MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET-CZECH CONFRONTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000200290004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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. D/ 1,Aj ~ (_ - .
Intelligence Memorandum
Military Developments in the Soviet-Czech Confrontation
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
MORI/CDF
8 1970
Top Secret
Copy No. 99
SR IM 68-19
August 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 August 1968
Military Developments in the
Soviet-Czech Confrontation
Summary
Soviet. military pressure against Czechoslovakia
has grown steadily as the political confrontation
has intensified. Within the last two weeks five
field armies have been poised near Czech borders,
Soviet tactical air forces near Czechoslovakia have
been increased 70 percent, and large Soviet troop
units have been seen moving inside Czechoslovakia.
Soviet troop activity in May and June appeared
to be mainly a show of force. This troop activity
had limited value as a genuine threat of large-scale
intervention because the units involved were in a
peacetime configuration and lacked the support ele-
ments necessary for extended combat.
In mid-July, however, the pressure tactics entered
a new phase. The Soviets began a major call-up of
civilian reservists and vehicles in the western USSR
--an unprecedented move for them in peacetime--necessary
to support deployments in Eastern Europe. The evi-
dence, however, does not suggest any extensive mobili-
zation of low-strength divisions.
The full scope of the Soviet mobilization is not
known, but by now it could have provided a control
and support structure sufficient to support a doubling
of Soviet ground forces strength in Eastern Europe.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Strategic Research.
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1. As the Soviet-Czech confrontation has in-
tensified, the Soviets have increasingly relied on
the threat of military intervention to deter Czech
resistance. The Czech armed forces, in contrast,
have not shown any indications of preparing for
hostilities.
2. In early May, the Soviets moved a few divi-
sions to positions near the Czech border. In mid-
June elements of these divisions, tactical air units,
and high-level staffs entered Czechoslovakia under
the guise of a Warsaw Pact exercise. Most of these
units subse uentl left
3. In mid-July t
,entered a new phase
Fn u y e soviet press reported ex-
tensive mobilization of men and equipment throughout
the western USSR as part of a large rear services
exercise. Moscow later announced that the exercise
had been extended to East Germany and Poland.
4. Soviet, Polish, and East German forces were
subsequently massed in areas near the Czech border.
By 30 July five armies were known to have been poised
against Czechoslovakia, and there have been indi-
cations of further reinforcement from the USSR (see
map). In addition, tactical air forces near the
Czech border have been increased from 14 to 24 regi-
ments.
5. On 31 July large Soviet units--at least one
division--were sighted in central Czechoslovakia.
6. In short, it appears that the Soviet high
command has in about two weeks' time completed
military preparations sufficient for intervening
in Czechoslovakia if that is deemed necessary by
the political leadership. (For a detailed chro-
nology of events, see Annex.)
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Mobilization
7. In developing this military posture, the
Soviets and their Polish and East German allies
have mobilized to a degree unprecedented in peace-
time, despite the danger of provoking counteractions
by the West and destabilizing the military situation
in Central Europe.
9. Existing combat units at the division or
army level are not, by themselves, capable of sus-
tained military activity. The Warsaw Pact forces
are structured so that only the front-level organi-
zation is capable of sustained independent action,
with the facility for continuous re-supply of the
combat units. By design, the line divisions and,
to a large degree, the armies have only combat re-
sponsibilities and rely on the front and the front
rear services for the bulk of their logistic require-
ments. Effective employment of the combat elements
is contingent upon the early establishment of a
functioning rear services organization. Although
individual divisions can be moved over long distances
prior to mobilization, they cannot fight for more
than a few days without this support.
10. Except for the Soviet forces in Germany,
Soviet ground forces have little front organization
or functioning rear services elements in peacetime.
Front staff and headquarters elements are submerged
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in the peacetime military administrative structure
without identity as an existing operational force.
The service units are at low or cadre strength and
are only concerned with the routine day-to-day
supply and maintenance of a garrisoned army.
11.
the Soviets have carried out many of the steps needed
for mobilization. A vital feature of the exercise
was the announced mobilization of reservists and
civilian vehicles. The Soviets later announced that
the exercise had been expanded to include Polish and
East German armed forces, While we are unable to
confirm the scope of the Soviet mobilization, the
announcements clearly imply that it is of major pro-
portions. Such an effort could by now be sufficient
to support a doubling of Soviet army strength in
Eastern Europe. There is no evidence, however, of
any extensive mobilization of low-strength Soviet
divisions.
12. According to Warsaw Pact plans, mobilization
begins with the alerting of key command and control
personnel and their separation from the peacetime
administrative structure. Reservists and civilians
must be called up and integrated in the required
units. Some men and vehicles will be used to augment
reduced-strength combat elements, with the great
majority used to create the rear service units. Some
supply units are at low strength and can be filled
out by adding the required mix of men and vehicles.
Other units must be created entirely from mobilized
resources. Many civilian transportation organizations
are mobilized with no more than minor modification of
their existing organizational structure. Concurrently
with these steps, the rail transportation system for
westward movement must be geared up and much of the
available rolling stock assembled at unit areas and
at border transshipment points.
13. In the current buildup, Polish rail cars
reportedly began to be massed about 23 July. Further
evidence suggests that Soviet forces from the Baltic
and Belorussian Military Districts began entering
Poland about 28 July. Forces from these areas
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heretofore have not been involved with Czechoslovakia.
This movement approximates expected actions of the
Soviet Union in the event of a reinforcement against
NATO. It is possible that because of the shift of
three GSFG armies towards Czechoslovakia, the Soviets
feel a need to fill the void created in their defenses
against NATO.
14. Warsaw Pact procedures allow movement to
begin before all the units are created or brought up
to strength since the front is designed for phased
deployment. Deployment involves moving the units by
road or trains in such order that they arrive with
organizational integrity. The numbers of men and
vehicles involved, combined with the complexity of
the routing and scheduling, require a high degree of
control and maximum utilization of the transportation
network for a successful and timely operation. Once
the front is organized and the transportation network
made available, about four divisions per day or approxi-
mately one army could be moved from the western USSR
through Poland.
The Threat
units have redeployed
southward within East Germany to the area closest to
western Czechoslovakia, where the eight full-strength
Czech divisions are located.
16. The Polish field army from the Silesian
Military District has been reoriented toward the
Czechoslovak border. At least one Soviet army from
the Carpathian Military District is partially deployed
inside Czechoslovakia.
17. Military attache observations indicate that
the Soviet Southern Group of Forces in Hungary is
out of garrison and that its four divisions are now
close to the Czech frontier.
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18. The Soviets have a force of tactical air-
craft located near Czechoslovakia which is nearly
twice the size of the Czech air force, and which
~coritans"nearly three times as many modern aircraft
The Soviet forces are mostly`MIG-21 's and SU-7'`s,
while half of the 600 Czech combat aircraft are
older model MIG's.
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Chronology of Significant Military Events
in the Soviet - Czech Confrontation
8 May - Soviet troop movements reported along
northeastern Czech border.
10 May - Soviet troops in East Germany move south-
ward.
-G 4 x ~
11 May - First of several restricted areas im-
posed in southern East Germany.
17-22 May - Grechko and Kosygin visit Prague accom-
panied by commanders of Soviet forces
which have taken up positions on Czech
borders.
24 May - Warsaw Pact exercise announced.
30 May - Czech defense ministry publishes de-
tails on exercise claiming only "marker
units" will participate.
30 May - Warsaw Pact chief of staff arrives in
Prague for exercise planning.
18 June - Marshal Yakubovskiy arrives in Czecho-
slovakia.
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23 June - Prague states a Soviet tank unit has
taken up a position in the western
part of the country.
30 June - Warsaw Pact exercise ends. Soviet
troops remain in Czechoslovakia.
2 July - Yakubovskiy attends exercise "evalu-
ation."
7 July - Travel restrictions in East Germany
extended to 15 July.
9 July - Czech defense minister says withdrawal
of Soviet troops being negotiated.
13 July - Some Soviet troops withdraw to Poland.
._1-1 July - Czech General Prchlik accuses Yakubovskiy
of breaking h'
withrIr;;w;;1c.
18 July -
19 July -
21 July - Soviet troops remain in Czechoslovakia.
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23 July - Moscow announces large rear-services
exercise to take place in western
USSR. Czechoslovak military officials
state 5,000 to 6,000 Soviet troops
remain in the country. An estimated
2,000 Soviet troops reported encamped
at Zilina, Czechoslovakia.
24-25 July - Additional Soviet troops begin moving
into southern East Germany from Berlin
area.
25 July - Soviets announce large air defense 25X1
exercise over large area of USSR.
28 July - Entire southeast quadrant of East
Germany closed.
30 July
Moscow announces that rear services
exercise has been extended to East
Germany and Poland. US embassy in
Warsaw receives reports of Soviet
troops moving into Poland from the
USSR. More Soviet troops move into
southern East Germany.
X4--31 July - US attache sees two. large Soviet con-
voys in central Czechoslovakia. Soviet
forces in Hungary move into assembly
areas. East German and Polish reserves
reportedly called up.
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