AFGHANISTAN: DIFFERENCES OF VIEW WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00885R000100230015-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2014
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: November 13, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC 01159/89
13 November 1989
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
John J. O'Donnell
National Intelligence Officer for
Near East and South Asia
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Differences of View Within the
Intelligence Community
1. The National Intelligence Officer (Nb) for Near East
and South Asia is convening the intelligence community on
15 November to prepare a Special National Intelligence Estimate
(SNIE) on Afghanistan: The War in Perspective. The community
will endeavor in these meetings to find common ground in their
analysis of military and political prospects for Afghanistan
over the last 12 months. This SNIE will be distributed to
oversight committees.
2. There are differences within the community on the near
term military prospects of the Mujahedin and on the possible
negative effect of political elements, such as the Afghan
Interim Government (AIG) and Pakistani policy generally, on the
course of the struggle. But, at the same time there are
considerable areas of agreement. Following is a summary:
a. The community generally agrees that:
(1) The Afghan insurgents hold the military
initiative and will prevail over time; continued US support is
esstential to this analysis.
(2) The Mujahedin are employing the right
tactics -- attacking lines of communications, airfields, and
trying to mount small scale military attacks throughout the
country.
(3) The war may well continue several more
years; there will be no significant changes in the military
balance of power through this winter.
(4) Najibullah's Kabul regime survives because
of massive Soviet support. It has surprised everyone by its
military performance but remains unacceptable to the vast
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Differences of View within the
Intelligence Community
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majority of Afghans. It is torn by factionalism and will not
extend its control outside the urban areas.
(5) Certain of the important Mujahedin
commanders must become more assertively engaged, particularly
those in the north such as Ahmad Shah Masoud and Ismail /han,
to bring additional pressure to bear.
(6) A US disengagement would be the orst
possible alternative for US interests because thi -ould:
-- cause the levels of fig 'rig immediately
to drop off, lowering the pressure on N jibullah.
-- threaten the stabilit of Pakistan.
-- leave the Mujahedin ,'feeling betrayed and
risk an eventual anti-American gove, nment in Afghanistan.
(7) Mujahedin militaTy pressure has already
forced extensive change and compromfse on the Kabul regime.
Continued pressure eventually will either defeat the regime
militarily or will force so great a transformation that the
Mujahedin will reach an accommodation with whatever is left in
Kabul. Najibullah probably must depart under any scenario.
(8) The AIG in Peshawar is essentially
irrelevant to the war, though some analysts believe the AIG
reflects a pro-Pakistani bias favoring the sourthern commanders.
b. The DIA dissent. DIA e4mines the same
intelligence and concludes: dews.
,
(1) The 1.ewm*ev,ei harassment tactics of
Mujahedin will not thr_eapen e Najib lla regime in the
foreseeable future. 44Zigloy1
(2) The mujahedin may prevail over the long
term but will have to increase levels of activity and improve
effectiveness in order to do so.
ONEMNIft
40/
(3) Najibullah is stronger and of higher morale
today than six months ago because of the surprising performance
of the regime military and the dependable high levels of Soviet
support.
(4) With the departure of the Soviet army the
Mujahedin have lost much of their common cause and will hav6.
problems maintaining country-wide opposition to the re
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Differences of View Within the
Intelligence Community
c. The CIA position. CIA has been more positive and
optimistic than the rest of the community. The Agency argues
that:
(1) The Mujahedin are following the same
harassment tactics that succeeded against the Soviets.
Progress is slow but steady, and sufficient pressure is being
generated to force the collapse of the Najibullah regime.
(2) It is inaccurate to allege Najibullah is
stronger. His regime remains totally dependent on Soviet
support and completely unacceptable to the Afghan people.
(3) The regime has lost territory since the
Soviet withdrawal and faces a severe manpower crisis; its armed
forces have been reduced from about 160,000 to 125,000 since
May 1988.
(4) CIA concurs that nothing dramatic should be
expected this winter. The war could last several years.
d. The State/INR view. INR puts more weight on
political factors as inhibiting Mujahedin progress. They argue
that:
(1) Many of the more important insurgent
commanders remain on the sidelines because the AIG remains
narrowly unrepresentative and unattractive as an alternative
government.
(2) The Pakistanis favor certain groups,
particularly the Islamic party of Ghulbedin Hikmatyar, and thus
contribute to divisiveness. Pakistan is backing the wrong
commanders.
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SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Differences of View Within the
Intelligence Community
NIO/NESA/O'Donnell;
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - C/NIC
1 - D/OCA
1 - ER
1 - NIO/NESA Chrono
13NOV89)
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