THE PREDICTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95M00249R000801110020-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 20
• Content Type: REPORT

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Through a glass darkly
THE PREDICTION OF SOVIET INTENTIONS
The record of U.S. intelligence in anticipating Soviet tactical and inter-
mediate-range intentions, understanding them, and putting them in proper
perspective is not particularly distinguished. We were unable (except, of course,
for the then DCI) to predict the Soviet intention to put missiles into Cuba until
we saw the photographs of them already there. We failed to anticipate the con-
struction of the Berlin Wall, the ouster of Khrushchev, the timing of the invasion
of Czechoslovakia, and other events of importance.
More significantly, we often have failed to understand-or at least have not
conveyed to the policy maker-the larger meaning of major Soviet initiatives,
and to give proper perspective to Soviet actions. We were much too tardy, for
example, in coming to realize the seriousness of differences between China and
the USSR, and the effect of these differences-particularly in the mid-1950's-
on Soviet policy. Similarly, we were slow to recognize the importance and scope
of the Soviet "peace program" in the late 1960's, even after its formal approval
by the 24th Party Congress.
The conclusion is inescapable that-while intelligence assessments of Soviet
military and economic capabilities have been remarkably accurate-treatment of
Soviet political intentions and decisions has not measured up.
Why We Have Done Poorly
Our failure to anticipate or even interpret these and other developments
better should come as no surprise. It derives in no small way from the difficulty
inherent in trying to predict how political leaders perceive situations, and how
they will react in given set of circumstances. It is a very difficult task in a free
society; it is that much harder in a closed one, where little if anything is known of
the personal lives and psyches of individual leaders, or of internal battles
at the top.
The Soviet Union is such a society. It has no free press to bare state secrets
or personal rivalries, to expose options under consideration by the leadership, or
any of the other juicy tidbits familiar to the American newspaper reader. Except
for occasional glimpses in the press of internal institutional disputes, discussion
of state policy and intentions is carried on in secret-and there are few leaks.
Moreover, instead of a single decision maker, the Soviet system has a 15-man
Politburo and a Central Committee of several hundred members, in both of
which constantly shifting balances can make or undo any plan or intention.
Perhaps the most difficult challenge is analyzing correctly the Soviets'
perception of problems and opportunities, both foreign and domestic. There is
a wide cultural gap between a college-educated analyst in the West and the
Soviet leadership. As Robert Conquest has stated, "the Soviet leaders are not to
be treated as though their motives and conceptions were in our sense natural
and rational. The particular leadership now in control in Russia derives from a
tradition which is alien in both aim and method to our own." Not only are they
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the products of a centuries-old system of absolutist rule; they are far more isolated
from Western ideas and experience than even their Tsarist predecessors. Few
among those at the top level have traveled widely, much less spent any period
of time in the West. Their narrowness is difficult to comprehend. The Czech
Communist leaders, returning from Moscow in late 1968, remarked that they had
expected narrow dogmatists, but not "vulgar thugs." While that is perhaps too
strong, the fact remains that our perception of situations is probably widely
divergent from the Kremlin's perception of those same situations. The Soviet
Union is a strange and idiosyncratic polity, not to be understood or dealt with
without considerable conscious effort. And often even that is not enough.
Another factor complicating our assessment of Soviet intentions is the role
of error and irrationality in the Kremlin. No political leadership is immune to
mistakes and, indeed, the Soviets have made their share. Just as important,
however, is the mental attitude of the leadership. For example, the Soviets, lack-
ing reliable allies, throughout their history have had a certain siege mentality.
Moreover, they are clearly concerned about their relative backwardness, a point
underliped by Khrushchev's admission of a sense of inferiority over his smaller
plane as he flew into Geneva in 1955 and, even now, their continued insistence
on dealing on the basis of "equality." Thus, there is the possibility that after
analyzing all the facts and alternatives, the Soviet leadership will react out of
personal spite, a sense of psychological or cultural inferiority, or fear.
In discussing the vagaries of personality and differences in culture, we have
just scratched the surface of the difficulty of predicting Soviet intentions. For
example, one invaluable legacy bequeathed by Lenin to his successors was a
sense of political expediency and opportunism probably without modern equal.
Stalin and his successors were relieved by historical determinism of the need to
be concerned about the final victory or defeat of Communism. Their main task
has been the survival of the "home of socialism" and the furthering of its interests.
For that task, Lenin's legacy was essential, imbuing Soviet internal and foreign
intentions with almost unrivalled flexibility-and unpredictability.
The changeability of Soviet intentions, foreign and domestic, is a natural
product of the internal political process. The Soviet Union, like other countries,
is continually beset by minor crises. In that dictatorial, ultra-centralized system,
however, the number of these time- and energy-consuming problems demanding
the attention of the top leadership is magnified many times. As a result, the
Politburo probably can only rarely take the time-and then only some members
of it-to reflect on future problems or future opportunities, and then come to a
decision on how best to meet a problem or exploit an opportunity. Consequently,
it seems likely that few Soviet "intentions" emerge as the result of a conscious
attempt to formulate long-range or even middle-range plans.
Those few intentions which do receive lengthy consideration and require a
clear-cut decision by the leadership generally concern large objectives often in-
timately related to economic or military issues. The difficulty in reaching deci-
sions even on these is well illustrated by the quinquennial travail over the Five
Year Plan. Bruising bureaucratic struggles over resource allocation, priorities
for various industries, and even the general direction of the Plan-whether to
emphasize heavy industry, the consumer, or agriculture-are involved in a
preparation process drawn out over months and even years. Yet after a decision
is made, the plan is still subject to alteration and modification throughout its
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existence. A similarly difficult time probably attends decisions on long-range
military intentions. A debacle, such as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, can perhaps
galvanize wide support to build a strategic force equal to that of the United
States, but other decisions on particular weapon systems, the strength of conven-
tional forces, and so forth no doubt call forth the worst demons of bureaucratic
and political rivalry.
Less cosmic issues, however, may never demand a conscious decision by the
Politburo. In many instances, plans or intentions have a life of their own, drifting
along earlier guidelines until circumstances force a change. Intentions are some-
times the product of an internal political trade-off or compromise in which one
faction agrees to support another's program in return for a similar favor. There
are also intentions decided by events, in which the leadership finds itself in a
situation where national pride, internal politics, or commitments preclude bailing
out, and leave only the course of pressing ahead. Soviet Middle East policy in
early 1970 could be an example of this. Moreover, some Soviet intentions probably
are born full-grown because of the actions of a representative or client which the
Kremlin may find either too embarrassing or too inconvenient to disavow.
? Yet another element in calculating Soviet intentions is the fact that one
intention can evolve into another-with attendant changes in rationale. As an
example, the Moscow anti-ballistic missile, apparently originally intended as a
defense of the capital against major attack, was scaled down because of its
inadequacy in the face of increasingly sophisticated offensive systems. Over time,
both the intention and the rationalization evolved into something quite different
from those originally envisaged. A political equivalent is suggested by Soviet
initiatives for a conference on European security. First broached in the 1950's
as an anti-German measure, such a conference has more recently been seen by
Moscow as a means to insure Soviet involvement in Europe in the future and to
speed the reduction of U.S. influence and its military presence on the Continent.
A change in leadership also can significantly alter intentions, as evidenced by
the replacement of Khrushchev in 1964. Soviet intentions in a number of areas
both at home and abroad were modified, in some cases substantially, in his wake.
Changes at even less exalted levels also can influence the direction of Soviet
intentions, whether it be the death or replacement of a high-level economic baron,
a military leader, or a political/party figure.
Finally, the bureaucracy can affect the interpretation and implementation
of a given intention. Aside from sheer incompetence, bureaucracies can drag their
feet in putting policies or intentions into practice, and can even actively obstruct
the will of a political leadership-particularly if special bureaucratic interests are
at stake. Moreover, bureaucratic inertia can also thwart the intentions of
the leadership.
External Influences
The plans and policies of the USSR, like those of every country, are subject
to external forces-the initiatives of other governments, foreign aggression,
internal turmoil in client or subject states, and so forth. Soviet sensitivity to
the actions and intentions of other powers is particularly acute in view of the
new relationship between the United States and China.
It is frequently argued on the one hand that Soviet intentions are formed in
reaction to outside influences or pressures, or on the other hand that they are
planned well in advance and are ruthlessly implemented. Both of these formula-
tions are too simple. For example, the same intention can be both reactive and
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assertive, depending on the perspective. Current Soviet initiatives and intentions
in Western Europe can be seen as a reaction to the Chinese problem and the
possibility of closer U.S.-Chinese relations. Yet in a strictly European context,
those same intentions are quite assertive. The important lesson, however, is
that external influence-whether it be an opportunity to exploit or a problem to
be dealt with-significantly affects Soviet intentions and substantially increases
their mutability.
Capabilities
Another factor affecting Soviet intentions is that of capability. If there are
no troops or installations on the Sino-Soviet border, a large-scale ground attack
on China clearly is not a near-term Soviet intention; if there is no missile in
service or under development accurate enough, or with a warhead big enough, to
destroy a Minuteman in its silo, then there is probably no intention of a first
strike. The absence of capability thus can effectively preclude intention. Un-
fortunately for the analyst, the reverse is not true: the existence of capability
does not necessarily indicate the intention to use it. A good example of this was
the SinotSoviet border situation in 1969, when some analysts believed that the
Soviets would attack China because they had the capability. This was a failure
to predict Moscow's intention accurately. The task of analyzing Soviet intentions
can only become more difficult as Soviet military capabilities are expanded to a
point where Moscow has numerous options in a given situation.
In assessing Soviet intentions, a point often overlooked is that political as
well as military capabilities must be considered. The Soviet system itself imposes
certain limitations on the leadership. It would be unthinkable, for example, for
the Politburo to contemplate dismantling the system of collectivized agriculture.
Even though that would benefit the country economically, it is an unacceptable
alternative for political and ideological reasons. Similarly, removing censorship
is also beyond the political, though not the physical, capability of the leadership.
The limitations posed by political and ideological capabilities-or lack thereof-
often narrow the alternatives or intentions open to the ruling elite in
internal affairs.
On the other hand, in the Soviet system political capabilities in foreign policy
broaden rather than limit the range of possible intentions. Answering to none but
those in power, inseparably tied to no ally, the Soviet Union politically is capable
of justifying-and doing-virtually anything. The Soviet Union has never been
inhibited from collaborating with another power because it would demand for-
saking ideological principles or the interests of an erstwhile ally.
Scope and Time
So far, we have elaborated a number of factors which together make Soviet
intentions extremely changeable and therefore quite elusive. Internal politics,
external influences, and a host of other pressures all render "intentions," even the
most fundamental, a mixed and constantly changing bag of expediency, com-
promise decisions, indecision, expressions of personal influence, and opportunism.
As if that did not make them baffling enough to sort out, they also vary according
to their scope and time frame.
. The most important intentions, and therefore those relatively less flexible,
are the ones concerning long-term strategy. These broad intentions are generally
expressions of Soviet national interest and are consequently relatively durable
and predictable-although the means of their achievement are remarkably
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flexible. Attempts to achieve military parity with the U-nited States, the political
and military neutralization of Western Europe, and the military and political
containment of China are examples of durable strategic intentions. The Soviets
have in mind specific methods for fulfilling each, yet are aware that their accom-
plishment-if possible at all-will take years.
Intentions of lesser scope and of shorter range may be considered tactical,
and they often relate to the specific means of achieving strategic intentions.
Referring to the same examples cited above, the development of a specific weapon
system such as the SS-9 is a tactical move intended to help realize the strategic
intention of parity; the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and
discussions of mutual force reductions reflect tactical intentions to achieve West
European neutralization; and the friendship treaties and military/economic aid
in South Asia, a tactical means to contain China. Tactical intentions also en-
'compass sudden military deployments, VIP visits or tours, friendship treaties,
and so on. These kinds of intentions are especially subject to expediency, oppor-
tunism, and chance; they are easily altered or eliminated, and replaced by some-
thing more likely to help achieve the larger objective. They may take a few years
to achieve, or only a few months.
Of course, some Soviet intentions are a mix of strategic and tactical inten-
tions. The invasion of Czechoslovakia involved all kinds of tactical aspects,
including the military preparation, the date of invasion, and political action. At
the same time, however, the invasion fulfilled a strategic intention which was to
limit, if not destroy, the influence of Czech reformism on the other satellites and
the USSR itself.
Priority and Action
Two final factors affecting intentions need to be mentioned. Most strategic
intentions are by definition vitally important to the Soviet Union. But shorter-
range tactical intentions have widely differing priorities. For example, shipping
Soviet military equipment and personnel to Egypt in early 1970 for a time clearly
had a higher priority than sending military aid to other third world countries.
A second factor is the frequent gap between intention and action. The best-
laid plans often go awry, and for a multitude of reasons intentions can fail to
become accomplished deeds. Any of the variables cited in this essay can consign
an intention to oblivion. By the same token, it would be attributing too much
foresight to the Soviets to assume that all their actions flow from intentions, to
believe that every move is calculated and planned. Often the Soviets are caught
in situations not of their own making, where they must act without prior planning.
Their intercession in the Jordanian-Syrian crisis in September 1970 is a good
example of this, as were their reactions to the first Chinese border incursion in
March 1969 and to their expulsion from Egypt in July 1972. These responses had
not been programmed beforehand; they were last-minute reactions to critical
situations.
All the foregoing hopefully suggests the enormous pliancy and complexity
characteristic of Soviet intentions. Such intentions are decided, develop, evolve,
or simply spring forth in a myriad of ways, and even the most important are
subject to alteration. They clearly are not decided for the coming year or decade
by 15 men in Politburo assembled and voting for the record. Soviet intentions are
far more elusive, both- in formulation and practice, than that. Lenin's legacy,
that sense of political expendiency and flexibility, is plainly still with us-and
perhaps becoming ever more important.
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Our Limited Assets
The problems posed to the analyst in predicting Soviet intentions could be
somewhat diminished, one might think, by the unique assets available to intelli-
gence. Yet, in reality, our intelligence collection capabilities are not very adept at
obtaining accurate or reliable information on the thinking of the Soviet leader-
ship. U.S. intelligence resources and the overt press are best suited to collecting
intelligence on military hardware and the economy. Except for occasional bits of
special intelligence, defectors, and unique finds like Penkovskiy, these collection
methods only rarely provide the access to the Kremlin necessary to analyze
Soviet intentions with assurance. Thus, in predicting Soviet intentions, we work
in an area where our special assets are of only marginal assistance.
Equally as important as our collection problems are our intellectual problems
ir; analyzing the Soviet Union. As the Soviet leaders follow a certain policy for a
period of time, the analyst perceives a pattern of response. It is within the context
of that pattern that the political analyst interprets and predicts Soviet behavior.
All too often, however, when the policy and hence the pattern change, there is a
lag between that change and the analyst's perception of it. Indeed, where we
consistently fail to measure up is in detecting such changes soon enough to help
the policy maker.
What is needed, in effect, is "near-real-time" political interpretation. The
analyst must somehow perceive a change in policy between the time the decision
is made in Moscow and the time when that change is manifested in action-such
as the building of the Berlin Wall or the dispatch of missiles to Cuba. Without our
ever-yearned-for source on the Politburo, this is indeed a difficult task. And what-
ever chance of success we have is further diminished by the simple fact that the
analyst sitting at his desk day in, day out becomes complacent, his perspective
narrow, and his perceptions stale.
Our Analytical Weapons
Despite this litany of analytical woe, we are not altogether helpless. We
know something, for example, about the Soviet leadership. We know something
about their personalities and their methods of cooperation. We know generally
how Brezhnev's techniques and style differ from those of Khrushchev, and how
Khrushchev's were different from Stalin's. If we are not in the position of being
able to read their intentions at a given moment, we still have a reasonable
knowledge of the motivations and attitudes which will go to form those inten-
tions. We are, it may be said, "in the position of a general, who naturally does not
know his opponent's intentions, but knows the style and traditions of that
opponent's army and his personal style of fighting."
In addition, as mentioned above, we in intelligence have the invaluable
asset of knowing a good deal about our opponent's capabilities. Our assessments
of his military strength, present and future, have been proved accurate time
and again. We are helped by a detailed knowledge of his economy and its capa-
bilities and limitations. And knowledge of the Soviet system gives us a rather
accurate reading of his domestic and foreign political capabilities. We have some
good insights into how that system works, into what makes it tick.
We also have the important asset of experience in looking at Soviet affairs.
The lessons learned during years of analysis have been passed down, along with
an enormous body of information collected on the USSR. Moreover, we have
individual analysts whose long experience provides them with useful insights
into Soviet actions and intentions. Finally, the ability for frequent assembly
of specialists in Soviet propaganda, internal affairs, foreign policy, the military,
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and the economy, to focus on a particular subject or to exchange ideas and
information, gives intelligence perhaps a unique institutional capability.
Doing the Job Better
Nevertheless, in view of our past record, to say we will keep plugging away
at the problem is not enough. Specific steps can be taken to improve our ability
at least to offer the policy maker a more accurate appraisal of the options open to
the Soviet leaders in a given situation, and to provide a better estimate of their
more likely choices. Moreover, there are ways to improve our ability to under-
stand and to report the significance of Soviet actions, and to place them in
perspective in relation to larger Soviet aims.
At relatively little expense and inconvenience, the following remedial
measures could be undertaken:
As stated earlier, there is a tremendous cultural and historical gap between the
USSR and the West. An analyst trying to understand the mentality of the Soviet
leaders or their approach to or perception of problems is seriously handicapped with-
out some background in Soviet history and, in particular, Russian history and culture.
The importance of understanding this Russian heritage in analyzing present Soviet
thinking and behavior can hardly be overemphasized. Intelligence agencies should
take steps to insure that future analysts have training in Russian and Soviet history
and culture. Analysts now in place without such training should be sent to school to
acquire it.
To encourage originality of thought and analytical imagination, and generally to
stimulate greater cross-fertilization of ideas, there should be instituted a regular rota-
tion of Soviet political analysts and supervisors among offices with current, esti-
mative, and in-depth research responsibilities. The perspective each could bring to
the others would undoubtedly improve the analysis of all.
Further to stimulate analytical imagination, originality, and perspective, periodic-
but frequent-exchanges should be arranged between intelligence analysts of Soviet
affairs and provocative specialists on the USSR outside the government, e.g. Adam
L r+a.p, George Kennan, Robert Conquest. Such men are experienced and well-
versed in Soviet affairs; it is a terrific waste of a valuable asset not to be able to probe
their minds. While the views of some outsiders on Soviet intentions would doubtless
be unorthodox, the exchanges would certainly provoke intelligence analysts to re-think
their own views and allow them to pick up new ideas and information.
If the U.S. intelligence community is to retain a corps of well-trained, expert
Sovietologists, it must provide material and psychological incentives for them to
remain as Soviet analysts and not to move on to non-Soviet-oriented positions.
Inexperience and constant turnover of analysts are hardly conducive to obtaining a
better grasp of Soviet intentions. Possible incentives might include promoting analysts
to higher grades without assigning them administrative responsibilities. Greater
opportunities to travel and meet with other Soviet specialists would be yet another
incentive, as would greater encouragement to write for outside publications and to
speak before internal and outside gatherings.
More attention should be paid by political analysts to the Soviet perception of U.S.
and Chinese intentions and actions. These two countries are without any question
among the most significant influences on Soviet intentions and actions. We must be
prepared to report that certain U.S. actions or plans will affect the Soviet leadership,
and to estimate how they will affect it. At the same time, U.S. policy makers should
be made aware that accurate and useful intelligence judgments on Soviet intentions
cannot be made without some knowledge of the substance of high-level exchanges.
No one should be permitted the luxury of deference on substantive matters. There
should be far more insistent probing and questioning at all levels to assure that all
possible Soviet options in a given situation have been investigated. Those options
generally outside the current. pattern of Soviet behavior should be given special
attention. In sum, the analytical atmosphere must be made more lively.
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Finally, a better channel should be established to convey speculative and/or
unorthodox views of experienced analysts to the upper echelons of the various intelli-
gence agencies. This might be done by means of gists of only a paragraph or two.
Acquaintance with such views could provide officials with a better grasp of Soviet
options and also serve to warn them of possible Soviet actions or intentions. Too
often, perceptive yet highly speculative analyses remain unknown beyond the analyst
level-only to be revived in a post-mortem.
Intelligence cannot realistically assure "near-real-time" identification of
changes in Soviet policy. We simply are not able to read the minds of the
Politburo. But we can improve our performance by encouraging fresh thinking,
imagination, and originality. At the same time, we-and those we serve--should
be aware of our limitations, and willing to admit that the political analyst is
neither seer nor mind-reader. The most we can promise is to interpret how we
think the Soviets perceive problems and opportunities, to set out fully the
Kremlin's options and, after vigorous discussion, to offer our analysis on the
most likely course of action. This is what we have tried to do in the past with
generally unsatisfactory results. To do better, we must consider some changes in
the wax we do business.
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MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA
2 July 1974
1. A memorandum addressing a subject as broad as the status of
Sovietology in CIA easily could have the effectiveness of a shotgun at
long range, that is, cover the target broadly but to no effect. To
forestall that possibility, this memorandum will focus on just three
aspects of the analysis of Soviet affairs in CIA--the appropriate use
of the small group of trained Sovietologists, bureaucratic barriers to
better analysis, and the current direction of the Office of Political
Research.* '
2. Analysis of Soviet affairs in CIA falls primarily into three
broad categories--economic, military and political. Because intelligence
sources and methods are particularly well-suited to gathering information
on Soviet economic and military performance and capabilities, Intelligence
analysts in these areas currently are doing rather well in providing the
policymaker with-accurate-and-useful information.
3. Political analysis of Soviet affairs, on the other hand, is both
more subjective and more difficult. The political analyst is called upon
(a) to analyze and explain past events, and (b) to predict Soviet intentions.
The first task is being performed well by Intelligence specialists;
analytical papers of this type repeatedly have received compliments from
the highest levels of the government. It is the second or predictive task,
however, that holds greatest interest for the policymaker. And it is
precisely in this task that political analysts face the most difficult
obstacles and possess the fewest assets. Much of the problem is inherent in
the thankless task of trying to predict the intentions of any political
leader or group of leaders, a problem compounded many times over when
dealing with a closed and culturally dissimilar society such as that of
the Soviet Union.
*This -memorandum addresses only the topic of Soviet analysis, but it should
be evident that the problems and related recommendations would probably
be similar, in other areas.
Ipossible to Determine
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VVIVI IL L1'1 I II1L
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SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA
4. While many of the problems affecting the quality of Intelligence
analysis of Soviet intentions are not susceptible to resolution or even
diminution by Intelligence managers, there are at least three that could
be remedied or at least ameliorated:
a. Analysts with experience and specialized training in Soviet
politics and history are often "promoted" out of analytical positions,
thus squandering an important Intelligence asset.
b.? Necessary bureaucratic divisions of labor (OER, OSR, OPR)'
have had the effect of encouraging narrow perspective on the part of
specialists in each area; few analysts are knowledgable in areas of
Soviet affairs beyond their own.
c.. The relatively small group of Soviet analysts whose experience
and talent resulted in their selection for OPR are not being employed
on short or near term projects of important policy interest such as
NSSM/NSDM responses., NIEs,, policy support memoranda, and even major
analytical articles for the NID.
5. The following recommendations may prove helpful in coming to grips
with the above problems.
a. Experienced and trained Soviet analysts should be assigned
with care and provided with incentives to remain "on the line," that
is, not forced to move out of analysis or substance to obtain
-.promotions or job satisfaction. It is important not only that career
Soviet specialists have the opportunity to rise to Grade 15, but also
that psychic incentives be further developed to reinforce the analyst's
self-esteem and job satisfaction and thence contentment to remain an
analyst. Such incentives should also be developed so as to encourage
originality of thought, analytical imagination, and greater cross-
fertilization of ideas. The quality of analysis clearly is diminished
by the simple fact that the analyst sitting at his desk day in, day
out becomes complacent, his perspective narrow, and his perceptions
stale.
b. Arrangements should be made for the rotation of individual
Soviet analysts from one office to another (i.e. OPR to OER, OSR to
OPR, etc.) on a regular though limited basis. Assignments of six
months to a year would not only allow, say, a political analyst to
gain useful knowledge about Soviet strategic programs or the Soviet
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SUBJECT: The State of Soviet Analysis in CIA
economy, but would also bring a new perspective to the work of
analysts in those areas. It seems indisputable that such cross-
fertilization would improve the analysis of all and at the same
time develop contacts for future consultation among Soviet
specialists in different;areas.
i
c. OPR appears to be moving in the direction of becoming-
another Special Research Staff (recently deceased), programming
long term research projects on topics often not relevant to
current policy issues. A situation in which our best Soviet-
ologists have little or no role in current or near term support
is unsatisfactory and a misapplication of Intelligence resources.
Consideration should be given to organizing OPR's Soviet staff
so as to derive maximum benefit from the analysts' expertise.
The Staff, small though it is, should be organized so that analysts
.are assigned to research projects (such as those currently pro-
grammed), to near term projects (NSSMs/NSDMs, NIEs, etc.) and to
current support (policy support memoranda for the Secretary of
,State and NSC Staff, preparation of analytical articles for the
NID, and so forth). Thus, in each of these important areas where
Intelligence is asked to make contributions, its best qualified
Soviet experts will,have focused on the problem.
6. Finally, it may come as a surprising and dismaying fact that the
number of trained and experienced Soviet analysts is probably too small to
perform all of the important tasks noted above. Managers should realize
that there is a need for career Sovietologists--especially those skilled
in Soviet internal affairs--and that little effort is being devoted either
to recruiting them from the academe or to selecting talented analysts in
other areas of the Agency for formal (i.e. not just "on-the-job") training
in Soviet affairs.
fl l'1 h - r- r ' --
Approved For Release 2011/08/11 : CIA-RDP95M00249R000801110020-9