SOVIET MILITARY PRODUCTION, 1975-88

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• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2014
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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Intelligence
Soviet Military Production,
1975-88
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Key Judgments
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Central
Intelligence
11M 89-10003/1
Soviet Military Production,
1975-88
Information available as of August 1 89 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval
Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
This Memorandum was approved for publication by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
September 1989
1989
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Soviet M.
1975-88
oduction
� Although fewer major weapons were produced during the 1980s
than during the 1970s, the Soviets have maintained levels of
output that are extraordinary by any standard.
� Since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, levels of weapons
production generally were somewhat below those for the full 14-
year period of this estimate, but remained high�well above the
US effort in every major category.
� As a result of Gorbachev 's announced unilateral reductions, Soviet
military materiel production is expected to decline. We anticipate
that the largest cuts will occur in the production of land arma-
ments with lesser cuts, if any, in strategic offensive weapons
depending, in part, on the results of negotiations on strategic arms
reductions. In contrast, there may even be increases in production
of air defense systems.
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Figure 1
Ratio of Selected Soviet to US
Cumulative Weapons Production, 1975-88
M 1975-1988
1985-1988
8:1
DIA
CIA
INR
4:1
2:1
DIA
INR
CIA
I: I
1:2
ICBMs Cruise Crew- Bombers Fighters Heli- Sub- Surface Tanks Major
and missiles served copiers marines warships artillery
SLBMs surface- pieces
to-air
missiles
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Key Judgments
Soviet defense industries exhibit a stability and momentum that have
resulted in levels of weapons production that'are extraordinary by any
standard. We note, however, that the period covered in this Memoran-
dum-1975-88�has been followed by repeated Soviet statements that
they will reduce defense expenditures and significantly alter how much and
what they produce and procure for their military forces. The implications
of these claims will become clearer over the next several years.
Figure 1 depicts the ratio of Soviet to US cumulative weapons production
for 10 major military equipment categories. In every category, Soviet
production has exceeded that of the United States. As shown in figure 1,
from 1975 through 1988, the Soviets produced about four times as many
intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles
as the United States, and twice as many nuclear-powered submarines.
During this period, the USSR produced some 500 long- and intermediate-
range bombers, whereas the United States produced 103 B-1 bombers. In
addition, the Soviets produced about six times as many crew-served, land-
based surface-to-air missiles as the United States, three times as many
tanks, and six times as many major artillery pieces. Figure 1 also depicts
the ratio of Soviet to US cumulative production for the period 1985-88�
the Gorbachev years. Although the Soviet-to-US ratios for 1985-88 are
generally smaller than for the overall period, the Soviets still outproduced
the United States in each of the major categories. In the area of land arma-
ments�those systems where we anticipate major reductions by the Soviets
over the next few years�the ratio of Soviet to US production since
Gorbachev came to power has been steadily increasing. Figure 2 illustrates
whether production for major military categories was higher, lower, or
about the same in 1988 as compared with 1985.
Tables 1 through 14 along with figures 3 through 9 reflect estimated Soviet
military materiel production during the period 1975-88. CIA and DIA
have agreed on year-by-year production estimates for more than 80 percent
of the more than 400 military systems covered in this Memorandum.
However, such agreement by itself should not be taken as an indication
that we have high confidence in these estimates. Although large amounts
of data are available and analyzed in the estimate process, there remain
major gaps in our knowledge that require analysts to make analytic
assumptions that, in some cases, differ substantially. The result is that, in a
limited number of cases, there are major differences in the estimate of
production for important weapon systems.
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Figure 2
Selected Soviet Weapons Production Levels,
1988 Compared to 1985
ICBMs
Cruise missiles
Tanks
Infantry fighting
vehicles
Armored
personnel carriers
ABMs
SLBMs
Spacecraft
Space launch
vehicles
Submarines
Surface warships
Radars
Artillery
Ammunition
Trucks
SRBMs
Fighters
Helicopters
Bombers
Transports
Crew-served
surface-to-air
missiles
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Although Soviet weapons production rates remained extremely high
throughout the 1975-88 period, in most cases production rates over the last
several years have been lower as compared with the mid-to-late 1970s.
These included:
� A general decline in the annual production of surface warships, subma-
rines, fighter aircraft, helicopters, short range ballistic missiles, surface-
to-air missiles, and artillery.
� A noticeable reduction in the annual rate of production of intercontinen-
tal ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles during the
early 1980s as production of older generation missiles entered their final
phases and production of the next generation began. Although production
rose noticeably over the past few years as the Soviets began deploying
their latest generation of ICBMs and SLBMs, annual rates remained
well below those of the 1970s.
Downward trends are the result of several factors, such as the Soviets'
introduction of more complex, sophisticated, and capable weapon systems
into production. More complex systems embody substantial improvements
in performance and can often replace older systems on a less than 1-for-1
basis. Thus, the Soviets have reduced their quantitative requirements for
fielding the newer systems
In contrast, the annual production rates of bombers, cruise missiles, and
heavy trucks generally increased. Although there is considerable uncer-
tainty in estimates of tank production, tank production clearly increased
during the period of this Memorandum. From 1975 through 1983 Soviet
tank production levels fluctuated between about 2,300 and 3,000 tanks
annually. Since 1984, production levels remained above 3,000�reaching
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3,550 in 1987�the highest level since the early 1970s. By comparison,
peak US tnknioduction occurred in 1979 when 1,200 tanks were
produced.
As a result of General Secretary Gorbachev's announcements of unilateral
reductions, we expect military materiel production to decline�in some
cases significantly�over the next few years. Although the Soviets have
announced a 20-percent cut in weapons procurement, the precise implica-
tions for the production of specific weapon systems are unclear. We
anticipate that the largest cuts will occur in the production of land
armaments, with lesser cuts if any in strategic offensive weapons depend-
ing, in part, on the results of negotiations of strategic arms reductions. In
contrast, there may even be increases in production of air defense systems.
Some of the announced cuts will become manifest soon, but the entire
program of reductions could stretch well into the 1990s.
Through 1988, however, the quantities of most military materiel produced
for general purpose forces since Gorbachev came to power in 1985
remained high; the output of strategic missile systems generally increased,
as several ongoing programs reached full-series production; at the same
time, the output of both tactical and strategic aircraft dropped. These
changes probably are rooted more in the schedule of programs initiated
earlier than in recent political decisions. During 1988 the Soviet leadership
clearly decided to shift some resources from the military to civilian
production; however, evidence of shifts will become apparent only over
time. We have recently discerned a reduction in tank production, but we
are not yet able to assess with certainty how much output has been or will
be reduced or to what extent similar reductions are occurring in other
programs.
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Color Codes for Tables 1 to 14
These tables present the total Soviet production of each weapon system or
item of military equipment cited, in the period under consideration. These
numbers are, in fact, the total amount estimated to have been delivered to
Soviet military forces unless some production went for export or was
delivered to the Soviet civilian economy. In those cases, a second portion of
the table reflects just that amount that was delivered to Soviet military
forces, but includes all production used in development and testing
programs associated with that system.
The color codes displayed in the tables reflect the degree of confidence the
analysts have in the accuracy of their estimates. In some cases there is
agreement on the estimated numbers but a difference between agencies on
the confidence levels. The levels of confidence used in the tables are
portrayed as plus or minus a percentage, as follows:
� We judge that the actual production figure does not deviate from the
estimated figure by more than plus or minus 10 percent.
� We judge that the actual production figure does not deviate from the
estimated figure by more than plus or minus 10 to 25 percent.
� We judge that the actual production figure does not deviate from the
estimated figure by more than plus or minus 25 to 40 percent.
� We have no confidence that the estimate is within plus or minus 40
percent of the actual production figure.
The intervals reflect the subjective judgment of the analysts involved and
their confidence in the estimates. These judgments are not a measure of
our ability to monitor production directly at the factory.
Footnotes follow table 14.
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Table 1
Soviet Strategic Missile Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figure in nonitalic bold type. In this
table, figures are presented for INR production estimates in plain italic.)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
ICBMs
SS-11 Mod 2/3
100
100
50
250*
215
180
395
120
120
240
SS-13
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
90 *
7
10
12
14
16
17
18
94
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
96
SS-16
20
20
30
70
23
29
35
87
20
10
10
40
SS-17
30
35
40
50
55
60
40
310 *
32
40
48
56
47
223
40
50
60
60
40
250
SS-18 b
55
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
45
10
4
8
9
30
581 *
42
54
66
78
89
77
10
10
10
10
4
8
11
19
488
50
60
60
60
60
60
30
30
JO
10
4
8
11
19
472
SS-I9
45
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
70
45
25
675 *
27
63
71
79
85
90
25
26
27
28
521
50
72
72
72
72
72
40
30
30
30
540
SS-25
5
10
25
60
60
70
90
320
1
6
18
65
47
64
80
281
2
12
36
70
50
60
70
300
3
7
10
10
20
30
45
125
SS-24
2
5
10
12
16
26
41
112
3
7
10
10
15
30
40
115
SLBMs
SS-N-6
45
50
60
65
75
80
85
90
550
45
52
61
67
74
79
86
464
50
50
60
70
70
80
80
460
SS-N-8
110
115
130
100
70
525*
110
114
131
109
464
120
120
120
110
470
SS-N-17
4
7
10
10
15
46
6
8
9
11
12
46
4
7
10
10
15
46
SS-N-18
5
25
20
50
80
110
140
100
70
600*
3
23
21
51
82
111
140
169
600
5
25
20
50
90
I/O
110
110
520
SS-N-20
1
10
15
20
20
25
30
40
40
40
241
1
6
7
20
15
20
25
30
35
15
174
1
8
13
20
14
30
30
26
20
20
182
SS-N-23
10
20
30
40
50
50
200
7
22
35
5
25
35
129
/0
20
35
40
40
40
185
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Table 1 (continued)
Soviet Strategic Missile Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figure in nonitalic bold type. In this
table, figures are presented for INR production estimates in plain italic.)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
IRBMs
SS-20
25
50
90
110
110
110
120
120
120
125
110
20
70
45
1,225*
24
44
66
87
75
104
127
125
41
49
7
15
17
10
791
25
50
80
70
80
80
80
80
80
83
8
12
43
28
799
* DIA'S cumulative estimate shown above represents production
required to support observed Soviet strategic ballistic missile
development and deployment programs and DIA's assessment of
refire requirements. DIA is confident that its cumulative estimate
for the period does not exceed the actual number produced by more
than 15 percent. However, the actual number produced could
exceed the cumulative estimate shown here by 25 percent or more.
Footnotes follow table 14.
Table 2
Soviet SRBM Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type. In this
table, figures are presented for INR production estimates in plain italic.)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Total production
SS-12 d
70 70 100 125 125 125 100
SS-21 5 5 10 10 30 60 100
SS-23 d c
5 10 10 10 10 15 25
5 10 10 10 10 15 25
5 10 10 10 10 10 10
Scud-B
1,000 1,000 1,000 750 750 500 300
1,000 1,000 1,000 750 750 500 300
FROG-7
525 525 525 525 175 175 175
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
Scud-B
800 800 800 600 600 350 150
SS-21 5 5 10 10 30 60 100
FROG-7
450 375 275 150 150 15 15
Footnotes follow table 14.
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
100
100
25
25
25
25
1,015
150
200
300
300
300
250
250
1,970
50
50
75
80
80
80
500
50
50
50
80
80
80
475
10
15
25
50
80
100
345
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
6,700
200
125
125
125
125
125
125
6,250
175
175
175
175
175
175
175
3,850
100
50
10
10
10
10
10
4,300
150
150
250
250
250
1,270
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
1,535
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Figure 3
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Note scale change
ICBMs
400
SLBMs
400
0 1975
IRBMs
80
85 88 0 1975
200
SRBMs
80
85 88
2,000
0 1975
80
85 88 01975
80 85 88
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Table 3
Soviet Spacecraft Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Low Res
11
10
10
10
7
48
ASAT
4
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
I
1
22
4
4
1
1
2
1
13
ASAT target
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
11
1
3
3
1
2
1
11
Hi Res I
19
18
17
17
10
4
85
Hi Res 2
1
2
2
2
5
7
8
8
10
10
10
9
8
7
89
1
2
2
1
4
5
10
8
10
8
8
8
8
7
82
Med Res
/
3
2
10
17
20
18
18
18
16
16
16
17
172
1
3
1
9
17
20
20
18
17
16
16
15
16
169
I MSAT
1
I
I
I
3
2
3
12
1
1
1
3
2
3
11
Molniya 1
3
4
3
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
3
4
3
46
Molniya 2 r
4
3
1
8
Molniya 3 f
3
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
3
37
3
2
2
2
2
2
4
2
3
5
3
1
2
33
Raduga
1
I
1
1
2
3
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
25
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
25
Gorizont
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
4
20
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
16
SPCS
2
3
2
3
3
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
37
2
3
2
3
1
2
5
3
2
2
3
3
3
34
MPCS
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
32
LDS 1
2
2
LDS 2
1
3
2
2
5
5
5
3
8
8
8
4
5
59
1
3
2
2
6
5
5
3
7
8
7
4
6
59
LDS-2-Geo
1
1
1
1
4
Cosmos 1870
2
2
Erpho r
1
2
'?
2
6
7
5
6
8
8
6
4
4
2
63
Foton (MATPROC)
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
5
Meteor 2 r
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
17
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
16
Meteor-P
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
1
8
1
1
1
3
Mod-Erpho
2
2
RELSAT
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
3
ELINT 2
4
4
3
3
1
1
16
3
5
3
2
1
1
1
16
ELINT 3
2
3
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
5
4
64
2
2
3
5
5
5
5
6
5
3
6
6
5
5
63
ELINT 4
1
3
1
3
8
1
1
2
1
3
8
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Table 3 (continued)
Soviet Spacecraft Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)
F
/
;
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
EORSAT 1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
32
29
RORSAT 3
3
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
3
3
4
4
1
2
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
29
25
NA VSAT I 2
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
8
8
NAVSAT 2 3
3
4
5
5
4
4
6
5
7
5
5
4
4
64
GEOSAT 2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
10
8
NAVSAT 3 I
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
20
G LON ASS s
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
3
3
14
13
RADSAT 1 4
2
6
RADSAT 2 2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
20
20
RA DSAT 3 1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
3
4
4
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
25
23
CA LSAT
I
I
I
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1 I
GEOSAT 1 2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
6
6
Salyut M
1
1
Salyut R r
2
Cosmos 929�type h
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
9
Kvant
(MIR Module)
2
3
Mir
Soyuz Ferry 6
5
3
4
3
3
5
3
3
3
4
/
2
25
20
Soyuz T 1
1
1
1
1
/
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
1
21
20
Soyuz TM r
1
1
2
2
3
2
3
2
9
7
Progress
2
3
3
3
2
3
3
4
3
3
7
6
42
Space plane
2
2
1
1
1
I
10
Space shuttle i
1
2
Ocean R
1
1
1
1
4
Photo Geo 2
1
1
/
1
1
1
1
1
I
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
10
11
Probable RORSAT
2
2
RORSAT 2
2
I
3
SDRS
1
1
1
3
Sixpack
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
6
7
Footnotes follow table 14.
Secret 12
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 4
Soviet Space Launch Vehicle Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Cumulative
1975-88
Total production
SL-3 5 5 10 10 10 5 5 5 5
2 62
5 5 7 5 8 7 6 5 4 1 2 55
SL-4
40 40 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 40 40 40 605
40 39 39 45 47 45 42 45 43 44 40 37 44 45 595
SL-6
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 15 15 5 10 145
10 11 10 9 7 12 14 11 11 11 16 14 5 10 151
SL-7 5 5
10
5 5 2 12
SL-8 k
18 28 29 21 18 15 18 24 23 19 11 14 14 8 260
20 30 30 25 20 20 20 25 20 20 15 20 15 15 295
SL-11
5 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 8 6 7 73
5 8 7 1 2 4 8 8 2 4 5 5 6 6 71
SL-12/13 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 15 15 10 10 15 15 125
5 5 5 8 6 5 7 10 12 13 10 9 13 13 121
SL-14 / 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 8 15 10 10 10 75
1 3 3 1 1 5 4 5 7 12 12 11 12 77
SL-16
1 2 1 3 4 4 5 2 22
2 1 3 3 1 3 3 16
SL-17
2
4
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
SL-3
1 2 6 8 7 3 2 4 4
2 39
SL-6
9 9 9 9 10 9 10 10 9 10 19
4 11 137
SL-12/13 2 3 4 3 3 3 2 6 5 6 9 8 10 11 75
SL-14 3 1 1 3 3 3 2 9 8 11 10 54
Footnotes follow table 14.
13
Secret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Figure 4
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Spacecraft
Space Launch Vehicles
150 150
100
DIA
50
50
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
0 0
1975 80 85 88 1975 80 85 88
323272 9-89
Secret 14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 5
Soviet Cruise Missile Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figure in nonitalic bold type.)
1975 1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Total production
Air-to-surface missiles
AS-4 220 220
220
220
220
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
100
2,400
AS-5 175 175
175
175
150
850
AS-6 155 160
165
170
180
200
150
100
75
75
50
1,480
AS-I5
5
10
45
75
160
185
205
215
900
AS-I6
5
5
5
50
250
315
AS-X-19
3
7
10
20
Naval cruise missiles
SS-N-2 470 500
520
545
565
580
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
600
7,980
SS-N-3B Mod 2 25 75
100
100
100
100
100
75
25
25
25
25
25
25
825
SS-N-7 40 40
40
120
SS-N-9 60 65
70
75
80
85
90
95
50
40
30
20
760
SS-N-12 15 40
65
75
80
80
85
90
45
45
45
45
45
45
800
SS-N-14 75 80
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
85
50
1,140
SS-N-19
5
5
20
30
50
50
50
80
100
120
120
150
780
SS-N-21
1
1
3
5
10
10
83
140
180
180
180
793
SS-N-22
5
5
10
20
50
100
100
120
120
150
680
SS-NX-24
8
5
5
7
5
10
40
ASW missiles
SS-N-15 15 15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
210
SS-N-16 2 2
2
2
2
5
5
20
45
45
45
45
45
45
310
Ground-launched cruise missiles
SSC-X-4 I
1
1
3
1
5
5
5
10
10
40
100
60
120
69
100
10
345
195
KY- l 6 a,
1
2
3
1
5
2
5
5
24
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
SS-N-2 427 496
405
467
177
439
429
436
491
547
524
550
594
551
6,533
SS-N-3B Mod 2 25 75
100
88
100
88
100
75
25
13
25
25
25
25
789
Footnotes follow table 14.
15 Secret
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
IDeclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 6
Soviet SAM Production
25X1
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
197 5-8 8
Total production
SA-4 2,700 1,400 1,300 900 900 900
900
600
9,600
SA- 1 2a Gladiator 5 5 10 15
15
15
20
50
150 200
300
350
1,135
SA-X-12b Giant 1 1
1
2
5
10
15 20
20
20
95
SA-6 2,400 3,600 4,800 3,600 2,100 800
700
600
600
500
400 300
20,400
SA-I1 20 20 20 20 50 100
150
200
500
600
850 1,000
1,200
1,400
6,130
SA-8 500 1,000 2,500 3,000 3,000 3,400
3,000
3,000
2,800
2,800
2,800 2,250
2,000
1,500
33,550
SA-9 6,000 6,000 6,000 3,600 3,600 2,000
2.000
1,200
1,200
500
300 300
32,700
SA- I 3 150 325 600 950 1,400 2,000
2,700
3,600
4,500
5,700
7,000 6,000
5,000
3,500
43,425
SA-2 3,000 2,500 2,100 1,700 1,500 1,300
1,100
1,100
700
700
700 700
500
500
18,100
SA-3 1,730 1,830 1,930 2,020 2,110 2,210
2,000
1,500
1,300
1,000
1,000 1,000
800
500
20,930
SA- I 6 100 250 500
2,500
4,000
5,600
7,600
9,900 12,200
14,600
16,200
73,450
SA- I 9 25 25
50
50
100
250
450 750
1,300
2,000
5,000
SA-5 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 600 600
600
600
600
600
600 600
300
250
10,150
SA-10 20 30 40 100 120 240
600
900
1,800
2,000
2,000 2,000
3,000
3,500
17,350
SA-7 21,900 24,300 26,600 29,000 25,000 18,000
16,000
5,000
2,000
167,800
SA-14 1,000 4,000 5,600 7,500 9,50011,000
8,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
500 500
500
500
57,600
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
SA-4 2,400 1,200 1,200 600 600 600
600
7,200
SA-6 1,200 1.200 1,200 1,200 400 200
100
5.500
SA-8 500 1,000 2,500 3,000 3,000 3.000
3,000
2,500
2,000
1.500
1,500 1.500
1.500
1,500
28.000
SA-9 4,000 4,000 4,000 1,000 1,000
14,000
SA- I 3 150 300 500 1,000 2,000 2,400
2,600
3,300
3,500
3,000
3,000 1,000
500
23,250
SA-2 2,500 2,275 1,835 1,500 1,160 745
855
855
440
400
485 435
375
375
14,235
SA-3 1,330 380 960 1,160 170 1,460
1,470
700
850
425
340 250
500
500
10,495
SA-5 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 600 600
600
600
600
550
455 385
155
250
9,595
SA-7 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 8,000
6,000
89,000
SA-14 1,000 4,000 5,600 7,500 9,50011,000
8,000
5,000
3,000
1,000
200
55,800
SA-16 100 250 500
2,500
4,000
5,600
7,600
9,90011,000
13,000
16,200
70,650
Footnotes follow table 14.
Table 7
Soviet ABM Production
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985 1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
197 5-8 8
SH-4 2 1
3
Gazelle 2 2 4 4 5 5
5
1
5
7
10 15
25
30
120
SH-Il 1 1 2 2
2
2
2
2
2 2
4
15
37
Footnotes follow table 14.
Secret 16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
.zieuict
Figure 5
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Note scale change
Cruise Missiles Crew-Served Surface-to-Air Missiles
2,000 24,000
DIA
1,500
CIA 18,000
1,000
500
12,000
6,000
111111111'1111 11111111111
0 1975
Antiballistic Missiles
80
85 88 0 1975
60
0 1975
80
85
88
80
85 88
�Seeret-
17
Secret
25X1
323273 9.8S
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
oecret
Table 8
Soviet Aircraft Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Total production
Bombers
Tu-22M Backfire
20
21
25
24
29
27
31
29
31
30
32
30
32
30
32
30
31
30
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
26
28
401
391
Tu-95 Bear H
1
1
4
10
17
17
13
11
11
85
Tu-I60 Blackjack
)
1
2
2
2
5
4
16
Fighter-bomber
Su-24 Fencer
55
75
80
85
95
100
100
105
100
95
90
90
90
90
1,250
ASW reconnaissance
Tu-142 Bear F
5
6
6
7
8
8
7
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
63
Maritime airborne communications
Bear J
1
2
2
3
3
2
13
Fighters
MiG-3I Foxhound
1
2
2
3
5
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
327
MiG-29 Fulcrum
1
2
2
3
4
2
40
85
130
170
205
205
849
Su-27 Flanker
1
2
2
3
3
1
12
45
70
90
110
125
464
Yak-36 Forger
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
15
10
5
5
5
5
165
MiG-21 Fishbed
325
220
220
220
220
220
220
150
140
100
50
40
20
15
2,160
MiG 23/27 Flogger
495
585
605
630
655
655
600
450
285
190
110
25
5,285
M1G-25 Foxbat
85
100
85
75
75
65
50
25
25
25
15
10
5
640
Su-25 Frogfoot
1
I
2
1
5
25
50
75
90
105
115
130
140
740
Su 17/20/22 Fitter
150
175
230
230
230
225
215
200
200
145
125
100
80
50
2,355
Yak-41 (RAM-T)
1
1
2
Su-15 Flagon
75
75
50
200
MiG-21U Mongol
55
45
45
40
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
20
15
10
465
Transports, others
11-76 Candid
17
24
30
35
40
46
49
51
53
53
55
53
60
55
621
Midas Tanker
I
2
5
5
6
7
26
Mainstay AWACS
2
1
1
3
3
3
5
5
23
An-26 Curl
90
100
110
125
135
145
155
150
80
65
50
30
10
10
1,255
Tu-134 Crusty
48
50
52
52
53
48
42
36
36
24
24
15
480
An-124 Condor
1
1
2
3
6
7
20
An-74/72 Coaler
1
1
1
1
I
1
6
15
20
47
Madcap AWACS
1
1
2
11-62 Classic
15
16
16
16
16
16
14
12
9
4
7
7
8
6
162
An-22 Cock
6
6
Mystic
Reconnaissance
1
1
1
3
Tag-D
1
Secret
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 8 (continued)
Soviet Aircraft Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Cumulative
1975-88
Helicopters
Mi-24 Hind 120 140 155 170 185 200 210 225 200 175 160 155 140 105 2,340
Mi-26 Halo 1 1 4 9 13 18 21 25 30 35 157
Ka-27 Helix 1 1 1 4 14 19 24 30 33 38 41 45 45 296
Mi-8 Hip 1,250 1,285 675 475 475 475 500 500 500 420 400 375 340 330 8,000
Mi-14 Haze 20 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 6 3 3 272
Mi-28 Havoc 1 1 1 3
Hokum
1 1 1 3
Ka-25 Hormone
19 19
M1-6 Hook 38 5 5 15 12 12
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
87
MiG-21 Fishbed 100 40 20 10 170
MiG-23/27 Flogger 429 489 511 497 525 543 442 339 100 91 33 3,999
M1G-25 Foxbat 85 100 85 48 34 43 13 15 10 15 10 5 463
Su-24 Fencer 55 75 80 85 95 100 100 105 100 95 90 90 90 80 1,240
Su-25 Frogfoot 1 1 2 1 5 30 50 75 78 87 63 97 114 604
Su-17 Fitter 132 136 170 180 190 180 185 140 140 65 35 40 20 10 1,623
M1G-29 Fulcrum 1 2 2 3 4 2 41 82 125 120 145 135 662
M1G-21U Mongol 15 15 12 10 7 5 2 2 1 69
11-76 Candid 17 22 25 25 27 35 28 37 38 42 44 44 46 43 473
An-26 Curl 55 55 55 45 30 45 50 30 25 20 15 10 10 445
Tu-134 Crusty 10 15 15 15 15 15 36 24 12 3 160
11-62 Classic 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 25
Mi-8 Hip 565 580 290 140 155 185 180 185 175 135 115 210 200 160 3,275
330 310 230 160 170 200 220 190 170 170 180 180 190 160 2,860
20 24 24 24 17 11 2 5 6 17 14 3 3 170
150 130 120 120 130 130 120 120 120 115 110 100 75 40 1,580
120 140 155 132 66 110 150 130 155 130 100 110 70 59 1,627
1 1 1 4 14 19 24 30 33 38 37 26 29 257
I 1 4 9 13 18 19 21 20 25 131
38 5 5 10 5 63
Mi-14 Haze
Mi-2 Hoplite�
Mi-24 Hind
Ka-27 Helix
Mi-26 Halo
Mi-6 Hook
Footnotes follow table 14.
19
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
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Figure 6
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Note scale change
Bombers
60
Fighters
1,600
15
I l
0 1975
Helicopters
400
11111111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
80
85 88 0 1975
1,600
Transports
80
85 88
300
400
75
11111111111i l i II i i Ili
0 0
1975 80 85 88 1975 80 85 88
�Sestet�
Secret
20
323274 9-89
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 9
Soviet Naval Ship Production
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Total production
SSBNs
Delta-1
2
2
3
7
Delta-11
4
4
Delta-Ill
4
2
2
2
2
1
1
14
Delta-IV
1
1
I
1
1
5
Typhoon
1
I
I
1
I
5
SSGNs
Charlie-Il
1
1
1
1
1
5
Oscar
1
1
1
1
I
5
SSNs
Victor-Il
I
1
1
2
5
Victor-Ill
2
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
I
1
23
Alfa
1
2
I
2
6
Mike
Sierra
1
1
2
Akula
1
1
1
1
4
Uniform SSAN
2
SSs
XRay SSA
Foxtrot
1
2
1
1
1
1
I
9
Tango
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
15
Kilo
1
1
1
2
3
4
4
4
4
24
India SSA
1
1
2
Lima SSA
Beluga SSA
Conversions
Yankee-Il SSBN
Yankee SSGN
Yankee SSN Pod
Tail
Yankee Notch SSN
1
1
2
Echo-Il SSGN
1
1
1
2
1
I
I
1
9
Echo-Il SSAN
Hotel SSQN
Hotel SSN
2
2
1
5
Golf-Ill SSB
Golf SSQ
2
1
3
Golf-V SSA
Aircraft carrier
Kiev CVHG
I
1
1
1
4
21
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Cruisers.
Kirov CGN
1
1
1
3
Slava CG
1
1
2
Kara CG
1
I
1
I
4
Kresta-Il CG
1
1
3
Destroyers
Udaloy DDG
1
1
2
1
2
1
I
1
10
Sovremennyy DDG
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
10
Rajput DDG (Mod-
Kashin)
1
1
1
1
1
5
Frigate/Corvette
Krivak 1 FFG
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
12
Krivak-II FFG
I
2
2
2
2
1
1
11
Krivak-I II WFF r
1
1
1
1
1
5
Koni FF
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
14
Pctya III FFL
1
1
1
3
Grisha 1 FFL
1
1
Grisha 11 WFFL r
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
9
Grisha III FFL
2
3
3
5
3
3
1
1
I
1
23
Grisha III WFFL r
1
2
1
2
6
Grisha IV FFL
Grisha V FFL
1
1
2
1
2
3
4
14
Conversions
Mod-Kashin DDG
1
1
2
Mod-Kildin DD
1
Kanin DDG
2
Mod-Petya 1 FFL
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
Mod-Petya II FFL
Provornyy DDG
1
1
Patrol combatants
Pauk 1 PG
1
2
1
2
2
1
9
Pauk II PG
1
1
Nanuchka 1 PGG
2
1
1
1
5
Nanuchka 11 PGG
2
I
I
1
2
1
1
I
10
Nanuchka III PGG
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
14
Tarantul I PGG
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
14
Tarantul 11 PGG
1
2
4
5
5
2
19
Tarantul III PGG
4
3
4
12
Dergach PGGA
1
Utka PGGA
1
Secret 22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
OCUFet
Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Svetlyak PG
Pauk I WPG P
1
3
3
2
4
2
3
4
4
26
Sorum WPGF P
I
I
I
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
16
Ivan Susanin WPG P
1
1
1
1
5
Sarancha PGGH
1
1
Alpinist PGFT
Coastal patrol craft
Osa-II PIG
6
10
11
11
9
9
7
11
4
2
80
Stenka WPCS P
9
7
6
1
3
3
3
3
5
5
5
5
5
60
Babochka PCSH
1
1
Matka PTGH
2
4
3
3
2
1
1
16
Mol PT/YTX
3
3
2
8
Turya PTH
4
4
1
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
29
Muravey WPCSH P
1
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
15
Yaz PM/WPM P
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
3
2
22
Vosh WPM P
1
3
1
1
2
8
Piyavka WPM P
4
2
3
1
10
Zhuk WPB/PB P
10
10
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
12
164
Bogomol PG
1
2
3
Mukha PCSH
Mine warfare ships and craft
Natya MSF
4
4
4
4
4
4
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
38
Barentsevo More
MSFT
Sonya MSC
6
6
5
5
6
6
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
5
75
Yevgcnya MSI
4
4
6
5
5
5
5
7
5
5
5
5
5
66
Andryusha MSS
Olya MSS
4
4
Pclikan MS1A
1
1
2
Gorya MHS
Lida MSI
3
5
8
Auxiliary ship and craft
Berezina AOR
1
1
Boris Chilikin AOR
1
1
1
3
Manych AW
1
1
Lama AEM
1
1
Amga AEM
2
Brykin AEM
1
1
Kapusta AGN
1
1
Katun-I ARS
3
23
Secret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
197 5-8 8
Katun- I I ARS
2
2
Ingul ARS
1
1
1
3
Rudnitsky ARS
1
1
1
1
4
Pinega ARR
1
1
2
Malina ARR
1
1
2
Eibrus ASR
1
1
2
Sorum ATA
1
I
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
I
12
Sorum AGE
1
1
Ivan Susanin AGB
1
Pelym ADG
1
2
1
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
18
Oncga AG
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
9
Marshal Nedelin
AGE
Kamchatka AG
1
Balzam AGI
1
1
1
1
4
Alpinist AGE
Alpinist AGI
1
2
1
4
Neon Antonov
WAK r
I
1
1
1
1
I
1
1
1
9
Neon Antonov AK
1
1
Amphibious ships
Alligator LST
1
1
Ivan ROGOV LPD
1
1
2
Amphibious craft
Aist LCUA
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
17
Gus LCPA
6
3
1
10
Lebed LCMA
1
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
2
1
18
Orlan LCUA
1
1
1
3
Utenok LCMA
1
1
2
Tsaplya LCMA
1
1
1
1
1
5
Pomornik LCUA
1
1
1
3
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
Foxtrot SS
0
Kilo SS
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
I
2
13
Rajput (Mod-Kashin)
DDG
0
Koni FF
1
1
Parchim Ils
1
2
5
8
Petya- I I I FFL
0
Pauk II PG
0
Secret
24
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 9 (continued)
Soviet Naval Ship Production
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Nanuchka-11 PGG
0
Tarantul 1 PGG
1
1
2
Osa-Il PTG
Stenka WPCS r 9
7
6
1
3
3
3
3
2
2
4
5
48
Mol PT
Turya PTH 4
4
1
9
Zhuk WPB r 2
2
4
4
4
4
8
8
4
2
3
3
3
4
55
Natya MSF 4
4
3
1
3
1
16
Sonya MSC 6
6
5
5
5
5
5
4
4
3
2
4
3
2
59
Yevgenya MSI 1
4
4
3
3
3
18
Pelym A DG 1
2
1
3
2
2
2
I
1
1
1
I 7
Dubna AOR q 1
2
3
Kaliningradneft
AO q
2
2
Amur AR ,
2
3
3
2
1
2
2
15
Goryn ATA q
2
2
5
4
13
Tomba AG , 2
2
4
Neftegaz AG ,
2
Vishnya AGI r
1
3
1
6
Sura AG L s 2
I
3
Akademik Krilov 1
AGOR
I
1
1
4
YugAGORr
7
2
2
5
2
18
Finik-1 AGS
4
4
7
1
1
5
I
23
Biya AGS 3
3
6
Yunyy Partizan 1
AK'
1
2
4
Bereza ADG r
3
2
3
2
10
OB Al-1 r
2
2
Emba ARC q
1
2
3
Emba 11 ARC q
2
Bogomol PB
0
Kashtan AGL
2
2
Klasma ARC q
1
1
2
Sliva ARS q
2
2
4
Smolnyy AXT r
3
Wodnik AXT r
2
2
Ropucha LST r 3
4
3
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
24
Vinograd AGS q
1
1
2
Footnotes follow table 14.
25
Secret
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Figure 7
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Submarines
20
15
Surface Warships
20
15
5
11111111111111
0 1975
80
5
0
85 88 1975
80
85 88
--Segfet�
Secret 26
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\ Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
oecret
Table 10
Soviet Armored Vehicles Production
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type.)
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
197 5-8 8
Total production
Tanks
T-55 800
750
700
500
300
3,050
T-64A 800
800
800
750
450
3,600
T-64B
50
100
300
500
600
600
600
600
500
400
300
50
4,600
T-72 Series . 600
600
700
700
1,000
1,000
1,400
1,400
1,550
1,800
1,750
2,000
1,500
1,500
1,800
1,800
1,400
1,400
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,500
1,600
1,600
1,300
1,300
800
800
18,400
18,900
1-80 80
80
80
100
100
175
475
600
600
750
850
850
950
1,050
6,740
NT-N-87/1 v
50
100
300
550
1,000
1,600
3,600
Infantry fighting vehicles
BMP 1 2,100
2,100
2,200
2.350
2,400
2,300
2000,
1,900
1,300
800
19.450
BMP 2
50
50
200
600
1,000
1,600
2,000
2,000
2,200
2,200
2,200
14,100
BMD 200
200
200
300
350
350
350
200
150
100
50
50
50
50
2,600
BMP 3
20
50
300
370
Armored personnel carriers, others
BTR-60 1,200
1,200
1,000
1,000
750
750
700
600
600
600
600
200
100
100
9,400
BTR-70 100
200
800
1,000
1,500
2,000
1,000
500
500
500
500
400
100
9,100
BTR-80
50
200
600
1,300
2,000
4,150
BRDM-2 800
800
800
800
800
750
700
700
700
500
500
500
250
250
8,850
MTLB 450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
450
6,300
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production) w
T-55 200
150
100
100
550
T-72 Series x 600
600
700
700
1,000
1,000
1,350
1,350
1,050
1,300
1,300
1,550
650
650
1,150
1,150
850
850
1,150
1,150
1,150
1,150
1,250
1,250
900
900
600
600
13,700
14,200
BMP 1 Y 2,550
2,650
2,500
2,450
2,050
2,100
1,900
750
750
450
18,150
BMP 2
100
300
500
1,000
1,400
1,600
1,600
1,600
1,600
9,700
BMD 200
200
200
300
350
300
300
150
100
100
50
50
50
50
2,400
BTR-60 1,000
700
500
500
250
250
250
200
200
200
200
100
100
100
4,550
BTR-70 z 50
200
800
1,000
1,500
2,000
1,150
800
950
1,200
1,200
900
450
200
12,400
BRDM-2 450
450
450
450
450
450
400
400
400
300
300
300
100
100
5,000
MTLB 450
450
450
500
750
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,050
1,150
1,250
700
600
500
11,000
Footnotes follow table 14.
27
Secret
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/07/02 : CIA-RDP94T00766R000500030001-3
Table 11
Soviet Production of Artillery Pieces
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Total production
T-12/T-12M
100-nun antitank
gun
400
350
300
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
250
200
200
3.700
D-30 122-mm
gun/howitzer
700
700
600
700
600
600
500
500
600
500
400
300
300
400
7,400
M-46 130-mm
gun
300
300
300
300
300
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
2,200
D-20 152-mm
howitzer
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
250
150
150
150
50
2,850
M-1976 152-mm
gun
10
40
60
60
8Q
120
160
200
250
250
250
250
270
270
2.270
2S1 122-mm
SP howitzer
100
150
250
350
400
450
450
400
350
400
400
400
350
350
4,800
2S3/2S3M 152-mm
SP howitzer
100
140
220
240
260
280
280
260
240
240
240
240
240
240
3,220
2S4 240-mm
SP mortar
25
25
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
34
34
40
40
30
438
2S5 152-mm
SP gun
10
10
20
20
20
40
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
680
2S7 203-mm
SP gun
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
38
30
30
30
30
383
M-I987 I52-mm
howitzer
5
10
10
50
100
150
200
525
MAZ-7310
270-mm MRL
5
5
5
10
20
60
105
2S9 120-mm
gun/mortar
10
40
60
100
100
100
100
100
100
710
BM-1 122-mm MRL
20
40
60
120
100
60
40
40
20
20
520
BM-21 122-mm
MRL
650
500
500
450
500
450
400
500
400
400
300
300
300
300
5,950
BM-21V
122-mm MRL
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
140
BM-22 220-mm
MRL
10
30
40
100
100
100
100
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
1.320
ZSU-23-4
SP antiaircraft gun �
350
300
250
250
300
250
200
250
250
200
150
100
2,850
2S6 SP AA gun
SP antiaircraft gun
2
2
3
4
4
10
20
50
50
100
245
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
T-12/T-I2M
350
300
250
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
150
150
3,000
13-30
500
500
400
400
400
400
300_
300
300
200
200
200
200
200
4,500
Secret
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oecret
ii
Table 11 (continued)
Soviet Production of Artillery Pieces
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
N4-46
20
20
20
20
20
100
D-20
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
100
100
100
1,900
2S1
90
130
200
250
250
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
300
3,620
2S3/2S3M
100
140
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
2,640
2S4
25
25
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
40
40
30
430
2S7
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
25
30
30
30
30
30
375
BM-21
580
350
300
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
100
100
100
3,130
7.SU-23-4
250
250
100
100
100
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
1,150
N4-I976
I52-mm gun
10
40
60
60
80
120
160
200
250
250
250
250
250
250
2,230
Footnotes follow table 14.
29
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Figure 8
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Tanks
4,000
CIA
Infantry Fighting Vehicles
4,000
2,000
1,000
2,000
1,000
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1975 80 85 88 1975 80 85 88
Armored Personnel Carriers
4,000
Artillery
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000 1,000
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I_
1975 80 85 88 1975 80 85 88
Secret
30
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N
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oecrei
Table 12
Soviet Radar Production bb
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Total production
EW/GCl/TA
Back Trap A/B
80
80
80
80
80
80
80
40
20
20
20
20
20
20
720
Big Back
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
35
Dog Ear
25
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
475
Flat Face Al
Squat Eye '
100
50
150
Flat Face B/
Squat Eye
50
100
100
150
150
100
50
50
30
30
30
30
30
900
Full Time
3
Long Track
90
60
60
60
60
35
25
35
10
5
5
5
450
Shock Sing
3
1
1
5
Soap Box
1
2
1
4
Spoon Rest D
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
90
1,260
Tall King B
70
70
70
40
40
40
40
20
390
Tall King C
10
10
15
20
20
25
40
40
180
Tall Rack
1
4
4
4
6
20
Bar Lock A/B/C/D
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
650
Box Spring A/B
1I
3
King Set
2
1
1
5
Show Time
1
1
2
Tin Shield
3
3
5
15
20
25
50
70
85
276
Tin Trap
2
2
10
15
29
HF
Odd Group
5
10
20
20
20
30
30
30
50
50
50
315
Odd Pair A/B
150
150
150
150
100
100
80
80
80
80
80
80
50
1,330
Side Net
120
100
220
Thin Skin A/B
100
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
70
70
40
40
50
720
Battlefield
PRP M-I986
20
20
20
20
80
Big Fred
20
20
30
30
30
30
30
33
33
33
33
36
30
30
418
Small Fred
20
30
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
20
390
Tall Mike
150
150
150
150
150
100
100
50
50
50
50
50
50
1,250
Rice Bag
10
30
50
50
140
IFF
Dog Tail
50
100
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
1,500
End Curve
50
100
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
150
1,500
Missile related
Big Bird
2
3
3
5
5
5
10
10
10
10
65
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C
Table 12 (continued)
Soviet Radar Production bb
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Bill Board
1
3
5
2
2
13
Clam Shell
I
1
2
4
10
12
15
15
15
20
25
30
40
60
250
Fan Song
40
40
Flap Lid
1
1
2
4
10
12
15
15
15
20
25
30
40
60
250
Grill Pan
1
1
5
10
10
10
5
42
Low Blow
40
20
30
40
50
50
30
25
20
20
20
20
365
Chair Back
1
1
2
High Screen
1
1
1
3
Snow Drift
1
4
5
5
15
Pat Hand
60
50
40
40
30
10
10
240
Square Pair
20
20
5
45
Straight Flush
50
50
40
40
40
50
50
40
30
10
10
10
420
Tube Arm
1
1
2
2
8
7
21
Wild Card
40
40
40
40
20
20
15
10
225
AAA Fire Control
Flap Wheel
150
100
50
50
20
20
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
500
ABM related
Cat House
1
1
Hen House
1
LPAR cc
1
1
1
2
1
1
7
Pill Box
Steel Work
2
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
Back Trap A/B
80
80
56
66
76
70
71
32
19
17
14
13
10
15
619
Dog Ear
15
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
40
50
385
Flat Face A/
Squat Eye
39
39
Flat Face B/
Squat Eye
39
8
20
16
23
20
8
23
20
25
30
232
Long Track
90
22
45
54
43
30
2
24
310
Spoon Rest D
30
63
13
31
4
3
29
50
54
72
65
70
50
534
Tall King B
62
59
60
15
15
26
30
10
277
Tall King C
10
10
2
9
19
19
25
30
124
Bar Lock A/B/C/D
25
25
25
20
15
15
15
20
35
30
35
25
30
315
Tall Rack
1
1
3
3
4
6
18
End Curve
50
100
150
150
149
150
150
150
150
150
125
1,474
Tin Shield
3
3
5
15
15
25
42
65
80
253
Odd Group
5
10
19
18
18
30
30
30
40
45
45
290
Odd Pair A/B
150
146
143
115
69
63
31
23
40
44
64
46
45
979
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vaGtol CL
)
Table 12 (continued)
Soviet Radar Production bb
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
Cumulative
1975-88
Side Net
95
49
144
Thin Skin A/B
15
27
25
5
18
27
40
14
13
35
219
Big Fred
20
20
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
400
Dog Tail
50
100
150
150
149
147
149
150
150
150
125
1,470
Fan Song
0
0
Low Blow
31
2
1
3
5
5
5
52
Pat Hand
60
41
31
29
1
3
165
Square Pair
20
19
4
43
Straight Flush
19
20
5
1
8
9
1
63
Wild Card
39
40
39
40
20
20
15
10
223
Flap Wheel
148
131
72
26
13
14
8
19
11
13
14
8
5
482
Small Fred
30
36
40
40
39
40
40
40
40
20
365
Footnotes follow table 14.
33
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Table 13 Thousand metric tons
Soviet Ammunition Procurement
(Where CIA and DIA have different estimates, the DIA figures are presented
first in bold italics followed by the CIA figures in nonitalic bold type)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Cumulative
1975-88
Total Ammunition
218 185 199 228 237 224 210 237 231 236 245 233 227 232 3,142
191 179 153 156 196 153 168 180 186 178 177 173 158 177 2,425
Footnotes follow table 14.
Table 14
Soviet Truck Production dd
Thousands
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 Cumulative
197 5-8 8
Total production cc
Light trucks
132 136 134 134 131 139 138 139 136 139 141 141 142 143 1,925
Medium trucks
460 463 465 471 471 459 455 436 425 425 425 422 415 419 6,211
Heavy trucks
104 117 135 157 178 189 194 205 214 230 241 254 275 287 2,780
Delivered to Soviet forces (if different from total production)
Light trucks
21 20 18 18 16 16 14 12 10 11 9 10 10 10 195
Medium trucks
138 139 139 140 141 136 138 137 134 136 138 138 138 138 1,930
Heavy trucks
35 42 42 42 44 43 45 57 56 63 72 72 77 80 770
Footnotes follow table 14.
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Figure 9
Soviet Military Production, 1975-88
Note scale change
Ammunition
Thousand metric tons
300
Stand-Alone Radars
2,000
150
75
1,000
500
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
01975 80 85 88 1975 80 85 88
Trucks
Thousands
200
Medium
150
100
Light
I
0
1975
80
85 88
Note: Figure depicts our estimate of trucks delivered to Soviet
forces. Of total 1975-88 production of 10.9 million trucks,
about 2.9 million were delivered to the Soviet military.
Sccrct
35 Secret
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Footnotes for Tables 1 to 14
e Because all strategic missile production is for the Soviet military,
there are no separate "production" and "delivered" entries.
h Estimates for 1985-88 reflect SS-18 Mod 5/6 production.
e Estimates for the SS-20 include the SS-20 Mod 2 in 1984-88.
d The acquisition of a significant sample of SS-12 and SS-23
factory markings from INF inspections suggests that production
estimates for these SRBMs�particularly the SS-12�will be the
subject of major revisions in the future.
e The INR numbers do not include inert training missiles.
f While none of these spacecraft were produced solely for civilian
space missions, the time spent in orbit by some of these spacecraft
was split between civilian and military tasks.
g Each MP SatCom payload includes eight satellites. Each
GLONASS payload includes three satellites.
h Cosmos 929�type spacecraft served as prototype space station
modules and resupply vehicles in addition to their use as indepen-
dent space stations in order to demonstrate multiple mission
capability. Once operational, their primary use will be as modules
for the MIR space station complex.
Subscale model. There have been 10 flights of these vehicles, but
there is no evidence of reuseability.
1 The Soviets have produced two shuttles for actual space flight. In
addition, they produced a shuttle prototype configured for atmo-
spheric flight only, and at least three nonflyable engineering test
units for ground testing and/or simulation.
k In addition to its use as a space launch vehicle, the SL-8 is used
for ICBM reentry vehicle tests. These numbers reflect SL-8 space
launch vehicles only; they exclude some 225 SL-8Js launched from
Kapustin Yar to Saryshagan for missile reentry vehicle tests.
I Previous production estimates for the SSC-X-4 GLCM and the
SS-N-21 SLCM were combined into one figure. Factory markings
data obtained during INF Treaty�mandated SSC-X-4 elimination
now permit separate estimates. Analysis of factory serial numbers
recovered during INF inspections suggests there were more
SSC-X-4 missiles produced than can be accounted for by the
number declared in INF and those expended in flight testing. We
judge that such "missing" SSC-X-4 GLCMs most likely have been
converted to SS-N-21 SLCMs.
0, KY-16 testing is assessed to be in support of the SSN-X-24
supersonic SLCM and the AS-X-19 supersonic ALCM programs.
" Available evidence indicates that the SH-11 is a modified
ABM-1B Galosh.
" The MI-2 is produced solely by Poland; the "delivered" figures
reflect imports of Polish helicopters by the Soviet Union.
P The leading "w" in ship types denotes KGB subordination.
q "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets
from Finland.
"Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets
from Poland.
Secret
s "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets
from the German Democratic Republic.
t "Delivered" figures reflect ships and craft imported by the Soviets
from Romania.
"CIA believes its cumulative estimate of production of this system
is more likely higher rather than lower than actual Soviet
production.
v The actual Soviet designator for this tank is unknown; although it
has been referred to previously as the FST-1, it has been given the
interim designator "NT-N-87/1."
w Entries in this category are derived from the estimated produc-
tion, adjusted to reflect vehicles of the type exported to foreign
countries or imported for use with Soviet forces.
't This figure is derived by subtracting exports (4,700 T-72s) from
total estimated T-72 production. Assuming that all NT-N-87/1
production was for Soviet consumption, then some 17,800 (CIA) or
17,300 (DIA) tanks of the T-72/NT-N-87/1 type went to Soviet
forces. Intelligence Community order-of-battle estimates of these
two types of tanks fielded in units, however, total only some 10,300;
no clear distinction between the NT-N-87/1 tank and later models
of the T-72 has yet permitted ready classification by type in
deployed units. CIA currently estimates that a minimum of 1,700
additional T-72/NT-N-87/1 tanks are maintained by Soviet forces
in nonunit storage or are used as training vehicles, indicating that
the Soviets have procured no fewer than 12,000 tanks of these types
for their forces.
Y "Delivered" figures include BMPs imported by the Soviets from
Czechoslovakia and exclude Soviet manufactured BMPs exported
to foreign countries.
z "Delivered" figures include BTR-70s imported by the Soviets
from Romania.
"""Delivered" figures include MTLBs imported by the Soviets
from Poland and Bulgaria.
hh "Stand-Alone" radars include only those systems that are not
affixed to a weapons platform. This category, therefore, excludes
such radars as the Gun Dish (ZSU-23-4), Land Roll (SA-8) and all
radars affixed to ships and aircraft.
"The LPAR at Krasnoyarsk appeared externally complete in
1985. Damage occurred to the face of the receiver during late 1986
or early 1987, and subsequently the Soviets declared a moratorium
on construction activity at the radar.
dd The three truck classes are: light (less than two metric tons
carrying capacity), medium (two to five tons), and heavy (over 5
tons).
"Total production estimates include those trucks produced for the
civilian sector as well as the Soviet military.
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