SENATE RESOLUTION 198-RELATING TO THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR REACTOR COMPONENTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Publication Date: August 4, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

August .~, 1983
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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 11803
SENATE RESOLUTION 195-
BUDGET WAIVER RELATING
TO THE CONSIDERATION OF S.
1009
Mr. STEVENS, from the Committee
on Governmental Affairs, reported the
following original resolution, which
was referred to the Committee on the
Budget:
S. RES. 195
Resolved, That pursuant to section 402(c)
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the provisions of section 402(a) of such Act
are waived with respect to the consideration
of S. 1009. Such waiver is necessary because
S. 1009 authorizes the enactment of new
budget authority which would fiI?st become
available in fiscal year 1984, and such bill
Republic of South Africa's attempts to force
him to surrender land his family had owned
for three generations;
Whereas this policy moved Saul Mkhize to
write South African Prime Minister Botha
stating, "We do not wish to be rebellious in
any way, but only to continue to live our
lives in our own environment.": and
Whereas this policy led to the shooting
death of Saul Mkhize by the security police
of the Republic of South Africa: Now, there-
fore, be it
Resolved by the Senate lthe House of Rep-
resentatives concurrtingl, That it is the
sense of the Congress that-
(1) the Government of the Republic of
South Africa should comply with interna-
tionally recognized human rights, the
United Nations Charter, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by ending the
"blackspot" policy and allowing relocated
South Africans to remain in or return to
their legally acquired land and residences;
(2) the Government of the United States
should continue its policy of not recognizing
the sovereignty or independence of the so-
called "homelands";
(3) at such times that any "homeland" of-
ficial applies for a visa for travel to the
United States, no such visa should be grant-
ed to such official unless such official holds
a passport which is recognized as valid by
the Government of the United States; and
(4) the President and his representatives
should convey to the Government of the
Republic of South Africa the concerns ex-
pressed in this concurrent resolution.
SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall
transmit a copy of this concurrent resolu-
tion to the President with the request that
he further transmit such copy to the Am-
bassador of the Republic of South Africa to
the United States and to the Prime Minister
of the Republic of South Africa..
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, today I
am introducing a new resolution ex-
pressing the sense of the Senate that
the Republic of South Africa should
cease its "blackspot" policy of forcibly
removing black South Africans from
their legally acquired residences and
relocating them. This new resolution
is essentially the same as Senate Con-
current Resolution 45 .which I intro-
duced on June 15. The new resolution
contains technical changes acid the
third resolved clause has been modi-
fied to clarify its meaning. The intelit
of the third resolved clause is to insure
that the United States does not give
any measure of recognition to the so-
called independence of these South
African-created homelands -by grant-
ing visas to "homeland" officials on a
"homelands" passport. We do not
intend to prohibit all travel to the
United States by officials of the home-
lands, either those which have been
declared independent by South Africa
or those which have not. However, we
do want to insist that no U.S. visa be
granted to any such official unless
such official holds a passport which is
recognized as valid by the Government
of the United States. I believe the new
language of the third resolved removes
any ambiguities which may have been
present in Senate Concurrent Resolu-
tion 45.
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for suc
authorizations.
to permit congressional consideration of
statutory authority for the agencies of the
U.S. Government.
S. 1009 provides an authorization for
fiscal year 1984 of such sums as may be nec-
essary for reauthorization of the Federal
Physicians Comparability Allowances Pro-
gram, first authorized in 1978.
SENATE RESOLUTION 196-
BUDGET WAIVER RELATING
TO THE CONSIDERATION OF S.
1513 -
Mr. STEVENS, from the Committee
on Governmental Affairs, reported the
following original resolution, which
was referred to the Committee on the
Budget:
S. RES. 196
Resolved, That pursuant to section 402(c)
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974,
the provisions of section 402(a) of such Act
are waived with respect to the consideration
of S. 1513. Such waiver is necessary because
S. 1513 authorizes the enactment of new
budget authority which would first become
available in fiscal year 1984, and such bill
was not reported on or before the appropri-
ate date required under section 402(a) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 for such
authorizations.
The waiver of section 402(x) is necessary
to permit congressional consideration of
statutory authority for the National Histori-
cal Publications and Records Commission.
S. 1513 provides an authorization for
fiscal year 1984 of $4,000,000, as part of a
five-year reauthorization totaling
$23.000,000.
SENATE RESOLUTION 197-
BUDGET WAIVER RELATING
TO THE CONSIDERATION OF S.
242
Mr. HATCH, from the Committee
on Labor and Human Resources, re-
ported the following original resolu-
tion; which was referred to the Com-
mittee on the Budget:
S. RES. 19?
Resolved, That pursuant to section 4021c)
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1979,
the provisions of section 402(a) of such Act
are waived with respect to S. 242, to provide
additional authorizations for labor intensive
programs, to provide additional provisions
for the dislocated workers program under
Title III of the Job Training Partnership
Act, to promote employment and training
for recipients of federally financed unem-
ployment benefits, to provie procurement
targeting in labor surplus areas, and for
other purposes. Such waiver is necessary be-
cause S. 242 authorizes the enactment of
new budget authority which would first
become available in fiscal year 1983, and
which would first become available in fiscal
year 1984 and such bill was not reported
prior to the date required pursuant to sec-
tion 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act.
of 1974 for such authorizations.
Compliance with section 402(a) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 was not
possible by such date, and the enactment of
S. 242 is necessary to meet the urgent needs
of the unemployed.
SENATE RESOLUTION 198-RE-
LATING TO THE EXPORT OF
NUCLEAR REACTOR COMPO-
NENTS
Mr. BOSCHWITZ (for himself, Mr.
GLENN, Mr. HART, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr.
HUMPIiREY, Mr. HELMS, Mr. RIEGLE.
Mr. FORD, and Mr. PRESSLER) submit-
ted aresolution; which was referred to
the Committee on Foreign Relations:
S. RES. 198
Whereas halting the spread of nuclear
weapons is one of the primary goals of
United States foreign policy;
Whereas the United States, along with
117 nations, is a party to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty;
Whereas the Congress in 1978 passed the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act which is de-
signed to establish guidelines for the export
of nuclear materials and technology:
Whereas the Government of India has
made an urgent request to the United
States for nuclear reactor components 1'or
its nuclear power station at Tarapur;
Whereas India is not a party to the Nucle-
ar Nonproliferation Treaty and has not.
agreed to place its nuclear facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency safe-
guards:
Whereas the Government of India con-
ducted anuclear explosion in 1974 and has
refused to rule out future nuclear tests:
Whereas there have been reports indicat-
ing that the Government of India is prepar-
ing for another nuclear test, which would
require a cutoff of United States nuclear ex-
ports under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Act;
Whereas in order to provide the requested
nuclear reactor components to India the
President may have to waive the require-
ment for such a cutoff of United States nu-
clear exports:
Whereas the nuclear cooperation agree-
ment between the United States and India
provides that nuclear facilities supplied by
the United States to India shall be subject.
to international safeguards; and
Whereas this agreement expires in 1993
and India has not agreed to extend its safe-
guard provisions in perpetuity; Now, there-
fore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the
Senate that the United States Government
should not export or help arrange for other
countries to export nuclear reactor compo-
nents for the nuclear power station at Tara-
pur, India, unless the Government of India
provides to the United States Government
stronger nuclear nonproliferation guaran-
tees. These guarantees should include, at a
minimum-
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5 11804 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE, Auk,=rrst .~, 18.3
(1) reliable assurances by the Go~~ernment the issue of nuclear nonproliferation
of India that it is not engaged in a program before we rush to help them get the
to develop nuclear weapons and will not ex- nuclear components they want.
plode additional nuclear devices; and Mr. President, the resolution we are
(2) agreement by the Government of India
to extend the safeguards provisions in the introducing states that two of those
United States-Indian nuclear cooperation concessions should be the following:
agreement in perpetuity. First, the Government of India
SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall should be required to assure us that it
transmit a copy of this resolution to the is not engaged in a program to develop
President. nuclear weapons and will not explode
Mr. BOSCHWITZ. Mr. President, I another nuclear device. India detonat-
rise today, along with my colleague, ed a nuclear expiosicn in 1974 and has
Senator Joxx GLENN, to submit a reso- ~ refused to rule out further nuclear
lution which reaffirms the commit- tests. In fact, it has recently been re-
ment to the United States to halting ported that India could be making
the spread of nuclear weapons. This preparation for a second nuclear test
resolution, which, in addition to Sena- at the Rajasthan Desert test site.
for GLENN, has been cosponsored by Given the threat that Pakistan may be
Senators PROXMIRE, HART, HUMPFIREY, attempting to acquire nuclear weap-
HELMS, PRESSLER, RIEGLE, and FORD, ons, we have reason to worry that fur-
expresses the sense of the Senate that they nuclear testing by India may not
we should not export or help arrange be consistent with its pledge to use nu-
for other countries to export nuclear clear power for peaceful purposes.
reactor components to India for its nu- Further, under the terms of the Nu-
clear power station at Tarapur unless clear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,
India provides us with stronger non- one of the cornerstones of U.S. non-
proliferation guarantees. proliferation policy, the United States
Mr. President, it is interesting to may not export nuclear parts or tech-
note the broad spectrum of the co- nology to any nonnuclear weapons
sponsors of this resolution. From state engaged in nuclear explosive ac-
among the most conservative Members tivities. The President may waive this
of our body to the most liberal, this prohibition, subject to congressional
resolution, which has only been veto.
brought to the attention of Members a To date, the administration has not
day or two ago, has already attracted a indicated whether President Reagan
number of most meaningful cospon- will use his waiver authority in this
sors. case. If he does, Congress veto power
This response springs, of course, i.s, of course, in serious doubt due to
from the recognition that the prolif- the recent Supreme Court ruling
eration of nuclear weapons is some- against the legislative veto. It is there-
thing that we must stop. Otherwise, it fore important for the Senate to speak
is not unlikely that in our lifetime we out on this issue in advance. Our reso-
will indeed see the detonation of one lution does just that.
of those weapons. Second, Mr. President, this resolu-
Actualiy, Mr. President, the likeli- lion states that as another condition
hood of such a nuclear exchange be- for receiving the spare parts, India
tween the superpowers is very remote, should agree to extend the safeguards
in my judgment. Both sides are simply provision in the United States-Indian
too powerful. But if nuclear weapons nuclear cooperation agreement in per-
proliferate among many nations, as petuity. Although the United States-
they have begun to, and if we are not Indian agreement first initiated in
able to control and contain the spread 1963 provides for International Atomic
of nuclear technology, we indeed are Energy Agency safeguards on U.S.-
going to be heading down the road to supplied nuclear facilities in India,
trouble. this agreement lapses in 1993.
India has made an urgent. request to The United States interprets the
the United States for spare parts for agreement to mean that the safe-
its nuclear plant at Tarapur. The guards provision extends in perpetu-
problem a.t Tarapur is that its nuclear ity, but the Indians contend that all
fuel has deteriorated and has cantami- provisions of the agreement lapse in
nated the plant's coolant. There have 1993. If we want to make sure the nu-
been reports that workers in some clear installation at Tarapur, one we
areas of the plant are being exposed to supplied, remains safeguarded indefi-
high levels of radiation. It is not cer- nitely we must apply whatever lever-
tain whether the spare parts India has age we have on India now. This is the
requested from the United States, plus message of our resolution.
decontamination procedures, will be Mr. President, the two items men-
adequate to solve Tarapur's problem. tinned in this resolution, India's plan
In any event, the Reagan adminis- for another nuclear test and its dis-
tration has informed the Indians that agreement with us over the nuclear co-
lt will make sure they receive the nee- operation agreement, are hardly the
essary parts for the plant, either from only disputes we have with India on
ttte United States or from alternative the nonproliferation issue. We have
suppliers in Europe and Japan. While chosen these two because sooner or
I can understand the administration's later India must make these conces-
desire to be responsive to India's re- sions if the United States is to legally
quest, I also think vt'e should gain cooperate with India in the nuclear
meaningful concessions from India on field.
As I have already noted, U.S. nuclear
exports are forbidden under the
NNPA to any nonnuclear state in-
volved in nuclear explosive activities.
In addition, the NNPA requires that
U.S. nuclear spare parts be exported
only to safeguarded facilities. There-
fore, Mr. President, all we are really
asking India to do is allow the United
States to comply with its own nonpro-
liferation law.
However, the resolution does not say
at all that we must limit ourselves to
these two conditions. We should as a
matter of policy require that India
accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear
installations, not just the one at Tara-
pur. In addition, we could require that
India not reprocess spent fuel from a
U.S.-supplied facility without our con-
sent, a position India does not now
accept.
As you know, Mr. President, it is the
reprocessing of spent fuel that pro-
duces~plutonium, a material that can
be used to make a nuclear weapon.
But again, Mr. President, our resolu-
tion does not require these last steps I
have mentioned, although neither
does it preclude them. So we are ap-
proaching it in a reasonable manner.
Mr. President, there has lately been
considerable public attention focused
on the issue of strategic nuclear arms
control. I certainly share the concern
felt by the countless Americans about
the nuclear arms competition between
the United States and the Soviet
Union.
There is unquestionably a need for
the United States and the U.S.S.R. to
reduce their nuclear arsenals, but I
think there is another important
aspect of the nuclear arms question
which often gets lost in all the discus-
sion about the nuclear freeze, the
build down, and other proposals for
strategic arms control. That is the
issue of nuclear proliferation. That is
an issue that should not get lost.
Therefore, Mr. President, when the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee
resumes it consideration of the various
arms control proposals now pending
before it, I will offer an amendment
urging the United States to continue
to press forward on the nonprolifera-
tion front.
Meanwhile, I am very pleased t,o join
Senator GLENN and the rest of my col-
leagues in speaking out on the export
of nuclear spare parts to Tarapur. In
this we have an opportunity to
strengthen the global nonproliferation
system at one of its weakest points.
We must not allow this opportunity to
slip away.
Mr. President, in closing I would like
to thank Senator GLENN and his staff
for their cooperation on this issue.
The Senator from Ohio has been a
leader in the nonproliferation field for
many years. I was pleased to vote with
him in 1980 when he tried to stop for
the Carter administration from ship-
ping nuclear fuel to India despite the
Tatter's failure to place all its nuclear
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August .~, 1983 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 11805
facilities under safeguards. I look for- from the non-nuclear states to forgo the ac- nuclear weapon against an adversary. We
ward to working with him iri the quiition of nuclear weapons and submit all have the power to prevent these horrible
future on the vital and underpubll- their nuclear facilities to periodic inspec- outcomes; the question is, do we have the
tions by the International Atomic Energy will?
cized question of nuclear nonprolifera- Agency, an arm of the United Nations. Mr. BOSCIiWITZ. Mr. President, I
tion. These inspections are called full-scope safe- also ask unanimous consent that other
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- guards.
sent that an article entitled "Stop Unfortunately a number of countries that Senators who wish to file statements
This Nuclear Sale," which appeared in are major proliferation risk-India, Paki- on this resolution during the course of
the Washington Post of July 22, 1983, Stan, South Africa, Brazil and Argentina to the day be allowed to do so, and that
be printed at this point in the RECORD. name several-have not signed the treaty. their statements appear at this point
There being no objection, the article In order to exert pressure on these coup- in the RECORD.
tries to allow inspection of sll their facili-
was ordered to be printed in the ties, Congress passed the NNPA, which in The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
RECORD, aS follows: addition to the provision previously men- out objection, it is so ordered.
[From the Washington Post. July 22, 1983] tinned, contains another provision banning Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I am
STOP THIS NUCLEAR SALE nuclear exports to countries that do not pleased to join Senator $OSCHWITZ in
(By Rudy Boschwitz) accept IAEA safeguards on all their facili- Submitting this resolution Concerning
ties.
Although the debate about strategic nu- In 1980, President Carter wanted to con- our nuclear nonproliferation policy
clear arms control has dominated the news tinue to supply nuclear fuel to India even toward India and its relation to the
lately, the Reagan administration now has though the Indians do not accept full-scope shipment of spare parts for the nuCle-
before it a true "test case" in a less publi- IAEA safeguards. Carter exercised his au- ar reactors at Tarapur. Once again, we
cized area of the nuclear arms question-nu- thority to waive this ban granted to him by are faced with an important decision
clear proliferation. This case, India's re- the NNPA. Although the House voted re- that will determine Whether the
quest for reactor components for nuclear soundingly, 298-98, to overturn the waiver, United States intEnds to llVe up to its
plan: at Tarapur (a city just north of the Senate upheld Carter's action in a close nonproliferation Commitments and
Bombay) is important for two reasons. vote, 48-46. On this vote I was pleased to
First and foremost the manner in which join forces with my colleague, Sen. John the spirit Of its laws in thls area.
the U.S. government responds to the Indian Glenn, who led the fight against the fuel Three years ago, the previous adminis-
request will reveal the strength of our com- exports. Too bad we lost. tratiOn failed the first real test of its
mitment to halting the proliferation of nu- With our veto power now in doubt, it 6s all nonproliferation policy When Presi-
clear weapons. Second, this case demon- the more important for those of us in Con- dent Carter made the decision to send
strates the potential impact on U.S. nonpro- gress to speak out loudly and try to influ- fuel to Tarapur despite the refusal of
.liferation policy of the recent Supreme ence public opinion on the proliferation
Court decision on the legislative veto. issue. Regarding India's current request for the Indians to accept full-scope safe-
India has made an urgent request to the reactor parts, the administration should not guards on their nuclear facilities as re-
administration for component parts for two provide India with the parts it needs, nor quired under the Nuclear NOnprolif-
reactors at Tarapur that have developed se- should it arrange for other countries to do eration Act Of 1978. The House by a 2-
rious radiation leaks. In my opinion, it will so. Instead, it should Lry to persuade all the t0-1 margin, voted to overturn the
be difficult for the administration to honor major nuclear suppliers-mainly ourselves 1'residerit's decision, and the Senate
this request without violating U.S. nonpro- and our European allies-to withhold parts Came within two votes Of doing the
liferation laws. This law, the so-called Nu- from the Indians until they: 1) make it clear same. Only One of tW0 pending Ship-
clear Non-Proliferation Act, passed by Con- that they are not planning another nuclear
gress in 1976 contains a provision banning test and 2) accept full-scope IAEA safe- menu was then sent, with the second
exports of nuclear material to countries "en- guards. If we who are already in the nuclear One Scheduled to be delivered at a
gaged in activities ...having direct signifi- business, either for civilian or military pur- later time. The main arguments
cance for the manufacture or acquisition of poses, are really serious about wanting to against the shlpment were that the In-
nuclear explosive devices ..." The problem stop proliferation, this is the kind of bold, dines had in the past refused to abide
is that there have been strong hints that forceful step that we have no choice but to by Clear U.S. understandings about the
India could be preparing for a second nucle- take. 1963 United States/India Agreement
ar test, and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi We must recognize that what drives coun- for Cooperation as well 8S the terms of
has in fact refused to rule out further nucle- tries like India and Pakistan to join the nu-
ar testing. clear club is not some perverse affection for a heavy-water Sale agreement between
India first exploded a nuclear device in nuclear weapons but a much more human the United States and Indla In 1956.
1974, calling it a "peaceful nuclear explo- emotion-fear. They are afraid for their se- Despite being told by the United
sion." However, Pakistan, with which India curity in a hostile world. Just as our concern States that the use of our heavy water
has been in deep dispute for over three dec- about Soviet military power and our desire in a nuclear explosives program would
ades, does not see it quite that way. Many to deter its use against us forces us ~ be contrary to the prOVislonS of the
proliferation experts fear that the Paki- deploy nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is Sale agreement, the Iridlans went
stanis are-clandestinely acquiring their own vital that we strengthen the international ahead and used our material In the re-
bomb-making capability. nonproliferation system, or regime, as it is
Under NNPA, the president may waive the sometimes called so that frightened coun- actor that produced the plutonium for
prohibition against unclear exports to India, tries will come to trust it as a way of remov- their 1974 nuclear explosion. Subse-
but Congress may overturn this decision by ing the nuclear terror. quently, after the passage Of the
passing a concurrent resulution within 60 On June 7, 1981, Israeli fighter-bombers NNPA, the Indians refused to abide by
days of his action. However, the congres- executed the first overt military attack in the full-scope safeguards criterion for
sional veto power granted to Congress in the history on a nuclear facility, destroying U.S. exports to nonweapon States. The
NNPA, and many other laws, could now be Iraq's Osirak research reactor. The Israelis previous administration argued that if
invalidated by the recent Supreme Court acted because they did not trust the peace- we did not send fuel for Tarapur we
ruling against the legislative veto. The un- ful intentions of a nuclear program being
certainty here is the breadth of the court's developed by an uncompromising enemy risked having the Indians Claim that
decision: the case involved aone-house veto, and because they had an equal distrust for we had abrogated the agreement-a
while the NNPA provides that both houses the international nonproliferation regime. Claim, incidentally, that would be false
of Congress must vote to block a presiden- While many expressed alarm and outrage since the Indians agreed in a 1971
tial action. that military force was used to resolve this amendment to the 1963 agreement to
The NNPA's two-house veto was a useful question, I think the Israelis did us all a abide by all our export laws-and
nonproliferation tool three years ago when favor by reminding us of our responsibility might then remove Safeguards from
Congress nearly succeeded in blocking an- to countries afraid of a nuclear threat from previous U.S. exports including the ac-
other ill-advised nuclear export. deal to hostile neighbors.
India by another administration. The facts We can exercise that responsibility by Cumulated spent fuel.
of the case were these: under the Nuclear taking a tough stand on the export of com- To the amazement of some, aftP.r the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1970, ponent parts to India. If we are not willing fight over the fuel Shipment was rP.-
signed by 115 nations including the United to take this type of action both now and in solved, the Indians began claiming
States and the Soviet Union, the nuclear the future, we should not be surprised when publicly that they would have the
"have" nations agreed to supply the nuclear another Osirak-style raid occurs by some ri ht to remove safeguards from Tara-
"have-not" nations with nuclear technology other threatened nation, or, worse still, g
for peaceful purposes in return for a pledge when one of these countries actually uses a pur aftP,r the United States-India
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S 11806 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENATE August 4, 1981
a re t
g em
en expired m 1993. They also would be glad to discuss them with you at
began claiming publicly that they length at your convenience. Rather, the
have the right to reprocess U.S.-origin Purpose of this letter is to inform you that
spent fuel without our permission, if the official Indian attitude on the reproc-
even though the United States-India essing of U.S.-origin spent fuel at. Tarapur is
agreement clearly calls for "a joint de- ~ reported in the Washington Post of Feb-
termination on safe uardabilit of ruary 3, 1981 sand my staff has been told by
the g y a State Department spokesman that the
proposed reprocessing facility quotes do represent official Indian atti-
before any extraction of plutonium Ludes), then a significant part of the ration-
from U.S.-origin spent fuel can be ale used to justify sending the fuel has been
processed. Such a joint determination undercut. During the Senate debate, the
has never been made. proponents of the shipment argued that the
In response t0 news reports Suggest- shipment was necessary in order to ensure
ing that the Indians were seeking to that the Indians could not claim breach-of-
terminate the agreement, I Wrote t0 contract on the part of the United States. In
the President on February 5, 1981, thetspent fuel at Tarapur andaongthereac-
suggesting that if the Indians wish to for itself would be maintained, and we could
terminate their agreement with the prevent the Indians from reprocessing the
United States, we ShOUId aCCOmmO- spent fuel since U.S. permission is required
date them with the understanding under the Agreement. Those arguments
that such termination does not relieve played a large part in convincing the Senate
them of any obligation with respect to by a vote of 48-46, to uphold the President's
either continued safeguarding of the decision. I argued against the decision on
reactors and the s the grounds that the Indians had not shown
pent fuel Or U.S. good faith with the United States in terms
prior consent on the reprocessing of of the discharge of Indian obligations under
U.S.-Origin Spent fuel. I ask unanimous the previous heavy-water sales agreement;
cons
t th
en
at this letter and the reply that India had refused to accept full-scope
from the White House be placed in the safeguards as required under the Nuclear
RECORD at this point. Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978; that
There being no objection, the letters Prime Minister Gandhi had reiterated that
were ordered to be the Indians would mount nuclear explosions
printed in the whenever they felt it was in their national
RECORD, as fO110WS: t
m
t
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AF-
FAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY,
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND GOV-
ERNMENT PROCESSES,
W?shington, D. C., February S. 1981.
The PRESIDENT,
The White Nouse,
Washington, D. C.
Bres
, and that it would be damaging to
the U.S. to fail the first substantive test of
the NNPA.
The Post article quotes Dr. V. N. Meckoni,
Director of the Tarapur Nuclear Safety
Group, as saying "There is no question of
permission from the U.S. for the reprocess-
ing of Tarapur fuel. The fuels belongs to
us." This suggests th
t
d
a
,
espite our bending
DEAR MR. PRESrnexT: Recent press repa?ts over backwards in order to show good will
indicate that the Indian government is pro- toward India in the nuclear area, the Indi-
posing an amicable end to its Agreement for ans may be prepared to violate the Agree-
Cooperation in nuclear matters with the meat for Cooperation and separate out plu-
United States. This issue has been an irri- tonium from the spent fuel at Tarapur
tant in U.S.-Indian relations since 1974 without our permission.
when the Indians exploded a nuclear device If the Indians take such action, we will be
using plutonium obtained from an unsafe- faced with a situation in which the United
guarded Canadian research reactor in which States publicly took a large step backwards
U.S. heavy-water was emplaced. in its nonproliferation stance to placate the
In an aide-memoire delivered by the U.S. Indians only to be subsequently and rudely
Slate Department to India four years earli- thrust aside. This is hardly likely to en-
er, the U.S. position was made clear that we hance American prestige in the world com-
would consider use of our materials for nu- munity.
clear explosive purposes as a contravention In my view, it would be most desirable and
of the terms under which the material was appropriate for the President to issue a
supplied. Nonetheless, India proceeded with strong statement regarding the United
the explosion. That action was one of the States' attitude on the nonproliferatiol) of
factors that influenced the U.S. Congress to nuclear weapons, and on the United States'
pass the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of determination not to knuckle under to the
1978 which provides that except for Presi- threats of other countries that demand the
dential intervention, no U.S. nuclear materi- export of our nuclear materials without sat-
als would be exported to any non-weapon isfying the export criteria in our laws.
state which refuses to accept full-scope safe- If the Indians wish an amicable end Co our
guards on its nuclear facilities. nuclear fuel contract rather than satisfying
It is important to understand that 111 the legal export conditions designed to pre-
non-weapons states, in return for receiving vent the misuse of nuclear materials. I feel
cooperation from nuclear suppliers, inchld- we should accommodate them with the un-
ing the U.S., have accepted full-scope safe- derstanding that termination of the con-
guards by virtue of their adherence to the tract does not relieve them of any obligation
Non-Proliferation Treaty. To send materials with respect to either the continued safe-
to nonsigners such as India, who refuse to guarding of the reactors and the spent fuel
honor this export criterion, is to undermine or U.S. prior consent on the reprocessing of
the Treaty.. U.S.-origin spent fuel.
The Indian issue is a complex one involy- The Tarapur shipment approved last year
ing subtle legal arguments regarding the ob- was divided into two parts, only one of
ligatons of both the United States and which has been sent. In light of the Indian
India under the Agreement for Cooperation statements I urge that you withhold send-
and the Fuel Contract pursuant. thereto. It ing the second part of the shipment until
is not my intent to reiterate all those argu- appropriate assurances are received from
meats. They were exhaustively examined the Indians regarding the future disposition
during the Senate debate last fall on Presi- of our spent fuel and the maintenance of
dent Carter's decision to send the furl, and I safeguards.
Finally, I continue to hold to the position
that the issue in the Tarapur case is not
what we can or cannot prevent the Indians
from doing. Their large, unsafeguarded, in-
digenous program will eventually dwarf the
Tarapur program in terms of production of
weapons-usable materials. The issue, rather,
concerns the impact that our decisions in
this area will have on other nations. If the
most flagrant nuclear violator can obtain
nuclear materials witty no concessions, the
message to the signatories of the NPT is
that the political commitment they made in
order to receive nuclear assistance has been
devalued. An equally unfortunate message
is also sent to those countries that may be
going down the path of developing a weap-
ons option themseh~es and to suppliers who
may be aiding them to do so. We should be
resolute in our determination not to engage
in nuclear trade with countries that are un-
willing to allow effective full-scope safe-
guards on their nuclear facilities. To do oth-
erwise is to guarantee failure in obtaining
international consensus on strengthening
and tightening the international safeguards
system.
Best regards.
Sincerely,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
W?shington, D. C., April 17, 1981.
Hon. JOHN GLENN,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR SENATOR GLENN: The White HOUSE
has asked me to reply to your recent letter
about the future of US nuclear cooperation
with India. We recognize your longstanding
commitmelt to non-proliferation and appre-
ciate having your views on the India issue at
this stage.
As you know the Administration has been
actively reviewing the situation with a view
to deciding on a course of action that best
serves our non-proliferation and foreign
policy interests. I understand that you have
been briefed by State Department officials
to bring you up to date on developments in
a number of areas of non-proliferation con-
cern, including India. As you can appreciate,
therefore, our discussions about the US-
India nuclear relationship are at a very deli-
cate stage.
While I cannot at this point predict the
outcome of this review or of related discus-
sions with representatives of the Indian
Government, this is a matter of high prior-
ity to which we will be devoting consider
able attention on the weeks ahead.
Sincerely,
ALVIN PAUL DRISCHLF.R,
Action Assistanl Sccretan/
.for Congressional Relations.
Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, unfortu-
nately, these conditions were ignored
when the United States subsequently
allowed the Indians to sign an agree-
ment for a new fuel contract with the
French for Tarapur. Despite the histo-
ry of contentiousness on key points
concerning safeguards, the United
States did not insist upon clarification
of these points prior to giving its ap-
proval of the French/Indian agree-
ment. In particular, the United States
did not insist that the French/Indian
agreement assure that perpetual safe-
guards shall apply to the fuel pxovided
by France; did not assure that safe-
guards shall apply to any material de-
rived from French-supplied fuel and to
any facility through which such fuel
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August .?, 198.3 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
passes; and did not assure that India those parts which third parties cannot
French-supplied fuel Cannot be reproC- Provide. I understand that extensive discus-
essed without a f Dint determination on sions have already taken place with Ger-
safegusrdability of the reproc.e~ing ~~ supplying st least ibsome of the de-
facility by the United States, the ~.~ equipment.
French, and the Indians. bty views on this were recently solicited
As a result of the French/Indian by Secretary Shultz through senator Percy.
agreement, the Indians will receive I have been informed that a cable was sent
fuel for Tarapur without having to to the Secretary informing him of my view,
put all their nuclear facilities under which is that I am opposed to provkring the
safeguards, thus escaping s major aim Imiians with any help in olrtsiclirrd these re-
of U.S. nonproliferation policy insti- actor items as long as the Indians maintain
th ition that the safeguards principles
os
e
sus have Dome back with a request for I believe that, in aiding the Indian nuclear
the United States to ship spare parts program under present cinalmstar~oes, the
for the Tarapur reactors. And once administration is making a grave error that
again, an administration has seen fit will undermine the nuclear nonproliferation
to cave irl before India's demands regime in much the same way as the Garter
without requiring the least quid pro Administration undid its own policy by
quo in return. This time, the argument sending fuel to Tanl,pur in 1980.
Some of my colleagues in the House and
for shipment of nuclear parts is based Senate have written to you about this issue
not just on the United States/Indian and tt is not my intelstioa to reiterate their
Agreement for Cooperation, but also arguments. Rather, because it has been
on an ostensible desire t0 protect both claimed that the tansfer of spas parts is a
nuclear plantworkers at Tarapur who "safety" and humanitarian issue that
are being excessively exposed to radi- should override nonprolfferatfon concerns, I
anon, as well as Indian Citizens living wish to bring to your attention some infor-
mation suggesting that such claims are mis-
near the Tarapur reactors who could -leading and obscure the true pricture of ru-
be exposed to radiation in the event of clear safety at Tarapur.
an accident. Nucleu experts in your administration
That there is a safety problem at the have told my staff that the Tanspur reac-
Tarapur reactors is beyond question, LOrs are, from the standpoint of safety and
but whether the spare parts will solve independently of the spare parts, much
the problem is another matter entire- worse than the worst operating plants in
ly. In the meantime, sending the parts the United States. There have been serious
fuel failures in the past few years in which
without any quid pro quo will, put the significant amounts of radioactive materials
United States once again in the post- have entered the primary coolant and been
Lion of having its nonproliferation deposited in pipes, pumps, valves, and other
policy undermined by countries with equipment, thus resulting in high exposure
the worst records since the Nuclear ~~ LO workers