THE STATE OF SOVIET ANALYSIS IN CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120008-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 2, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120008-2
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120008-2
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120008-2
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA
2 July 1974
1. A memorandum addressing a subject as broad as the status of
Sovietology in CIA easily could have the effectiveness of a shotgun at
long range, that is, cover the target broadly but to no effect. To
forestall that possibility, this memorandum will focus on just three
aspects of the analysis of Soviet affairs in CIA--the appropriate use
of the small group of trained Sovietologists, bureaucratic barriers to
better analysis, and the current direction of the Office of Political
Research.*
2. Analysis of Soviet affairs in CIA falls primarily into three
broad categories--economic, military and political. Because intelligence
sources and methods are particularly well-suited to gathering information
on Soviet economic and military performance and capabilities, Intelligence.
analysts in these areas currently are doing rather well in providing the
policymaker with-accurate-and-useful information.
3. Political analysis of Soviet affairs, on the other hand, is both
more subjective and more difficult. The political analyst is called upon
(a) to analyze and explain past events, and (b) to predict Soviet intentions.
The first task is being performed well by Intelligence specialists;
analytical papers of this type repeatedly have received compliments from
the highest levels of the government. It is the second or predictive task,
however,'that holds greatest interest for the policymaker. And it is
precisely in this task that political analysts face the most difficult
obstacles and possess the fewest assets. Much of the problem is inherent in
the thankless task of trying to predict the intentions of any political
leader or group of leaders, a problem compounded many times over when
dealing with a closed and culturally dissimilar society such as that of
the Soviet Union.
*This memorandum addresses only the topic of Soviet analysis, but it should
be evident that the problems and related recommendations would probably
be similar,in other areas.
Impossible to Determine
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SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA
4. While many of the problems affecting the quality of Intelligence
analysis of Soviet intentions are not susceptible to resolution or even
diminution by Intelligence managers, there are at least three that could
be remedied or at least ameliorated:
a. Analysts with experience and specialized training in Soviet
politics and history are often "promoted" out of analytical positions,
thus squandering an important Intelligence asset.
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b.? Necessary bureaucratic divisions of labor (OER, OSR, OPR)
have had the effect of encouraging narrow perspective.on the part of
specialists in each area; few analysts are knowledgable in areas of
Soviet affairs beyond their own.
=c. The relatively small group of Soviet analysts whose experience
and talent resulted in their selection for OPR are not being employed
on short or near term projects of important policy interest such as
NSSM/NSDM responses., NIEs, policy support memoranda, and even major
analytical articles for the NID.
5. The following recommendations may prove helpful in coming to grips
with the above problems.
a. Experienced and trained Soviet analysts should be assigned
with care and provided with incentives to remain "on the line," that
is, not forced to move out of analysis or substance to obtain
.promotions or job satisfaction. It is important not only that career
Soviet specialists have the opportunity to rise to Grade 15, but also
that psychic incentives be further developed to reinforce the analyst's
self-esteem and job satisfaction and thence contentment to remain an
analyst. Such incentives should also be developed so as to encourage
originality of thought, analytical imagination, and greater cross-
fertilization of ideas. The quality of analysis clearly is diminished
by the simple fact that the analyst sitting at his desk day in, day
out becomes complacent, his perspective narrow, and his perceptions
stale.
b. Arrangements should be made for the rotation of individual
Soviet analysts from one office to another (i.e. OPR to OER, OSR to
OPR, etc.) on a regular though limited basis. Assignments of six
months to a year would not only allow, say, a political analyst to
gain useful knowledge about Soviet strategic programs or the Soviet
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SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA
economy, but would also bring a new perspective to the work of
analysts in those areas. It seems indisputable that such cross-
fertilization would improve the analysis of all and at the same
time develop contacts for future consultation among Soviet
specialists in different areas.
c. OPR appears to be moving in the direction ofrbecommiing.
another Special Research Staff (recently deceased), programming
long term research projects on topics often not relevant to
current policy issues. A situation in which our best Soviet-
ologists have little or no role in current or near term support
is unsatisfactory and a misapplication of Intelligence resources.
Consideration should be given to organizing OPR's Soviet staff
so as to derive maximum benefit from the analysts' expertise.
The Staff, small though it is, should be organized so that analysts
are assigned to research-projects (such as those currently pro-
grammed), to near term projects (NSSMs/NSDMs, NIEs, etc.) and to
current support (policy support memoranda for the Secretary of
State and NSC Staff, preparation of analytical articles for the
NID, and so forth). Thus, in each of these important areas where
Intelligence is asked to make contributions, its best qualified
Soviet experts will,have focused on the problem.
6. Finally, it may come as a surprising and dismaying fact that the
number of trained and experienced Soviet analysts is probably too small to
perform all of the important tasks noted above. Managers should realize
that there is a need for career Sovietologists--especially those skilled
in Soviet internal affairs--and that little effort is being devoted either
to recruiting them from the academe or to selecting talented analysts in
other areas of the Agency for formal (i.e. not just "on-the-job") training
in Soviet affairs.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/08/27: CIA-RDP95M00249R000801120008-2