AMENDMENT NO. 2310 (PURPOSE: TO PROHIBIT CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER ROUGE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95B00895R000300030023-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 20, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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S 14266 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE October 20, 1983
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I know the purpose, or with the effect, of promot- The newly established Communist
of no objection on this side of the ing, sustaining or augmenting, directly or in. government than began its own brand
aisle. directly, the capacity of the Khmer Rouge of reform. What the world witnessed
Mr. PELL. There is no objection on or any of its members to conduct military or
this side, paramilitary operations in Kampuchea or was nothing short of a holocaust.
Mr. GOLDWATER addressed the elsewhere in Indochina. The record of the Khmer Rouge's 4-
Chair. (b)(1) All funds appropriated before the year reign of terror is well documented
date of enactment of this section which and widely known. I wish to recall
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The were obligated but not expended for activi- briefly a few details of that record.
question is on agreeing to the amend- ties having the purpose or effect described Following their April 1975 take over,
ment. in subsection (a) shall be deohll?ated
agreed to. Paragraph (1) shall be deposited in the forced the evacuation of Cambodia's
Mr. PMr. President, Treasury of the United States as miscella. cities, including Phnom Penh with its
have one PROXMIRE.
neous receipts. 2 million residents. Tens of thousands
other MI amendment that' I
would like to introduce, and then I will Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, this of people, especially the sick and the
be happy to yield to the Senator from amendment would bar all U.S. military elderly, died in forced marches. The
Arizona. assistance directly or indirectly to the Khmer Rouge then systematically ex-
Mr. PERCY. Did the distinguished Cambodian Khmer Rouge-a political- ecuted various segments of the popula-
Senator wish to comment on the pre- military faction who in the late 1970's tion: former national civilian and mil-
cious amendment? pursued the most reprehensible perse- tary officials; lower ranking local gov-
Mr. GOLDWATER. . Mr. President, I cution and destruction of a cultural ernment and military personnel; mer-
wanted to make an inquiry. Are we group since the Nazi Holocaust. chants and the educated; teachers,
will on the Byrd amendment? The Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, is students, and many workers; ethnic
. We amendment? temporarily laid currently opposing the Vietnamese in- and religious minorities. Few groups
Mr. Ph Byr
the Byrd aaside inasmuch vasion of Cambodia and their subse- were left untouched. Many were
the we Byrd amendment m completed debate with the Sena- quent installation of a puppet govern- simply killed; many others died under
tors present, but it can w be e brought ment there. A recent Newsweek maga- torture.
back. We temporarily laid brought ht zine article alleged that the CIA is At some locations hundreds of indi-
at we could take up two or three helping China to supply the Khmer viduals were exterminated daily, and
noncontroversia amendments and Rouge force with arms. As a matter of mass graves containing the remains of
then return to the Byre amendment' policy, CIA spokesmen will neither thousands have been discovered.
Mr. GOLDWA By I have a few confirm nor deny this charge. This Horror stories abound. Some of the
words G say about the Byrd amend- Senator has no independent knowl- killings seem to make little sense at
mend when my time comes, if I might edge of the accuracy of the Newsweek all. An example:
be llowed to do that. charge. But given Pol Pot's past The story of Tak Mok's guesthouse is a
Mr. PERCY. That would be fine, as record, it is clearly improper for the case in point. It is told and retold by every-
soon as Renish the amendment as United States to support any activities one from people who work there to the pro-
so Senator frm Wisconsin. of the Khmer Rouge. Therefore, this vincial governor. The stately, three-story
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment would require that any building, now a government hotel, stands on
possibly existing support cease, and a small island in a pleasant lake in this pro-
Chair notes that there is an order for that no further support be estab- vincial capital 50 miles south of Phnom
a vote at 11:30 on the Byrd amend- lished. Penh.
ment. Cambodia, now known as Kam u-cite, but O, bethere Tak was Mok, Buddhist
the lpaKhmer goda R uge
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, it is chea, was ruled for nearly 30 years by h it torn , the local odo n in 19 6 and
my understanding that the Byrd Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who tried rde ed the guest ouse down When the
amendment has been temporarily laid to keep the Vietnam war outside of his first floor was finished, the workers who
aside for the purpose of offering one own borders. He was only partially built it were put to death and their bodies
other amendment. successful. In early 1970, he was de- thrown in the lake.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The posed by Army Marshal Lon Nol. An Another crew was brought in and, eventu-
Senator is correct. ardent anti-Communist, Lon Nol ally, those workers too were killed. In all,
AMENDMENT NO. 2310 strayed considerably from Sihanouk's people here say, 30 to 40 workers died-for
(Purpose: To prohibit certain assistance to neutral posture. The Communist what reason, no one seems to know.
the Khmer Rouge) movement known as the Khmer We should note, as a postscript to
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I Rouge slowly began to gain strength this story, that Tak Mok is still alive
send a second amendment to the desk in opposition to the military govern- and well and chief-of-staff of the
and ask for its immediate considera- ment. Then the United States invaded Khmer Rouge rebel forces.
tion. Cambodia. We hoped to help our own Another anecdote of atrocity:
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The cause in Vietnam by cutting off the Many children were separated from their
amendment will be stated. flow of arms from Communist North families as the Khmer Rouge took them
The legislative clerk read as follows: Vietnam to the Vietcong rebels in away to work in "mobile teams" far away
The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROX- South Vietnam through Cambodia. from their homes. They lived in groups of
up in
MIRE) proposes an amendment numbered Despite the U.S. intention that the n t
hat the 100 long other hours" said children the and social worked " worke e ,
2310. invasion was only to protect its own in- who cr did not hor,
amed.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I terests in Vietnam and thus not an at- h we efo c be nto ditches, uild
ask unanimous consent that further tempt to embroil Cambodia in the roads and plow fields," she said. Often they
reading of the amendment be dis- Vietnam conflict, Cambodians viewed were beaten to make them work harder or
pensed with. it in a negative light. Though he as punishment for minor offenses. Many
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- denied it, Lon Nol's tacit support for died.
out objection, it is so ordered. the invasion further entrenched him These are children we are talking
The amendment is as follows: in the U.S. camp. The development of about. Many were orphaned and alone.
At the bottom of page 48, add the follow- the Khmer Rouge opposition acceler- They were innocent victims of the
ing: ated. Pol Pot, leader of the Khmer Khmer Rouge terror, and even if they
TITLE VII-GENERAL PROVISIONS Rouge, gained considerable strength in survived it, the scars would remain for-
PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE TO THE both manpower and firepower. By ever.
KHMER ROUGE IN KAMPUCHEA 1975, the United States removed its In all, an estimated 1 million Cambo-
SEC. 701. (a) Notwithstanding any other troops from Southeast Asia. Shortly dians were systematically executed by
provision of law, none of the funds author- thereafter, the Lon Nol government the Khmer Rouge under Pol Pot, and
ized to be appropriated by this Act or any was toppled and Pol Pot assumed the approximately 1 million more died of
other Act may be obligated or expended for reigns of power in Phnom Penh. exposure, disease, malnutrition, and
3
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October 20, 1983 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
AMENDMENT NO. 2350 In my veiw, the practical impact of
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The the Supreme Court decision is to
question recurs on the amendment of remove the value of that provision of
the Senator from West Virginia. the War Powers Act. The uncertainty
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President. the which would surround any attempt to
amendment by the Senator from West exercise that provision of the act, and
Virginia to the War Powers Resolution the strong likelihood that the Su-
of 1973 would conform the procedures preme Court would extend its holding
under that statute to the holding of to include the war powers area also,
the Supreme Court in the Chadha deprive that procedure of any realistic
case last summer. It would change the
congressional veto procedure in sec-
tion 5(c) of the War Powers Resolu\
tion from a concurrent resolution to a
joint resolution and would conform
the priority procedures of section 7 of
War Powers accordingly.
Mr. President, it has been the inten-
tion of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations to conduct a hearing on this
issue, among others, on September 29.
That hearing was overtaken by our
need to consider the resolution relat-
ing to Lebanon under the War Powers
Act during that same week. It was our
intention to reschedule that hearing
either later this year, or early next
year.
We may still wish to hold such a
hearing to discuss a number of pend-
ing proposals for changes in the War
Powers Resolution, but this is one
change in that resolution which, as
the majority leader has already stated
today, would command nearly unani-
mous support in the Congress. I
strongly support the amendment of
-the Senator from West Virginia, and
urge my colleagues to do likewise. As
he has said, we should not leave in
limbo the question of how Congress
should proceed if it should decide to
oppose any particular involvement of
U.S. Armed Forces in hostilities
abroad. We should make clear how
such a legislative directive would be
considered and assure that it would be
covered by the expedited procedures
appropriate to such a grave exercise of
our responsibility under the Constitu-
tion.
Mr. President, I am aware that there
nrP snmP e.nmmpntsi.tnrs and exnerts-
S 1425
No individual may be eligible for appoint-
ment as an officer of the National Endow-
ment for Democracy, and no individual may
be eligible for employment by the Endow-
ment, it such individual has engaged in any
intelligence activity since 1963.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President., this
amendment is designed for a single
purpose. That purpose is to protect
the National Endowment for Democ-
racy from unwarranted attack abroad
President, I know that there are grave as being an agent of the U.S. intelli-
doubts on the part of many Members gence community. If the goals and
of the Congress, including myself, programs of the Endowment are to be
about both the wisdom and the consti- effective internationally, this organi-
mpst circumstances, it should require ganda which would picture it as an
arr'extraordinary majority of the Con- arm of the CIA or some other Western
gresS to direct the termination of an intelligence organization. Such protec-
ongo g military operation, particular- tion can be provided by legislating
ly where it has already been previous- that officers and employees of the En-
ly authprized under the other proce- dowment be free of any intelligence
dures of\the War Powers Act. That is community relationship for the past
essentiall3( the position we adopted in 20 years.
section 7 of the recent joint resolution We all know that the Soviet Union
159 on Leb~non, and I think it is ap- has a vigorous propaganda organiza-
propriate toy amend the War Powers tion around the globe. One of their
Resolution in'this fashion. common tools is the charge that some
Mr. Presider, I suggest' the absence U.S. or anizat-ion really is a front for
of a quorum. the CIA. Now it is impossible to con-
The PRESID~NG OFFICER (Mr. trol what the KGB says or does
WILSON). The cleitk will call the roll. abroad. But we can dilute their effec-
The legislative '\clerk proceeded to tiveness in making false charges by
call the roll. mandating in our law that the Endow-
Mr. PERCY. Mr.\ President, I ask ment be free of any intelligence con-
unanimous consent ttrat the order for nection.
the quorum call be rescinded. This has been an effective barrier to
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With false charges for our Peace Corps. The
out objection, it is so ornimo . world knows that the Peace Corps is
Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent prohibited from recruiting individuals
that the pending Byrd afgtendment be with intelligence backgrounds. Prohi-
temporarily set aside. bitions are contained in detailed lan-
The PRESIDING OFFI E;R. With- guage in Peace Corps literature and
out objection, it is so ordere . regulations. This has given the Peace
Mr. PERCY. There are oi?e or two Corps enormous protection from dis-
amendments that will be o ered by ruptive claims of intelligence relation-
the distinguished Senator fr m W's- ships.
consin which I believe are no contro- We should provide the same protec-
versial and which can be acre ed by lion for the endowment which will be
both sides. operating abroad under similar cir-
thank PRO% Mr. Presid~tt, I cumstances and which will be open to
thank the distinguished uished ohairmal} of the same propaganda attacks.
the Foreign Relations Committee. \ . -- _3.....-. --l-,
including the distinguished tormer AMENDMENT NO. 2369 merit by the endowment, including its
Senator from New York, Senator (Purchase: To deny eligibility for appoiri- officers, to any individual who has en-
Javits, whom I have consulted on this merit to, or employment by, the Nation gaged in any intelligence activity in
question-who believe that the reason- Endowment for Democracy to individuals the past 20 years. By intelligence ac-
ing of the Supreme Court in the who have engaged in intelligence activi \t I mean employment by or close
Chadha decision does not reach the ties)
War Powers Resolution. They would Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I ssociation with any U.S. intelligence
argue, therefore, that there is still life send an amendment to the desk and organization either here in the United
in the concurrent resolution veto pro- ask for its immediate consideration. St tes or abroad. I interpret this lan-
cedure presently contained in the War The PRESIDING OFFICER. The gue to be broad, inclusive, and with-
Powers Resolution, or in other words, amendment will be stated. out 1qualification-the purpose being
that section 5(c) containing that pro- The legislative clerk read as follows: to pr\vide a blanket prohibition rather
cedure was not struck down by deci- The Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROx- than to allow specific loopholes.
sion in June. MIRE) proposes an amendment numbered We e`.nnot stop false charges but we
Mr. President, there may be some 2369. can create the climate in the world for
merit to this argument as a matter of Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I making ,these charges unbelievable.
constitutional law, that the war ask unanimous consent that further That would take a great advantage
powers area is distinguishable from reading of the amendment be dis- away from, our adversaries who will be
other areas of the Constitution. I took pensed with. out to discredit the endowment.
that position and I was joined in that The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- I understand that the managers of
position by my distinguished colleague out objection, it is so ordered. the bill are familiar with the amend-
(Mr. PELL), the ranking minority The amendment is as follows: ment and have no objection to it.
member of the Committee on Foreign At the appropriate place in the bill insert The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
Relations. a new section as follows: there objection?
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October 20, 1983 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
forced labor. Almost one-third of the
Cambodian population was wiped out
in a brief 4-year span. Pol Pot's reign
witnessed atrocities of a scope unex-
ceeded in modern history, save by Hit-
ler's anti-Semitic Holocaust.
Pol Pot's rule spanned the late
1970's. He soon fell out of favor with
his Vietnamese Communist neighbors
as well as the Soviet Union, eventually
turning toward the Chinese for sup-
port. In the name of its own security
and its own proclaimed perceptions of
the terror fomented by the Khmer
Rouge, the Vietnamese invaded Cam-
bodia and deposed Pol Pot and his
regime. They proceeded to install
their chosen puppet replacement,
Heng Samrin, a former colleague of
Pol Pot. Thus, in 1979, the Khmer
Rouge was out of power, while the
Vietnamese were running Cambodia
through Samrin.
With Heng Samrin and his Vietnam-
ese sponsors controlling the Govern-
ment of Cambodia, several rebel fac-
tions joined forces and formed an alli-
ance to depose them and return con-
trol of Cambodia to the Cambodians.
There are three major parties to this
confederation; Prince Sihanouk and
his neutralist followers; Son Sann and
his ardent anti-Communist supporters;
and, the remnants of Pol Pot's Khmer
Rouge, run by Pol Pot himself and his
remaining colleagues. Clearly, these
groups are incompatible. They share a
common goal-displacement of the
Vietnamese-but how they would or
could share power is unclear. At
present, they remain politically and
militarily distinct. The Pol Pot forces
have the strongest military capability.
Our sympathy for the Cambodian
tragedy might lead us to desire a more
active role in this turbulent region. It
is unfortunate that the Cambodian
people have found their nation occu-
pied and essentially ruled by a foreign
power. They have indeed lost their
self-determination. Their countryside,
once ravaged by a civil war, has been
ravaged again by an invading nation.
Millions died under Pol Pot and many
more are dying under the Vietnamese.
Desperate war-weary Cambodians flee
the Vietnamese-controlled sectors and
stream into refugee camps across the
Thai border. The ouster of Pol Pot by
the Vietnamese clearly did not bring
an end to the suffering.
Which faction should we support in
Vietnam? Should a united rebel force
regain power, how will power be
shared among the competing factions?
Would not the Pol Pot forces domi-
nate and ruthlessly remove the
others? Is it not dangerous to support
Pol Pot in any way? .
There may be a group or groups In
Cambodia that are worthy of our sup-
port, either economically or morally.
But, I know one group we should not
support under any circumstances-the
Khmer Rouge. They claim that they
have changed for the better, that the
ruthlessness is over. We have no way
of knowing this; and, even if they have
indeed changed, they deserve no lead-
ership role in Cambodia. They have
wrought enough havoc already. They
are mass murderers. They have com-
mitted genocide against their own
people-killing nearly a third of them.
They are ruthless and inhumane. We
have a moral obligation to the world
and to ourselves not to support the re-
instatement of such a ruling class re-
gardless of our opposition to the
present Vietnamese-sponsored govern-
ment and despite the United Nation's
persistent recognition of Pol Pot. Even
if we wish to aid others in the rebel
alliance, we must give the Khmer
Rouge nothing. Aiding them directly
or, indirectly will only increase their
strength within the resistance and
make it easier for them to reassert
total authority and subjugate the
other resistance partners to their
wishes. A dialog between the contend-
ing factions might provide the basis
for an appropriate resolution of the
Cambodian quagmire and the suffer-
ing that is its product; but, the Khmer
Rouge must not be the centerpiece of
such a dialog. We may not like the
180,000 Vietnamese troops in Cambo-
dia, but Pol Pot is not an acceptable
alternative.
Mr. President, the Khmer Rouge
must never again threaten the Cambo-
dian people. And the United States
must never support the Khmer
Rouge-directly, indirectly, or in any
other form.
Mr. President, we have discussed
this amendment with the staffs of the
managers of the bill, and I am hopeful
that they can accept it.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is
there objection?
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I know
of no objection on this side.
Mr. PELL. Nor is there any objec-
tion, to the best of my knowledge, on
this side.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the amend-
ment.
The amendment (No. 2310) was
agreed to.
Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I
once again thank the managers so
much for the adoption of the amend-
ment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question now recurs upon the Byrd
amendment.
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, we now
return to the Byrd amendment, and I
understand that the Senator from Ari-
zona will seek recognition.
Mr. GOLDWATER addressed the
Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Is there a time
limit on this amendment, might I in-
quire of the floor leader?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. There
is a vote ordered for 11:30.
Mr. GOLDWATER. The vote will be
at 11:30?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is
correct.
S 14267
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
rise in opposition to the amendment,
just as I very vehemently opposed the
War Powers Act when it was originally
passed. It is unconstitutional. I do not
think there is any question of it. Very,
very few scholars uphold the idea that
it is constitutional, and the Byrd
amendment in my opinion is also un-
constitutional. Congress does not have
the authority to dictate the removal of
troops, whether it be by a bill or a
joint resolution or a concurrent resolu-
tion.
Mr. President, article II, section 2 of
the Constitution makes the President
"Commander in Chief" and also sec-
tion 1 of article II gives all the execu-
tive power to the President. These pro-
visions enable him to make the deter-
mination of war. I emphasize that be-
cause I hear so often on the floor of
this Chamber and read so often in the
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the statement
that Congress has the right to declare
war. We do have the right to declare
war. We can stand up and declare war
every 5 minutes, 24 hours a day, and
we cannot send one man to war any-
place in this world. Witness that in
the course of the 204- or 205-odd years
of our history the President has seen
it necessary to call out the troops
about 202 times. Now, these were not
all for war purposes; they were for
purposes of keeping peace here and
there, but in all of these times of call-
ing out the troops the Congress has
declared war five times, and two of
those were in the same war.
Now, I would hope some day to be
able to have hearings held on legisla-
tion which I am preparing that would
repeal the War Powers Act. I think a
much better approach to it, if it is the
desire of the Congress to have the
power to go to war, would be to pass
something like the War Powers Act as
a constitutional amendment and send
it out to the States so the sovereign
American people can consider the
issue, and, if 38 States ratify it, then it
is the people who will decide to take
from the President his vested authori-
ty to be Commander in Chief and
make the determination on covert
action or upon war. In fact, there is a
vote going to take place in the House
sometime today that will decide
whether or not this country can
engage in covert action, and I might
remind my friends in the House that if
they vote for this, the only alternative
they have is to go to war.
The history of the Congress In the
field of war is so miserable that we
should not make any further effort to
get into it.
Let me briefly recite the history at
the end of the Revolutionary War
with Great Britain. Members of the
Continental Congress were going out
in the field making tactical decisions,
making promotions here, there, and
everywhere, and we nearly lost the
war because of the intervention of
that Congress. I really believe that
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S 14268 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
one of the main reasons for replacing
the Articles of Confederation with the
Constitution was for the very fact that
the Congress had mistakenly injected
itself into war. I cannot think of any-
thing worse for this country than 535
people with absolutely no knowledge
of the subject and very little knowl-
edge of the subjects surrounding the
problems of war and peace making up
their minds on the subject of war.
We can stop war. We can stop the
funds for weapons systems or cut the
number of the Armed Forces. We have
never done it in time of war. We have
never had the courage to do it.
Mr. President, I do not think this
amendment would do anything more
than add to the confusion we have al-
ready created. We have seen what
Congress has done. The first time the
War Powers Act was invoked, we
agreed to an 18-month extension. Why
did we do it! Because the Members of
Congress realized that, in the Presi-
dent's judgment, we had to do what we
are doing in Lebanon.
I opposed sending any American
troops to Lebanon for police purposes,
and I told the President that when he
did it. I supported the President be-
cause he is the man who makes the
Executive decision about war.
While I oppose the War Powers Act.
I supported the President and his
power as Commander in Chief, just as
I would support the powers of any
man under whom I served, as my com-
mander. I might disagree with him.
Nevertheless, we have to learn a little
discipline in this world and in the
course of our lives.
I do not want to prolong this discus-
sion, Mr. President, because I know
the vote is imminent. I think this is
another unfortunate, misguided effort
to take into the hands of Congress the
propagation of war, the tactical oper-
ation of war, and to take away from
one man the decision as to whether
this country will use its military
power, its economic power, and its po-
litical power in the process of getting
our foreign policy understood by the
world.
I see nothing but disaster for this
country, I see nothing but war ahead
for this country, if this matter is left
up to the prerogative and judgment of
Members of Congress. We are not par-
ticularly trained in those fields. We
are not particularly notorious for
having good judgment in those fields.
Day after day, effort after effort is
being made to downgrade the powers
of our President, whoever he might be.
Democrat or Republican-that is
beside the point.
Mr. President, I am going to vote
against this amendment. I hope some
of my colleagues will join me. I hope
that someday we can take this matter
to the proper courts and see whether
or not it agrees with the Constitution.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent to have printed in the RECORD an
article I wrote recently on this subject
for the Freedom Foundation, entitled
"Presidential Defense of Freedom."
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
PRESIDENTIAL DEFENSE OF FREEDOM
(By Barry M. Goldwater)
The stationing of American Marines as a
police unit between Druze Moslems and
Lebanese Christians in Beirut has revived
an issue as old as the United States-who
controls the War Powers. By War Powers, I
mean the authority to make the fundamen-
tal decision when, where, and in what
manner to deploy and use the Armed Forces
of this country in defense of its citizens and
freedoms. It is my belief that the hard-won
lessons of the War of Independence instruct
us that the President should mike these ul-
timate decisions.
Let us begin with the winter of 1777-78,
when General George Washington an-
swered civilian criticism of his army at
Valley Forge:
"I can assure these Gentlemen ttkat it is a
much easier and less distressing thing to
draw remonstrances in a comfortable room
by a good fireside than to occupy a cold
bleak hill and sleep under frost and Snow
without Cloaths, or Blankets " ' '"-
George Washington to Henry Laurens,
president of the Continental Congress, De-
cember 23, 1777.
The Suffering of Washington's 10,000
troops was caused in great measure by the
administrative incompetence of Congress, as
were other setbacks to his military oper-
ations.
The experience gained from harmful legis-
lative meddling with military decisions
during the Revolution led directly to a
strengthening of executive power in the
Constitution. Fully 30 of the 55 delegates
who attended the Constitutional Conven-
tion had performed military duty in the
War of Independence. These Farmers also
had fresh memories of Shays' Rebellion, in
which Governor Bowdoin of Massachusetts
had singlehandedly raised an army to re-
store order while a reluctant and divided
legislature sat on its hands.
Other dangers were known to the Framers
which are mostly forgotten today. Great
Britain held onto northern military posts in
violation of the Treaty of Paris and ex-
cluded us from the St. Lawrence. Spain con-
trolled the mouth of the Mississippi, occu-
pied' forts in the Floridas, and schemed to
establish a hostile Indian nation between its
possessions and the United States. France
sought to embroil us as a dependent client
in its own foreign conflicts. To these trou-
bles, John Jay warned in the Federalist No.
4, that war might arise out of the rivalry be-
tween our nation and European states in
navigation and trade "as far away as China
and India."
The Framers were practical men. They
knew the nation could not survive if its de-
fense was shackled by unrealistic rules.
Thus, the President was made the "Com-
mander-in-Chief" and vested with all the
"executive power" of the United States.
Congress was given power to "declare
war," but the Framers rejected a proposal
to allow Congress "to make" war. The dif-
ference is significant. Samuel Johnson's
"Dictionary of the English Language," cur-
rent in America at the time of the Constitu-
tional Convention, defines "declare" as "to
make known" or "to proclaim." The term
"to make" means "to create" or "to bring
into any state or condition," a power which
was denied to Congress.
Declarations of war have been noted only
five times by Congress. Yet a documented
October 20, 1983
study by my office has turned up more than
200 occasions when Presidents have de=
ployed troops abroad and used force or the
threat of force without any declarations of
war in defense of the country.
Starting in the 1970's. however, Congress
has tried to assert supremacy over military
powers. At least 12 different statutes re-
stricted American military activities in Indo-
china. The end result of these limitations
led to genocide in Cambodia, the loss of a
neutral Laos, and the disaster in Vietnam.
The collapse of South Vietnam signaled a
period of Soviet encroachment all over the
globe, from Angola, to Ethiopia, to Afghani-
stan, to Nicaragua.
The War Powers Resolution, enacted over
Presidential veto in 1973, heads the list of
Congressional intervention in tactical mili-
tary decisions. The legislation states that
American forces cannot be engaged in hos-
tilities for longer tha 60 days without specif-
ic Congressional authority. An extra 30 days
is granted if necessary to'remove our troops
safely.
My concern is that the War Powers Reso-
lution may cause a constitutional crisis of
confrontation between the Congress and
President when decisiveness and national
unity are needed. Democracies can only
avoid disaster if they are willing to confront,
the obvious threats to their survival while
these threats are manageable.
The question is: can a weakened United
States, whose President is hamstrung by
Congressional restrictions, protect its citi-
zens and freedoms? Rather than leave the
matter to a future crisis, it should be re-
solved immediately. The War Powers Reso-
lution should be repealed and Congress
should lay before the people the choice of
ratifying or rejecting a Constitutional
Amendment placing the control of national
defense with the President. Let the people,
the ultimate source of sovereignty in Amer-
ica, decide the issue.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I have
not discussed this request with the
majority leader. I do not believe he
would have any objection to it, but if
he does, I would certainly not press it.
I do not see any reason for two roll-
call votes on this matter. I would be
willing, if Senators consent to a unani-
mous-consent request, to withdraw the
yeas and nays on the amendment in
the second degree. I say to the major-
ity leader that I would be willing, if I
could obtain unanimous consent, to
withdraw the yeas and nays on the
amendment in the second degree, and
we could have a voice vote on that. If
it appeared that I would be losing, I
would, of course, go back to the yeas
and nays.
Mr. BAKER. I thank the minority
leader. If that is agreeable to the man-
agers, I commend it to the Senate. I
urge the minority leader to make such
a request.
Mr. BYRD. So that then the rollcall
vote at 11:30 would be on the amend-
ment as amended.
Mr. BAKER. Yes.
Mr. BYRD. With the understanding
that if I see I am losing the voice
vote-which I do not anticipate-I will
renew my request for the yeas and
nays.
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October 20, 1983 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the order for the yeas and
nays on the amendment in the second
degree be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to the
amendment.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, the vote
has been ordered for 11:30. Is that not
so?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. BAKER. I suggest the absence
of a quorum.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, reserving
the right to object, very briefly, I re-
spect the viewpoint expressed by Mr.
GOLDWATER. He makes no bones about
his position. He is against the War
Powers Act, and I respect him for
that. I have no quarrel with that at
all. Mr. STENNIS. I shall take only a However, I feel that the Supreme minute.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the
Court, in the Chadha case
dealt with
,
a congressional veto and, in so doing,
indicated that a concurrent resolution
in that instance does not meet the re-
quirements of the Constitution, in
that a concurrent resolution cannot be
a law. Therefore, in the case of the
War Powers Act, the concurrent reso-
lution to withdraw troops within the
first 60 or 90 days would not be a law.
In the Chadha case, the court point-
ed out that a concurrent resolution is
not presented to the President, as is
required by the Constitution for any
matter that is to become law. The
court did not deal with the War
Powers Act. But we have the same
flaw in the. War Powers Act, in that it
provides for a concurrent resolution to
remove troops introduced into hostil-
ities. That would not be a law or a leg-
islative act, under the requirements of
the Constitution, because it would not
be presented to the President.
So my amendment simply corrects
that defect and provides that any
withdrawal as would have heretofore
been required by way of a concurrent
resolution under section 5(c) of the
War Powers Act, would have to be by
joint resolution, which would have to
be presented to the President, which
he could veto, and which veto Con-
gress could override by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses.
My amendment also provides for an
expedited procedure in the case of a
congressional attempt to override the
President's veto.
It also clarifies the situation. In the
event we were in a situation in which a
President had placed troops into a
hostile situation or into a situation in
which the circumstances clearly indi-
cate imminent involvement in hostil-
ities, there might be some effort to
take that to the court during the 60-
day period, and it might happen late
in that 60-day period.
So this simply clarifies the matter,
so that it would not be left to the
courts to do what would be probable in
light of, the Chadha opinion, which
would be to throw out the concurrent
S 14269
resolution provision as being unconsti- to his own viewpoint and I respect him
tutional as a legislative veto. for it.
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will But I think Senators are conversant
the Senator yield to me for a question? enough with this matter that they will
Mr. BYRD. I yield. cast a vote based on their own good
Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I just judgments and on the information
arrived in the Chamber and have not that they do already possess.
had any prior notice about this Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator.
amendment. I know it is something Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
that deserves serious consideration or will the Senator yield a moment?
it would not be offered by the major- Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield
ity leader. I always wish to support his the floor or I yield to the Senator
proposals. from Arizona.
But this amendment was not before Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I
the committee that handled the bill. wish to comment that the Senator cer-
Mr. BYRD. No. tainly has every right to offer this
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- amendment.
sent that the Senator may proceed for If this matter were to go before the
an additional 2 minutes. committee I think I know what the
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- committee would do.
out objection, it is so ordered. I do not believe the Supreme Court
amendment I have offered has not
been before the Foreign Relations
Committee but the subject matter has
been before the committee during the
deliberations on the War Powers Act;
the case of Lebanon. They certainly
took a look at the concurrent resolu-
tion. Furthermore, the committee
heard testimony on July 28, 1983, on
the impact of the Chadha decision on
legislative veto provisions of statutes
related to foreign relations, including
the War Powers Act.
In light of the Supreme Court deci-
sion in the Chadha case, the Lebanon
debate, and the July hearings, I think
that the members of the committee
are very conversant with the subject
and, therefore, would be prepared to
cast a vote on it without further
debate.
Mr. STENNIS. I just heard of the
amendment in the last 2 or 3 minutes.
We had a debate here on the situation
on Lebanon, and I thought it was a
pretty good debate, and then there
was a vote. The vote that I cast was
not with the majority. It was defeated.
But this is such a delicate, sensitive,
and far-reaching matter, that is seems
to me, with great deference to the mi-
nority leader here, we should not be
passing anything on this subject with-
out prior notice, at least, if not com-
mittee consideration, but' some com-
mittee consideration would be better,
and I notice here that there are only
three or four Senators in the Cham-
ber. It sounds as if the vote is immi-
nent now.
So as one who was awfully interested
in that debate and voted with the
losing side, so to speak, I respectfully
say that I cannot vote for this or any
other amendment under all these cir-
cumstances. The membership has not
thoroughly gone into it.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I respect
the Senator's position.
Mr. STENNIS. I wish to say that to
Senators.
Mr. BYRD. I certainly find no fault
with the Senator's feeling with regard
will ever make a decision specifically
pointing out the War Powers Act is or
is not unconstitutional because their
attitude down through our history has
been not to do anything in the way of
judgment on political questions that
they feel the executive and legislative
branches can handle, and this is one of
those cases.
So I not taking a vehement stand
against my friend from West Virginia.
It is a continuation of a stand that I
have held ever since this matter was
introduced, and I know the outcome of
the vote.
I will continue to fight this, hoping
to win some day.
Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Time
for debate has expired.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, is
a unanimous-consent request in order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from New Hampshire.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
ask unanimous consent that I may
proceed for 30 seconds to make a state-
ment before we have a vote.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I
simply wish to state for the record
that I intend to vote against this
amendment, not that I am especially
opposed to it on the merits, but simply
on the basis that I have not had time
to consider both sides of the issue. In-
asmuch as this is a momentous ques-
tion to be decided, I prefer to vote
against it and allow myself time to
study it in anticipation of a future
vote.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that I may proceed
for 30 seconds.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, Senators
are- not unaware of what this is all
about. It was discussed to some extent
during the war powers debate recently
and the media has carried articles
dealing with the Chadha decision.
This is a matter which protects this in-
stitution, the legislative branch, in its
rights and at the same time does not
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S 14270 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE
create an impediment to the executive
branch because the President could
very well veto a joint resolution. Obvi-
ously, he cannot veto a concurrent res-
olution-which is now in the law-be-
cause it would not be presented to
him.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
question is on agreeing to the second-
degree amendment of the Senator
from West Virginia.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I received
consent, I believe, to withdraw the
yeas and nays on the amendment in
the second degree.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator is correct.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President,
were not the yeas and nays ordered on
this?
Mr. BYRD. On the second-degree
amendment they were vitiated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. On the
second-degree amendment the yeas
and nays were vitiated.
The question is on agreeing to the
amendment in the second degree of
the Senator from West Virginia.
(Putting the question.)
The amendment (No. 2363) was
agreed to..
AMENDMENT NO. 2350, AS AMENDED
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Now
the question is on agreeing to the
amendment of the Senator from West
Virginia in the first degree, as amend-
ed.
On this question, the yeas and nays
have been ordered, and the clerk will
call the roll.
The legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. STEVENS. I announce that the
Senator from Pennsylvania (Mr.
HEINZ) and the Senator from Idaho
(Mr. MCCLURE) are necessarily absent.
Mr. BYRD. I announce that the
Senator from California (Mr. CRAN-
STON) is necessarily absent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
KASTEN). Are there other Senators in
the Chamber desiring to vote?
The result was announced-yeas 86,
nays 11, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 305 Leg.]
YEAS-86
Abdnor Ford Moynihan
Andrews Gam Murkowski
Armstrong Glenn Nickles
Baker Gorton Nunn
Baucus Grassley Packwood
Bentsen ? Hart Pell
Biden Hatfield Percy
Bingaman Hawkins Pressler
Boren Hecht Proxmire
Boschwitz Heflin Pryor
Bradley Hollings Randolph
Bumpers Huddleston Riegle
Burdick Inouye Roth
Byrd Jepsen Rudman
Chafee Johnston Sarbanes
Chiles Kassebaum Sasser
Cochran Kasten Simpson
Cohen Kennedy Specter
D'Amato Lautenberg Stafford
Danforth Laxalt Stevens
DeConcini Leahy Thurmond
Dixon Levin Tower
Dodd Long Trible
Dole Mathias Tsongas
Domenici Matsunaga Wallop
Durenberger Mattingly Warner
Eagleton Melcher Weicker
Evans Metzenbaum Zorinsky
Exon 2vlitchell
NAYS-11
Denton Helms Stennis
East Humphrey Symms
Goldwater Lugar Wilson
Hatch Quayle
NOT VOTING-3
Cranston Heinz McClure
So Mr. BYRD's amendment (No.
2350) as amended was agreed to.
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I move
to reconsider the vote by which the
amendment was agreed to.
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to
lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was
agreed to.
(Purpose: To call for a review of United
States participation in the United Nations)
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I send
an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
amendment will be stated.
The assistant legislative clerk read
as follows:
The Senator from Oklahoma (Mr.
NICKLES), for himself, Mr. SYMMs, and Mr.
RANDOLPH, proposes an amendment num-
bered 2371.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that further read-
ing of the amendment be dispensed
with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
At the bottom of page 48, add the follow-
ing:
TITLE VII-GENERAL PROVISIONS
REVIEW OF UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION IN
THE UNITED NATIONS
SEC. 701. (a) The Congress finds that-
(1) the United Nations was founded for
the primary purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security by encouraging
peaceful resolution of disputes and the de-
velopment of friendly relations among na-
tions;
(2) the United States, as a founding
member of the United Nations and the larg-
est contributor to the United Nations,
became and remains a member of the
United Nations in order to contribute to col-
lective efforts among the nations of the
world to realize the ends of international
peace and security;
(3) the United States is committed to up-
holding and strengthening the principles
and purposes of the United Nations Charter
upon which the United Nations was found-
ed.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that-
(1) a review of United States participation
in the United Nations is urgently called for
with a view to examining-
(A) the extent and levels of United States
financial contributions to the United Na-
tions;
(B) the importance of the United Nations,
as presently constituted to fulfilling the
policies and objectives of the United States:
(C) the benefits derived by the United
States from participation in the United Na-
tions;
(2) the President should review and make
recommendations to the Congress regarding
the matters described in this section by
June 30. 1984 and
(3) the Secretary of State should commu-
nicate to the member states of the General
October 20, 1983
Assembly of the United Nations the policy
contained in this section.
Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, the
amendment that I offer today, along
with my colleague, Mr. Symms, is the
result of our concern over the deterio-
ration of the original intent of the
United Nations. I am not on an anti-
United Nations campaign nor am I
trying to punish the member nations.
Rather, this is an attempt to reaffirm
the principles of the U.N. charter.
The charter states that the members
shall maintain international peace and
security-first and foremost. The
United Nations arose from the ashes
of World War II to prevent another
such holocaust. And yet, one must ask
how successful is the Security Council
in maintaining peace.
Libya has invaded Chad wiCi no con-
sideration by the Security Council.
The Iran-Iraq war continues with
thousands of lives lost and no discus-
sion in the United Nations. The inva-
sion of the Soviets into Afghanistan is
not an item on the agenda nor has
anything been done over the presence
of Vietnam in Kampuchea. Lebanon is
torn apart-no longer capable of self-
government. The multinational peace-
keeping group in Beirut, including our
own marines, are not sponsored by the
United Nations. Nicaragua declares
unsubstantiated charges of imminent
invasion by the United States at the
Security Council rather than the
proper arena under the U.N. charter
which is the Organization of American
States.
The United Nations, in a variety of
other contexts, has aggravated rather
than resolved conflict. Some members
have sought to exclude Israel from
participation in the United Nations.
The latest manifestation of this tend-
ency was the decision by the Govern-
ment of India, as head of the nona-
lined movement, to bar Israel from
participation in the International
Energy Conference held this fall.
Mr. President, the United States is
committed to world peace. Our Nation
has demonstrated this throughout the
nearly 40-year history of the United
Nations. When the nations at the San
Francisco Conference voted to locate
the headquarters in New York City,
several things happened: Congress
passed the resolution allowing the
President to make the agreement; New
York City gave waterfront rights and
made arrangements to improve the
area in which the headquaters would
be built; and John D. Rockefeller, Jr.,
offered the land. During those early
years, the United States bore 40 per-
cent of the financial support and
today is paying close to $1 billion a
year.
I strongly believe that the U.S. Con-
gress must play a larger role in oven.
sight of the U.N. and its objectives. We
task the American taxpayers with this
burden of $1 billion a year; therefore,
they deserve to know that we are
doing all we can to make certain that
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