HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ON NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP95B00895R000200010002-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Page Count: 43
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 3, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
HEARING
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
28-838 O WASHINGTON : 1984
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona, Chairman
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, New York, Vice Chairman
JAKE GARN, Utah
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
DAVID DURENBERGER, Minnesota
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., Delaware
HARRISON H. SCHMITT, New Mexico
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas
SAM NUNN, Georgia
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
ROBERT R. SIMMONS, Staff Director
GARY J. SCHMITT, Minority Staff Director
VICTORIA TOENSING, Chief Counsel
PETER M. SULLIVAN, Minority Counsel
DORTHEA ROBERSON, Chief Clerk
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On April 26, 1983, we were joined by all members of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence in introducing Senate Concurrent
Resolution 28. The purpose of this resolution was to support the estab-
lishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum. Later in the
year we introduced Senate Resolution 267 with the same purpose.
On November 3, 1983, open hearings were held by the full committee
on this Senate resolution. Witnesses included the following: William
J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence; Walter Pforzheimer, for-
mer General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency and noted
intelligence historian; Martin G. Cramer, president of the National
Historical Intelligence Museum Association; William E. Colby, for-
mer Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen. William Quinn, U.S.
Army (retired), former Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence
Agency and consultant to this committee; Dr. David Kahn, editor and
author, and Joseph Persico, author.
We feel that intelligence has played an important role in the history
of our country, both in peacetime and during periods of war. A Na-
tional Historical Intelligence Museum would provide the American
people with insights into the important but complicated world of intel-
ligence-a world which is often misunderstood and unfairly criti-
cized. This museum would give the American people a unique oppor-
tunity to learn about the contributions of intelligence to our Nation's
history.
BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman.
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
Vice Chairman.
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CONTENTS
William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence----------------------
Walter Pforzheimer, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence
Page
3
Agency _ 6
Lt. Gen. William Quinn, U.S. Army (retired) ---------------- --------- 16
William E. Colby, former Director, Central Intelligence Agency__________ 18
Dr. David Kahn, editor and author___________________________________ 19
Joseph E. Persico, author --------------------------------------------- 21
Martin G. Cramer, president, National Historical Intelligence Museum___ 23
PROCEEDINGS
Chairman's opening statement ------------------------------------------ 1
Statement by Senator Hecht ------------------------------------------- 2
Statement of William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence---------- 3
General Washington, first Intelligence Director-------------------- 3
Covert arms supported American Revolution ------------------------- 3
History of intelligence -------------------------------------------- 4
Public museum-------------------------------------------------- 4
CIA contribution limited__________________________________________ 5
Statement of Walter Pforzheimer, former Legislative Counsel, CIA, mem-
ber of the executive committee and board of directors of the Association
of Former Intelligence Officers, and collector of intelligence memorabilia_ 6
George Washington, greatest Intelligence officer--------------------- 7
Exhibit items---------------------------------------------------- 8
Museum location, cost, exhibits ------------------------------------ 10
Prepared statement of Walter Pforzheimer------------------------- 11
List of exhibits to accompany the testimony of Walter Pforzheimer__ 14
Biographical sketch of Walter L. Pforzheimer______________________ 15
Statement of Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn, U.S. Army (retired)____________ 16
Combat forces Intelligence________________________________________ 16
Summary of duties in field of intelligence of Lt. Gen. William W.
Quinn, U.S. Army (retired)------------------------------------ 17
Panel introduction ----------------------------------------------- 18
Statement of Mr. William E. Colby, former Director of Central
Intelligence ------------------------------------------------------- 18
Statement of Dr. David Kahn, editor and author ------------------------- 19
Purpose of Intelligence Museum ----------------------------------- 20
Statement of Joseph E. Persico, author --------------------------------- 21
Statement of Martin G. Cramer, president, National Historical Intelli-
gence Museum----------------------------------------------------- 23
Proposed museum ------------------------------------------------ 24
Displays -------------------------------------------------------- 24
Exhibit selection------------------------------------------------- 25
Prepared statement of Martin G. Cramer on proposed project for a
National Historical Intelligence Museum, before the Senate Perma-
nent Select Committee on Intelligence, November 3, 1983___________ 26
Prepared statement of Senator David Durenberger_____________________ 28
Statement by Senator Inouye_________________________________________ 29
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APPENDIX
Establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum, Senate Page
Resolution 267 (Congressional Record, Nov. 17, 1983) -----------------
31
Statement of Lt. Gen. Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF (retired), former Direc-
tor of Defense Intelligence Agency---------------------------------
32
Statement of J. Milnor Roberts, vice president, National Historical Intelli-
gence Museum, and vice president, National Intelligence Study Center_-
32
Statement by Maurice Matloff, former Chief Historian, Center for Military
History, Department of the Army, and member, advisory board, National
Historical Intelligence Museum-------------------------------------
33
Statement of George C. Constantinides -------------------- ------------
34
Statement of Russell F. Weigley, professor of history, Temple University-
34
Statement of Lawrence McWilliams, former Chief, Foreign Counter Intel-
ligence Training, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and member, board,
National Historical Intelligence Museum -----------------------------
34
Statement of Richard K. Betts, senior fellow, the Brookings Institution,
and member, advisory board, National Historical Intelligence Museum-_
35
Statement by Roger Pineau, captain, USNR (retired), and member,
board, National Historical Intelligence Museum -----------------------
35
Letter to Senator Barry Goldwater from James R. Withrow, Jr., chairman
of the William J. Donovan Memorial Foundation, Inc-----------------
36
Letter to Hon. Barry Goldwater from Minor Myers, Jr., professor of gov-
ernment, assistant secretary general, the Society of the Cincinnati, Con-
necticut College----------------------------------------------------
37
Letter to Hon. Barry Goldwater from Ray S. Cline, president, National In-
telligence Study Center ----------------------------------------------
38
Telegram to Hon. Barry Goldwater from William J. Morgan, Ph. D-------
38
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NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1983
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9 :58 o'clock a.m., in room
SR-385, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Barry Goldwater, chair-
man of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Goldwater (presiding), Inouye, and Hecht.
Also present: Robert Simmons, staff director; Victoria Toensing,
chief counsel; Dorthea Roberson, clerk of the committee; and Jean
Evans, Edward Levine, Daniel Finn, Sam Bouchard, Don Wynnyczok,
Pamela Crupi, Thomas Blau, George Krauss, Diane Branagan, and
Benjamin Marshall, staff members.
The CHAIRMAN. The meeting will come to order. I want to apologize
for the lack of attendance of other members of the committee, but the
Senate has periods when it gets into unusually busy situations. And
this morning is one of these times. So not all of us can be here. In
fact, I am probably going to have to leave because a bill that affects
intelligence, our 1984 authorization bill, is scheduled for floor action
at 10:15, and if that happens I will have to leave.
The purpose of today's meeting of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence is to hear testimony supporting the establishment of a na-
tional historical intelligence museum. Earlier this year I introduced
legislation in the form of a resolution supporting such a museum. I am
happy to say that this resolution already has the support of all of the
members of the Senate Select Committee, including our vice chairman,
Senator Moynihan.
Intelligence has long played an important role in the history of na-
tions. As well, it has always been a vital force in the history of our
country. General Washington relied very heavily on good intelligence
in fighting our Revolutionary War, and intelligence has played an im-
portant role in every war which we have fought, including the Civil
War. To the extent these wars were fought to keep us free, intelligence
has played -a vital role in our freedom.
My purpose in reviewing these facts is to give my colleagues a feel
for the long and distinguished history of American intelligeice.
These facts should also give my colleagues a picture of the sorts of
historical events that a national historical intelligence museum could
display for the American people.
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The establishment of a museum is endorsed by the National His-
torical Intelligence Museum Association. This nonprofit organiza-
tion was established in close cooperation with the Donovan Memorial
Foundation, which itself is organized as a public foundation to honor
the name and memory of General Donovan.
The directors of the Donovan Memorial Foundation support the
establishment of a national historical intelligence museum to provide
a visual presentation of the history of American intelligence. Such a
museum could contain a variety of artifacts which would give the
American people a better feeling for the role, nature, and importance
of intelligence to our Nation's history. Obviously, none of these arti-
facts or displays would reveal current sensitive sources or methods of
the intelligence business. The purpose is to show an historical perspec-
tive.
It is important for my colleagues to understand that this resolution
does not provide any funds for this museum. What we are trying
to do here is to provide congressional support for the establishment
of an historical intelligence museum. We want to encourage private
donors to assist in its construction and its displays. In other words,
passage of this resolution will not cost the Government any money.
Before these distinguished witnesses that we have with us today
testify, I would like to introduce the committee's special consultant on
this matter, Gen. William Quinn. I have known General Quinn for
many years. I have known of his background in intelligence and of his
brilliant career in World War II, and in the Korean war. I and very
proud that lie agreed to serve as the head honcho on this whole thing.
Senator Hecht has a very short statement he would like to make,
and then we will have Bill Casey.
Go ahead.
STATEMENT BY SENATOR HECHT
Senator HECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am proud to cosponsor this piece of legislation, and I have the
honor of being a former agent who has served in this Nation's intelli-
gence service behind the Iron Curtain. It is an interesting field because
many of our colleagues and many great Americans have been on cer-
tain missions and they are great heroes. Unfortunately no one is ever
given the information to know about them, about what they did, often-
times not even their families. I think it is time we recognized these
great American heroes and what they did for our country. We should
absolutely look up to them because they are some of the greatest
heroes, and yet no one knows anything about them.
Intelligence is a vital part of any military operation and is essential
to keep the free world alive. I think it is time the recognition is given
to these deeds and individuals.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, very much, Senator, for being here.
I am pleased at this time to have Bill Casey, Director of Central
Intelligence as our leadoff witness. Besides being a very well known
lawyer and intelligence expert, Bill is also known around here as a
great lover of history.
Bill, I look forward to what you have to say about this project.
Please proceed.
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STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. CASEY, DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for this opportunity to give you my views
on the Senate resolution to support the establishment of a national
historical intelligence museum. I am truly moved by this resolution's
recognition of those Americans who have worked and sacrificed, from
the first days of our Republic to give our Government the intelli-
gence it has needed to prevail in war and to remain secure in peace.
CIA is a young organization, going back to only 1947, and its
World War II progenitor, OSS, goes back only another 6 years to
1941. But American intelligence did not begin with OSS or CIA.
As the resolution notes, Gen. George Washington organized and
relied upon a variety of intelligence activities in leading the 13
American Colonies in the long war for independence, whose happy
ending 200 years ago we celebrate this year.
I have done some research and writing on the American Revolu-
tion, and I claim that my first predecessor as Director of Central
Intelligence was not Admiral Sidney Sours who was appointed Di-
rector of Central Intelligence by President Truman, but George
Washington, who appointed himself. How did Washington's ragtag
army, some 6,000 or 8,000 men for most of the war, defeat what was
then the most powerful nation in the world. Second only to Wash-
ington's qualities as a leader in this achievement were his natural
aptitude as a director and practitioner of intelligence and special
operations and with General Greene and his lieutenants in the South,
as a master of what we know today of guerrilla warfare.
The earliest predecessor of your committee, Mr. Chairman, was
the Secret Committee created by the Continental Congress for the
covert procurement of_ arms in September of 1775, and the Commit-
tee on Secret Correspondence created 2 months later for the purpose
of corresponding with our friends in Great Britain, in Ireland, and
other parts of the world, notably our adversaries as well as our
friends in Europe.
But to these committees, the Continental Congress appointed its
strongest members, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Morris, Silas Dean,
John Day, Benjamin Harrison, Richard Henry Lee, John Dicker-
son, and under the authority of these committees, Benjamin Franklin
and Silas Dean carried out the first. American special operations in
arranging the clandestine acquisition and financing in Europe and
shipment to America of the weapons needed to sustain the American
Revolution. And to meet his needs, his military needs as Commander
in Chief over here, Washington gradually developed a working
intelligence network and became his own intelligence chief.
The intelligence process consists of three broad steps. The identifi-
cation and collection of information. The evaluation and analysis of
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that information, drawing inference and conclusions relating to neces-
sary decisions. And third, the dissemination to convey facts and con-
clusions to the commanders and the policymakers needing them.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Washington himself performed
all of these functions. In his letters time and again he specifies the plea
for the kind of information he needs to estimate the enemies plans and
intentions. Most of the analysis and interpretation of the facts col-
lected for him took place in his own mind, and his massive correspond-
ence was a major means of conveying relevant information to his com-
manders and the Congress.
The special operations, intelligence activities and the resulting de-
ception which enabled Washington to keep his tiny force alive and
ultimately defeat the trained British Army at Yorktown were critical
to winning our independence. And this has continued down to this day,
notably during World War II and the reading of German messages,
the deception which kept 15 German divisions away from the beach-
head at Normandy, and the development and support of French re-
sistance forces which protected the flank of the Third and the Seventh
American Armies as they liberated France.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I take you briefly through this history of in-
telligence related to our military and political challenge because I
believe it important to our national spirit that all of this be remem-
bered by our people. It is important to the future of the American
intelligence community that the interest and the understanding of
young people be engaged at an early age, and the challenge and the
opportunity which these activities offered in the past as well as in the
future. It is important that the American public recognize and under-
stand the importance of intelligence, and for this the public needs in-
formation and education about the role of intelligence in our Nation's
history.
And as this resolution suggests, one highly important way of educat-
ing and informing the public would be to establish a national museum
where intelligence objects of historical interest could be collected, pre-
served and exhibited to the public. And I am grateful that all of you
on this committee have joined your chairman in sponsoring this resolu-
tion to establish a museum that will commemorate the contribution of
thousands of men and women of American intelligence since 1775.
In inviting me to testify today, Mr. Chairman, you and your vice
chairman asked my thoughts not only on the importance of having
such a museum, which I have just shared with you, but also what might
be included in it and how I think that such a project might be carried
forward. Since the question of what such a museum should contain
depends to a considerable degree on how it is set up, let me first com-
ment on the kind of institution that I believe is envisioned, and which
I think would be appropriate.
PUBLIC MUSEUM
At the outset I would say that I am glad the movement to establish
a, national historical intelligence museum is a private initiative. I think
its advocates are right in wanting to create a public but not a govern-
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mental museum. I agree with those that hold that it would probably
not be appropriate for CIA, the intelligence community as a whole, or
the Federal Government to fund or administer such a museum. Such a
museum should be entirely free of the constraints of national security
classification. That is, all of its holdings should be freely accessible
to the public. It should also be independent in managing its affairs,
especially in deciding what and which to exhibit. For these reasons, it
should not be an appendage or adjunct to CIA or other organizations
in the intelligence community, but entirely independent of them.
Indeed, for such a museum to depend upon intelligence agencies for
funds, exhibits, and direction, might encourage the public to believe
it was merely a government public relations operation. Thus, I find
myself in sympathy with the proponents of this museum who believe
that the general public interest, the functional requirements of intel-
ligence work, and the benefits of freedom from official constraints all
argue for an independent institution, albeit possibly some degree of
government support. Having said all this, I can immediately add that
CIA, and I am sure other components of the intelligence community
as well, will be glad to support and cooperate with a national histori-
cal intelligence museum in every legitimate way that we can.
This brings me to the question of what should be included in such
a museum. Here I would focus primarily on what might be expected
to come from CIA and the intelligence community. And I must say
frankly that what CIA can contribute here will almost certainly be
quite limited. This is first because we do not have many objects or
artifacts that could be exhibited in a museum. We mainly produce
paper, and the release to the public of some of our records is, I think,
a separate issue which is dealt with regularly in other forums, arenas.
Beyond this, our need to protect our sources and methods means
we must keep much of our material secret for very considerable lengths
of time, sometimes long after the actual substance of a report may be
general knowledge. Within these constraints, however, there are some
things that we could offer to such a museum. We have, for example,
been able to release U-2 photography to the John F. Kennedy Library
for its documentation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. We have also given
the Smithsonian Institution related U-2 materials for exhibits there.
We have shared with the public the results of applying advanced photo
interpretation techniques to World War II aerial photography, by
releasing detailed analysis of Nazi death camps, and evidence of the
Soviet massacre at Katyn. While I am confident we can continue to
release this kind of intelligence material from time to time, I would not
want to mislead anyone into expecting us to be a major source of
exhibits with this projected historical intelligence museum.
Indeed, it seems to me that while artifacts and intelligence and other
historical documents would be an essential component of an intelligence
museum, most of the presentation and most of the interest would be
created by exhibits showing in historical context how intelligence con-
tributed to desirable military and political results. This can be done
largely with exhibits using historical material and material available
in the public record, the product of scholars engaged in historical
analysis.
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I have in mind how Washington succeeded in getting the British
commander in New York to bring back forces from Virginia to New
York City by feinting. an attack on New York as he and General
Rochambeau marched their forces through Westchester County and
down through Jersey and down into Virginia. This kind of a story
can be told with legends on maps, accompanied by actual messages and
orders which are available from the historical record.
The same kind of thing can be done with the deception which kept
15 German divisions 100 miles north of Normandy. If they could have
been put into Normandy they could have pushed our forces back into
the Channel. Also this applies to French resistance to develop protec-
tion for General Patton's flank as lie raced up the route-General
Patch's flank as he raced up the route of Napoleon from Mediterranean
to Grenoble, and General Patton's flank as he raced from Brittany to
Lorraine. All this kind of thing can be done with maps and reports
and messages supporting the maps which are publicly available.
I have seen this in actual practice, visiting intelligence resistance
museums which have been established and are functioning at Oslo,
Norway, in Copenhagen, Denmark, and in Paris, France. I was told
in Norway just last week that the resistance museum there still re-
ceives more visits than any other tourist attraction in Norway, in-
cluding the major Viking ships and the Kon Tiki raft, which are
the subject of dramatic exhibits in Norway. But the resistance museum
outdraws them.
Senator Hecht, in conclusion, I am grateful for the opportunity
to testify before you today and for the support all of you have shown
by joining our chairman in sponsoring this important resolution.
Senator HECHT [presiding]. Thank you, very much, Mr. Casey. And
I want to say that our chairman had to leave to make sure there was
an authorization bill passed for the Intelligence Community.
Mr. CASEY. I'll happily excuse him for that.
Senator HECHT. Our next witness is Walter Pforzheimer.
Mr. Pforzheimer is an intelligence expert and noted collector of rare
books, including those on intelligence. A lawyer and Yale graduate,
Mr. Pforzheimer has been in the intelligence business since December
8, 1942. He was the first legislative counsel for the CIA. From 1956 to
1974 he served as curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collec-
tion. I understand he has brought items from his own collection, and
when you testify maybe you will want to speak about these different
items.
Mr. Pforzheimer.
STATEMENT OF WALTER PFORZHEIMER, FORMER LEGISLATIVE
COUNSEL, CIA, MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND
BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF FORMER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AND COLLECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
MEMORABILIA
Mr. PFORZHEIMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
After so kind an introduction I can hardly wait to hear what I have
to say. I am grateful to you this morning for the privilege of testify-
ing before you. Especially, I deeply appreciate your taking time from
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busy days and having the thoughtfulness to introduce the Senate
resolution which is now being considered to establish, in theory, a na-
tional historical intelligence museum. Such a museum represents a
concept which I endorse in principle; in this I am joined by my col-
leagues in the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, AFIO, on
whose board of directors and executive committee I have the privilege
of sitting.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you and your colleagues have been
made aware of the fact that I have been a rare book collector most of my
life and began to collect books in English on intelligence service when
I first joined the Central Intelligence Group in 1946. That collection,
destined for Yale University, has now grown to almost 5,000 volumes.
I have placed a few items from my collection on the table before you,
to show you this morning examples of what might be included in an
historical intelligence museum.
As one example, even formal intelligence legislation is not all that
new in this country. On the table right in front of the woman with the
camera there is House bill No. 240, to provide for the establishment
of a Bureau of Special and Secret Service. This bill is marked Secret
Session, and it was introduced into the House of Representatives of
the Confederate States on November 30, 1864.
Before getting into my specific thoughts on the subject of a museum,
I would like to urge one slight amendment in paragraph (2) of the
Senate resolution now before you, which I feel might better read, "That
intelligence activities were employed by George Washington and the
Founding Fathers at the outset and throughout the American Revolu-
tion". To me the American Revolution was a dandy intelligence war.
To be sure, intelligence did not have the detailed structured organiza-
tion with which we are familiar today. Technology was very limited,
but the basic principles of intelligence, rudimentary though they once
were, serve to illustrate that modern practices are but an extension in
a broad sense of those of our forefathers.
GEORGE WASHINGTON, GREATEST INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
But I must give it as my personal opinion that George Washington
was the greatest intelligence officer in our history prior to the advent
of William J. Donovan, the head of OSS in World War II. I gather
from Director Casey's statement that he would concur in that. In the
field of espionage, Washington often selected the agents, was vitally
interested in their reports, helped to develop ruses for them to escape
if caught, and, of course, even made some mistakes. The ill-fated mis-
sion to New York for which Nathan Hale volunteerd in 1776, without
proper cover and with no training, is one unfortunate example.
The small statue facing you, Mr. Chairman, is a replica of the
statue by Frederick Macmonnies in New York's City Hall Park, a
reminder of Hale's heroism in what he called "a peculiar service,"
and of his untimely death on the gallows. And I would like to pay
tribute to one of Mr. Casey's predecessors as Director who is here
in the room, Bill Colby, who, even though a Princeton man, called
me one day and said, "Sav, we have to have a statue, of Nathan Hale
(a Yale man, class of 1773), placed before the CIA Headquarters
building". And Bill, you couldn't have brought me 76 trombones that
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would have made me happier, because, as you know, that statue,
through Mr. Colby's efforts, is standing out at CIA Headquarters
today.
Washington was also a master of deception, but you have heard of
this from Bill Casey. As one author has said, the man who could
not tell a lie about chopping down a cherry tree could surely tell
some whoppers in the service of his country. Above all, General
Washington had a feeling for intelligence that was unexcelled. To
illustrate that point, I wish to quote a paragraph from a letter Gen-
eral Washington wrote from near Morris Town, N.J., on July 26,
1777, to Col. Elias Dayton, his intelligence chief in New Jersey.
That letter is on the left hand corner facing you, Mr. Chairman.
To me, this is perhaps the finest single paragraph on our profession
that has ever been written. The last paragraph reads :
The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be
further urged-All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole
matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enter-
prizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however
well planned & promising a favourable issue.
Time does not permit me to expand on the intelligence activities
of the Founding Fathers, but their names are a roster of our early
history, as Mr. Casey said, including Benjamin Franklin, Thomas
Jefferson, John Jay, the Adamses, Samuel and John, Silas Deane,
Robert Morris, to name but a few. In those days, and I need not
repeat what Mr. Casey said, there was no executive branch of the
Government. It was run by the Continental Congress, and their two
Intelligence Committees controlled intelligence and did it extremely
well.
EXHIBIT ITEMS
One book that is in front of you there, sir, I brought in order that
we may pay appropriate homage to a little known and unsung intelli-
gence hero of the American Revolution whose name was James
Aitken, widely known as John the Painter. A Scot who migrated to
America, John the Painter returned to England in December 1776,
and proceeded to the Royal Dock Yard at Portsmouth, where he set
fire to the Rope House. his fire destroyed part of the building and
some 20 tons of hemp, 10 cables of rope, each of 100 fathoms in
length, and 6 tons of cordage. The destruction of this hemp and rope
in those days of sail was a serious blow to the Royal Navy. What we
must emphasize here is that John the Painter was the only American
to commit an act of sabotage for his country in England during the
American Revolution. Regrettably, he was caught, tried, and hanged
by the British in March 1777. The rare book before you is a short-
hand transcript of the trial.
I would like to suggest that the cornerstone books on intelligence
in America start with the "Proceedings of a Board of General Offi-
cers . . . Respecting Major John Andre." As we recall, this book
relates to the terrible treason of Gen. Benedict Arnold at West Point.
Major Andre was his British case officer in New York. Andre sailed
up the Hudson River to talk with Arnold, his defector-in-place, be-
cause Arnold, although perhaps our best combat general, was a difficult
man to deal with. One could almost call him a psychiatric nut.
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Washington convened this Board of General Officers after Andre's
capture to advise him what to do in this case. The Board included such
luminaries as General Lafayette and Baron von Steuben. Before reach-
ing his decision, George Washington received a letter from the British
commander in New York, General Clinton, offering an exchange of
prisoners for Andre. Washington said sure, you give me back Arnold
and I'll give you back Andre. As much as the British wished the return
of the popular Andre, General Clinton realized that to give up a de-
fector would mean that he would never get another one, and so the
deal fell through. Such a decision would be as valid today as it was
then.
Major Andre was hanged as a spy at noon on October 2, 1780, and
General Washington bundled up the papers of the Board of General
Officers and the correspondence he had, not only with General Clinton,
but also a villifying letter from General Arnold, and sent them to the
Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Within a few weeks, the few
weeks that remained of the year 1780, the Continental Congress
ordered the "Proceedings of a Board of General Officers", which is
before you here, to be printed in a pamphlet; indicating again, as I
said above, that this is the cornerstone book of a collection of American
intelligence literature.
So popular was this pamphlet that it was reprinted in six different
cities in America before the year 1780 was out. No library has them all.
One edition exists in only two known copies. Even the British saw
fit to reprint the text of this pamphlet in their newspapers, without
its appendices, adding one word throughout. It is now the "Proceed-
ings of a Board of Rebel General Officers." A copy of the London
Chronicle of November 30, 1780, is exhibited on the right hand corner
before you and contains the text.
Of that period, I wish to show only one other document. It is an
authorization for rations for four spies for 4 days in March 1795. It
is signed by the aide-de-camp to Gen. Mad Anthony Wayne at Green-
ville, Ohio, where General Wayne was beating the Indians and con-
cluding the Treaty of Greenville. The lieutenant who signed this
authorization, which is directly in front of you, was William Henry
Harrison, later President of the United States.
I would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the concept of an intelli-
gence museum for there remain a good many questions to be answered.
The first answer lies in paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) of your Senate
resolution. While over the years there have been literally thousands
involved in our profession, they are sufficiently few in relation to our
total population to remind us of Shakespeare's words from "King
Henry V" before Agincourt, when the King spoke of "We few, we
happy few, we band of brothers," and Mr. Chairman, I hasten to add,
sisters. Occasionally, there have been some small attempts to develop
an intelligence museum.
Within military premises, such as the Army Intelligence School at
Fort Huachuca, we find that the retirement of a curator often means
the end of the effort, and that in any event, those things tend to rise
and fall with the interest of the commanding officer. NSA is building
up historical exhibits of cryptology, but few of the general public see
them. I recall when the CIA Headquarters was nearing completion at
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Langley, the Deputy Director then. General Cabell, asked if we could
not provide space at least for a permanent internal museum for our
employees. The answer was negative, for we could not find even a
broom closet because space was so tight. After CIA put up its wonder-
ful exhibit at headquarters to commemorate the 10th anniversary of
the Cuban Missile Crisis, an exhibition which included enlargements
of some of the key photography, an original U-2 camera, and some
documents, we tried, at the end of the exhibit, to offer it intact to a
major museum in Washington. The offer was refused, although the
suggestion was made that it might go to the Kennedy Library at Har-
vard, which it did. There it rests today, waiting to be brought down
to an exhibition at the Smithsonian in 1987, commemorating the 25th
anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Thus one of the major reasons for an intelligence museum is that
much of the material is now dispersed throughout the country, and
much of it, I fear, may be permanently lost. To bring such material
together in one place so that the public can view it, at least in rotating
exhibitions, is crucial, and the time is rapidly passing us by.
MUSEUM LOCATION, COST, EXHIBITS
The next question is where? My personal view is that it should be
in the Nation's Capital, where there is much material that can be
borrowed for temporary exhibitions. Obviously a museum, as Mr.
Casey says, cannot be located in an intelligence community facility,
where public access is nil. The question then arises, should it have a
separate building of its own, or can one make use of a wing of the
Smithsonian Museum of History? A third floor wing is now being re-
furbished there. I believe that having it in the hands of the Smith-
sonian and having it located on one floor of an exhibition wing for
rotating exhibitions is an ideal solution. The Smithsonian can collect
the material, drawing on its stores and loans for display. Think of
the impact of such rotating exhibitions, not only on the grownups
who are drawn to tales of intelligence and spies, but also on the kids
who are so fond of gadgetry and the kinds of exhibits that could be
mounted.
One comes to the question of who pays? To build a building would
require more funds than probably the William J. Donovan Founda-
tion and other private sources could raise, although their support is
essential and their claims promising. I do not believe that there is
enough money available for such a project by private subscription to
raise the millions required, not only to build a building, but also to
fund a curator and staff, and above all, to protect this material with
the required security, not of classification, but security against damage
and theft. An existing facility here appears to me to be the answer.
A pool of volunteers might be drawn from AFIO and the Veterans
of Strategic Services and CIRA to serve as docents.
Finally, what goes into this museum? Does it need a large library?
A proper intelligence library in all languages and on all aspects of the
profession could easily reach 25,000 volumes. The museum does not
seem to be the place for such a library, for there are other library
resources in Washington. Does it want a few rare books such as I have
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laid before you? Perhaps. Does it require a permanent collection of
the kinds of rare documents that I have exhibited here? Possibly. Prob-
ably. The artifacts, the cameras, the agent radios, photography boards
when declassified, all of these should go to a museum, stored for use
for the appropriate exhibit. But in the end I think the cost of build-
ing and maintaining a separate building is too much to ask for either
through private subscription or government funds. I do believe, how-
ever, that the government can afford to make one floor of a Smithson-
ian Museum wing available for this purpose, if the Congress so desires.
That is the route I would take. All I can add is that it be done as soon
as possible, before valuable materials and artifacts disappear further.
As I commenced, so do I end, that the thoughtfulness of this com-
mittee in discussing this matter is much to be appreciated. I have laid
out before you a variety of other items from my collection which are
sort of fun and which are available for you to see here. I wish to thank
you for the privilege of testifying.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, very much. I enjoyed your testimony,
but I would like to add one point to it. Another benefit of this would
be to inspire bright men and women to enter the intelligence field. I for
one feel very strongly that the future of our country and the free world
will rest on our intelligence capabilities. This is not like World War
II, where we had the luxury and security of two oceans. Today maybe,
it has been said, we have 15 minutes. So we need bright, dedicated
young men and women to continue this great tradition.
Mr. PFORzHEIMER. I couldn't concur with you more, Mr. Chairman.
I am sorry I didn't include that thought, but my mind was on books
and papers. Obviously this would be a marvelous example.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, very much.
[The full prepared statement of Walter Pforzheimer, a "List of
Exhibits to Accompany the Testimony of Walter Pforzheimer" and
a biographical sketch of Walter Pforzheimer follow:]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am grateful to this Committee
for the privilege of testifying before you this morning. Especially, I deeply ap-
preciate your taking time from busy days and having the thoughtfulness to
introduce Senate Resolution 267 in support of the establishment of a National
Historical Intelligence Museum. Such a Museum represents a concept which I
endorse in principle ; in this I am joined by my colleagues in the Association of
Former Intellieence Officers (AFIO), on whose Board of Directors and Execu-
tive Committee I have the privilege of sitting.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, that you and your colleagues have been made aware
of the fact that I have been a rare book collector most of my life and began to
collect books in English on intelligence service when I first joined the Central
Intelligence Group in 1946. That collection-destined for Yale University-has
now grown to almost 5,000 volumes. I have brought a very few items from my
collection with me to show you this morning as examples of what might be
included in an Historical Intelligence Museum.
As one example, even formal intelligence legislation is not all that new in
this country. I hold in my hand House Bill No. 240: To provide for the estab-
lishment of a Bureau of Special and Secret Service. This bill is marked Secret
Session and was introduced into the House of Representatives of the Confederate
States on November 30, 1864.
Before getting into my specific thoughts on the subject of a Museum, I would
like to urge one slight amendment In paragraph (2) of the Senate Resolution
now before you, which I feel might better read "That intelligence activities were
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employed by George Washington and the Founding Fathers at the outset and
throughout the American Revolution ;". To me the American Revolution was a
dandy intelligence war. To be sure, intelligence did not have the detailed struc-
tured organization with which we are familiar today; technology was very
limited ; but the basic principles of intelligence, rudimentary though they once
were, serve to illustrate that modern practices are but an extension, in a broad
sense, of those of our forefathers. But I must give it as my personal opinion that
George Washington was the greatest intelligence officer in history, prior to the
advent of William J. Donovan, the head of OSS in World War II. In the field
of espionage, Washington often selected the agents, was vitally interested in
their reports, helped to develop ruses for them to escape if caught, and, of course,
even made some mistakes. The ill-fated mission to New York for which Nathan
Hale volunteered in 1776, without proper cover and with no training, is one
unfortunate example. This small statue of Nathan Hale that I place before you
is a replica of the statue by Frederick Macmonnies in New York's City Hall Park,
a reminder of Hale's heorism on what he called "a peculiar service," and of his
untimely death on the gallows.
There are, in the Houghton Library at Harvard, two sheets of notes in Wash-
ington's hand which can only be extracts he made personally from agents' reports
so that he could brief his staff properly-an example of his use of intelligence.
Washington was also a master of deception. He would have the same rumor
planted along the East Coast from Charleston to New York so that the British,
finding the report repeated, would swallow it hook, line and sinker. As one author
has said, the man who could not tell a lie about chopping down a cherry tree
could surely tell some whoppers in the service of his country. Washington's use of
deception before the Battle of Yorktown is a classic.
Above all, George Washington had a feeling for intelligence that was unex-
celled. To illustrate that point, I wish to quote a paragraph from a letter Gen-
eral Washington wrote from near Morris Town, New Jersey, on July 26. 1777, to
Colonel Elias Dayton, his Intelligence Chief in New Jersey. To me this is per-
haps the finest single paragraph on our profession that has even been written,
and I lay his original letter before you. The last paragraph reads :
"The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is apparent & need not hA
further urged-All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter
as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends in most Enterprizes of
the kind, and for want of it, they are generally defeated, however well planned
& promising a favourable issue."
Time does not permit me to expand on the intelligence activities of the Found-
ing Fathers, but their names are a roster of our early history, including Benjamin
Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, the Adamses, Samuel and John, Silas
Deane, Robert Morris, to name but a few. In those days of the American Revo-
lution there was no executive branch of government. What government there was
was managed by the Continental Congress. In September 1775, the Continental
Congress established The Secret Committee which, in effect, handled what we
now call special activities, particularly in the field of covert procurement. Two
months later they set up the Committee of Secret Correspondence which han-
dled secret agents. The Continental Congress at every turn maintained the sec-
recy of their sources and methods, as does your Committee.
One book I have brought today in order that we may pay appropriate homage
to a little known and unsung hero of the American Revolution whose name was
James Aitken, widely known as John the Painter. A Scot who migrated to
America, John the Painter returned to England in December 1776 and proceeded
to the Royal Dock Yard at Portsmouth where he set fire to the Rope House. His
fire destroyed part of the building and some 20 tons of hemp, 10 cables of rope
each of a hundred fathoms in length, and 6 tons of cordage. The destruction of
this hemp and rope in those days of sail was a serious blow to the Royal Navy.
What we must emphasize here is that John the Painter was the only American
to commit an act of sabotage in England during the American Revolution. Re-
grettably, he was caught, tried and hanged in March 1777. The rare book before
you is a shorthand transcript of his trial.
I would like to suggest that the cornerstone volume of hooks on intelligence
in America starts with the "Proceedings of a Board of General Officers .
Respecting Major John Andre" held on September 29, 1780. As we recall, this
book relates to the terrible treason of General Benedict Arnold at West Point.
Major Andre was his British case officer in New York. Andre went up river
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to talk with Arnold, his defector-in-place, because Arnold, although perhaps our
best combat general, was a difficult man to deal with ; one could almost call him
a psychiatric nut. Washington convened this Board, after Andre's capture, to
advise him what to do in this case. It included such luminaries as General La-
fayette and Baron Steuben. Before reaching his decision, General Washington
received a letter from the British commander in New York, General Clinton,
offering an exchange of prisoners for Andre. Washington said : Sure. You give
me back Arnold and I'll give you back Andre. Much as the British wished the
return of the popular Andre, General Clinton realized that to give up a defector
would mean that he would never get another one, and so the deal fell through.
Such a decision would be as valid today as it was then.
Major Andre was hanged as a spy on 2 October 1780, and General Washing-
ton bundled up the papers of the Board of General Officers and the correspond-
ence he had, not only with General Clinton but a vilifying letter from General
Arnold, and sent them to tLe Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Within the
few weeks that remained of the year 1780, the Continental Congress ordered
the Proceedings to be printed in a pamphlet which I lay before you, indicating
again as I said above, that this is the cornerstone book of a collection on
American intelligence literature. So popular was this pamphlet that it was
reprinted in six different cities in America before the year 1780 was out. No
library has them all. One edition exists in only two known copies. Even the
British saw fit to reprint the text of this pamphlet in their newspapers, with-
out its appendices, adding one word throughout. It is now the "Proceedings
of a Board of Rebel General Officers." A copy of The London Chronicle of
November 30-December 2, 1780 is exhibited here.
Of this period, I wish to add only one other document. It is an authorization
for rations for 4 spies for 4 days in March 1795. It is signed by the Aid-de-
Camp [sic] to General "Mad Anthony" Wayne at Greenville, Ohio, where Gen-
eral Wayne was beating the Indians and concluding the Treaty of Greenville.
The Lieutenant who signed this authorization as Aid-de-Camp was William
Henry Harrison, later President of the United States.
I would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the concept of an intelligence museum,
for there remain a good many questions to be answered. The first answer lies
in paragraphs (3), (4) and (5) of your Senate Resolution; namely, that it is
important for our fellow citizens to understand the role of intelligence both
in war and in peace ; that the sacrifices and contributions to intelligence serv-
ice of thousands of men and women should be commemorated, and that our
fellow citizens should recognize the importance which intelligence has played
in our history, an importance which I have tried to stress in the few exhibits
before you. While, over the years, there have been literally thousands involved
in this profession, they are sufficiently few in relation to our total population
to remind us of Shakespeare's words from King Henry V before Agincourt
when the King spoke of "We few, we happy few, we band of brothers ;" and,
I hasten to add, sisters, Mr. Chairman. Occasionally, there have been some
small, local attempts to develop an intelligence museum. Within military prem-
ises, such as the Army Intelligence School at Fort Huachuca, we find that
the retirement of a curator often means the end of the effort ; and that, in any
event, those things tend to rise and fall with the interest of the commanding
officer. NSA is building up historical exhibits of cryptology, but few of the gen-
eral public see them. I recall when the CIA Headquarters was nearing com-
pletion at Langley, the Deputy Director, General Cabell, asked if we would
not provide space at least for a permanent internal museum for our employees.
The answer was negative, for we could not even find a broom closet, because
space was so tight. After CIA put up its wonderful exhibit at Headquarters
to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis-an exhibi-
tion which included blown up boards of some of the key photography, an orig-
inal U-2 camera and some documents, we tried, at the end of the exhibit to
offer it, intact, to a major museum in Washington. The offer was refused,
although the suggestion was made that it might go to the Kennedy Library at
Harvard, which it did. There it rests today, waiting to be brought down to an
exhibition at the Smithsonian in 1987 commemorating the 25th anniversary
of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, one of the major reasons for an Intelligence
Museum is that much of the material is now dispersed throughout the country,
and most of it, I fear, may be permanently lost. To bring such material together
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in one place so that the public can view it. at least in rotating exhibitions, is
crucial, and the time is rapidly passing its by.
The next question is, Where? My personal view is that it should be in the
Nation's Capital where there is much material that can be borrowed for tem-
porary exhibitions. Obviously, a Museum cannot be located in an Intelligence
Community facility where public access is nil. The question then arises : Should
it have a separate building of its own or can one make use of a wing of the Smith-
sonian Museum of History? A third floor wing is now being refurbished there.
I believe that having it in the hands of the Smithsonian, and having it located
on one floor of an exhibition wing for rotating exhibitions, is an ideal solution.
The Smithsonian can collect the material, drawing on its stores and loans for
display. Think of the impact of such rotating exhibitions, not only on the grown-
ups who are drawn to tales of intelligence and spies, but also on the kids who
are so fond of gadgetry and the kind of exhibits that could be mounted.
One comes to the question of, Who pays? To build a building would require
more funds than probably the William J. Donovan Foundation and other private
sources could raise, although their support is essential and their claims promis-
ing. I do not believe that there is enough money available for such a project by pri-
vate subscription to raise the millions required not only to build a building but
also to fund a curator and staff, and above all, to protect this material with the
required security to guard against damage and theft. An existing facility here
appears to me to be the answer. A pool of volunteers might be drawn from AFIO
and the Veterans of Strategic Services, and CIRA to serve as docents.
Finally, What goes into this Museum? Does it need a large library? A proper
intelligence library in all languages and on all aspects of the profession could
easily reach 25,000 volumes. The Museum does not seem to be the place for such
a library, for there are other library resources in Washington. Does it want a
few rare books such as I have laid before you? Perhaps. Does it require a perma-
nent collection of the kinds of rare documents that I have exhibited here? Pos-
sibly-probably. The artifacts, the cameras, the agent radios, photography boards
when declassified-all of these should go into a museum, stored for use for the
appropriate exhibit. But in the end I think the cost of building and maintaining a
separate building is too much to ask for, either through. private subscription or
government funds. I do believe, however, that the government can afford to make
one floor of a Smithsonian History Museum wing available for this purpose, if
the Congress so desires. That is the route I would take. All I can add is that it
be done as soon as possible before valuable materials and artifacts disappear
further.
As I commenced so do I end, that the thoughtfulness of this Committee in dis-
cussing this matter is much to be appreciated. I have brought with me and will
put before you, some additional material not previously mentioned, including
Mata Hari's last passport application to go into France, and what I consider to
be the first book on intelligence service published in English. Matthew Smith's
"Memoirs of Secret Service." London, 1699. Finally, I have included some postage
stamps for those who are stamp collectors. These stamps are forgeries by the
British and Americans for intelligence purposes in World Wars I and II. Thank
you for the opportunity to present my views on this legislation.
LIST OF EXHIBITS TO ACCOMPANY THE TESTIMONY OF WALTER PFORZHEIMEB
1. Letter from George Washington on intelligence, addressed to Col. Elias
Dayton, July 26, 1777.
2. Replica of the Macmonnies statue of Nathan Hale.
3. The Trial of John the Painter, the only American to commit an act of'
sabotage in England during the American Revolution. London. 1777.
4. "Proceedings of a Board of General Officers ... Respecting Major John
Andre." Philadelphia 17P0.
5. "Proceedings of a Board of Rebel General Officers . respecting Major
John Andre" in The London Chronicle, November 30-December 2, 1780. ,
6. Authorization for provisions for four spies, signed by Lt. William Henry
Harrison, Greenville, Ohio, March 1795.
7. "My Imprisonment" by Rose O'Neal Greenhow, Confederate agent in the
Civil War. London. 1863.
8. Letter from Rose O'Neal Greenhow to President Jefferson Davis, August
19, 1863. Concerning her missions to England.
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9. House Bill No. 240 [Confederate House of Representatives] To provide
for the establishment of a Bureau of Special & Secret Service, November 30, 1864.
10. Authorization for expenditure of up to #20,000 for secret services, signed
by Queen Anne of England, 6 December 1705.
11. "Memoirs of Secret Service" by Matthew Smith. London, 1699. Inscribed
by the author to "the Lord High Chansellour" of England.
12. Last visa application, 1916, of Margaretha Geertrulda Zelle McLeod-
Mata Hari-to enter France. There she was arrested as a spy and executed in
1917.
13. Photograph of Mata Hari. Berlin, 1907.
14. "J'Accuse." The first book used by the French to drop from airplanes
behind German lines for propaganda purposes in World War I.
15. World Wars I and II postage stamps forged for intelligence purposes.
16. World War II escape and evasion gadgetry.
17. "Maanen er gaaet ned" [The Moon Is Down], by John Steinbeck, and
"Een Verden" [One World], by Wendell Willkie. Printed during World War II
by Danish clandestine presses for distribution by the Danish Resistance.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF WALTER L. PFORZIIEIMER
Walter L. Pforzheimer was born in Port Chester, New York, in 1914, and lived
in Purchase, New York, until World War II. He attended prep school at
Horace Mann in New York City, received his B.A. from Yale in 1935, and J.D.
from the Yale Law School in 1938, following which he practiced law in New
York, specializing in copyright law. In 1940, he headed the Speakers' Bureau in
the Manhattan Campaign for Willkie. In February 1941, he was in charge of
the Speakers' Bureau in the special New York City congressional by-election for
Joseph Clark Baldwin III, the winning Republican candidate in the "silk-stock-
ing" district.
In April 1942, Mr. Pforzheimer enlisted in the Army, completed Officers' Candi-
date School, received his commission in the Army Air Forces, and on 8 December
1942, he was assigned to the Air Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
He has been in the intelligence profession continuously since that date. During
the war, he first served in a series of intelligence assignments in the United
States and then, for 15 months, in the European Theatre on the Intelligence
Staff of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF), the Senior Air Headquarters
in Europe.
In February 1946, Mr. Pforzheimer joined the newly formed Central Intel-
ligence Group and served as CIG (and then its successor) CIA's first Legislative
Counsel, 1946-1956, handling all of the Agency's relations with the Congress.
Among the more important intelligence legislation for which he secured passage
were the intelligence provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which
established CIA, the CIA Act of 1949, and the legislation for the new CIA
Headquarters Building, as well as CIA appropriations. For most of this period,
he also served as the Agency's Assistant General Counsel.
In January 1956, Mr. Pforzheimer was appointed by Allen Dulles as the Cura-
tor of the CIA Historical Intelligence Collection (HIC), a position he held (in
addition to other duties) until his retirement from CIA in June 1974. HICJ is
the Agency's collection of books and articles on intelligence tradecraft, and is
always headed by a professional intelligence officer. Its primary purpose is for
use in training, the study of precedents in the craft of intelligence, and the con-
tinuing study of the literature of intelligence.
Following his retirement in 1974, Mr. Pforzhelmer continued as a consultant to
CIA and its General Counsel until August 1977. He lectures at the National War
College and the Defense Intelligence School. In addition, at the latter school,
where he serves as an adjunct professor, he conducts an extended seminar on
"The Literature of Intelligence." Mr. Pforzheimer has published several reviews
of books on intelligence and on intelligence legislation. He also served on Presi-
dent-elect Reagan's CIA transition team.
Mr. Pforzheimer is particularly noted as a rare book collector, with special
collections of books and manuscripts in the field of American literature, Moliere,
and on Intelligence Service. He served as a Trustee of the Yale Library from
the mid-thirties until 1976, when he was designated an Honorary Trustee. He
was also appointed, in 1958, to the Yale Faculty position of Adviser on Special
Collections to the University Library, an appointment he still holds.
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Decorations : World War II-The Bronze Star. CIA-Intelligence Medal of
Merit, Career Intelligence Medal.
Memberships: The Grolier Club of New York. The Yale Clubs of New York
City and Washington. The Central Intelligence Retirees' Association (LIRA).
The Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO) (Board of Dir-etors
and Executive Committee). The National Intelligence Studies Center (NISC)
(Board of Directors). The Subcommittee on Intelligence, Advisory Council on
National Security and International Affairs, Republican National Committee
(1979-So). Reagan Foreign Policy Council (Intelligence Committee) 1989. Presi-
dent-elect Reagan's Transition Team on CIA, 1980-81.
Senator HECHT. Dr. Ernest May, who was to be our next witness,
became ill yesterday, and cannot be here. So we will proceed to our
next witness, General Quinn, whom Senator Goldwater introduce(]
earlier. General Quinn has taken a great interest in this project, and
we want to hear publicly what his views are on establishing a museum.
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM W. QUINN, U.S. ARMY
(RETIRED)
General QUINN. Mr. Chairman, what. you've heard, what I might,
add to what you've heard would be redundant, so I am taking an
entirely different tack, and I would like to discuss a museum as a
vehicle to demonstrate to the public the need for tactical or combat
intelligence as well as the need for strategic or national intelligence.
At times however the line of demarcation between the two is
indistinguishable.
COMBAT FORCES INTELLIGENCE
My purpose is to remind the committee of specific tactical intelli-
gence requirements for combat forces. Mr. Casey touched on one or
two of those. Now, I will not devote any time to the manner or tech-
nique in which these requirements are presented in a museum, as
this is a challenge to be accepted by others.
I have been involved in two major amphibious operations. One,
the invasion of southern France by the United States' 7th Army and
the French Army B in World War II and the Inchon Landing in
Korea. In both operations I was the G-2 and senior intelligence of-
ficer of the invading force. Now, our needs on these occasions involved
intelligence on tides, currents, weather, visibility, coastal defenses,
underwater obstacles, beach gradients, landing areas for gliders and
paradrops, enemy order of battle, their composition and disposition,
terrains to the objective, hedgerows, location of enemy reserves and
logistics, communications, road and rail nets, power, capacity of
bridges for tanks and heavy loads, topographical information for
revision of maps, civilian population, their attitude, friendly or
hostile, and more.
I mention these elements to emphasize the magnitude of the tactical
intelligence problem. Again, how these requirements could be dis-
played is another matter. But I do believe that it would be in the
interests of our national intelligence effort if the public were in-
formed of and understood the need for tactical intelligence collection
capabilities and their requirements.
Now, once landed, the force will require most of the elements of
information I have cited. But now forthcoming obstacles must be
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identified, rivers, mountains, canals, more hedgerows, major defense
fortifications such as the Siegfried Line and of course the strength
of the enemy and its disposition.
In addition to the force, any force must contain a security element,
that is, a counterintelligence unit or agents, to protect against sabotage,
unit identification, observation of movement and composition of our
forces. As an example, on February 15, 1945, exactly 6 months to the
day after the landing in southern France, the 7th Army CIC had ap-
prehended 100 enemy agents in its area of operation. Now these were
stay-behinds and paradrops in our rear areas. Now also after the land-
ing scores of special and technical units in teams followed. I have here
a list of 42 different units attached to my office in southern France. I
will describe the missions of a few of them, but I want you to see that
once we have a solid bridgehead we began to serve both our immediate
needs and our national longer term requirements.
For instance, I had a highly classified team attached to me shortly
after we crossed the Rhine. It was searching for German heavy water
plants and other atomic energy related R&D facilities. The unit com-
mander carried a letter which solicited cooperation and support from
all field commanders, and signed by the President of the United States.
Now, here are some of the others. Advanced documents. These units
were to seize, process any documents from military and Gestapo head-
quarters, and also consulates. Censorship of personal mail and military.
CIC I mentioned. Interrogation centers. Document examination cen-
ters. Field censors. Interrogation of prisoners of war. British liaison,
French liaison. Postal and telegraph censorship. It goes on and on
and on, up to 42, so I won't read any more of them, but just to give you
an idea of the forms of intelligence that were reported.
I am going to conclude by reiterating my opinion that a museum
which could in some manner convey to the American public the need
and application of tactical intelligence would be in the long term in-
terest in our national security. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, very much.
Some of us went through Fort Holabird, and your remarks are like
those Napoleon made to some of his people. I remember we had a big
sign at Holabird, "One man in the right spot is worth 50,000 men in
the field." I have always remembered that.
(A summary of duties in the field of intelligence of General Quinn
follows J
SUMMARY OF DUTIEs IN FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
WILLIAM W. QUINN, U.S. ARMY
Assistant G-2, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division 1941-1942: Routine duties
in intelligence planning, training and security incident to preparation of 4th
Division for combat.
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters IV Corps 1942-1944: Initially
executive officer then G-2 of Corps Headquarters. Responsible for intelligence
training and testing of divisions assigned to IV Corps. Routine planning for intel-
ligence operation in North Africa and Italy.
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Headquarters Seventh U.S. Army 1944-1945:
Responsible for the intelligence planning and operations from the Invasion of
Southern France (by the Seventh Army and French Army B) to the end of
World War II.
Directed the activities and coordinated the operations of 42 varied intelli-
gence teams, agencies, and commands involving over 900 individuals of varied
services and nationalities.
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Director of Strategic Services Unit (Formerly OSS) 1945-1947: Initially
Executive Officer, then Director of S.S.U. Responsible to Assistant Secretary of
War for the maintenance of intelligence assets created by O.S.S.
Directed world wide foreign intelligence operations and related intelligence
activities of S.S.U. until nominated for attendance to the National War College
in August 1947.
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, Headquarters Tenth Corps 1950: Responsible for
the intelligence planning and operations incident to the Inchon landing in Korea
on September 1950.
Directed normal combat intelligence activities during fall and winter cam-
paigns against the Chinese and North Korean Communists.
Coordinated the intelligence planning for the evacuation of Marine and Army
Divisions at Hung Nam, North Korea.
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army 1958-1959: As
Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, served as the principal assistant
to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Supervised the conduct of all De-
partment of Army Intelligence planning and programming; supervised budget
development for intelligence activities, the administrative aspects of the U.S.
Army Attache System, and participation in Joint and U.S. Intelligence Board
actions.
Deputy Director, Defense Intelligence Agency 1961-1964: Assumed these duties
on October 1, 1961. Transferred to command the Seventh Army in Germany
February 1964.
Senator HECHT. We have a panel from the distinguished organiza-
tion supporting our project. This organization is named the National
Historical Intelligence Museum Association. I would like to welcome
William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence; Dr. David
Kahn, who has a Ph. D. in history from Oxford, is editor of Newsday
and co-editor of Cryptology Magazine, and author of numerous books,
including "The Codebreakers" and "Kahn on Codes," due in January
1984; Martin Cramer, president of the National Historical Intelligence
Museum Association; and Joseph E. Persico, who was a senior mem-
ber of the staff of former Vice President Rockefellor and author of
several books.
Would the panel please come up, please.
Since I am pinch-hitting for Senator Goldwater, I don't have an
agenda of the panel, so let's just start with you, sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM E. COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. COLBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I merely want to assert my enthusiastic support for this idea of a
national historical intelligence museum. I think it very important
that we stress the fact that intelligence has been a part of our national
life since its origin, and that it is indeed an honorable profession for
those of our young people contemplating what they should do. I fully
endorse the statements of Director Casey and the other speakers before
you.
I would only like to add one additional point, which I think gets
to the point you made, Mr. Chairman, about the importance of
attracting young people. American intelligence has led a world rev-
olution in the information world in the last 30-odd years, by the
concept of central intelligence, bringing all the information to one
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place so that it can be analyzed, by the technological marvels that
have been created in these last years to open up subjects and areas
of the world which we had never previously been able to penetrate.
These have changed the nature of intelligence. It still does use the
spies and the covert operations, and I think it should and in some
areas it must. But I think the lesson for our young people today is
not that he or she has to have the qualities of a James Bond or a Mata
Hari in order to engage in intelligence; that there are intellectual ad-
ventures as stimulating, as challenging as the physical adventures of
the spies of the past; that in the area of analysis, in the structure of
American intelligence which provides analysis as its key element, in
the area of developing new technology to increase our knowledge of
the world; in the ability to increase our understanding of the diverse
cultures, ethnic, religious, and other groups around the world, so that
we can deal better with the complicated problems ; in the function of
intelligence today to help keep the peace by the monitoring of arms
control agreements, by such examples as using intelligence sensors be-
tween Egyptian and Israeli lines, so that these sensors would report
any massing of forces on either side, and neither side's soldiers had to
stand in the night in the desert, nervous and frightened at what might
happen, because intelligence had provided them confidence and knowl-
edge, replacing their fear and suspicion. These are the real challenges
of intelligence of the future.
I think the museum could dramatize these and the role that intel-
ligence has played in many of the historical events of recent years.
And I think that could respond best to your challenge, Mr. Chair-
man, to invite the participation of our bright young people in the
future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator HECHT. Thank you. For the record, that was William
Colby, former Director of the CIA. Dr. David Kahn.
STATEMENT OF DR. DAVID KAHN, EDITOR AND AUTHOR
Mr. KAHN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to testify
before this committee, and I thank the members for their invitation.
I am here to urge the committee to report favorably to the Senate
on the resolution to support the establishment of a national historical
intelligence museum.
The benefits of such a museum can be great. Intelligence is a major
activity of the Government, and like other activities, its artifacts
deserve, as the resolution says, "collection, preservation and exhibi-
tion." That is probably why at least two American cryptologic agen-
cies, the National Security Agency and the Naval Security Group
Command, have cryptologic museums, though these are not open to
the public. The French Army, too, has a small nonpublic museum of
cryptology, located in the suburban Paris fort of Kremlin-Bicetre.
I believe that Great Britain opened an Intelligence Corps museum
in Kent to the public a few years ago. In addition, by preserving the
past, these museums probably also serve to bind workers closer to
their institutions. It is also possible that a public museum might
recruit people to the intelligence agencies.
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20
But the major purpose of a national historical intelligence museum
should be to help the public understand what intelligence is, how it
saves lives in war and treasure in peace, how it helps stabilize the in-
ternational situation, how it protects against a surprise attack. Such
an understanding will help win the public support, political and finan-
cial. If intelligence is worthy, so is this museum.
What should be exhibited in this museum? Museum specialists will
have their own ideas, but certainly photographs of persons important
in intelligence should be shown. And I hope that not only the leaders
and the agents of derring-do, such as "Wild Bill" Donovan or Francis
Gary Powers be depicted, but also the backroom boys, such as the man
who fathered analysis in American intelligence, William Langer. Ap-
paratus such as cameras and radios should be displayed, as well as the
originals or reproductions of important documents. Here and there
some items should be grouped to tell a story.
On cryptology, I think, as a historian of codes and ciphers, that the
museum might incorporate some of these episodes and personalities :
To give substance to the resolution's statement that "intelligence ac-
tivities were employed by George Washington," we should include the
solution of Redcoat messages by James Lovell, a member of the Con-
tinental Congress, that revealed plans to relieve Cornwallis at
Yorktown.
The solution of the message of a Torv spy by three patriots, one of
them Elbridge Gerry, later fifth Vice President of the United States.
The invention, around 1800, of a cipher that was still serving the
U.S. Navy in the 1950's, by the Father of American Cryptography, a
man better known for other accomplishments : Thomas Jefferson.
A demonstration of good American Comsec, of communications
security; the Union's word transportation cipher that the Confederates
never were able to solve.
America's first formal codemaking and codebreaking agencies :
MI-8, the 8th Section of Military Intelligence, headed by Herbert O.
Yardley, which solved the complex cipher that led to the conviction
of a young German spy; G.2 A.6, the AEF's codebreaking unit, whose
solution of German messages warned American troops of enemy at-
tacks; and the Code Compilation Section, which produced field codes
for the AEF.
The foundations laid down in the 1920's and 1930's:
Yardley's American Black Chimber, which solved Japanese diplo-
matic messages during the Washington Disarmament Conference of
1922 that helped the United States press the Japanese to a capital
ship's ratio, with Great Britain, of 5:5:3.
The invention of the rotor, the most widely used cryptographic prin-
ciple of World War IT, not by a large corporation or by the Army or
Navy, but by a single inspired Californian, Edward H. Hebern.
The establishment of the Armv and Navy cryptologic establishments
under William F. Friedman and Laurance F. Safford, and the creation
and development of mathematical and protocomputer techniques for
making and breaking codes.
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The joint Army-Navy reconstruction of the Japanese Purple diplo-
matic cipher machine, which gave the Allies unparalleled insights into
Hitler's thoughts as reported by Japan's Ambassador in Berlin.
The Navy's solution of Japanese naval codes during World War 11,
which enabled the United States to turn the tide of the Pacific War
at Midway, to shoot down Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japan's best
strategist, and to sink scores of marus, thereby cutting off Japan from
vital war supplies.
The post-World War II development of computers for cryptanaly-
sis and of silicon chips as tiny cipher machines.
The control of encryption of missile telemetry by SALT treaties to
assist verification of arms limitations.
Of course the museum will encompass other sources of information,
such as spies, sensors, and aerial photography. And I believe that it
should include an exhibit on the oversight of American intelligence
by the House and Senate committees. Though an exhibit devoted to the
abuses of U.S. intelligence agencies seems inappropriate, these errors
form too important a part of the Nation's intelligence past to be glossed
over and can perhaps be included in the congressional exhibit by tell-
ing about the Church and Pike committee investigations and the im-
provements resulting therefrom.
May I finally suggest two changes in the wording of the resolution
that I think will better express what seems to be intended.
Section 2 states that, "intelligence activities were employed by
George Washington at the outset of the American Revolution." In
fact, he used intelligence throughout the war. I suggest replacing "at
the outset of" with "during."
Section 5 states that. ` the understanding of * * * intelligence ac-
tivities * * * can best be achieved" by a museum. In fact, such under-
standing comes much more from this committee and its House counter-
part and from the press. I suggest replacing "best" with "in part."
I thank you.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, very much.
I don't know what your procedure is. Who is next on the panel and
will you introduce yourself for the record, please.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH E. PERSICO, AUTHOR
Mr. PERSICO. Yes. I am Joseph Persico. I suspect that I am here
today as the author of a book on American intelligence entitled
"Piercing the Reich : The Penetration of Nazi Germany by American
Secret Agents During World War II."
I want to draw from my book to tell a brief tale of heroism and
ingenuity, which in my judgment illustrates the kinds of materials
that might find their way into a national historical intelligence
museum.
Picture this scene : Berlin, in March of 1945. On the outskirts of the
German capital, two men hiding in a field. One of them holds a small,
black device in his hand, from which extends a short antenna. Thirty
thousand feet above, a British Mosquito bomber is circling. The man
with the hand-held device is speaking into it the location of marshal-
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ing yards for German freight trains, giving the location of a tank
assembly plant, and providing other choice targets which will be re-
layed back to the U.S. Air Force. The two men on the ground had
been parachuted into Berlin some weeks before. They are agents of the
OSS. The gear into which this agent is speaking is entitled Joan Eli-
nor, and I would like to tell you in a minute or so the history of Joan
Elinor.
During the last year of the war in Europe, the United States in-
filtrated some 200 secret agents inside Nazi Germany. They faced this
problem : How .were they to extract from Germany the intelligence
that was gathered there. The problem had not been so great in the
friendly occupied countries. There agents found numerous safe houses
and a friendly climate in the occupied peoples, and the form of trans-
mission for the most part was wireless radio. This did not work in
Nazi Germany, because wireless radio has a diffuse signal which is
easily intercepted. Germany was criss-crossed by radio detection vans
which could pinpoint clandestine broadcasts and home on it almost
within minutes.
The problem was turned over to an OSS engineer who had come out
of the Radio Corp. of America, his name was Steven Simpson. I might
add that he was handed his challenge by William J. Casey, who was
then heading up the OSS operation to penetrate Nazi Germany with
American agents out of England. Steve Simpson went to work on
this project, and he developed a radio receiver-transmitter which he
called Joan Elinor. What it did simply was this: The agent on the
ground held a small transmitter-receiver which broadcast along a beam
which at its point of origin was no larger than a pencil. This beam, as
it rose into the atmosphere fanned out and the signal could be picked
out by the aircraft circling overhead. Because of the narrow beam at
the point of origin, this radio transmission, even given from the Nazi
heartland, was virtually undetectable.
Radio detection vans could pass within just a few dozen yards of an
agent broadcasting and never hear him. There was another marvelous
advantage of the Joan Elinor radio device, in that conventional wire-
less radio, because it was easily picked up, had to be encoded at one
end and decoded at the other, a terribly time consuming business. Be-
cause Joan Elinor was virtually undetectable, the agent could speak
in plain language and enormous valuable time was saved.
Joan Elinor radio became one of the most successful devices for our
getting out of Nazi Germany the intelligence that our people were
gathering there. After the war, Steven Simpson, its inventor, went
back to his hometown of San Antonio, Tex., and formed a very pros-
perous electronics manufacturing firm. Joan Elinor, in a large respect,
became the mother of supersophisticated intelligence listening and
transmitting devices which characterize a great part of intelligence
activity today.
What is striking and interesting to me is that Steven Simpson. there
in San Antonio, Tex., still has the original device, the Joan Elinor
radio transmitter-receiver, which he invented. I think it would make
a marvelous artifact to find its way to a National Intelligence Museum,
and I hope it will find a home.
Thank you.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Martin Cramer.
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STATEMENT OF MARTIN G. CRAMER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL
HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, about 20 years ago I
was dispatched as a speaker by my employer in the Department of
State, to a city on the Kentucky-Tennessee border. The State Depart-
mend had sent someone every year to a local festival as a speaker,
Averell Harriman beginning it and it finally trickeled its way down
to me through the years. Several speakers preceded me, including the
then Governor of Kentucky, now a member of this body. He proceeded
to give my speech on the need for international links and friendship
and knowledge of the rest of the world. I checked the points off one by
one, and when I got up, I gave the audience a choice of going straight
to my mailing address or to questions. And I find myself somewhat in
that same situation today. So many excellent points have been made
about the usefulness, once established, of a National Historical Intel-
ligence Museum.
Some of my associates have submitted written statements and we
would appreciate, Mr. Chairman, the record being kept open as a
couple of them have not yet been received this morning, but we have
about a half a dozen to submit today.
Senator HECHT. Yes.
Mr. CRAMER. And in addition to those, I guess my thesis is why two
groups of volunteers from the Donovan Memorial Foundation and
from the group down here working toward a National Historical
Intelligence Museum have worked as hard as we have to try to launch
it and why we believe the Nation needs a museum dedicated to the
history of intelligence. There have been many reasons why. I will
reiterate some which have been mentioned.
First, as has been said, to gather together historical artifacts of the
intelligence profession, these pieces of history currently scattered
among museums and private collections. We need to make them or
replicas of them available where the maximum number of people can
see them, in some cases before they are lost or destroyed. They are an
integral part of our Nation's history.
No. 2, to help the public understand, as I think also has been pointed
out, the contribution the intelligence community has made to the
national interest. To help visitors see, as Dr. Kahn has mentioned,
how cryptology affected-supported us in World War II. I would add
to that how it affected the state of the world in World War I with the
Zimmerman Note, and many -other illustrations, most of which Dr.
Kahn has mentioned.
And how intelligence gathering in the Revolutionary War and
helped us win our independence has been cited over and over again.
To help the public understand that much of intelligence activity is
not romantic but is complex and demanding, and its standards for
analysis and evaluation. And that there is much more to intelligence
work than those activities which have been given the maximum amount
of publicity, very often covert action, which has, over the past 200
years been important, but very far from the total story.
And No. 4 to demonstrate that there is a particular American char-
acter to our intelligence efforts. Not only are they very different from
those of dictatorships, but even from those of our fellow democracies,
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for many reasons, one of which has been cited by Dr. Kahn also, and
that is the separation of powers in our governmental structure. And
the other, the one that hasn't been mentioned but should be, the ever-
present media, for example, the press vans on the battlefields of the
Civil War. This kind of creative tension, or whatever I was a State
Department spokesman for a while wasn't invented yesterday.
And we think that your committee and others in the Congress should
know about our plans and our hopes for continuing interest in the Con-
gress in this proposed museum. Our hope is that the committee and
others in the Congress will continue the interest demonstrated this
morning. We are clear on the money question, all right. That has been
made very, very clear by your chairman. But we might in the future
seek a Federal charter, as suggested by some people on the Hill friend-
ly to the museum project, if that appears wise.
Once established, we will also work like other museums, if it seems
indicated, to get grants from the National Endowment for the Human-
ities or the Institute of Museum Services of the Department of Educa-
tion. And most importantly, we hope-and this question of sites and
buildings has been hit head on-we hope the interest of the Congress,
beginning with this committee, will help us to obtain space. We do not
think it is as difficult as has been posed. It could be, but it needn't be.
And we hope it will be possible to be located on favorable terms where
tourists visit in search of our national history. That would help us
establish our initial exhibits at the earliest possible time, and also help
with the financing of such an enterprise.
Interest in our exhibits we are certain will be high. The Museum of
the Cowboy, in Cody, Wyo., has, I understand, from 1 to 2 million
visitors a year, and we think the story of American intelligence merits
comparable attention. What we propose at the outset is perhaps 12,000
square feet, and when you talk about exhibitry space, as we all know,
you're not talking about feet occupied by exhibits, you're talking about
a percentage of that space which is actually exhibitry. We think at the
outset we might be able to work with 12 or 16,000 square feet. That is
what the Donovan Memorial Foundation and we have proposed. But
some day over the years we might be as bin as, say, 40,000 square feet
if we prosper. The comparisons are there in my written statement
which I have submitted. They show the size of the Armed Forces Hall
and the Smithsonian History Museum and the Marine Historical Cen-
ter and some other examples.
DISPLAYS
The displays, as has been said, would, by and large, center around
the American Revolution, the Civil War, two World Wars, major in-
telligence developments in the interwar and postwar periods, some-
what along the lines I have described in my written statement.
The three interlocking themes of the museum would be history, tech-
nology, and people. I think this has come out in previous witnesses
testimony very clearly. And some individuals, Generals Donovan and
Van Deman, for example, Herbert Yardley and Allen Dulles, would
probably be signaled out for special mention.
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I was very pleased to hear the Director of Central Intelligence say
that he thinks a museum is always a balance between things and stories,
and I was happy to hear him say he thinks this is very heavily a matter
of stories, and I think it has to be. Rather than simply showing things
or even telling stories, the museum will also, to the largest extent feasi-
ble, invite the participation of the visitor, which as you well know,
great museums of the world, like the Smithsonian, do.
Items displayed could show visitors how photointerpreters work or
perhaps if it is feasible let them look at blown up photographs or en-
larged microdots. But they could also try their ear at recognizing fist,
the telltale sign of who is transmitting a message, a matter so im-
portant in Operations Double Cross and Nordpol.
They could also test themselves, as they have done in some exhibits,
on their knowledge of the international affairs involved in the things
we will display, and on some national security matters, and in fact, on
their knowledge of famous spies.
The museum hopefully will tell a story of interest to visitors at
various levels, from knowledgeable historians and other researchers,
to Cub Scouts. And all, we hope, will come away from the museum
with a better understanding of the intelligence community's role in
support of the national interest, and the array of talents, language,
scientific, mathematical, mapmaking, analytical, et cetera, et cetera,
et cetera, which it requires.
And using the devices of modern exhibitry we will be able to draw
upon many films, some classics on intelligence by now, such as "The
Man Who Never Was," "Decision at Dawn," "Counterfeit Traitor."
Our colleagues in the Donovan Foundation say this is possible.
The project does, indeed, pose many challenges, some of which
have been mentioned. And this brings us back to the themes that
might be displayed and challenges to be overcome :
How to be credible, educational and interesting at the same time,
which is always an exhibitry matter.
How to deal with fact, as best it can be determined. In the Civil
War, for example, all the Confederate records on espionage were de-
stroyed. And with legend about the same events. For example, how to
deal with fact and myth relating to some of the women spies and
couriers of the Civil War.
Which examples should be chosen to illustrate different types of
intelligence; and, again, how to illustrate themes and subthemes
through both exhibit materials and story lines.
Such themes might include, as has been said by previous witnesses :
Whatever the state of technology, people remain crucial, whether
photointerpreters, counterintelligence, physical security people, com-
puter specialists, cryptologists, whatever.
The overriding importance, as has been mentioned, of warning and
surprise and data on capabilities and intentions.
I was very happy to hear General Quinn mention, for example, in
this era of air, space, and water centered interest, the importance of
terrain.
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The continuing importance in conventional warfare of the time
honored means of gathering intelligence such as interrogation of
prisoners, deserters, and refugees.
And elemental principles that Ave all take for granted like seeking
confirmation of something you got from one method through use of
another.
How intelligence gradually became much broader than a purely
military matter.
How our world role brought about an intelligence job of many
facets requiring efforts of a number of organizations, the establish-
ment of which has represented milestones in the American intel-
ligence story, and many people in the room were part of the estab-
lishment of those groups.
And how it has for a long time taken a mix of all 'services and
military and civilians to do the national intelligence job.
Before closing, I want to thank, on behalf of our Board and other
volunteers and The Donovan Foundation, the committee for endors-
ing the resolution and for this hearing. As William Hood, a former
OSS officer and author of the book, "Mole," stated in the introduc-
tion to that book, "the story is worth telling;" "and for better or
worse considerable tradecraft," and I am quoting, "is now in the pub-
lic domain." We want to tell the story to help the public better under-
stand the tradecraft of intelligence to which it has been exposed,
often in a skewed way, in movies, television, and books. And as Mr.
Hood wrote about his book, the museum's contents "will not add a
jot or a tittle to what Moscow already knows."
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator HECHT. Thank you, very much.
[Prepared statement of Martin Cramer follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTIN CRAMER ON PROPOSED PROJECT FOR A NATIONAL
HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM, BEFORE THE SENATE PERMANENT SELECT
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, NOVEMBER 3, 1983
The proposed National Historical Intelligence Museum is being planned and
developed by the Washington-based organization of that name with the collabo-
ration of the William J. Donovan Memorial Foundation of the Veterans of
OSS in New York City. Temporary and permanent sites are being sought in
Washington, D.C., nearby Virginia, and adjacent Maryland areas, with South-
ern Pennsylvania as a less likely location. At the outset, the Museum's sponsors
hope to have an exhibit of from twelve to sixteen thousand square feet, expand-
ing it as funds and space permit, perhaps to the approximate size of the
Armed Forces Hall of the Smithsonian's National Museum of American History
(30,000 square feet) or the Navy Museum (now 44,000 square feet, including
support areas and offices, and due to expand to 52,000 square feet). Fundraising
plans, scheduled to get underway in 1984, calls for raising two million dollars
from private sources. Funds will not be sought from the defense and intelli-
gence agencies, although, like other educational and historical museums, this
one might well seek them from the humanities and educational grant-making
organizations and state and local bodies which assist such understandings.
Possible locations which have been surveyed range from sites on bases of
all three services and National Park Service land to surplus schools and other
surplus government buildings.
The content of the Museum will stress three major subjects : history, technol-
ogy and people, but will necessarily be largely connected by the historical thread.
After an introductory area, featuring a slide show and exhibits on pre-revolu-
tion antecedents, a major section will be devoted to the American Revolution-
the espionage networks run for or by General Washington ; the principal agents
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of both sides-some very well known like Andre, Arnold and Dr. Bancroft, Ben
Franklin's personal secretary ; others, little-known to most who will view the
exhibits, but important to the fate of the armies and the hopes of the Americans.
In addition to networks and individual agents, this section will cover the tech-
nology of the time-codes, ciphers, secret inks, concealment devices ; the Intelli-
gence aspects of the not-very-secret dealings among the Continentals, the French
and the Spanish ; an inept plot to kidnap General Washington ; counterintelli-
gence efforts ; and the deception operations of the American Commander-In-Chief.
A connecting area will display the intelligence story of the period between the
Revolution and the Civil War, the intelligence components of the conflicts with
Britain in 1812, with Mexico ("the Mexican Spy Company" included), the Bar-
bary Pirates, and the intelligence-related usefulness of explorations and map-
making of the period.
The Civil War story will, like the Revolution segment, center around intelli-
gence principles and activities displayed through stories told through audiovisual
techniques now common to all museums. Again, where there was one, the impact
will be shown of intelligence on the outcome of campaigns and battles ; but where
the story is one of human interest and color, that will be its focus. The relation
of new or expanding technologies to intelligence will be shown, although it will be
clear that "humint" (scouts, "detectives," generally used for counterintelligence,
and spies) was still at the center of the intelligence efforts of both sides. The roles
of aerial reconnaissance (balloons) ; advances in signals intelligence (signal
towers and flags, signalling codes, and the telegraph), and accompanying inter-
ception activities ; and the key role in Union intelligence of a railroad officer will
demonstrate the importance of the technological changes, along with mention of
ironclads, torpedoes and a primitive and unsuccessful submarine. The role on
both sides of women spies and couriers-both the legend and the fact-will be
displayed, demonstrating, in effect, that courtliness and barbarous acts were both
part of this civil strife. As in the Revolution segment, deception, interrogation of
prisoners and deserters, and the use or non-use of seized and found documents
will be covered in the displays. Covert action operations, particularly Confederate
plans to free prisoners from camps in the North and burn Northern cities, will
also be shown.
The next connecting passage-1865 to 1914-would center principally on the
Spanish-American War, showing how there had been significant changes affecting
intelligence in this period in American military thinking, and how American
actions in the conflict with Spain were products of strategic planning, thanks to
Teddy Roosevelt and others. It would also relate how the nature of campaigns
in that brief war, involving particularly Cubans and Filipinos, affected intelli-
gence. Coverage of World War I will range from pigeons as couriers and other
aspects of battlefield intelligence, to the Inquiry, President Wilson's generally
unused venture into overt foreign intelligence collection and analysis. But the
two principal points of focus will be counterintelligence against German espion-
age, sabotage and other covert actions ; and the effect of intercepts and cryptol-
ogy, particularly the Zimmerman Note, on American actions. It will include the
continuing development of professional intelligence services through efforts of
General Van Deman and others.
The third connecting passage covering the period between the two World Wars
will continue to stress cryptology, as its principal points of focus will be arms
buildups of potential adversaries, weapons development, and arms control efforts ;
the impact of technological developments, traffic analysis, radio direction finding;
and the activities of Naval and Military Intelligence and of the Black Chamber of
Herbert Yardley.
The fourth major area, covering World War II, will depict the continuing story
of codebreaking-ENIGMA, ULTRA, MAGIC-wherever American forces fought ;
intelligence and "the Wizard War" (R and D) ; key networks and spies; Pearl
Harbor, Midway, Barbarossa, the North African landing, D-Day, and other
major events with huge intelligence components; the various roles of the OSS in
intelligence and guerilla warfare in Europe and Southeast Asia, and how it
worked with the British and the Resistance and German opposition elements ; and
Operation Double Cross and its opposite number, Operation Nordpol.
The final transition area of the proposed Museum, under present plans and
estimates, will cover from the end of World War II to the present, featuring
Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the special problems posed by Viet Nam
and Iran. The final (fifth) major area will cover the many present challenges
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to American Intelligence. Here again, counterintelligence will be stressed, as the
story is displayed of recruitment by the KGB and its satellites of British, Ger-
man, French and American agents to spy on NATO and other key secrets. The diffi-
culties of protecting against terrorism and assassination will be demonstrated.
The expanding role of the President as "Chief Intelligencer" will be depicted.
There will be coverage of media presentations of modern espionage.
Finally, there will be a summing up and a very brief treatment of possible
future trends, covering such things as the expanding role of Third World coun-
tries and the previously incredible happenings in space.
A historical museum is, of course, a combination of stories and things. This
museum will benefit from a host of publications on intelligence, a wealth of
knowledgeable people, the existence of a number of collections of intelligence-
related items, and lessons to be gained from the experience of museums from
Europe to San Francisco. Although collection of artifacts from existing museums,
private collectors and elsewhere will not he easy, the location of many has been
identified. Modern museums try to let viewers be participants ; also intelligence
lends itself to the viewer's involvement. He can do more than just view the
bugged eagle from our Embassy in Moscow, which was shown at the UN, or
the concealment devices. He can look at an enlarged microdot, listen to a radio
transmission to try to detect a familiar "fist," or see how radio direction-finding
helped with locating Sorge. He can also quiz himself, or be quizzed in key intel-
ligence information, or his assumptions about it. In this Museum he will have
his chance to be engaged, while being both educated and entertained.
Senator HFCIIT. I want to turn the Chair back to Senator Inouye,
who has very graciously allowed me to sit here in his absence, but
before I do, I want the record to show a statement of Senator David
Durenberger.
(The statement of Senator Durenberger on the establishment of a
National Historical Intelligence Museum follows :1
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR DAVID DURENBERGER
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to be a co-sponsor of your resolution
supporting the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum. It
is vital that the American people appreciate the role of intelligence in U.S.
foreign policy. This museum will help increase that understanding.
An intelligence museum will remind Americans of the vital job that our
intelligence professionals have done. It could also serve as a research center,
helping scholars and the public to understand how intelligence works.
There is much research to be done on intelligence, both to inform the Ameri-
can people and to point the way to improvements. Americans may hear of
occasional covert actions, for example, but they have not had the benefit of
a serious study of such efforts in twenty years. They may hear of technical
intelligence collection when an arms control treaty is debated or when there
is a big espionage case, but there are very few studies of how the intelligence
community uses-and contributes to the development of-the most modern
technology to gain information on foreign capabilities and intentions. And
while Americans may hear of purported intelligence failures, they could cer-
tainly use more coherent studies of how intelligence analysis works in a world
of secrecy and uncertainty.
Last month, Bill Casey and I exchanged letters on the subject of a CIA
program to declassify materials that might be of historical or other public inter-
est. We agreed that such a program won](] benefit not only historians and re-
searchers, but also the public as a whole- It helps to have an historian as
Director of Central Intelligence, and I take his presence here today as a further
sign of the Director's commitment to bringing more releasable information
into the public domain.
Mr. Chairman, I know that you, too, are one of the great supporters of letting
the American people know what intelligence is all about. We all share the goal
of getting beyond the James Bond and "rogue elephant" images of intelligence.
We on this Committee are well aware of both the strengths and the weak-
nesses of U.S. intelligence efforts. We are painfully aware of the complexity
of intelligence issues. A well-informed American public will likewise understand
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those complexities. That can only help us as this Committee pursues its missions
of supporting the intelligence community, improving U.S. intelligence, and main-
taining the safeguards that guide the functioning of intelligence in a free society.
Senator IIECHT. Senator Inouye.
Senator 1NouYE [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Once again I wish to apologize to all for the absence of the members
of the committee. As you know we are at present considering the In-
telligence authorization measure on the floor.
It appears that just about every article or book written about intelli-
gence gathering in the United States paints a negative picture of all
of our various agencies-be it the FBI, the CIA, or the NSA. In the
same way, nearly every book, especially novels written about intelli-
gence gathering, is not only a grotesque imagination of what really
happens, but almost always paints the CIA officer as a villain.
Therefore, it should not come as any surprise to any of us that in-
telligence gathering in the United States is the least understood, the
least appreciated, and the most maligned of all activities of this Gov-
ernment. Therefore I think this resolution is timely and very im-
portant, and I wish to join my colleagues in commending the chairman
of this committee, Senator Goldwater, for taking the initiative to in-
troduce this measure.
I would hope that this museum will take on the monumental job of
letting the people of this country know what intelligence gathering is
all about, the role it has played in our history, the important role it has
played in carrying out the interests of this country, the role it has
played in protecting us, the role it continues to play in serving our
best interests. It is not an easy job, and it may seem like a futile at-
tempt for a little museum to do this, but it has to begin somewhere,
and you may be assured, as the cosponsors of this measure have indi-
cated-incidentally, every member of the committee is a cosponsor-
that we are behind you. If it means receiving grants from some of our
Government agencies, you can call on us to be on your side.
It has been said that the success of any democracy, especially like
ours, will depend upon the level of acceptance shown by the people
of the country of their government and its activities. If we continue
on the present path, permitting our inteligence agencies and agents to
be maligned, misunderstood, and unappreciated, then our democracy
will be in danger. That is the importance of this resolution.
I commend all of you for taking time from your busy schedules to
participate in this hearing. On behalf of the chairman, I thank all of
you.
In behalf of the chairman I have been asked to note that there is no
objection to a request for polling the members on this measure. Since
no one here has questioned the absence of a quorum, without objection
the committee will be polled on the acceptance of this resolution.
Before I close, I would like to relate part of my personal history.
I arrived here as a Member of Congress in 1959, and one of the first
Members I met was a man from Minnesota, John Blatnik. John Blat-
nik introduced me to the OSS and the CIA. He was the one who made
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me appreciate the activities of the intelligence-gathering agencies of
this Government. Because of his unceasing efforts among his col-
leagues, I think our intelligence agencies have done pretty well. He
should be one of those featured in this museum, the Man from the Iron
Mountain.
Senator Hecht, I thank you for this-opportunity to say a few words
here on behalf of this resolution.
Before I adjourn this hearing, I would ask consent that the record
be kept open for any statements that may be placed in by other Mem-
bers of the Senate.
Thank you very much. If there are no further statements to be
made, this session is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:18 a.m., the bearing was adjourned.]
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APPENDIX
[From the Congressional Record, Nov. 17, 1983]
ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution (S. Res. 267) to support the
establishment of a National Historical Intelligence Museum.
Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, I rise in support of Senate Resolution 267. The
purpose of this resolution is to support the establishment of a National Historical
Intelligence Museum.
This is not a controversial subject. To my knowledge, there have been no ob-
jections to this resolution. It does not request that any public money be spent. It
will not cost the American taxpayer a single dollar. Instead, it shows congres-
sional support for a museum which allows the American people to have insight
into a complicated subject that is often misunderstood and unfairly criticized.
Mr. President, on November 1, 1983, I Introduced this resolution. It was co-
sponsored by every Member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. As
well, Mr. HECHT, the distinguished Senator from Nevada, is a cosponsor of this
resolution.
On November 3, 1983, the Intelligence Committee held a public hearing on this
resolution. A variety of witnesses voiced their support for this idea including:
Mr. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence and Director of CIA; William
Colby, a former Director of Central Intelligence ; Gen. William Quinn, one of
the early organizers of the intelligence community as we know it today ; and a
panel of experts drawn from the American intelligence community. None of these
witnesses spoke against the National Historical Intelligence Museum.
Mr. President, the idea of a National Historical Intelligence Museum is en-
dorsed by the National Historical Intelligence Museum Association. This non-
profit organization was established in close cooperation with the Donovan Memo-
rial Foundation, which itself Is organized as a public foundation to honor the
name and memory of General Donovan. The Directors of the Donovan Memorial
Foundation also support the establishment of this Museum.
This Museum is something for the American people. Our support will give its
backers the message that we think it is a good idea. It will encourage them to
proceed with this important historical project.
I believe that this Museum would be an interesting place for the public to visit.
It would give them a better understanding of what intelligence is all about, and
why it is important to the preservation of American freedoms. Therefore, Mr.
President, I ask my colleagues to support passage of Senate Resolution 267 now,
before the Senate goes out of session.
The resolution was considered and agreed to.
The preamble was agreed to.
The resolution, and the preamble, are as follows :
S. RES 267
"Whereas intelligence activities have played a -crucial role in the history of the
United States ;
"Whereas intelligence activities were employed by George Washington at the
outset of the American Revolution ;
"Whereas it is important that the citizens of the United States understand the
role of intelligence in not only military achievement in wartime, but also in main-
taining stability in peacetime ;
"Whereas the sacrifices and contributions to intelligence by thousands of men
and women should be commemorated ; and
(31)
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"Whereas the understanding of the importance which intelligence activities
have played in the history of the United States and the acknowledgement of
the people who have contributed to such activities can best be achieved by the
collection, preservation, and exhibition of intelligence objects of historical signi-
ficance : Now, therefore. be it
"Resolved, That the Senate supports the establishment of a National Historical
Intelligence .Museum."
[The following material was submitted for the record:]
STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. EUGENE F. TIGHE, JR., USAF (RET.) FORMER DIRECTOR OF
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
This Nation cannot conduct its relations with other nations in a proper manner;
cannot act as a leader among nations and cannot act in any way, as a moral force
for good without an extraordinarily professional intelligence capability. The U.S.
must know every nation on earth-its people, its mores, its culture, its language.
From the national academic pool it must be able to glean the very best to assist it
in its intelligence role. Young men and women at the peak of academic excellence
must be encouraged to believe that intelligence activities are moral, are critically
important to the Nation and that the people of the United States support them,
respect them and are proud of the men and women who toil in silence for the good
of the Nation.
The symbols of respect-the monuments in our Nation's Capitol praise men
and institutions ; serve to remind our citizens of the traditions and the proud
moments in our Nation's past and serve as beacons to the young to honor and seek
to serve the great institutions of government. 'Museums hold the best of the great
fine arts' achievements of ours and other nations, the proud symbols of U.S. in-
dustrial and technical achievements and other symbols of all that is best in our
Nation's past.
Old men take their memories to their graves and soon their mementos
too, scatter and soon become lost in a maze of garage sales, junk yards and
oblivion. This is especially so with a professional like the intelligence profession.
This country eagerly should seek to save the memorable facts, achievements,
biographies, mementos and artifacts of the intelligence profession. All these
should be housed permanently in an exhibition hall clearly dedicated to the
Nation's pride in the intelligence profession. Public interest in and respect for
these displays surely will build interest in the profession if they are placed in
the Capitol area where most of the Nation's children are drawn as tourists-
where the fact that our Nation's leadership is so supportive of the intelligence
establishment that it placed an intelligence museum among the best of the
symbols, the displays and the greatest institutions of government here in Wash-
ington, D.C.
As a military officer who served the intelligence profession for thirty-seven
years I've seen the pride of thousands of the Nation's brightest intelligence
personnel in the difficult tasks of assuring U.S. pre-eminence in its ability to
communicate power for good in the world. I've seen also the difficulty of proving
to the Nation's young that intelligence is an honored and honorable vocation. I've
seen the pain and hurt on the faces of young intelligence officers at whom insults
are hurled by the ignorant-the ill-informed.
I am proud to lend my support to those who strongly urge the broad support
of the Congress for a permanent National Historical Intelligence Museum here in
the Nation's city.
STATEMENT OF J. MILNOR ROBERTS, VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTEL-
LIGENCE MUSEUM AND VICE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY CENTER
Since high quality military and political intelligence has been of prime im-
portance to governments since ancient times, it is indeed surprising that the
subject has not been covered to a greater extent by higher educational institu-
tions or by the establishment of a National museum prior to this time. Most of
what the public knows about intelligence has been communicated through motion
pictures, special television presentations, and books, many of which have pre-
sented distorted or even inaccurate views on the subject. Thus, I believe the
establishment of a scholarly and attractive National Intelligence Museum is long
past due.
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There is no shortage of museums in the United States. Several branches of the
military services have established excellent museums devoted to their own
Services, and there are a wide variety of historical museums covering a broad
number of subjects. The topic of intelligence is included in many of these but
with limited treatment of necessity.
I believe that the proposed museum would attract far more interest and have
a more permanent display of long term interest if a separate facility is used
rather than incorporation in a much larger museum such as the Smithsonian.
Under these conditions, special showings may be held but the core of the exhibits
can be available for inspection throughout the year. I feel that a downtown site
in the District of Columbia would be ideal for the museum, but a site in Arlington
or Alexandria, Virginia, would be acceptable if the location has easy access to
the District.
Since the subject of intelligence has received so much dramatic attention in
the form of movies and television as mentioned above. I believe that many
thousands of visitors to Washington would include the museum on their itin-
eraries. I feel that young people would have a special interest in it, and this
could lead to many of them becoming interested in intelligence as a career field.
The educational aspects of the museum can thus be important for many of our
intelligence agencies including the intelligence branches of the Armed Forces.
In an informal survey conducted by the officers of the National Historical
Intelligence Museum it was discovered that there would be no shortage of exhibit
material, both in the form of hardware and printed displays. It is important to
collect such material at an early date to prevent its loss or destruction, and
special attention will be paid to security measures when the museum is opera-
tional. The exhibit material should cover a broad spectrum of subjects, includ-
ing counter-intelligence ; photo intelligence ; coding and code breaking ; covert
activities ; intelligence satellites ; and political intelligence, to name just a few.
It is the intention of our officers and Advisory Board to raise funds for this
project through private means. However, recognition and support of the mem-
bers of the Select Committee as well as other members of the Senate will be of
major importance to this activity. It is also hoped that cooperation by appropriate
government agencies will be forthcoming in connection with the establishment
of the museum. Assistance in locating and securing an appropriate site is an
example of the ways in which the government can be helpful.
In conclusion, I appreciate the opportunity to present these views for the
Committee and for the record.
STATEMENT BY MAURICE MATLOFF, FORMER CHIEF HISTORIAN, CENTER FOR MILITARY
HISTORY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, MEMBER, ADVISORY BOARD, NATIONAL
HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
I am writing this letter to endorse the proposal to establish a national intellig-
ence museum. A national intelligence museum has long been needed and never
more so than today when national security problems require understanding and
knowledge on the part of the American public. From the American Revolution
through all the subsequent wars-hot and cold, total and limited-in which the
United States became involved, intelligence gathering and analysis have played
significant roles. The breaking of the Japanese diplomatic code before World
War II and the detection of offensive weapons during the Cuban missile crisis
are but two of the better known episodes of a long history in the intelligence
field. Today a variety of governmental agencies and considerable resources deal
with the complex and myriad facets of this important function of national gov-
ernment. Yet relatively little is known by the American public of the contribu-
tions made by heroic and sometimes little known citizens in war and peace in
this field.
As a long practicing military historian, I have encountered no museum in this
country that deals adequately with this function. Each military service has its
own museum system but no museum exists on the national level to bring to-
gether the civilian and military aspects of intelligence in a meaningful, coherent,
effective fashion from the historical standpoint. To assemble the artifacts and
other resources and house them in a central institution dedicated to this purpose
will require governmental support. Such a museum will not duplicate existing
public or private museums. It will fill an important gap in our national cultural
apparatus and inform our citizens of an important but little known aspect of past
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American history. It will also promote public understanding of a significant
medium in protecting national security in recent times nad help enlighten Ameri-
can citizens about the ramifications of conducting foreign policy in a dangerous,
uncertain world.
In my opinion, the establishment of a national intelligence museum is fully
deserving of Congressional support.
I was happy to learn that a congressional committee is about to begin consid-
eration of the desirability of an intelligence museum.
As a student and author of intelligence literature and history, and of the
craft of intelligence itsef, I welcome any reasonable means that will make Amer-
ican citizens more aware of the importance of intelligence to our security, and
of the role American intelligence has played in our history and in preserving
this country and its institutions. The concept of a museum, presenting these
contributions and traditions in an educational, objective manner is one means.
I would hope that making our youth aware of the crucial importance of intel-
ligence to our nation's future will inspire them to consider intelligence as a
career. I would also hope that whatever facilities are created would also become
a repository of research material and a center for scholarly research on all
American aspects of the profession and its history.
STATEMENT BY RUSSELL F. WRIGLEY, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY
As a military historian, and particularly as a student of the institutional
history of the armed forces, I strongly support the effort to establish a national
intelligence museum.
I have found that there is no major aspect of the history of national security
policy that has been so badly neglected as intelligence. Even many minor aspects
of military history are much better known to both scholars and the public. A
national intelligence museum would be an invaluable step forward toward a
better scholarly and public understanding of the relatively unknown beginnings
and evolution of American intelligence activity, so important to understanding
that activity in the world today.
STATEMENT BY LAWRENCE MCWILLIAMS, FORMER CHIEF, FOREIGN COUNTER
INTELLIGENCE TRAINING, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND MEMBER,
BOARD, NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
After a career in counter-intelligence of twenty-seven years with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation I have reached the following conclusions : The FBI
cannot accomplish its counterintelligence (CI) mission without the cooperation
and understanding of the American people. To obtain it, the FBI has, throughout
the years made efforts to inform the public of the existence of foreign intelli-
gence service officers and agents in the U.S., nature of the threat, the modus
operandi employed, and how individuals are recruited to serve a foreign power.
This is why the FBI incorporated into its extremely popular tour in Washing-
ton, D.C., a section on foreign counter-intelligence matters.
By locating in one place the records of famous court trials such as Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg, Alger Hiss, Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Sergeant Robert Lee
Johnson, etc., along with the exhibition of instrumentalities used in espionage
operations, i.e., rollover cameras, microdots, "Pumpkin papers," etc., the process
of educating and alerting the public to the ever-present existence of the foreign
threat, will be enhanced.
Of great importance also will be the centralization of records that, year after
year. are of continuing concern to segments of the populace.
I would add that when the concept of establishing an Intelligence Museum
was presented by me to Assistant Director Roger Young and representatives of
several divisions within FBI headquarters in May 1983, the concept was endorsed
along with an expression of willingness to respond to load requests that are with-
in legal parameters covering the Bureau.
On June 14. 1983, when I met with it, the Executive Board of the Former
Agents of the FBI also endorsed the concept.
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STATEMENT OF RICHARD K. BETTS, SENIOR FELLOW, THE BROOHINGS INSTITUTION,
AND MEMBER, ADVISORY BOARD, NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
The full scope of "intelligence" as we know it covers an extraordinary wide
range of functions-from espionage and clandestine collection of information to
technical reconnaissance and surveillance; from covert political activities to
paramilitary operations ; from organizational problems of processing and dis-
seminating data to analytical correlation, interpretation, and reporting; from
short-range military warning to long-range political economic estimates; and
so forth. A museum would naturally focus exhibits more on some of these func-
tions than others. One virtue of a museum, however, is that it can bring together
intriguing evidence from a number of these various functions (including col-
lections of research materials apart from exhibits) in one place, and in so doing
make it easier for visitors to grasp the diversity and interrelations of these vital
tasks.
Indeed, "intelligence" in the public imagination is often associated only with
"cloak and dagger" sorts of activities. If a comprehensive museum helped to il-
lustrate the complexity of intelligence matters, and the importance of some of
the less glamorous aspects of the whole process, that alone would be a worthwhile
service. Take for example one area of intelligence in which I have done research :
warning to prevent surprise attack. Most Americans think of this problem in
terms of one dramatic event, Pearl Harbor, and generally have the impression
that this was a case of total surprise, a "bolt from the blue" with no warning at
all. In fact, of course, as government officials and those who have studied the
problem are aware, the reality in this and other cases is far more complex. By
supplementing exhibits about Pearl Harbor with other materials, such as collec-
tions documents and information on other cases of warning failures or successes,
a basis for greater appreciation of historic intelligence problems and an oppor-
tunity to delve into relevant research would be easily available for both the
interested public and scholars. No significant center of this sort now exists.
War museums have been created because of the obvious historical significance
of national security and the cases in which it has been threatened. Intelligence is
a vital aspect of security and an important element in our military and diplomatic
history. It seems sensible, then, to provide an institution that can serve public
and expert interest in the subject to complement those institutions that do so
for other reknowned aspects of our history.
STATEMENT BY ROGER PINEAU, CAPTAIN, USNR (RETIRED), AND MEMBER, BOARD,
NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
For forty-one years I have associated and involved almost continuously with
intelligence-the work of gathering and using information for the protection
and preservation of life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.
Naval duty, active and inactive: 1942-43 study Japanese language; 1943-45
duty in radio communication intelligence ; 1945-46 strategic bombing survey,
Japan (6 months) ; 1946-47 WDC/CIA; 1947-57 assisting Samuel Eliot Morison
on 15-volume History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II (1950-57 as a
civilian) ; 1957-72 Reserve Intelligence Division 5-2, including six White House
assignments as assistant to naval aide ; and 1972-78 Director, Navy Memorial
Museum.
Civilian occupation : Assistant to Samuel Eliot Morison (7 years) ; Department
of State (7 years) ; Smithsonian Institution (7 years) ; and Private research (6
years).
During those years I have been involved with historical, military, political, or
scientific intelligence. The work has included research and study in the archives,
museums, and universities of the principal countries of Europe, the Far East
(mostly Japan), as well as in the United States.
Never, in the course of those years of interested inquiry and search, have I
seen the subject of intelligence treated for public exhibit and enlightment in an
understanding, appropriate, intelligent, adequate (or even inadequate) manner.
It is high time that the subject of intelligence be presented publicly. It is im-
portant for people to know the role that intelligence has played historically and
in our daily life.
It is important for people to know that intelligence is not just a matter of spies,
seduction, compromises, and intrigues as appear in occasional news breaks. The
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need for intelligence activity-acquiring and using information essential to
survival-has existed since man's beginning, and it will survive until his finish.
In fact, the abuse, disuse, or misuse of intelligence has invariably expedited man's
defeat, and always will.
Therefore, a public intelligence museum is needed. The need is great, and it is
urgent. It is desirable and essential that work be started as soon as possible, for
three reasons:
(1) So that the museum may be completed for use at the earliest feasible
time, but, more importantly,
(2) so that appropriate artifacts may be collected and preserved before
they vanish, and, most importantly,
(3) so that the men and women still living who have been a part of the
intelligence developments of recent decades can avail the museum and history
of their unique experience and knowledge.
Within the bounds of security considerations, the public is not only entitled
to know, but needs to know the facts about intelligence. There is no more fitting
place to initiate public awareness of intelligence than in the United States. There
is no more proper and effective method of effecting such awareness than a public
museum.
THE WILLIAM J. DONOVAN MEMORIAL FOUNDATION, INC.,
New York, N.Y., October 31, 1983.
Senator BARRY GOLDWATER,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GOLDWATER : Herewith please find a statement submitted by the
Donovan Memorial Foundation for the record re the hearing being he''d Novem-
ber 3, 1983 for the National Historical Intelligence Museum.
Sincerely,
JAMES R. WITHROW, Jr.,
Chairman.
Following over 20 years of awarding the William J. Donovan Medal to out-
standing men and women of the Free World in recognition of their service to
country and the cause of freedom (as was rendered by General Donovan in
both his private and public life), the Veterans of OSS have spearheaded the
desires of many others to further foster and memoralize the General's legacy
of courage and concern for the world's security, and the role of the United
States therein, by establishing a not-for-profit, public foundation in his name.
The Donovan Memorial Foundation (DMF) has, therefore, been organized
(and approved by the IRS as a public foundation, ID #13-3095744) with offices
In New York City and the initial Officers, Directors and Advisory Council com-
posed of friends/associates of General Donovan. as shown on this letterhead.
For your further information, the DMF has three initial goals which are out-
lined in the attached statement entitled "OUR GOALS".
As you will see, the DMF is most interested in helping establish a National
Historical Intelligence Museum (NHIM) in Washington, D.C., to provide the
general public with visual presentation of all permissable insight into intelli-
gence and related clandestine operations-not only of General Donovan's and
OSS, but from the beginnings of our United States, through its different wars
into today's advances in technology and communications-for a better under-
standing of the significant functions of such operations to our national security
as well as to the maintenance of world peace.
We feel General Donovan would have liked us to do this in his memory.
As you may know, he was convinced that a knowledge and understanding of
the crucial role of intelligence activities to our country's well-being must be
given the greatest possible exposure, because, in the last analysis, in the Amer-
ican democracy it is the people who decide America's course of action.
We feel a properly developed NHIM would be most helpful in achieving this
goal.
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In keeping with General Donovan's ideas and interests, the primary goal of
the William J. Donovan Memorial Foundation will be to undertake the real-
ization of two specific priority projects:
One, to help establish a National Historical Intelligence Museum in Washing-
ton, D.C. (along the lines of the entertainingly instructive Air and Space Mu-
seum) to provide the general public with visual presentations of all permissable
insight into intelligence and related clandestine operations-not only of Gen-
eral Donovan's and OSS, but from the beginning of our United States through
its different wars into today's advances in technology and communications-
for the greatest possible awareness of the significant role these activities have
played, and are continuing to play in our country's well being and the mainte-
nance of world peace.
Second, the equally important corollary but more specific educational project :
to support and increase the study of intelligence in our colleges and universi-
ties (in cooperation with existing organizations specializing in this area). This
for a greater and better understanding by the youth of America of the dynamics
of national security policy and the significant functions of intelligence opera-
tions thereto as well as to the maintenance of international peace in a danger-
ous world-for informed students are our future leaders as well as citizens.
The Donovan Memorial Foundation also has an additional continuing overall
goal of significant consequence : to help promote the relationships and strengthen
the fraternal bonds established by General Donovan and by OSS men and
women (before, during and after WW II) that tie them to these special friends
and associates, both at home and abroad. This by continuing the William J.
Donovan Award Dinners and other such gatherings, as well as by planning
reciprocal visits with overseas intelligence and special services comrades of
common purpose among our allies in the free world. And it follows that we
will also seek to assist in the relief of hardship and privation caused by war
and/or disaster that may have befallen such former associates, individually
or in groups, to include their families and children. The people who shared the
common dangers, hardships and the final victory share a common concern for
the future of freedom and democracy throughout the world-and for world
peace.
We feel General Donovan would have liked to have us do this in his memory.
When he extended the hand of friendship, he meant it to be helping.
CONNECTICUT COLLEGE,
Hon. BARRY GOLDWATER, London, Conn., November 1, 1988.
,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GOLDWATER : I received your notice of the hearing on November
3 about your proposal for a National Intelligence Historical Museum, and I write
to express strong support for the project.
I have visited the National Museum of American History in virtually every
season. It is crowded at all times, giving millions a strong appreciation of Ameri-
can history and the development of our technology. A museum devoted to the
history of intelligence, or a division of the Smithsonian devoted to that task,
will likewise give the American public an informed understanding of the history
of intelligence gathering and its potential use.
Many I fear believe that secret service work began with the OSS, if not James
Bond. I have recently completed a book on the Society of the Cincinnati, the
organization of the American officers formed at the end of the Revolution. Work
on that project impressed me with the importance of intelligence gathering in
that era, and any museum would naturally focus on that formative period and
probably go back to the Renaissance and ancient period as well. A long term
understanding would give the American public a better basis for sorting out
budgetary priorities in our annual debates.
There is another benefit which will flow from a museum. Museums organize
exhibitions, and in the process sponsor research on questions not yet explored.
I finished my work wondering about several intelligence connections in the 1780s.
The British had sources inside Congress. Who were they? Lt. Col. Benjamin
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Tallmade, ran American military intelligence but left no clear record of what
he did. Can his efforts be reconstructed? In short, such a museum will have in-
estimable benefit in bringing about a more enlightened public, and it will also
be of great benefit to the scholarly community.
I am pleased to support your proposal and would be happy to submit a more
lengthy statement should it be useful.
Very truly yours,
MINOR MYERB, Jr.,
Professor of Government,
Assistant Secretary General, the Society of the Cincinnati.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STUDY CENTER,
Washington, D.C., November 3, 1983.
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR CHAIRMAN GOLDWATER: I am writing in my capacity as President of the
National Intelligence Study Center (NISC) to endorse the purpose of Senate
Resolution 267 supporting the establishment of a museum dedicated to the history
of intelligence.
A permanent exhibition in one of the Smithsonian Institution's buildings would
certainly help educate the American people about the importance of intelligence
activities to security and sound decisionmaking in the U.S. Government.
NISC was established in 1977 as a private, non-profit organization to improve
public understanding of the role of intelligence in our society. I am enclosing its
five-year report, which I believe you may wish to attach to the papers of your
hearing on November 3, 1983. I feel sure that the NISC membership would want
me to say we applaud your efforts to bring greater recognition to the achievements
of intelligence agencies and officers in American history.
Please ask the staff of the Select Committee on Intelligence to contact me if
NISC can be of assistance to you in connection with this resolution or other
endeavors of the Committee.
Cordially,
Senator BARRY GOLDWATER,
Capitol One D.C.
DEAR SENATOR GOLDWATER : I strongly support your resolution asking for
Senate support for the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence
Museum.
The creation of this museum will not only do honor to the thousand of silent
heroes who have served their country quietly and patriotically throughout its
history but it will also inspire many young people to devote themselves to the
defense of this Nations liberties by joining the silent services.
Respectfully,
O
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