us from
deciding ... what is necessary to our own security".
Following the Afghanistan invasion, the great difference from previous crisis periods was that the German position became softer and
the connection with Washington looser rather than closer even though the Carter Administration was talking tougher. This derived both from a
lack of confidence in the depth of any Carter commitment and from heightened fear. The left wing of the SPD, including the older
leaders such as Wehner, Bahr and Brandt "veered toward some form of neutralism" according to one analyst. The Schmidt proposal for a
delay in the deployment of the NATO missiles was one example as was the absence of any move to increase defense expenditures or prepared-
ness.
In March 1980, the Soviet Union warned that "it would not remain passive" if the U.S. or Europe "took action against our security ... Evi-
dently in the American administration, they do not yet have a clear idea of what the Soviet Union is". At the same time, the Kremlin threat-
ened to cut off its exports of 25% of Germany's natural gas if Bonn participated in any economic sanctions. Although trade with the
USSR accounted for only $6 billion of a $175 billion total in 1979 and trade with the entire communist bloc adds up to only 5% of Germany's
exports -no economic sanctions were taken. In this domain the right and left wing meet for different reasons. For some large and powerful
German companies such as Hoechst, Mannesman and Thyssen, trade with the communist bloc amounted to 4 billion DM in 1979 and con-
stituted a significant portion of their earnings. A German consortium is negotiating a $12 billion multi-year natural gas deal and none of these
organizations want their trade interrupted for political reasons.
Historically, before the Second World War, most significant German business and trade ties were with the East. As German ma-
chine tool and other industrial equipment manufacturers have recently found their Western markets declining because of lower demand
and increased competition from Brazil, Spain, and others, their trade with the Eastern Bloc has increased. In addition, German dependence
upon imported oil and gas makes it increasingly susceptible to Soviet inducements through energy-related trade. In June, the Germans and
Soviets agreed to long-term energy-related trade pact to complement the 25 year agreement signed in 1978. Such historical as well as current
economic and political realities may pursuade some in Germany that their future best interest lies more to the East. As an example of this pro-
cess in action, there is evidence of an explicit Soviet drive to play upon the hopes of German industry for business deals and the desires of the
leftist SPD members for peace, disarmament, and possible reunification. One example reported in the American press followed the fall of the
Shah in 1979-A senior Soviet KGB official met with German business and political leaders and made these points: 1) Taiwan and Iran show
the U.S. cannot be trusted; 2) the Arab oil nations will soon be under radical or Marxist control; 3) Moscow will help Germany obtain its needed
oil: 4) now is the time to begin steps toward German disarmament and talks on a reunified, neutral Germany; and 5) the USSR wants a major
increase in trade.
DIVERGING U.S. AND GERMAN POLICIES ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB OIL STATES
For seven years the industrial democracies, including the U.S. have failed to take serious steps toward economic counterpressures as a way of
containing OPEC price demands. The addition of post-Shah Iran to the side of the Arab radical states has made the problem worse. Led by
France, Europe has been drifting toward ever greater appeasement of the Arab oil producers by moving away from Israel. For several
years the left wings of many European social democratic parties, including the SPD, have been excusing or ignoring the terrorism of the
PLO and arguing that it should be recognized as the leader of the Palestinian Arabs. In early June, Al Fatah, the largest and most powerful
group within the PLO concluded a strategy congress with a call for the military elimination of Israel and its replacement by a Palestinian
state (the continuing radical pressure as forecast in the May, 1980, lSI). Nevertheless, Germany joined the other members of the EEC on June
15 in calling for the PLO to be associated with the Palestinian autonomy negotiations.
As suggested in the May 1980 ISI, the combination of selective perception in Europe and the effective use of Arab oil as an iar
centive has led to a partial break between Washington and its allies just at the time when unity is most important to counter the grow-
ing dangers of radical destabilization in the Persian Gulf. Germany could have been a force for an offensive strategy designed to forge a link
with pro-Western Arabian oil producers and divide them from the radical Islamic regimes. It imports less than half of its consumption from the
Arab nations and is highly valued as a source of technology and expertise. Instead, the Schmidt government has tilted toward the PLO and
against Israel as well as against the principal security both front-line nations have-the U.S.
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GERMAN POLICIES ON CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN-SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S.
The Social Democrats of Germany exercise important influence over the social democratic parties of Costa Rica, Venezuela and the
entire democratic Socialist International consisting of 40 parties from Europe and the third world. Starting in January 1980, the Ger-
man and Latin American social democrats began to tilt strongly toward the extreme left in Central America. Despite the
truly significant social reforms begun in El Salvador last March. the March meeting of the Socialist International led by Germany's Willy
Brandt condemned the moderate government in El Salvador but made no criticism of the terrorist left. U.S. policy in El Salvador was
condemned, but Fidel Castro was invited to speak. This is especially ironic coming from the German Social Democrats because they
once were in exactly the same position as the current government in El Salvador: reformists violently attacked by the extreme right and
the communist left.
The current failure of the German Social Democrats and their very effective political training organization, the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, to support the forces of democratic reform in Central America seems to reflect the increased power of the more dog-
matically Marxist young socialists of the 1960's who (as mentioned above), are now rising in the Parliament and the German
party. It also reflects a perplexing tendency by former Chancellor Willy Brandt and parliamentary leader Herbert Wehner to be self-
deceptive about the communist left. This is in sharp contrast to the enormous contribution the German democratic parties made in help-
ing Portugal escape the communists in 1975. Chancellor Schmidt does not seem to be informed about the destructive actions of his party
in Central America. It may require President Carter's personal efforts to bring the German Social Democrats back to support for demo-
cratic social reform in El Salvador.
This March's Socialist International meeting, the first in Latin America, also voted unanimously for Puerto Rican independ-
ence-rather than self determination. A number of leadinq German Social Democrats also concluded that the only solution in El Salva-
dor is for the moderate left to join the extreme left as in Nicaragua. In early April, following this advice, the small Social Democratic party
of El Salvador and other groups formed the "Democratic Front" to cooperate with the extreme left as "one more soldier in the revolution-
ary process".
The example of Nicaragua has been used to justify this strategy in spite of the clear evidence that the genuinely democratic elements
are nearly powerless. The communist core groups control the new secret police. the army. the Sandinista Defense Committee informant
networks. most labor unions. and all government jobs. (See IS[, Vol 1. No. 1.)
In May, the SPD-sponsored Friedrich Ebert Foundation held a conference in Costa Rica to establish a Committee Against Re-
pression in Guatemala which would unite the communist and the moderate left in opposition to the current government.
In Jamaica, where the radical elements in the governing socialist party are becoming more powerful and receiving significant, covert
Cuban help, the German government has provided special financial aid to bolster Michael Manly (but refused to provide aid already
budgeted for the moderate government in Ell Salvador). Further, the opposition leader, Edward Seaga has publicly claimed that the
Friedrich Ebert Foundation is providing funds for a known communist to work in Jamaica to radicalize the mass media.
The effect of the German/SPD/Ebert endorsement of the communist left in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala is to confuse and
deceive public opinion and the media about the true totalitarian character of the revolutionary groups and worse, to divide the Social
Democrats from the Christian Democrats and other centrists at precisely the time when their unity might promote peaceful reforms.
In strategic terms, if the extreme leftist revolutionaries are successful in Central America and if that in turn helps ignite a destabilization
process in Mexico by 1982 (as suggested ISI. April 1980). German Social Democrats will have played a major role in causing an
enormous loss to the U.S. At present, this is receiving no media attention-but should the revolutionaries succeed, there will be strong
recriminations when the German role becomes more widely known. That, in combination with the divergence of policies on the Middle
East and the Soviet Union. could generate powerful recriminations and hostility within the next two to three years.
The U.S. and Germany have too much to gain by their alliance to make undeclared German neutralism seem possible. Yet. the actions
in Central America go beyond neutralism to German and Socialist International help for the enemies of the U.S. In the Middle East. the
European socialists, including Germany, are on the verge of helping the enemies of a significant American ally. These and NATO issues
have to be explored and discussed frankly-and soon. Yet there is a curious reluctance to give systematic attention to the German-
American relationship; when all is well there seems no need and when problems appear there is a feeling that inquiry will bring more
suspicions rather than communication and rapprochement. Germans are perceived-correctly-as fed up with the need to prove their
loyalty. Despite these sensitivities and equivalent ones on the American side when questions are raised about how credible the nuclear
guarantees might actually be in time of crisis-it would be a serious mistake to permit the current drift to continue without honest discus-
sion.
BUSINESS IMPLICATIONS
West German policies would appear to be clearly harmful to U.S. interests in Central America and the Persian Gulf and support the
seriously dangerous trends outlined in ISI April. 1980. and ISI, May. 1980. They could lead to the serious reversals for American busi-
ness and the economy suggested in those issues. Beyond that, however, the de-facto neutralization of Germany would greatly increase
the military and political threat of the Soviet Union to Central Europe, and could eventually lead to a major collapse of trade and business
relations with those countries. The consequences to both U.S. business and the EEC would, obviously, be enormous.
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APRIL 1980 Volume I, Number 1.
CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO:
A FORECAST OF STRATEGIC TRENDS-1980.1983
While the Administration and the media remain focused on Iran, Afganistan, and the economy, a
longer-range problem is emerging in Central America, with the potential for making Mexico the Iran next
door.
1. BACKGROUND-CENTRAL AMERICA/MEXICO AS IT APPEARS TO BE
90 million people live in Central America and Mexico. Mexico, with 70 million people, has had 20
years of steady economic growth, rising living standards for the majority of its people and an orderly
government under a mild authoritarian one-party system. Simultaneously, there has been a doubling of
population, increased urban concentration with unemployment at nearly 40%, near doubling of the
numbers of landless poor peasants, a decline in food production and a large increase in the concentration
of wealth among the top 20% (who receive 63%) while the bottom 40% obtain only 7%.
Costa Rica is a democracy with the highest and most evenly distributed income, despite the least
extensive resource base in the region.
The other five countries, during the last twenty years, have been marked by economic growth, rising
living standards for much but not all of
the population, little change in the concen-
tration of income, and authoritarian govern-
ment-usually military. Since the middle of
the 1970s, there has been a renewed upsurge in
organized terrorism by radical left and communist
groups in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.
They have murdered government officials, businessmen,
and diplomats to provoke brutal reaction from the military,
polarize the society and hope to emerge victorious. The Cen-
tral American regimes have responded with both reforms and counter-
terrorism including intimidations, murder and the permanent disappearance
of labor leaders, students, clergy and other politically active individuals. The victims of
both the radical and rightist terrorism were often members of the centrist democratic
groups interested in reform and a peaceful evolution to representative government.
What will the future hold for this strategically important region? There are strong forces in each
country that suggest progress and stability. In Nicaragua, the Sandanista leaders affirm that they
are not communists and that their revolution will be no threat to any other country. A large, politically
aware middle-income group includes a significant proportion of genuinely reformist and democratically
inclined individuals with important technical skills. Similar groups and political parties are potentially im-
portant in Guatemala, Honduras, Panama and El Salvador where they could work with the military
governments to bring about social reform and a return to constitutional government. The Catholic
Church is generally aligned with the Christian Democratic parties and labor groups in a loose coalition
for peaceful change. Honduras enacted significant agrarian and labor reforms in 1975 and plans free
elections for a constitutional assembly in April 1980. El Salvador has instituted agrarian and social re-
forms and scheduled free elections for Congress. President Lucas of Guatemala, elected in 1978, has
pledged free elections in 1982 as well as major investments in social services, especially health care. In
Panama, the resolution of the canal issue and the economy also suggest a positive future. Mexico can
count on its fifty years of peaceful transfers of power within the single-party framework and its massive oil
and gas resources to provide the opportunity for coping with its social and economic problems.
By world standards, all the economies have performed well. The Central American Common
Market (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica) has grown from annual trade of
$33 million in 1963 to $703 million in 1977, with the United States as the major trading and investment
partner. These and other factors would justify a hopeful forecast for the next few years.
II. THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE-
AN ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO FOR THE FUTURE
Missing in this positive forecast, a viewpoint shared by most American observers, is an understanding
of the commitment and competence shown by communist revolutionary groups and a sense for the
motivating impact of changes (Nicaragua, Iran, Afganistan, etc.) in the perceived historical context.
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A FORECASTING
TOOL FOR BUSINESS
Editor:
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Published by:
SAGE Associates, Inc.
International Square
Suite 925
1875 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Phone: [phone]
Cable: "SAGECO, WASHDC"
For further information
about ISI or the consulting
services of SAGE, contact:
Mr. Grady E. Means
President
ISI is sold by subscription
at $190 per year; $30
for each extra copy
mailed in the same en-
velope.
Copyright 1980 by SAGE
Associates, Incorporated.
Reproduction or com-
mercial use without writ-
ten permission is pro-
hibited.
I/
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Commitment is exemplified by Tomas Borge, the new Minister of Interior in Nicaragua who fought for communism (a fact he now conceals)
for 17 years and never gave up even when Castro cut support Competence is evident in the political understanding of the communist core
group running Nicaragua that they must conceal their political purposes from the United States to prevent intervention and from their
colleagues in the anti Samoza movement until they have established an unshakable hold on the nation, e.g., the Sandanista leadership de-
stroyed all communist symbols in August 1978 to aid in such deception.
From a Marxist perspective, the 1980s promise to be a time of troubles for the leading capitalist nations. Continuing threats of instability in
Iran and other Persian Gulf oil states, increased use of Soviet military power. and adaptation to OPEC price increases will all preoccupy the
United States. These factors will also divide the United States internally and from its allies and make it possible for discreet revolutionaries to
use some of the democratic nations as a source of economic aid-Castro instructed his Nicaraguan comrades in 1979 to obtain economic aid
from Western countries since the Soviet Union cannot afford another Cuba ($3 billion per year). Seen from this perspective. a future scenario
looks more ominous.
A. Nicaragua: Consolidation and Quiet Help for Terrorists
The Sandanistas have executed relatively few people, but they have kept seven to ten thousand guardsmen and Somocistas in prison.
awaiting war criminal trials. The nine man, fully-Marxist Sandanista Directorate. appointed by Castro in 1979, is moving carefully to con-
solidate power: a secret police is being built: the large groups of newcomers to the guerrilla forces in 1978 and 1979 are being screened, and a
new reliable army is being formed while the others are disarmed: and a system of Sandanista defense committees has been formed to provide
a neighborhood informant and control system similar to the Cuban bloc committees which have worked well. Meanwhile, the demo
cratic anti Samoza leaders are being kept busy in the powerless revolutionary junta (and the former Cabinet) where they can help obtain
foreign loans, plan reconstruction and perform useful projects for the country. provided there is no effort to establish any independent power
base. Elections are postponed for about four years due to the needs of reconstruction. There is one independent newspaper, which is running
into serious trouble from the regime.
Nicaragua's intent may be to become a base for helping the terrorist wars against El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. A CIA report
of May 1979 (cited in the New York Times, July 22. 1979) informed President Carter that Castro had concluded by the fall of 1978 that
"prospects for a revolutionary upheaval in Central America - had markedly improved. . As a result, Cuba has intensified its efforts to unify in-
surgent groups. not only in Nicaragua where Cuba has concentrated its efforts, but in Guatemala and El Salvador as well." Most likely, the
real leaders in Nicaragua will conceal their communist political affiliations and objectives until the beginning of revolutionary destabilization in
Mexico.
The three radical terrorist groups mainly limited their actions to the murder and kidnapping of businessmen and government officials
until the fall of Samoza. Since then. there has been a steady escalation of violent attacks on the Presidential palace. police and army barracks.
and the like. The military coup of October 1979 which brought more reform-oriented officers into a coalition government with Christian Demo-
crats and other reformist civilian politicans. produced only a slight and temporary respite in the growing insurgency.
In January 1980, the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR), the political arm of several terrorist groups, mobilized 80.000 people for a
demonstration in the capital Then. in a classic destabilization action. unidentified persons opened fire on the crowds leading to panic and a gun
battle between demonstrators and the military resulting in 22 dead and hundreds wounded. Evidence that the final push against the gov-
ernment is going to take place this year. probably through the spring and summer. is the joining of the terrorist organizations and their political
action wings and the Communist Party into a united front.
The pattern will probably repeat that used in Nicaragua. There will be more dramatic attacks on the government-perhaps the seizure of
additional embassies (such as the recent seizure of the Spanish embassies in both Guatemala and El Salvador) to get more press
attention (an assault by 300 terrorists on the U.S. Embassy failed in October 1979). The purpose will be to provoke the military to resume
counterterrorism in order to make the democratic political groups either withdraw from cooperation with the government or become
hopelessly divided as they debate what to do while they are caught between the violent leftist and ultra-rightist groups.
As the insurrection approaches. the leftist terrorists may begin to murder prominent members of the democratic opposition and try to blame
this on the counter-terror actions of the right-wing. This would serve three purposes (1) divide both the government and the democratic
groups: (2) further alienate the politically active, but not radical, groups from the government: and (3) convince the foreign press that the gov-
ernment is hopelessly brutal
In the meantime, Cuba and Nicaragua would continue to smuggle in the weapons and provide the training needed for a large scale up
rising to launch the final battles. To prevent American Intervention, this might coincide with a distracting crisis elsewhere-Soviet moves
against Yugoslavia. the destabilization of Sadat. or terrorist acts such as the hostage taking in Columbia. An act which could serve as the
symbolic trigger for the uprising could be either another peaceful demonstration made violent or the murder of a prominent individual such as a
spokesman for the center, e.g. Archbishop Romero or the American Ambassador. If that could be made to look like the work of the gov-
ernment. it could he the spark that destroys any unity among the opponents of the leftist radicals. Given current trends. there could be
national revolutionary government in El Salvador well before the end of 1980.
C. Guatemala:The Bridge to Mexico
The failure of the moderate military-civilian transition to elections and instability in Ell Salvador would reinforce the hard-line
predilictions of the military in Guatemala despite the reformist promises. Many leaders among the military believe that the failure of the United
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States to support the Shah of Iran and Somoza demonstrates that in an unconventional, political war with leftist radicals, they must act on
their own.
The struggle now going on in Guatemala began 36 years ago when the October Revolutionaries overthrew a military dictatorship. The result
ing governments came under increasing communist control until overthrown by a CIA-aided coup in 1954. In 1960, with encouragement from
Castro, a group of junior officers revolted and then went underground. By 1962, a full-fledged liberation movement with close ties to Cuba
and the communist party began the radical violence which surged until the late 1960s and accelerated again during the last five years. At
present, there are three separate radical terrorist organizations: EGP, FAR, and PGT,--a dissident wing of the main communist party. In
addition to increasing terrorism directed at the government, business, foreign investors and diplomats, the last two years have been spent in
efforts to penetrate labor unions and other institutions. The radical-leftist groups are drawn mainly from the modernized sectors of the
society, the cities and larger towns, but have made some progress in building a base among the more populous rural populations. which are
non-Spanish speaking Indians and neutral in the current conflict.
The military has permitted counter-terror squads since at least 1966. Amnesty International has alleged that these groups have killed
more than 20.000 persons (over 2000 since 1978), a good portion from the democratic middle. It is equally possible, however, that radical
leftist terrorists murdered some of these victims to accelerate the polarization of the society. Although there are a number of reformist,
democratic groups-including the Christian Democrats, trade unions and civic associations-they are virtually helpless to counter the growing
violence from both extremes as long as there is no help from outside.
There will probably be a linkage between the civil war in El Salvador and the events in Guatemala. The military in Guatemala feel
that if they can't prevent the communist and radical groups in El Salvador from winning, the combined forces of revolutionary Nicaragua, El
Salvador and Cuba will bring them down. Therefore, the Guatemalan military will be prepared to use their troops directly in El Salvador. The
Communist leaders in the region have the same perception. To keep the Guatemalan security forces too busy to help prevent El Salvador
from falling, Cuba and Nicaragua may promote a sharp increase in terrorism. This might include attacks on targets such as hydroelectric plants
or the 120 mile long oil pipeline.
If radical leftists defeat the government in El Salvador by the summer of 1980, the psychological impact on the government of Guatemala
will be devastating. Already there has been a large-scale movement of families, money and business interests out of these countries. Recently,
the Spanish and the Germans closed their embassies, removing two potentially moderating forces. These trends could accelerate and
edge the military toward panic. The revolutionary government of El Salvador would play the Nicaragua scenario of apparent moderation,
reform and gradualism while consolidating its hold on power. Some months of apparent relaxation would, in fact, only mark the time when
people and weapons were being shifted farther north for assaults on Guatemalan military targets.
The United States might be absorbed by the Presidential campaign and by ever more severe crises in the Middle East and elsewhere
while this is going on. The Guatemalan revolutionary groups would demand increased help from their allies after the fall of El Salvador to re-
peat the pattern of escalation before the November 1980 elections are over. Their reasoning: Carter would be far less likely to intervene with
military force in the apparently ambiguous situation of internal upheaval in Guatemala while worried about his reelection. Afterwards, whether
he won or lost, the chances of decisive action might increase.
The communists would probably conduct a propaganda campaign as the fighting accelerates with three goals: (1) to prove that they are not
communists; (2) to document the barbarity of the military in Guatemala and politically isolate them, and (3) to appear reasonable by inviting
Mexico, Nicaragua, Venezuela and other neutral countries to mediate the dispute.
If possible, depending on how quickly the military seems to be collapsing, there may be subtle efforts to maneuver President Portillo of
Mexico into playing an appeasing role similar to his termination of diplomatic relations with Somoza in May 1979. A large number of leftist
radicals in Mexico might want to help in the fight against the Guatemalan military by providing safehouses, training facilities and arms through
the 1,100 mile Mexican border with Guatemala. The Mexican Government might permit this with the implied promise of good relations with
the revolutionary government that came to power.
Assuming that El Salvador and Guatemala join Cuba and Nicaragua by early 1981, the entire Mexican support network could, of
course, become an infrastructure for action against the current Mexican governing system.
D. Mexico: The Iran next Door
For fifty years, the Partido Institutional Revolucionario (PRI) has functioned as the machinery of political succession and government.
It is organized by sectors corresponding to the major social groups: agriculture; labor (with pro and anti BUO-Bloque de Unidad Obrera) -
components; and the popular sector (CNOP-including civil servants, teachers, cooperatives). Adding membership in all the sectors together
gives the impressive totals in the range of 6-8 million among the active labor force of 20-30 million. Despite the appearance of unity from the
outside, there has in reality been a persistent internal split between very leftist and more moderate currents within the PRI especially in the
organized labor groups.
A serious challenge to the PRI would have to be carefully prepared and most important would probably need to begin under the banner of re-
forming or authenticating the revolution of 1910. There is every reason to imagine that the new revolutionary leaders of Central America
would have the wisdom and the sensitivity to help the already powerful radical forces in Mexico in a way that would seek to divide the PRI
internally and would prevent a new revolution from being perceived as communist or even Marxist. 1981 would be the right time to prepare
the second revolution and it could begin very slowly in 1982 within the context of the usual politicking within the PRI as a new president is
being negotiated among the factions. Since Portillo would be in his last year and was the moderate President. it is time for another leftist to be
tapped for the office. The question would become how far left permits broad-based backing. This delicate process may coincide with the
retirement of 79 year old Fidel Velazquez, the George Meany of Mexican labor for 40 years. For decades. there have been strong com-
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munist groups in some of the key labor sectors: oil, communications, transportation, some northwest peasant groups, and others. The
combination of changes within the PRI, the success of the revolutions to the south, and the objective problems of the nation could
unleash a new labor radicalism, severely weakening the PRI from within.
At the same time, other more radical and violent leftist groups might begin to create a climate of fear and insecurity in 1982. It is all but
forgotten among Americans that communists fomented massive labor unrest in 1959 following Castro's victory in Cuba. In 1961, a
coalition of communist and radical groups was formed with help from Castro. It helped produce large student uprisings in 1966 and
1968 in which hundreds died. In the mid-1960s, as in much of Latin America, two or three Cuban-backed terrorist groups began a
campaign of kidnapping and murder which could flare into a far more active phase in 1982.
The huge Reforma oil fields in Southeastern Mexico are causing enormous disruption in the formerly rural way of life. Peasants
are being forced off their lands by the thousands, and the corrupt and incompetent administrative process results in too few cases of fair
compensation. In 1979, peasants were very successful (trial run?) in blocking oil production facilities and roads to protest their loss of
land and means of earning a living. These displaced peasants are among the 21 million Indians of Mexico who have always been un-
fairly treated-especially in the countryside. They are of Mayan origin, and the same ethnic and linguistic groups as those just over the
mountains in Guatemala. It would be logical for the new revolutionary government of Guatemala to establish relationships of solidarity
with some of these Mexican Indians, as well as those around the new Campeche oil fields in the Yucatan.
Well paid. highly skilled workers in an isolated setting have often been among the most radical in many different social contexts. This
might prove true among the 20,000 oil field workers in the southeast who are not permanent employees of PEMEX but rather hired
by contratistas and resent the bribes (20% of their pay) they have to give for the jobs. They, as well as the unionized PEMEX
workers, might begin to wonder where the oil billions are going, and might become a natural target for radical leftist recruitment, possibly
providing the leverage to shut down oil production at times of crisis.
Other political problems In Mexico include (1) the split between Portillo's economic cabinet (which wants to hold down oil pro-
duction to 2.5mbbl/day to prevent a sudden jump in inflation and other destabilizing effects) and PEMEX (which reportedly wants to
raise production to 4mbbl/day to generate the revenue to cover Mexico's debt service and support development): (2) the deterioration
of the agricultural economy: (3) the unprecedented number of candidates for President reflecting a decline in discipline within the PRI:
(4) the increasing pervasive use of anti-American rhetoric by most Mexican political groups: and (5) the poor US-Mexican diplomatic re-
lations.
A tactical scenario for destabilization might include the following elements. Internal dissension and debate weaken the PRI.
Radical terrorism accelerates and raises anxieties leading to less investment, loss of foreign capital and credit, and losses in jobs, In
imitation of the terrorists in Jamaica and Spain, tourists become a target and Mexico loses needed revenues and jobs. At the same time,
labor unrest spreads, civil servants and teachers protest against the government's anti-terrorism and strike breaking. Oil workers join the
protests and cripple production, costing Mexico desperately needed foreign exchange earnings used to pay for food imports and to repay
the huge bank loans (to a large degree, from U.S. banks). Mexican Indian guerrillas begin systematic sabotage of the oil pipelines and the
petro-chemical facilities-all of which bring about severe economic troubles. street riots and a downward spiral of protest and anarchy.
As the Iran next door unfolds in 1982, the American President meets with his Cabinet to determine how to save Mexico. The media
emphasizes the internal nature of the problem. Recent U.S.-Mexican relations, characterized by insensitivity and rancor (the Mexican
gas pricing dispute, the bitter exchange between the White House and Portillo over the Shah. Carter's disastrous trip to Mexico) leave
very limited U.S. political alternatives. The Pentagon informs the President that a military coup to restore order is impossible because the
security forces of Mexico are too spread out and too divided (as intended by the PRI leadership). In addition, this slow-motion second
revolution might well coincide with even more severe crisis in the Persian Gulf and in Central Europe or Africa. Potentially, by 1983, a
new revolutionary government in Mexico could offer non-intervention in American affairs (referring to the 8 million illegal Mexicans
living there) if the same is strictly observed by the United States.
III. THE AMERICAN BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE-LIMITED OPTIONS
American business has made massive investments in the region, and especially Mexico: bank loans, corporate extensions of credit,
product manufacturing plants, market development, employees. as well as contracts for energy and other raw materials. After assessing
the foregoing political scenario, many companies may find themselves facing a complex puzzle. If they believe their investments are in
danger. strategic planners may decide on withdrawal (e.g. Mexicanization of assets, accompanied by setting up management contracts
under control of the U.S. parent company). Such action, however. could not be done sufficiently quickly to avoid loss. and more to the
point, invesment withdrawals would exacerbate an already sensitive political situation. Further, a victory of radical leftists in Mexico
would be very bad for the United States and American business, whether or not assets were withdrawn.
The most workable course for American business is the most difficult: to encourage and work with both the U.S. and Mexican
governments and business associations to improve diplomatic relations and to begin to support democratic groups in Central America in
struggling against radical destabilization from the left and in discouraging repressive. over-reaction from the right. To counter what is
essentially a struggle of political ideas, business will need to find effective ways to communicate to Central American audiences the case
for democratic social reform and the mutual benefits of free trade relations. At the same time. businesses should also develop
contingency loss control programs. if these moderating efforts fail.
Future issues of ISI will contain updates on these trends.
Next issue of ISI-the future of the Persian Gulf.
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le
June 1980, Volume 1, Number 3.
AN ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIC FORECAST FOR TURKEY,
GREECE, AND YUGOSLAVIA: 1980-1982
The Aegean Triangle of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Cyprus represents a critical strategic area for
Europe and the United States. The death of Tito, combined with the eroding political and economic con-
iiit ons in Turkey and the strength of the socialists in Greece, brings enormous pressure upon this area
which could lead to serious problems for Western Europe and the U.S. during the next two years.
A hopeful view for this region is that the shared leadership system developed by Tito for Yugoslavia
will prevent ethnic and political factionalism from being used by the Soviets to split the country and that
the strong Yugoslav army will provide a sufficient deterrent against direct Soviet or Warsaw Pact military
intervention; that Turkey, with major outside economic help, will be able to generate a slow economic re-
covery, and that centrist democratic groups will be able to resist the increasing leftist terrorism, as well as
the threat of a military coup; that settlement of the Cyprus issue will diminish the chances of a socialist
victory in next year's elections in Greece, and allow a return to full Greek military participation in NATO.
turn attempt to succeed to power with guerrilla aid and arms through Yugoslavia (as in the 1944-1950
civil war). The results for the West of this scenario would be very serious-a major weakening of NATO
and strengthening of the Warsaw Pact: a significant increase in military flexibility for the Soviet Union
which would no longer need to worry about the Turkish armed forces or the strategic positioning of Tur-
key as a NATO ally; large defaults on Western loans and extensions of credit to Turkey; the loss of active
Greek participation in NATO and its increased neutralization; and the integration of Yugoslavia into the
Warsaw Pact, with possible Soviet bases on the Adriatic potentially threatening Italy and the remainder of
Western Europe.
CYPRUS -THE KEY TO THE ANTAGONISM SPLITTING THE AEGEAN TRIANGLE
Cyprus is at the heart of the conflict between Greece and Turkey. It became independent from Britain
in 1960, following a guerrilla war led mainly by the Greek Cypriots who account for 80% of the island's
800,000 people. Within a few years, communal war broke out between the Greek majority and the Turk-
ish minority with each of their homelands providing military help. In 1964, Turkey bombed several
Greek Cypriot villages, but its invasion threats were deterred by Soviet and American pressures. Turkey
felt that as a guarantor of the 1960 treaty establishing Cyprus, it had the right to intervene if the provisions
for the protection of the Turkish minority were being violated. A decade later, the Greek military junta
conspired to stage a coup on Cyprus and overthrew Archbishop Makarios as a step to enosis or union-
a long sought objective of some Greek nationalists.
That set off a chain reaction which included: the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey; the partition of the is-
land with 27.000 Turkish troops occupying 40% of the land and expelling Greek Cypriots; the fall of the
military government in Greece, with the restoration of democracy and the withdrawal of Greece from
military participation in NATO. For many in Greece and Turkey, the Cyprus question has been the
focus of hostility toward the U.S. for 16 years. Each nation views the U.S. as doing too little for its
cause and too much for the other. In Greece, the argument is that all the U.S. cares about is using Turkey
An alternative, highly plausible,
scenario is that internal ethnic divisions in
Yugoslavia, actively exploited by clandes-
tine Soviet action, will lead to a weakening
of the nationalist communist government
and its replacement by a pro-Soviet regime
leading to political alignment with the Soviet
bloc. that in Turkey the military will seize
power, or near anarchy will occur (as in
Iran), as a result of the country's rising terror-
ism and economic collapse; that lack of re-
solution of the Cyprus crisis will provide
the socialists with a strong issue to increase
their chances of gaining power in the Greek
elections scheduled for late 1981 and lead
to the de facto neutralization of Greece vis-
a-vis NATO, and that the communists will in
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A FORECASTING
TOOL FOR BUSINESS
Editor:
Dr. Constantine C. Menges
Published by:
SAGE Associates, Inc.
International Square
Suite 925
1875 Eye Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Phone: [phone]
Cable: "SAGECO, WASHDC"
For further information
about ISI or the consulting
services of SAGE, contact:
Mr. Grady E. Means
President
ISI is sold by subscription
at $190 per year; $30
for each extra copy
mailed in the same en-
velope.
Copyright 1980 by SAGE
Associates, Incorporated.
Reproduction or com-
mercial use without writ-
ten permission is pro-
hibited.
J
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as a buffer against Moscow and therefore will not act to force its withdrawal from Cyprus. For-Turkey, the embargo of U.S. arms sales following
the Cyprus invasion, which lasted until 1978. is seen as a victory of narrow ethnic group politics over the larger obligations of the NATO alliance.
TURKEY-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNRAVELLING AT THE INTERSECTION OF
NATO, THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE MIDDLE EAST
From a strategic point of view, few nations are more important to Western alliances than Turkey. Its half million troops and 3,500 tanks
guard the southern flank of NATO. Without that military power, the Soviet Union would be able to deploy additional troops against the borders
of Central Europe, Iran, and China. The Turkish army. along with the Israeli, represents the only major Western military force capable of a rapid
response in the Middle East, and thus could help protect vital Persian Gulf oil supplies in the face of increasing Soviet and radical left aggression.
In addition. Turkey has served as a Western intelligence gathering base, made all the more critical with the loss of facilities in Iran.
Among middle income nations, the World Bank ranks Turkey as one of the most successful. During the last two decades its economy grew at
an average rate of 4.4% per capita with industrial production advancing at 9% annually and agriculture also showing steady gains. The popu-
lation has increased from 19 million in 1950 to 45 million today and living conditions have improved for the majority.
The need to meet the OPEC oil price increases since 1974, along with the economic slowdown in Europe have combined to make the Turkey
of 1980 a stark warning of the troubles which will face many other countries in the next few years. Turkey had borrowed heavily to pay the
higher oil prices until the huge increase in 1979 made that course impossible. Turkish international borrowing grew from $4 billion in 1973 to
an officially acknowledged $14 billion today with an additional hidden debt of several billion dollars borrowed on short term from one group of
foreign banks to pay loans due others. By the autumn of 1979 Turkey could not pay back any foreign loans and even lacked enough foreign
exchange to pay for essential oil imports. Prime Minister Demirel said: "If you have high inflation (80% last year), if your factories stop, if one
million trucks are not working, if your foreign currency income is down to zero. . what do you do?"
The test of trouble might have included the growing unemployment now at 25 % of the labor force, the acute shortages of heating fuel
In a bitter cold winter along with the complete cut-off of electricity for some hours each day in most cities. Cumulatively, inflation has added
up to 300% in the last few years. Besides OPEC there were several other causes of these problems, including the low productivity of the
large government industry sector. Another source of problems has been the limitations on foreign investment and a large network of govern-
ment protection for nationalist reasons.
The International Monetary Fund has managed to reschedule and stretch out repayment of some of Turkey's 12 billion dollar foreign debt
in return for the usual austerity measures, which include: living standards cut temporarily in order to use government funds for productive
investments which create viable jobs; and increased use of market forces and competition to bring about quicker improvements than continuing
with the current patterns of government subsidies. To make this work, Turkish officials have negotiated a multi-billion dollar aid package
with the U.S. and West Germany. This money should permit oil to be imported to get industries moving, provide a way to restore foreign credits
by paying back and rescheduling loans, and reduce the economic hardship which the lowest income groups will feel in the next months.
With such foreign assistance, there should be grounds for hope under normal conditions. The military which has twice before taken
power (1960, 1971) told the two main political parties to put aside their sterile arguments and work together. If Bulent Ecevit and his opposition
party confine their attacks on the tough economic program to rhetoric while working quietly to encourage the labor unions to cooperate, the
chances for success will increase.
But Turkey does not face normal conditions. A campaign of internal war by organized terrorists has accelerated in the last two years.
In the last two years more than 2,500 persons have been killed by terrorists and 10,000 have been injured. The extreme left and communist
groups appear to be responsible for most of the killing, though recently they have been joined by extreme right wing nationalists, Shiite Islamic
radicals (inspired by Iran), and ethnic separatists.
The Hitler-Stalin agreements of 1940 listed what Moscow wanted from Turkey (and continues to aim for): permission to establish
military bases on its terrority; control of naval passage into the Black Sea through the Dardenelles Straits; the annexation of the border provinces
of Kars and Ardahan with large Armenian and Kurdish populations. In 1945 at the end of the war Moscow applied intense pressure seeking
these objectives and failed. In the 1950's, Turkey was a loyal member of NATO, fought in Korea, worked with the then pro-Western govern-
ments of Iraq, Iran and Pakistan to establish the Baghdad Pact and signed a mutual defense agreement with the United States.
Beginning in the early 1960's, the Soviet Union decided to pursue an entirely different approach to its relations with both Turkey and Iran. At
the level of government to government relations, Moscow encouraged normalization through the exchange of high level visitors, cul-
tural diplomacy and greatly expanded economic relations. This process began in 1963 a few weeks after the American withdrawal of the Ju-
piter Intermediate range missiles (part of the Cuban missile crisis settlements) and reflected Turkish irritation with Washington's stand on the
Cyprus question in 1964 as well as a desire for greater independence. Upon his return from a Soviet visit in 1967, Premier Demirel (who now is
serving in that office for the fifth time) said that his visit has ended "the last traces of hostility" in Soviet-Turkish relations. Today the Soviet Union
Is Turkey's sixth biggest customer (ahead of the United States), supplies 10% of Turkey's oil which is paid for with wheat and has extended one
billion dollars in credits during the last decade-compared with about $17 billion from the West since 1974. Although condemning the Soviet
Invasion of Afghanistan, the Turkish government insists the American bases on its soil are limited to NATO responsibilities-meaning not for use
in the Middle East. Similarly, Turkish airspace cannot be used by American U-2 aircraft to make up for the loss of strategic weapons monitoring
facilities in Iran.
Unfortunately for Turkey, Moscow has shown no inhibitions at the level of Its clandestine actions. One author described "A brutal cam-
paign of urban terrorism, kidnapping and assassination. . directed against Turkey...which began in the early 1960's with a few agents recruited
by KGB officers working out of the Soviet embassy in Ankara and trained in the Soviet Union. . this cadre inducted more radicals into the
terrorist movement some of whom were slipped into adjoining Syria for training in camps supervised by the Russians" (J. Barron, KGB, 1974).
Present estimates are that thousands of radical left terrorists are active in Turkey. Besides the Turkish People's Liberation Army, the Marx-
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ist-Leninst Armed Propaganda Union and others, these include elements of the Armenian and Kurdish communities with long ties to
Soviet sponsors.
A new development, that should cause deep concern in Ankara, is the use of official East German and Czechoslovakian radio trans-
mitters to broadcast calls by the illegal Turkish Communist Party for strikes, demonstrations and terrorism against the fascist state. In 1978
similar broadcasts by the Tudeh (Communist) Party of Iran were permitted by official transmitters in Bulgaria only after the Soviet leadership
had concluded that the time had come to put the full weight of its clandestine resources behind the effort to bring the Shah down.
From a Marxist-Leninst perspective Turkey is ripe for revolution. Sharp austerity is being imposed on the working people in order to buy
oil from rich feudal rulers and pay back loans to imperialist banks and countries. The terrorist networks are obviously competent and the economic
situation provides innumerable occasions to stimulate strikes, demand lower prices or higher wages and use hostages, bombs and murder in the
name of the people. From the Soviet perspective, any development that weakens Turkey and radicalizes it further are favorable-whether a
military coup, a radical Islamic or leftist regime or fragmentation into different ethnic and religious entities. The Soviets feel that any one of these
forms of turmoil could remove Turkey as a potential military threat-witness Iran. Collapse in Turkey would have damaging psychological re-
percussions in both Europe and the Middle East. Further, the half million strong Turkish army with its 3,500 tanks and the intelligence posts
along the Soviet borders are all the more important in view of the loss of similar facilities in Iran and the delay in SALT II.
GREECE-MOVEMENT TOWARD NEUTRALITY, HINGING ON CYPRUS
Premier Constantine Karamanlis restored democratic government after the disastrous period of Greek military rule (1967-74). He has just
decided to take the more ceremonial office of President and new parliamentary elections are to be held late next year. Recent public opinion
polls indicate that, if those elections were held now, the socialists would win control of the government. Under the leadership of Andreas
Papandreou, the socialist party has opposed any return to military cooperation in NATO. It has used the mistaken but widespread perception
of the CIA as responsible for the harsh military dictatorship (1967-74), and the Turkish 1974 invasion of Cyprus with American weapons as
the focal points for an anti-American campaign. This has had much of the emotional intensity of the propaganda coming from Iran about our
responsibility for the repression of the Shah. Anti-Americanism serves the partisan purpose of discrediting the current government and It is a
device to win over the significant block of communist voters who hate the United States because it supplied the help that prevented their victory
in the bloody civil war which lasted from 1944 to 1950.
Without a resolution of the Cyprus question, that would virtually assure the movement of Greece into de facto neutrality. This would harm
the West in three ways. It would make it more difficult to resist the certain Soviet effort to use the post-Tito succession struggle within the eth-
nically divided Yugoslavian communist party as the occasion to Install a pro-Moscow regime. In combination with recent events in the Middle
East, a neutral Greece would probably further undermine the morale of anti-Soviet Yugoslavs to the point of making any struggle with a deter-
mined Moscow appear hopeless. Second, Germany as the most threatened NATO country would have to view the collapse of the prospects for
real unity among the 15 NATO nations with deep anxiety. Third, Turkey would then have a strong incentive to choose appeasement rather
than resistance to Soviet pressures.
YUGOSLAVIA-SOVIET TARGET AND POTENTIAL TRIGGER FOR POLITICAL INSTABILITY
World-wide attention is now focussed on post-Tito Yugoslavia, in order to determine whether its complex government with rotating, shared
responsibility will be able to maintain national unity and resist potential aggression from the Soviet Union and its proxies. For three decades,
Soviet agents have carefully cultivated leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party, and the secret police in order to enlist their help In moving
Yugoslavia into the Soviet sphere of influence after the death of Tito. Options now open to the Soviet Union include continued cultivation of
the leadership, combined with clandestine efforts to use traditional ethnic rivalries (contained by Tito) to split the leadership and the country,
along with the implicit threat or outright use of military power.
Within the complex interplay of events in the Aegean Triangle, the political relationship between Yugoslavia and Greece will depend to a
great degree on the timing of events. If the socialists should take control of the Greek government in 1981 before Yugoslavia faces major In-
ternal crises, then a de facto neutralist Greece will not be available as a necessary point from which NATO could try to prevent internal factional-
ism or external military pressure from splitting Yugoslavia and moving it under Moscow's control. On the other hand, once Yugoslavia is con-
trolled by the Soviets, it could become a direct conduit for military and guerrilla aid to be used to bring communists to power in Greece (much
as was tried between 1944 and 1950). It could also become a base for Soviet activity In the Adriatic, potentially targeted on Italy and Southern
Europe.
To counter this ominous outcome, the U.S. and its Western allies should push for a settlement of the Cyprus issue, but also support actively
(to the degree possible) any policies of liberalization in Yugoslavia and any movement of Yugoslavia closer to the West as a defense against
Soviet subversion or invasion.
A SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM-AN IMMEDIATE REQUIREMENT TO
PREVENT SERIOUS LOSSES IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
For two years, Turkey has been blocking the reentry of Greece into the military wing of NATO and it has been asserting claims over some
nearby Greek islands where 600,000 Greeks live. The real and present Soviet and radical threats to its continued existence and independence
can provide the incentive for Turkey to alter Its policies and improve its relations with Greece and the rest of NATO only if this is made an
integral part of the larger scale economic aid that has been agreed upon.
It is estimated that Turkey needs help of Marshall plan proportions or about $1.5 billion more each year for several years. The United States
and Germany have organized such economic help and it should be placed now in the context of an explicit or private Greek-Turkish agreement
in the following areas: the phased withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus and the enlargement of the existing United Nations force to assure
the rights of all Cypriots; the payment of reasonable compensation to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots who have lost property as a result of
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events since 1974; the immediate ending of Turkish opposition to the military participation of Greece in NATO; the termination of
Turkish territorial claims to Greek islands and the establishment of a binding arbitration panel to settle within a fixed time period all other
reciprocal claims concerning the sea-bed, airspace, compensation and the like. Equally important, both governments should agree to a
program of exchanges among citizens, media representatives, political and cultural leaders with the purpose of improving relationships
between their two peoples.
In a direct sense. Germany is on the front line in NATO and therefore realizes that it has the most to gain or lose in the Aegean Tri-
angle. A stronger NATO and an independent Yugoslavia reduce the risks that Moscow will shift back from trade to threats in Central
Europe. Germany is also in the strongest financial position to carry most of the burden of financial aid for Turkey and the Schmidt gov
ernment has already agreed to play the major role. This means that now is the time for Washington and Bonn to agree that they should
quietly and discreetly use financial incentives already offered to Turkey as a means for encouraging Turkey and Greece to accept the
agreement outlined above. The military in Turkey should he receptive because they must understand that the fate of the Iranian generals
awaits them if they fail to focus their attention on the radical terrorist threat. It should appeal to Turkish political leaders because they
know their destiny depends heavily on the success of the economic reforms which in turn require large foreign credits.
THE LIKELY POLITICAL FORECAST: MAJOR LOSSES FOR THE WEST
Regretably, the current opportunity to move constructively on the Cyprus issue is not being taken up by the U.S. or West Germany.
The timetable is clear-a settlement must be reached on the Cyprus issue well before the Greek elections next year. (This assumes that
the recent economic aid package to Turkey will forestall the Turkish military for the time being from seizing power.)
If the next months are not used to reach such agreement, however, the likelihood is increased that the military will take power in Turkey
and the socialists will win in Greece. In that event, factional politics within the Turkish military and its heightened dependence on Turkish
nationalist groups as a political base after their seizure of power deepens the internal polarization and would probably prevent Turkey from
compromising. In Greece the anti-American socialists will hold out for international pressure on Turkey-perhaps including the Soviet
Union-rather than compromise as their answer to Cyprus. The Karamenlis centrists would hesitate to make a deal with a military gov-
ernment in Turkey because that would open them to sharp criticism from both nationalists and the left. With neither side likely to be able
or willing to make the necessary compromises, the negative Aegean spiral could become another example of tragic history, resulting in
the de facto neutralization of Greece; the isolation of Turkey and a continuation of its destabilization process; and increased prospects for
Soviet dominance of Yugoslavia since Western help for the post-Tito groups would require cooperation not likely to be given by a neutral
Greece.
Such an unfortunate chain of events could easily take place before the end of 1981, unless the major democracies act. Unfortunately,
there is every indication that sufficient action will not be forthcoming. Two recent events signal the problem. The Carter Administration
has told Congress that it looks to the United Nations for a solution to the Cyprus issue. That routine approach will not be enough and re-
flects a lack of strategic foresight. Secondly, the U.S. and Germany, in developing their very helpful aid package for Turkey, have shown
no signs that they are attempting to persuade Turkey, as an implicit condition for such aid, to begin to move toward an agreement on the
Cyprus issue, such as that outlined above, even though Congress modified the arms embargo in 1978 to specify as a condition of re-
newed aid that there be progress on resolving the Cyprus issue. In lieu of such strong and serious action, the pessimis-
tic scenario becomes more inevitable.
ISI UPDATE-"ISOLATED EVENTS" IN MAY
Central America and Mexico (See ISI, Vol. 1, No. 1)
The Friedrick Ebert Foundation, representing the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD), held a conference in
Costa Rica at the end of May to create a committee against repression in Guatemala as part of its mistaken strategy to unite the demo-
cratic left and the communist left in a struggle against the terrorist dictatorship, following its pattern in Nicaragua (1979) and El Salvador
(1980). It unfortunately suggests that continuing division of democratic groups, leading to further political polarization, and an accelera-
tion of the forecast outlined in ISI:1,1..........Guatemala-new reports of weapons and logistical support equipment for guerillas being
shipped across the border from Mexico, as well as from Nicaragua, Honduras, and Cuba.........ElSalvador-a continuing pattern of
terrorism from the left and right with the left now carrying out small unit operations with several communist radical calls in May for a final
offensive against the government.........with U.S. prodding, the El Salvador government and armed forces have begun moving against
right wing extremists, and in response the U.S. Embassy was surrounded by apparent rightists, and Ambassador White required a military
guard to escape before the embassy was firebombed and sprayed with machine gun fire......... Nicaragua-two moderates were placed on
the Junta, but the fully Marxist governing Directorate has not been changed.........the State Department announced that the Soviet Un-
ion has signed economic agreements with the ruling Nicaraguan Sandanista Marxist Party and Cuba is supplying military advisors.
Persian Gulf (See ISI, Vol. 1, No. 2)
The Israeli/Egyptian peace talks failed to meet the May 26 deadline on reaching agreement on the approach to the Palestinian
issue........ the Begin government has adopted a more hard-line stance on the major issues of Jerusalem and the West Bank ......... Sadat
reflected his anxiety over his post-May 26 vulnerability by withdrawing from the talks. then returning, reshuffling his government, and ask-
ing the 'U.S. to intervene with new proposals.......Yassir Arafat and the leaders of the Palestinian terrorist groups met in Syria on May
22 to plan post-May 26 strategy which may be aimed at increasing the pressure to oust Sadat building up toward the mid-summer holy
month of Ramadan (which occurs at the same time the U.S. is maximally distracted by the Presidential election.)
NEXT ISSUE OF ISI: NEUTRALIST AND LEFTIST PRESSURES ON WEST GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY.
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