PAKISTAN: POPULATION PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000200070010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: RP

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Pakistan:
Population Problems
and Political Stability (u)
Confidential
Copy 2 3 7
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Intelligence
Pakistan:
Population Problems
and Political Stability (u)
This paper has been coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the National
Intelligence Council. (u)
25X1
November 1982
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Pakistan:
Population Problems
and Political Stability (u)
Overview Population problems will continue to work against efforts by the Pakistani
Information available Government to achieve national integration and to establish a politically
as of4 November 1982 stable and economically prosperous nation through the end of the century.
was used in this report.
? Population growth, with or without the presence of the Afghan refugees,
will continue high and surpass 152 million by the end of the century.
Rapid growth will offset government efforts to improve social and
economic conditions and could increase alienation from central govern-
ment authority.
? National, provincial, and city governments will be unable to cope with
the problems of uncontrolled rapid urban growth. Rural migrants will
continue to flood the cities, which will experience further deterioration in
infrastructure and services. Agitation by coalitions of urban interest
groups could again reach regime-threatening proportions as it did prior to
the fall of Presidents Ayub Khan in 1969 and Bhutto in 1977.
? Interprovincial antagonisms, which have plagued every government since
independence, will be intensified as an ever larger population competes
for a share of already limited government services. Punjabi domination of
the federal government and the armed forces will continue to exacerbate
deep cultural and ethnic divisions among the provincial peoples.
? The approximately 2.5 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan will increase
pressure to settle outside the camps as their stay lengthens and prospects
dim for an early return to Afghanistan. The Pakistani economy and
society will be severely taxed to absorb them into the mainstream of
Pakistani life, particularly if they move out of the frontier areas into the
more heavily populated and ethnically unrelated provinces of Punjab and
Sind. We do not expect a further substantial refugee influx from
Afghanistan, either as a result of the war or as a result of direct Soviet
policy. If there is a new wave of refugees, however, we believe that failure
of the international aid organizations, heavily funded by the United
States, to effectively accommodate them could increase US-Pakistani
tensions.
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? Ma for contributions to the Pakistani economy from remittances of the
1.5 million Pakistani workers overseas (now netting more than $2 billion
yearly) will continue to be threatened by uncertainty in the job market in
the Middle East. Return of the workers would reduce remittances, a vital
parr of Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings, as well as further strain the
already overloaded domestic job market. '
We do not expect any of these demographic forces to be the sole cause of a
violent replacement of the Zia regime. We believe instead that the buildup
of demographic pressures will increase frustrations throughout Pakistani
society that could translate into periods of social and economic unrest,
which., in turn, could snowball into wider antiregime demonstrations with
serioti.s political implications for the Zia regime or its successors.
This information is Confidential.
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Pakistan:
Population Problems
and Political Stability (u)
Pakistan has experienced exceptional demographic,
social, and political turbulence in the 35 years since it
obtained independence. The secession of the eastern
wing to form Bangladesh in 1971 resulted in the loss
of more than half of the country's citizens, and for the
second time in less than 25 years, a newly constituted
Pakistan had to start over. Ethnic and linguistic
differences have long divided the people of the region,
have periodically erupted into political violence, and
have made the building of a sense of national identity
at times appear impossible. Major refugee migrations
in 1947, 1971, and most recently since 1979 have had
lasting social and political effects. Labor migration to
the Middle East, involving hundreds of thousands of
workers since the mid-1970s, has already affected
economic structures and may accelerate social change
in the future as increasing numbers of relatively
prosperous workers return (see figure 2).II
Rapid Population Growth: The Bottom Line
We believe that the causes of Pakistan's explosive
population growth-high birth rates and a rapid
decline in death rates-will be sustained and will
translate into high growth at least through the end of.
the century. Total population as of mid-1982 was 94.1
million, including an estimated 2.5 million Afghan
refugees, according to a US Census Bureau estimate.
The Census Bureau expects the 1982 growth rate of
2.9 percent to decline slightly to 2.7 percent over the
next 20 years and the total population to reach 156
million by the year 2000. The Bureau estimates that,
even if all the refugees were to return to Afghanistan
immediately, the Pakistani population would still
reach 152 million by the end of the century (figure 3).
The projected addition of nearly 3 million people
annually to Pakistan's population during the 1980s
will, in our judgment, overwhelm government efforts
to secure the support of the people by raising their
social and economic level (table 1). The Census Bu-
reau projection that the under-15 age group will
remain at the existing high level of about 43 percent
of the total population virtually ensures that the
government will continue to fail to provide promised
social services-education, jobs, health care, housing,
internal security-for the demographically young
population
Pakistan's Fifth Five-Year Plan (1978-83) admits
that, because the needs of the rapidly growing popula-
tion continue to outstrip resources, less than half the
population receives the basics of education and health
care as measured by an overall literacy rate of only 24
percent, organized health coverage for somewhat less
than 50 percent, and a safe water supply for 27
percent of Pakistan's people. (According to five-year
plan statistics, the situation is particularly bad in
rural areas: a literacy rate of 17 percent, health
coverage for 32 percent, and potable water supply for
14 percent.) Limited resources to meet the exponen-
tially growing needs will increasingly strain the ability
of the government to respond adequately. In our view,
pervasive unrest caused by these conditions eventually
will be exploited by dissident groups.
0
Pakistan's failure to convince couples to have fewer
children or to institute a family planning program
acceptable to a majority precludes a significant drop
in the population growth rate through the end of this
century. According to US Census Bureau estimates,
fertility will decline from about 7 in 1982 to 5.5
children per woman by 2000, but this decline will
have little impact on this century's growth rate and, in
our judgment, will make no difference in the magni-
tude of social and political problems. Pakistani and
US population specialists have found, based on fertil-
ity surveys conducted periodically from 1962 through
1975, that 20 years of family planning programs have
brought about no tangible reduction in fertility rates.
A 1975 fertility study revealed that only 6 percent of
women of childbearing age used contraceptives. Nor
does there appear to be an unmet, widespread demand
for family planning services, according to recent
survey data
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Figure 2
Pakistan: Social and Political Consequences of Demographic Developments
rapidly growing smaller cities
Rapid population growth 3- Population doubles in 24 years from 76 million in -iw- Increased competition between ethnic groups and regions for
1976 to 152 million in 2000 limited government resources; increased unrest and alienation
from government as demands grow and government is unable
to deliver services
hind urban quality of life
Rural to urban migration
Rapid urbanization
Diverse provincial
characteristics
Insistence on unique heritage by all four prov- Role of central government seen as intrusive; national leaders
inces; fear of Punjabi cultural and political and government actions suspect; tensions rise quickly when
domination by other three provinces; sense of Sind, Baluchistan, or N W FP perceive interests suppressed;
nationhood has not taken root maintenance of internal security difficult
Over 2.5 million refugees strain government Diversion of Pakistani administrators and money to meet
resources required to provide basic necessities needs of foreign population alienates Pakistani population
which perceives own needs unmet
Refugees unlikely to stay in designated camp Integration into Pakistani society causes internal security
areas if return to Afghanistan is denied for next 10 problems arising from competition for jobs, housing, agricul-
several years tural and grazing lands; pressure on government to reach
understanding with Afghan Government for peaceful return
of refugees could be both domestically and internationally
troublesome
Tensions between Pakistan and labor-importing countries
over treatment of workers or migrant behavior in host nations
could heighten; return of large numbers of expatriated
workers cuts off economic boon from remittances and
increases local unemployment
L-v~ Increased wealth and rising expectations of returned workers
make them less amenable to government control and more
likely to criticize government
badly needed but expensive urban infrastructure-water
supplies, housing, roads, schools, clinics, and hospitals-will
produce rising frustration and conditions for potential unrest
Increasing number of poor, illiterate, under- Enforced idleness of poor crowded into slums increases chance
employed or unemployed, rural migrants living _ for dissidents to mobilize them against government
in slums
Refugee camps placed in close proximity to Tensions between refugees and Pakistanis arise over equitable
settled Pakistanis distribution of water, grazing areas, firewood supplies; risk of
confrontation increases need for police and internal security
forces to keep order and settle disputes; movement of refugee
camps to ethnically mixed areas increases risk of ethnic
conflict
employment negligible for antigovernment demonstrations as unemployment rises;
unemployed educated youth particularly vulnerable to re-
cruitment by agitators
About 1.5 million Pakistani workers presently
working overseas; domestic shortages arise in
some occupations as workers migrate; productivi-
ty falls as experienced workers are replaced by
inexperienced; possibility rises of sudden return
of large numbers of workers
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Figure 3 Figure 4
Pakistan: Population Growth, 1950 to 2000 Pakistan: Population of Major Cities,
1961) to 2000
I I I I I I
20 1950 60 70 80 90 2000
Afghan
Refugee
Influx Began
Source: 1950-72 US Bureau of the Census, Coun:ry Demographic
Profiles-Pakistan, Table 1, p. 7, March 1980. 197:1-1990 US Bureau of the
Census, Projection, January 1982.
Experience in Third World countries such as Indone-
sia, where substantial fertility reductions have oc-
curred, show that both vigorous support from the top
level of government and involvement of people at the
grass roots to plan and manage outreach programs are
essential for a successful family planning program.
Neither condition prevails in Pakistan. Unless star-
tling changes occur in the attitudes of both officials
and the population, we do not believe that programs
as sensitive as family planning have much chance of
success
National Population (Pakistanis and Refugees)
Pakistanis Only
I Population
Doubled in
23.5 Years
Rawalpindi/
Islamabad
Faisalabad
Gujranwala
Hyderabad
Multan
Peshawar
Quetta
Sanghoda
Sialkot
Source: 1960, 1970, and 1980 populations based on 1961, 1972, and 1981
census data. 1982, 1990, and 2000 populations used on
census growth rates for 1972-81 and UN proje
Growth of the Cities: The Urban Tinderbox will continue to provide the impetus for large-scale
Fed by the inflow of rural migrants, we expect growth exodus to the cities. As bad as conditions may be in
of the cities to continue at a rapid annual pace of the cities, demographic data and reports by knowl-
about 4.5 percent, the average rate over the last two edgeable observers indicate that they are worse in the
decades, at least through the 198Gs (figure 4). We
believe that depressed conditions in the countryside
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Table 1
Pakistan: Population Projections, Selected Years
Population Average Annual
(millions) Growth Rate
(percent)
Note: Projections are prepared in three series corresponding to high,
medium, and low assumptions for the path of fertility decline. The
medium projection is considered the most likely to occur. (See
appendix for projection methodology and for high and low series.)
countryside and are not likely to get better: employ-
ment and educational opportunities are fewer, and
housing and social services are even more inadequate.
Even so, we believe that the more easily mobilized
urban masses constitute the greater threat to political
stability. II
Pakistani Government officials are candid in their
gloomy outlook for the future of the cities and in their
assessments of the government's ability to bring about
real improvements. According to Pakistani newspa-
pers, the Punjab and Sind provincial governors have
noted the acute and multiplying problems large cities
face as a result of the continuing influx of rural people
and the natural increase of the urban population; all
existing services are under tremendous pressure, and
many Western observers believe that some-such as
transport, electricity, sanitation, and water supply-
are near the breaking point. Editorials in Karachi and
Lahore newspapers characterize the problems with
language such as "depressingly awesome" and speak
of the "misery and squalor found in the shantytowns
Afghan
Refugee
Population Average Annual Population
(millions) Growth Rate (millions)
(percent)
We believe that national and local urban development
schemes proposed in the Fifth Five-Year Plan and by
government directives are inadequate to address the
magnitude of urban infrastructure problems and the
plight of slum dwellers. They do, however, encourage
a perception among urban people of federal concern.
A federal directive to provincial governments to step
up improvements in slum areas by granting property
rights to slum residents occupying public lands has
been reported prominently in newspapers to have the
personal backing of President Zia. While provincial
governments report that thousands of slum dwellers
have received title to their land, the presence of
2 million slum dwellers in Karachi alone and the
history of unkept promises by political parties, politi-
cians, and bureaucrats to resolve this longstanding
problem make it unlikely in our view that Zia will be
able to accomplish his goals. II
Given the concentrations of people suffering common
problems, we expect rapid growth of the cities to
contribute to the stresses of urban life that, in turn,
that are a permanent feature of the urban scene." =
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Problems faced by Third World cities are mirrored in
Karachi, Pakistan's largest city and only port. At
independence it burst into urban dominance, drawing
migrants from all parts of Pakista,7 to share in the
opportunities afforded by its industrial and commer-
cial growth. Rapid population growth and low urban
investment have since resulted in shortages in essen-
tial services and in haphazard development, com-
pounded by local incapacity to deal with the
problems.
? Karachi's current population is 5.4 million, 6 per-
cent of Pakistan's total population and 22 percent
of its urban population. We estimate that nearly
300,000 persons will be added every year between
1982 and 1990; about one-third of them will be
migrants, largely unskilled and illiterate. By 1990
approximately 7.8 million persons will live in Kara-
chi and an estimated 11.6 million by the year 2000.
may translate into political activism and a threat to
the regime. Urban interest groups--labor unions,
professional and trade associations, student societies,
and neighborhood and ethnic alliances-have long
been the voices of political dissatisfaction over issues
such as low wages, lack of jobs, shortages of housing,
inadequate water systems, and congested transport
systems. F~
The cities are also the traditional battleground for
Pakistan's ethnic groups. It is here, in enforced prox-
imity, that they compete for jobs ar d services, exacer-
bating underlying distrust and ethnic enmities. His-
toric antipathies and rivalries, triba 1 and regional
politics, and intrigues swirl through the cosmopolitan
atmospheres of Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore. We
believe that the charged tensions arising from rapid
social and economic change are present even in
smaller cities, in particular the pro ,incial capitals of
? Between 1.4 million and 2 million persons currently
live in Karachi's slums, with the average family of
six to seven living in one or two rooms. Nearly 50
percent of slum dwellers are general laborers, over
half unskilled; about 10 percent have white-collar
jobs; the remaining 40 percent are self-employed or
do "miscellaneous "jobs.
? Only 30 percent of households had water connec-
tions in 1974, 20 percent had sewer connections,
and less than half of city refuse, accumulating at
1,500 to 2,000 tons per day, was collected and
disposed of We do not believe that these services
have been appreciably extended.
? Commuting time is long and costly; buses are
overcrowded, run irregularly, and are too few in
number to serve the population.
Quetta and Peshawar, which have been transformed
from quiet backwaters into boom towns by the several
refugee crises.
Our assessment is that the greatest potential for
serious instability lies within the overpopulated and
politically pressurized limits of the four largest
urban areas-Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, and
Rawalpindi/ Islamabad-which comprise about 43
percent of Pakistan's urban population and 12 percent
of its total population. The demonstrations and riots
that led to the fall of Presidents Ayub Khan in 1969
and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977 were centered in
these cities. Urban interest groups representing the
lower and middle classes were allied under opposition
parties to bring about the downfall of Ayub Khan.
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Confidential
Among them were students, teachers, organized in-
dustrial workers, menial service ranks from govern-
ment departments, and rural migrants living in slum
areas. These same classes were mobilized in the
overthrow of Bhutto eight years later, but this time
they were linked with a highly religious ideology
fostered by Islamic fundamentalist parties.
Turbulence in these large cities continues to occur
under Zia's Martial Law Administration-student
agitation and teacher and labor union strikes-
although it is not yet of the magnitude or as organized
as the disturbances in the mid-1970s prior to the
downfall of Bhutto. We believe, however, that the
government's inability to improve social and economic
conditions probably will ultimately lead to the forma-
tion of antiregime coalitions among the interest
groups F___1
As reported in World Bank surveys throughout the
1970s and early 1980s, in the Pakistani press, and in
the official five-year plans, little increase in the
standard of living has occurred in the 35 years since
independence. There still is an excess of labor relative
to available jobs, and opportunities for advancement
through education are limited. The educated unem-
ployed, mostly young men concentrated in the cities,
form a potentially volatile group that we believe could
be easily mobilized to vent their frustration on the
establishment.'
We expect that rapid growth in smaller cities, a
phenomenon that began in the 1970s, will further
augment the stress put on the national government by
urban governments barely able to cope with their
growing problems. The Fifth Five-Year Plan says
little about the sometimes spectacular growth in these
cities, concentrating its development plans instead on
services for the four largest metropolises. (Two urban
areas in the 500,000 to 1 million range, Peshawar and
Gujranwala, have annual growth rates of 7 to 8
' A World Bank study on Pakistan in 1978 calls the unemployment
of the educated "one of the most serious, most discussed and least
changed of the economic and educational problems of the last 10
years." A 1972 survey showed that 47 percent of graduates from
the three Punjabi universities were unemployed three to four years
after graduation. Only 15 percent said they had ever had jobs.
Partial evidence for 1975 indicated that the surplus in most skilled
work areas was growing=
percent and have doubled their populations over the
past 10 years.) We believe that the governments of
these smaller cities will soon add strident demands to
those of the larger urban governments for increased
services and development aid. Growing alienation
from government could develop as their populations
see their needs squeezed out by the greater political
pressures brought to bear by the larger cities.C
Provincial Rivalries: The Search for National Identity
Provincialism continues to be the hallmark of Paki-
stani politics. A shared devotion to Islam, stressed by
President Zia in his Islamization policies, has not
overcome the problems of ethnic, linguistic, and cul-
tural rivalries that divide the people of the four
provinces.' We expect these divisions to continue to
frustrate central government aims to foster a sense of
national identity through the 1980s.
All observers agree that the minority Sindhis,
Baluchs, and Pushtuns resent the more numerous
Punjabis and their domination of the Army and the
central government (figure 5). The Punjabis profess
that their sacrifices at the time of partition from India
give them the authority to control the national govern-
ment. Studies of the Punjabi power base by US
scholars suggest further that Punjabis consider the
other provincial peoples are "backward" and need
strong control and direction in order to become "true"
Pakistanis. The scholars claim that the people of the
other three provinces resent such implications, believe
that their cultures are threatened, and distrust intru-
sion of the central government into their affairs on
one hand but charge government neglect on the other.
Movements for separatism or greater autonomy by all
three provinces have plagued every central govern-
ment since partition and remain, in our view, an ever-
present danger to the political stability of the country.
' None of the four provinces-Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the
North West Frontier Province (NWFP)-are exclusively the home
of the ethnic groups that gave them their name or form the
majority, but all four projei ct the unique characteristics of the
dominant ethnic group.
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Pakistan: Provincial Social and Political Profiles
Punjab: Punjab is the most popu,'ous province with an
estimated 52 million people. It i:a also the most
developed and exerts the greatest degree of political
influence on the national government. The Punjabis
since independence have demanded and achieved a
dominant position in most governmental decision-
making processes. Punjabi socie.'y is more heavily
influenced by its long associatio,7 with the Hindu
caste system in prepartition India than by the more
egalitarian precepts of Islam. Punjabi social struc-
ture is rooted in the rich farmlands of the province
and in the landed gentry who own them. Landlords
exert power through kinship and patron-client
networks.
Sind: The political, social, and economic problems of
Sind are rooted in the social dynamics that shaped
the province at the time of Pakistan's independence.
Several million refugees from India (muhajirs)fled to
Sind, including to Karachi and other urban centers,
and by virtue of greater wealth, education, and
economic expertise, gained control of the private
sector from the indigenous Sindhis. Few Sindhis
profited from their experiences under the new Paki-
stani Government. Embattled Sindhis still believe
that outsiders are about to overwhelm them even
though they comprise about 60 percent of the provin-
cial population (21 million persons) while only 30
percent are muhajirs and 5 percent each are Push tuns
and Punjabis. The majority of ,Sindhis are either
urban poor or impoverished peasants under the domi-
nation of feudal landlords.
North West Frontier Province (NWFP): Out of the
approximately 14 million peop,'e in the NWFP the
Pushtun tribesmen are numerically superior, al-
though the province is home to several other ethnic
groups. Push tuns are divided into many distinct
tribal units, with a tradition of'bloodfeuds and
intertribal warfare. Most Pushtuns live in agri-
cultural villages in the settled areas, while an esti-
mated 3 million nomads and seminomads live in the
mountainous regions of the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FA TA). In the so-called protected
areas of the FA TA, the government has established
access through a steady economic development pro-
gram. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
pace of this development has increased. The unpro-
tected areas, where tribal law rules alone, are rapidly
diminishing.
The government has, since the early days of nation-
hood, recruited large numbers of Pushtuns into the
Army and into heavy construction. Despite efforts at
integration, however, Pushtun leaders have frequent-
ly called for a Pushtun homeland to include fellow
tribesmen in Afghanistan. With the imposition of the
Marxist regime in Kabul and the flight of more than
2 million Afghan Push tuns into the NWFP, however,
loyalties have at least temporarily swung to the
Pakistan Government.
Baluchistan: Baluchistan is the historical home of the
more than 400 Baluch tribes who comprise a little
over half of the 4.5 million population. Pushtuns
form a large minority, and Punjabis and Sindhis
together represent 5 to 10 percent of the population.
The Baluch tribal groups operate under a semifeudal
political system that exercises administrative, politi-
cal, and social authority over the clans. The tribes
are suspicious of one another, often in conflict, and
maintain an independent and provincial outlook that
brings them into confrontation with the central gov-
ernment. Long-heard calls for autonomy have been
muted by President Zia's less strident handling of
Baluch concerns than that of governments before him,
and by the specter of Soviet troops on their doorstep
in Afghanistan.
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Figure 5
Pakistan: National and Provincial Populations
for Selected Years
Punjab
Sind
North West Frontier Province
Baluchistan
? Afghan Refugees
as Zia's Islamization program as a means to unify a
country comprised of ethnic groups in different stages
of political and social development 25X1
We believe that the minorities' resentment toward the
Punjabi-dominated government has been exacerbated
under Zia's Martial Law Administration (MLA) in
which political parties have been banned and elections
indefinitely postponed. The 350-member Federal Ad-
by the President and whose sessions are held only at
his invitation, does not provide a popular grass-roots
political voice for the provinces. A nationwide crack-
down on "antisocial and subversive elements" in
February 1981, while ostensibly intended to demon-
strate Zia's responsiveness to.the Council's concerns
about a perceived breakdown in public order, instead
sharpened provincial antagonisms, according to US
Embassy reporting. The Embassy estimated that
7,200 people were detained, almost all in Sind and
Punjab. Public opinion in Sind, where many political
party activists were detained as well as criminals, held
that Sind was the main target of the crackdown and
Source: National figures and total number of refugees estimated by US
The perceived government domination by Punjabis is
borne out by the facts: an official 1977 government
survey shows that 53 percent of the nearly 112,000
civil servants are from Punjab, while only 26 percent
are from Sind, 11 percent from NWFP, and 3 percent
from Baluchistan. (About 7 percent of government
employees did not respond to the survey.)' The Army
is even more heavily Punjabi; a 1980 US Embassy
report estimates about 80 percent of Army personnel
is Punjabi, 15 percent Pushtun, and 5 percent Baluch
and Sindhi. The officer corps, according to Western
analysts, endorses a strong central government as well
' As illustrated in figure 5, we estimate that the proportion of
Punjabis in the civil service is actually less than their overall
population in the country and that, among the minorities, only the
Baluch and Pushtun are underrepresented in government jobs.
Nonetheless, the minorities resent the greater Punjabi government
representation.) I
government, according to US Embassy evaluations.
II
In our view, government actions against relatively
moderate minority political leaders, even though they
had in the past criticized the government and called
for elections and are therefore considered to be "anti-
regime," fuel the frustrations so close to the surface of
Baluch and Pushtun political consciousness. For ex-
ample, even though the ban on political meetings is
sometimes overlooked by the government, a meeting
in May 1982 of the Executive Committee of the
Baluch- and Pushtun-based National Democratic
Party in Punjab was broken up on orders of the
Punjab Governor. Three respected leaders of the
party were expelled from Punjab, and 20 more were
arrested, according to newspaper accounts. 25X1
President Zia's policy of promoting economic and
social development in Baluchistan and the NWFP-
the so-called lagging regions-to foster national inte-
gration has not gotten off the ground, and it may even
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aggravate provincial tensions, in our view. Sindhis
charge that their needs are being neglected to the
benefit of the two less developed provinces. Given the
geographic dispersion of the population of Baluchistan
and the NWFP, Zia's programs for agricultural aid,
water resource development, educational facilities,
and health care systems will be Expensive. We expect
that progress will be slow, that the population of these
provinces will continue to charge neglect, and that
political activists will continue to lobby for greater
autonomy.
The steadfast refusal of all Paki.,.tani governments,
including the Zia administration, to grant autonomy
to any of the provinces or even to meet minority
demands for greater representation in their provincial
governments continues to fuel th-, political passions of
the minorities. Zia granted amnesty in 1977 to tribal
leaders who had been in rebellion under Bhutto in the
hope that this would produce calm and augment
loyalty to the government. But tl: is step did nothing to
satisfy provincial autonomy goal;, and Islamabad
continues to place Punjabis in key administrative
posts in all provinces as well as ii most top. national-
level civilian and military positions. The minorities,
according to provincial leaders, argue that their quali-
fied candidates are not given adequate consideration
for these jobs and that autonomy is the only way to
gain control over their own area,. While Zia has
managed to achieve a surface calm, we believe that
the underlying unrest remains a threat to stability.
Afghan Refugees: An Added Burden
We expect that the Afghan refugees will present a
problem of increasing complexity and a growing
threat to Pakistan's internal stability throughout the
1980s. We believe that the sheer size of the refugee
population-the largest in the world-will strain the
government's ability to accommodate the refugees as
well as its ability to limit their threat to political
stability.' The US Census Bureau estimated that
there were 2.5 million refugees i:i Pakistan as of mid-
1982, based on the numbers of refugees registered by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
between 1979 and the end of 1981, estimated net
gains of 25,000 during 1982, and the estimated
number of births and deaths occurring in the refugee
population. The Census Bureau projects that the
refugee population will reach 2.7 million by 1985 and
3.2 million by 1990, assuming that no additional
refugees will arrive or be repatriated after 1982.5 25X1
While US and international observers agree that
Pakistan's international prestige has been enhanced
by its acceptance of the refugees and by its willingness
to share its limited resources to care for them, the
economic costs have been high. The government
estimates its assistance costs for 1982-83 at $555
million-over and above aid provided by international
relief organizations for 1982 of $230-250 million.' 25X1
Most refugees are Pushtun tribesmen who, according
to local and national Pakistani sources, have been
received as brothers by the Pakistani Pushtuns of the
NWFP and Baluchistan, and as Muslim brothers in
need by all Pakistanis. Despite these ethnic ties,
government authorities say that preservation of public
order is their greatest concern in the two volatile
tribal areas where nearly all refugees reside. Pakistani
officials have reported only one significant disturb-
ance involving locals and refugees: last June more
than a hundred were killed in sectarian fighting in
' Estimates by various organizations on the size of the refugee
population ranged between 2 million and 2.7 million during spring
and summer 1982. The Pakistani Government estimate, based on
renewed efforts by Pakistani relief officials to count camp popula-
ticns, was 2.7 million as of 31 July 1.982. Although officials say that
net inflow was "only a trickle" during the first half of 198
still expect an increase to 3 million by the end of the year.II
agencies and the US Embassy believe that government num ers are
overstated. in May 1982 agreed to provide food
raeions for 2.2 million refugees rather than dispute numbers; the
US Embassy reported in March 1982 that they used 2 million as an
informal working nurnhc~ We ' ve that the US Census Bureau
25X1
25X1
estimate, based on bothegistrations and documented 25X1
demographic growth assumptions, is reasonable and can be used
with some degree of confidence. (See appendix for Census Bureau
methodology.) =
6 Western sources believe that Pakistani costs should be considera-
bly lower than the government's official estimate-on the order of
only $80-100 million. These sources attribute the difference be-
tween Pakistani and Western estimates to inclusion in the assist-
ance estimate of indirect costs such as road and railway repair, law
enforcement, reclamation of devastated forest and grazin areas
and reimbursement for damage to private properties.
25X1
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Figure 6
Afghan Refugee Camps in Pakistan
NOTE: Not all camps are
shown. One symbol may
represent multiple camps.
India
zoo
J
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Kurram Agency that also involv;d Afghan refugees.
Officials fear that even minor disagreements between
refugees and the local population or between rival
refugee groups could lead to a pattern of increasingly
serious incidents, according to US Embassy reporting.
US Embassy officials report that Islamabad, which is
concerned that unrest could be exploited by Soviet-
sponsored agents, has adopted preventive measures:
? Refugee camps have been deliterately situated
away from more populous cents;rs.
? Refugee areas are rigorously policed.
? Grazing, water, and land rights have been carefully
defined between locals and refugees.
? Where resentment toward refugee aid has been
vocal, local inhabitants have been granted aid com-
mensurate with that given to the refugees, or resti-
tution has been made by the government to the
aggrieved party.II
Although Islamabad must necessarily devote most of
its refugee management resources to immediate prob-
lems, a few officials and other prominent Pakistanis
have speculated on the social and economic ramifica-
tions for both refugees and Pakistanis of an extended
or permanent refugee stay. They fear the economic
burden of continued support and express concern over
the ability of Pakistan to absorb peacefully and
productively such a large foreign population. We
believe that unless a solution is reached in Afghani-
stan in the next few years, the increased demands of
the refugees will put enormous pressures on the
balance that the government stri%es to maintain be-
tween basic care for the Afghans and the needs of its
own population, much of which is no better off
materially than the refugees. Baring a further large
migration-which we do not expect-we believe that
support from both the Pakistani Government and
international organizations can probably preserve rel-
ative calm over the next two or three years. Beyond
that time frame, however, Pakistan in our view will
increasingly be faced with pressures to integrate at
least some of the refugees into Pakistani society.
Even though Pakistan has had the painful experience
of integrating, amid great social chaos, large numbers
of refugees, first from India in 1947 and then from
Bangladesh in 1971, we believe that a repetition of
such events would meet with both social and political
opposition. According to both Western and Pakistani
observers, the NWFP, with over 2 million refugees,
already is reaching the saturation point in terms of
suitable land available for refugee camps. Reluctant
refugees are being moved from overcrowded border
regions to more remote and increasingly marginal
lands. Some camps may eventually have to be opened
in Punjab, well away from Pushtun ethnic areas.
Although government officials say that such a move
would be acceptable to Punjabis on the basis of
Islamic ties, we believe that ethnic, cultural, and
linguistic differences between Pushtuns and Punjabis
would ce strained relations or even open vio- '
lence.
We expect entry of refugees into the economic main-
stream to occur with accelerating frequency as the
refugees' stay lengthens. Pakistani officials report
that a small number of Afghans who brought goods or
capital with them have already entered into small
transportation or commercial businesses in the
NWFP, as well as in the cities of Rawalpindi and
Islamabad; officials say that there are several thou-
sand living in Sind Province. These relatively few
Afghans, although apparently highly visible, have
been absorbed into the economy. But the absorption
of I.arge numbers of refugees, mostly uneducated
farmers or nomads, into the already overburdened
economy would present the government with a far
more serious challenge, in our opinion. II
Labor Emigration: Short-term Benefits,
Long-Term Challenges
Temporary labor emigration to the Middle East has
substantial short-term benefits for Pakistan but, in
our judgment, poses a threat to economic and social
stability over the long run. The approximately 1.5
million workers overseas represent about 5 percent of
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the total labor force.' Labor emigration relieves im-
mediate pressures on the domestic labor market that,
according to official Pakistani data, can employ effi-
ciently only about half of all eligible male workers.
Worker migration is described in economic develop-
ment literature as well as by some Pakistani officials
and foreign observers as a "safety valve," drawing
large numbers of low-paid workers, the unemployed,
or the socially disaffected away from the domestic
scene. We believe that in the short term there is some
validity to this assumption but that, in the long term,
the roots of labor instability reside in the domestic
labor force, with the 95 percent of workers who do not
reap the benefits of overseas employment.l I
The flow of remittances from migrant wages, rising
from $339 million in 1976 to more than $2 billion in
1981, according to official data, has aided the Paki-
stani economy and figures prominently in government
decisions to maximize the worker exodus. In relative
terms, worker remittances currently are equal to
about 70 percent of the value of imports. The official
figures do not include large sums, possibly another
$1-2 billion according to guesses by local bankers,
brought home by migrants personally or sent through
unofficial middlemen.F___1
According to a survey conducted by the Pakistan
Institute of Development Economics, average annual
earnings of Pakistani workers in the Middle East are
$5,800, nearly $5,000 more than they would have
earned in Pakistan. The survey estimates that the
average worker sends about $2,800 home annually. Of
this, the migrants' household consumes 62 percent
and invests only 13 percent in savings or other
investments. According to US Embassy reporting, the
government has been disappointed that so little has
gone into productive investments. We believe, howev-
er, that the government underestimates the workers'
economic impact. Their purchase of consumer goods
I stimate of 1.5 million workers is based on survey data
sowing 1.25 million workers in early 1980 and government
estimates of workers departures since that time. The survey,
conducted by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics,
estimated about three-fourths of the workers were in Saudi Arabia
and the United Arab Emirates, with the remainder in Kuwait,
Libya, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. (c)
may ultimately channel funds into productive invest-
ment as sellers of these items reinvest or increase their
own consumption, thereby recycling the worker's
funds through the economy. II
Despite an overall excess of labor in the domestic
labor force, World Bank reports show that shortages
that have developed in some categories as a result of
the migration have retarded Pakistan's economic de-
velopment. According to data from recruitment agen-
cies, skilled and experienced general laborers are
more likely to emigrate than the unskilled. World
Bank analysis shows that skilled laborers' places in
the domestic work force have been taken by less
skilled or inexperienced persons, which has created a
drop in domestic productivity. Vocational training
schemes have so far failed to fill the gap, according to
the World Bank.=
In our view, the Pakistani Government has undertak-
en insufficient long-term planning to meet the social
and economic problems that will arise when the
Middle East job boom ends. Labor Ministry officials,
who believe that the overseas demand for Pakistani
labor will remain high at least through the 1980s,
concentrate on maximizing and regulating the flow.
We are not certain that the demand will remain high.
Although we believe that Middle East labor needs will
continue, Pakistani workers may face increasing com-
petition for jobs from workers from East and South-
east Asia. A World Bank migration study, moreover,
foresees a trend developing in favor of specialized and
professional labor at the expense of the nonspecialists
and unskilled as Middle East development projects
move into a new stage. If so,, the opportunities for
emigration by the nonspecialized and unskilled labor-
ers may decline before the end of the decade. This
development would hurt Pakistan's economy by re-
ducing worker remittances. It would also throw the
bulk of the overseas workers back on the ill-prepared
domestic labor market.
We expect that social problems will intensify as
increasing numbers of migrants return home with
money, new experiences, and higher expectations. The
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money earned abroad can move thy; returned migrants
into the middle class with enhanced community
standing. We believe that this elevated status in-
creases their resistance to the autccratic demands of
landlords, tribal leaders, political leaders, and employ-
ers. Pakistani social scientists have- documented in-
stances where the political and social powers of
traditional leaders have been successfully challenged
by returned workers. They have also cited cases where
the shift of family power from father to sons or to
other family members during the absence of the
father has created conflict within :he family. We
believe that the perceptions of inequality among the
poorly paid local workers may also strain relations
between them and the "newly rich" returned mi-
grants. Such incidents are only beginning to be recog-
nized and documented, but as the migration stretches
out in time and more migrants return, we expect that
pervasive social change, a unsettling in a tradi-
tional society, may occur.
Outlook
We expect Pakistan's manifold demographic and eth-
nic problems to continue unabated through the rest of
the century and, in a worst case, could combine with
other factors to topple the Zia reg.me or its succes-
sors. Social tensions developed over competition for
dwindling resources and services, especially in over-
crowded urban environments, almost certainly will
present opportunities for antiregime agitators to re-
cruit followers. II
Ethnic and provincial tensions will continue to threat-
en the nation's uneasy surface calm and prevent
national integration, in our judgment. Continued con-
centration of political power among the majority
Punjabis, making second-class citizens of Sindhis,
Baluchs, Pushtuns, and other minority groups, will
offer opposition leaders opportunities to attract adher-
ents in the name of Islamic unity and egalitarianism.
II
In our view, heightened awareness among Pakistanis
that the Afghan refugees may become permanent
residents and compete for limited jobs and services
will increasingly stretch Pakistani hospitality in spite
of their ethnic ties with the refugees. We believe that
the danger of local flareups between the two groups
will mount a's frustrations heighten and the refugees'
stay lengthens. If the situation in Afghanistan does
not permit the refugees to return over the next several
years, we expect pressures to build among the refu-
gees to settle elsewhere in Pakistan. Under such
circumstances, we believe that the already strained
ethnic relations in the country will worsen as Pushtun
and other tribesmen move into nontribal areas. F I
Should Soviet actions inside Afghanistan push large
numbers of new refugees into Pakistan, the pressures
on the Pakistanis as well as on the international aid
organizations would intensify. Although we do not
believe the Soviets would see an advantage in a
further depletion of the Afghan population, we do
believe that the Soviets could see their interests well
served by a selective depletion of troublesome Afghan
tribal groups while at the same time laying the
groundwork in Pakistan for further social, political,
and economic upheaval by increasing the size of the
refugee population there. US-Pakistani relations
would be tested under such a scenario as the financial
capabilities of the United Nation and other interna-
tional organizations, which are heavily funded by the
United States, were stretched.
While we expect the overseas laborers to be a major
force for economic growth, at least during most of.this
decade, the returned "newly rich" migrant, deter-
mined to find a social niche commensurate with his
economic status, may make unanticipated changes in
the traditional society. As the number of returned
workers grows, they could increasingly become,the
agents of social change at the grass-roots level, there-
by indirectly influencing the nation's future political
course. We believe that.if the job market in the
Middle East shrinks or is altered, or the political
climate changes so as to squeeze all or many of the
Pakistani workers out of the overseas market, the loss
of worker remittances as well as the search by the
returned workers for domestic employment could
badly dams e the Pakistani economy and upset politi-
cal stability
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Appendix
Data Quality and Projection Methodology
X1
Data Quality
Demographic data from four Pakistani censuses and
six national surveys are characterized by major defi-
ciencies, according to UN, US, Canadian, and Paki-
stani demographers. The data are contradictory be-
tween sets and internally inconsistent.
The 1951 and 1961 censuses are criticized for both
content and coverage: they were inadequately planned
and administered; too many questions were asked,
thereby eliciting incomplete and inaccurate responses;
and because many people were still in refugee status
and tribal areas were inaccessible to enumerators, the
country was not completely canvassed
The 1972 census was conducted 18 months later than
originally scheduled, due mostly to the 1971 war and
loss of the eastern wing that subsequently became
Bangladesh as well as disarray in the census organiza-
tion. The census was conducted during a period of
heightened political sensitivities in the aftermath of
the war and coincided with widespread language riots
in Sind, leading to a lively demographic argument
through the years over whether the census under-
counted or overcounted selected areas. Publication of
results was not completed until 1978. 1I
Only. provisional statistics for total populations of
provinces, divisions, districts, and 12 major cities are
so far available from the 1981 census. Data have been
collected for the first time in the country's history
under generally favorable political conditions and
with improved census organization and broader geo-
graphic coverage over previous efforts. For the first
time data were collected on an individual basis in
most tribal areas where tribal elders had previously
provided only personal estimates of the population
under their control. II
Methodology
The US Census Bureau prepared population projec-
tions for 1979 through 2000 in three series-low,
medium, and high. For each of the series, figures were
Table 2
Assumed Mortality and Fertility Levels for the
Projection Period: Selected Years, 1979 to 2000
Expectation of Life Total fertility rate
at Birth (births per woman)
(for all projection
series) Years
Males
Females
Low
Medium
High
52.5
50.5
6.81
6.91
7.01
55.4
54.9
5.96
6.32
6.66
58.1
58.9
5.00
5.50
6.00
provided for the projected Pakistani population, the
population of Af ban refugees, and the combined
total of the two.
Pakistani Population. The base population is the
population as counted in the 1972 census, adjusted by
the Census Bureau using available census and survey
information and projected to 1979. The 1979-2000
populations were then projected by age and sex using
a component projection model with a single mortality
assumption and three separate fertility assumptions.
For the projection period, mortality conditions were
assumed to improve with a resulting increase in the
expectation of life at birth; fertilit was assumed to
decline throughout the period.
Afghan Refugees. The Census Bureau used refugee
data from reports by the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the US De-
partment of State. The UNHCR classifies refugees in
camps as follows: children of both sexes; adult males;
and adult females. This breakdown allows a compari-
son of the reported refugee population with the age
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Table 3
Reported and Projected Increases in the
Number of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan:
1979 to 1983
Projected
1982
1983 and thereafter
Additional Afghan Refugees
Enter:ng Pakistan
During the Year
24,575
0
Source: Reported figures from the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees and the US Department of State. Projected
figures from the US Bureau of the Census.
and sex composition of the estima ;ed population of
Afghanistan. This comparison suggests that the refu-
gees represent a cross section of tf.e Afghan popula-
tion; that none of the three age-se',( groups is over-
represented relative to the Afghan population in
Afghanistan. The three age-sex groups were further
broken down into five-year-age groups using the
estimates for the Afghanistan population as a guide.
0
Refugees have been entering Pakistan for only slight-
ly over three years. Available data for the second half
of 1981 suggest that the numbers were beginning to
decrease. Based on this declining trend, the Census
Bureau assumed a total of 2.4 million persons as the
total number of refugees by the end of 1982-an
implied increase of about 25,000 refugees over the end
of 1981. Fertility and mortality levels in the refugee
population were assumed to be the same as for the
Pakistani population throughout the projection period.
Because the Census Bureau assumed that after 1982
the net flow of refugees would cease, and further, that
there would be no return movement before the end of
the projection period, the projected increases in the
refugee population after 1982 occur only through
naturalincrease.F71
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Table 4
Pakistan: Selected Midyear Population Estimates
Total
Population
(thousands)
Growth
Rate
(percent)
Total
Population
(thousands)
Growth
Rate
(percent)
Total
Population
(thousands)
Growth
Rate
(percent)
1980
87,606
3.3
87,442
3.2
87,277
3.1
1985
103,163
3.0
102,481
2.8
101,843
2.7
1990
119,730
3.0
118,139
2.8
116,616
2.6
1995
138,959
2.9
136,046
2.7
133,014
2.5
2000
160,935
156,038
150,893
1980
86,674
2.9
86,510
2.8
86,345
2.8
1985
100,402
3.0
99,733
2.8
99,108
2.7
1990
116,508
3.0
114,956
2.8
113,471
2.6
1995
135,180
2.9
132,343
2.7
129,393
2.5
2000
156,507
151,742
146,737
1980
932
21.7
932
21.6
932
21.5
1985
2,762
3.1
2,747
2.9
2,735
2.8
1990
3,222
3.2
3,182
3.0
3,145
2.8
1995
3,779
3.2
3,702
3.0
3,621
2.8
2000
4,428
4,296
4,156
Note: Detailed age-sex breakdowns for the three projection series
are available from the author of this report.
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