WHY DID CYPRUS COUP SURPRISE U.S.?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000100230009-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 3, 1975
• Content Type: NSPR

FRIDAY MORNING, 3 October 1975
754R0001 O 230009-
WASHINGTOApSTroved CT el ease 2005F0 F02/29'-RDP94TSurprise
A U
h ' rus cou Y p p
By Norman Kempster
Washington Star Staff Writer
Perplexed House intelligence
investigators are trying to determine
why the U.S. government apparently
was taken by surprise by the 1974 Cy-
prus coup in spite of strong evidence
that such action was likely.
Former Greek strongman Dimi-
trios loannidis personally told a CIA
official in Athens about a month be-
fore Archbishop Makarios was
toppled from the island nation's
presidency that a coup was in the
works, according to the committee's
chief counsel, A. Searle Field.
But on July 15, 1974, the date that
Greek Cypriots - acting at the insti-
gation of the Athens regime - over-
threw Makarios, the CIA was still
assuring U.S. policymakers that all
was v~
1T~E DAILY fiational Intelligence
Bulletin - a top-secret news sum-
mary prepared for the highest levels
of the government - reported July
15 that "Gen. loannidis takes moder-
ate line while playing for time in dis-
pute with Makarios.'
The committee wants to know why
the warning of a pending coup was
discounted. Although bad judgment
seems to be the most likely explana-
tion, it was understood that the law-
makers have not ruled out the possi-
bility that-the CIA lost its objectivity
for reasons that have not been ex-
plained.
A CIA "postmortem" on the crisis,
released yesterday by the commit-
tee, shows that in June. the intelli-
gence community provided. "explicit
warning of the growing confronta-
tion." But it said that although the
U.S. Embassy in Athens attempted to
"discourage" action aganst Makar-
ios that nothing much was done.
Field, apparently basing his as-
sessment on documents that have not
yet been made public, said the 'ex-
plicit warning came from loannidis,
who told a CIA official that he was
planning a coup and asked how the
United States. would react.
IN SPITE of the June Warning, the
postmortem shows that on July 3, the
CIA filed a report discounting the
possibility of a coup. Field said this
report was based on a "new and inter.
ested source." He said it is a mystery
why so much reliance was placed on
this source.
The CIA document says- the intelli-
gence agencies correctly foresaw the
'initial Turkish invasion July 20 but
they provided only a "confused and
unconvincing" 'warning of the mas-
sive Turkish attack which-began' in
August and resulted in the de facto
partition of the island which remains
in effect.
The Cyprus crisis caused havoc
with U.S. foreign policy.
As a result of the Turkish invasion,
Congress slapped an embargo on
arms sales to Turkey, putting severe
new strains on relations between
Washington and Ankara: President
Ford and Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger have been trying for more
than a year to convince the lawmak-
ers to lift the ban.
Also as ceuit of the Cyprus coup;
the dictatorial Ioannidis'regime was
ousted in Athens and replaced by a
democratic government. Relations
between. Greece and Turkey remain
hostle, weakening the southern flank
of NATO.
MAKARIOS WAS later returned to
the presidency but reverberations
from the coup continue.
The committee is known to be con-
cerned with the possibility that offi-
cials in the Athens CIA station de-
veloped such close relations with the
Greek dictators that they lost their
ability to make objective judgments.
The lawmakers are also trying to
determine what role Kissinger may
have played in the affair. Kissinger
was virtually in total control of U.S.
foreign policy at the time of the coup
which came only about three weeks
before former President Richard M.
Nixon's resignation. Nixon was
preoccupied with Watergate matters
and delegated foreign policy to the
secretary of state.
The report that Ioannidis tipped
his hand in June seems to contradict
the State Department's, position that
it had no warning of the coup.
At the time of the coup, the Athens
CIA station was serving in effect as
the nation's embassy because the
Greek regime would have nothing to
do with. Ambassador Henry J. Tasca,
preferring to deal with the CIA.
Tasca apparently was cut
off both from the govern-
ment in Athens and the
State Department in Wash-
ington. Summarizing a six-,
hour interview with Tasca,
who has since left the For-
eign Service, committee
staff member Jack Boos
said the ambassador main-
BALTIMORE SUN
3 OCTOBER 1975
Portuguese
coup block
is reported
Lisbon (AP)-The Socialist
party claimed yesterday that
its "action and vigilance" had
prevented an overnight coup at-
tempt by an alliance of soldiers
and revolutionary groups.
A statement from Socialist
headquarters said the party
was prepared to back up its na-
tionwide alarm Wednesday
with proof of a conspiracy tc
seize power at 4 A.M.
But at least one leftist news-
paper scoffed at the Socialist
report of a "suicidal adventure
headed by irresponsible ele-
ments or provocateurs." "False
alarm," read a banner headline
in the leftist afternoon newspa.
per Diario Popular.
Streets remained calm over-
night and no special security
precautions were apparent to
protect Premier Jose Pinheiro
de Azevedo, allegedly the tar-
get of the conspiracy. But the
Socialist alarm was seen as a
sign of the widespread nervous.
ness over the country's hitnrp
tamed that he had been
kept in the dark.'
"HE FLATLY denied
having been told by the CIA
station. that Ioannidis on
June 20 had threatened a
coup," Boos said'in relating
the interview which was
conducted under oath.
"Tasca was greatly puz-
zled as to why the U.S.,
which purportedly had a
neutral policy between the
two NATO allies, apparent-
ly did not complain when
the Turks ignored the,
cease-fire arragement that
had been worked out. by
Secretary Kissinger, did
not complain as the Turks
ran amok , .. and did not
complain wwhen the Turks
launched their massive
invasion on Aug. 14," Boos
said.
Tasca was replaced in
the aftermath of the coup.
The State Department also
replaced its desk officers in
charge of relations with Cy-
prus, Greece and'Turkey as
a result of the crisis.
The Cyprus desk officer,'
Thomas Boyatt, filed a
memo complaining to his
superiors of "mismanage-
ment" by the department
during the coup. The com-
mittee has asked the de-
partment for a copy of the
memo, but the department
has refused to supply it.
The committee tried to
question Boyatt earlier this
week but he declined to an-
swer because Kissinger has
prohibited' junior and
middle-level 'officials from
revealing the policy recoin-
mendations they make to
their superiors.
COMMITTEE sources
said the material made
public yesterday was "just
the beginning" of the reve-
lations about Cyprus.- But
there was' no indication of
when the committee would
return to the subject. One
source said the committee
.hoped to settle the dispute
with the State Department
over the testimony of
working-level officials be-
fore holding its next hear-
ing on the coup:
The committee yesterday
settled one feud with the
White House when it agreed
to. a procedure that makes
Ford the ultimate arbitra-
tor of whether. disputed
documents will be made
public. The President, as a
result, lifted his ban on the
committee receiving classi-
fied documents.
"I was slipped a 'note that
the President' has with-
drawn his. objections and
the documents will flow,"
Chairman Otis . Pike, D-
N.Y., told reporters. "I'll
believe it when I .see it."
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CI&l3PP94T00754R000100230009-7
 Part TI--Main a tion--3 October 1975
TORONTO GL0ipi9. Fgr7Ryifqf&JR0g~0?L>IA-RDP94T00754R000100230009-7
HOW CANADA SHOWED IT CAN'T CONTROL THE ARCTIC
BY JOHN GELLNER
EVERY TIME a report, appears
about illicit activities in the Ca-
nadian Arctic (like the recent
one about the disappearance in the
Northwest Passage of a Polish
schooner) one gets more exasperated
over the federal Government's unwill-
ingness to back up its words with ac-
tion. ,
Where the more than one-third of
'Canada that lies north of the 60th par-
allel is concerned, statements were
made and legal steps were taken in
the first years of the Trudeau era that
seemed to Indicate the Government
was Intent on tightening Canadian con-
trol over this vast area.
In April, 1969, a new set of defence
priorities was laid down that put in
first place "the surveillance of our
own territory and coastlines, that is,
the protection of our -sovereignty".
Just one. year later, Parliament
passed the Arctic Waters Pollution Act
and far-reaching amendments to the
Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.
By the former, Canada arrogated to
Itself the right to impose special regu-
lations upon ships operating within 100
miles of any Canadian land above 60
degrees north latitude.
By the latter, Canada unilaterally
extended its territorial waters to 12
miles, measured from a base line
drawn from the farthest cape to the
farthest cape (which in practice
means that in some places Canada
claims sovereignty over belts of
coastal waters 100 miles, and, more,
wide).,, The., amended act also estab-
lished new, and more extensive fisher-
ies ?t msing? lines.
" Finhlly, tyre White Paper, Defence in
the 70s, published in August, 1971, ac-
knpwiedged that in . the Arctic and
sub-Arctic , Canadian . capabilities of
surface surveillance were limited; and
of under-the-water. and under-the-ice
surveillance .weer non-existent but
promised immediate study of the prob.'
lems and early improvements.
All this happened between four and
634 years ago. The trouble is that vir-
tually nothing has been done to put
these policies Into practice. Where
control over Canada north of Sixty is
concerned, we are not any better off-
and in some respects worse off-than
we were In 1969..
Take surveillance and control over
the Northwest Passage, where the ex-
isting shortcomings have just been re-
vealed again by the case of the miss-
irog Polish schooner Gedenia-or
Gdynia-or Gdansk there is not, even
certainty' about the correct name.
Whether we want It or not, world de-
mand for scarce .natural-resources will
no doubt ; lead to ever-mounting politi-
cal pressure upon Canada to open up
the Northwest Passage as an impor-
tant avenue of trade. Sailing through it
will never be 'easy, but the real diffi-
culties are in fact not quite as great as
has generally been assumed.
Smooth trip
Only last, month, for instance, the
Canadian Coast Guard training vessel
Skidegate went smoothly through the
passage, admittedly In abnormally fa-
vorable conditions, but without pos-
sessing the mass (the Skidegate is of
only ?200 tons) , or ;the power. (it has
only a 640 hp engine) a ship must have
to break through ice.: , , .
One should not be misled by the rel-
ative failure-lt could not make it
without the help of accompanying lee-
breakets-of the'SS Manhattan in.Its
famous' voyage in .1969: the 111'anl%at-
tan, at 155,000 tons and with engines
developing only 43,000 hp, was in fact
grossly underpowered for work in Arc-
tic waters.
On ' the' other . hand,: shins with the
correct thassAo-power ratio, like the
Danish icebreaking freighter that has
been bringing out lead-zinc ore
through'the 'Northwest Passage from
the Cominco deposits on Little Corn-
wallis island, normally need no assist.
ance during the Arctic navigation sea-
son.
The Russians have been using such
cargo carriers successfully for years
in their Northeast Passage (north
around Siberia) and ships built on sim.'
ilar principles are reportedly being
readied in German yards to carry iron
ore from Milne Inlet on the north tip
of our Baffin Island into Baffin Bay,
and thence through Davis Strait into
the open Atlantic.
There will have to be tight regula-
tion of shipping north of Sixty, and
effective means of enforcing the rules.
The law of April, 1970, at least recog-
nized that pollution is a deadly peril in
Arctic waters. A spill,. with the oil
trapped underneath the ice, could foul
up a considerable expanse of sea for
years.
As it Is, we really have no means of
.knowing what moves in our,, Arctic
waters. We would not have known the
Gedenia was in the passage had it not
put in at Resolute, on Cornwallis Is-
land, for supplies, and it could not be
tracked once it sailed from there.
This Is not surprising, since all there
is in the way of surveillance in those
parts Is one over-flight by a Canadian
Forces Argus maritime patrol aircraft
every .10 days or so. This is not an
effective, let alone a cost-effective,
method of exercising control.
The 26 Argus planes now In opera-
tion entered squadron service from
1960 onward. They are by now old and
battered and thus progressively more
difficult and more costly .to maintain
-one flying hour in them must? by now,
cost at least $2,500.
Since there, are no fully equipped
forward bases, Arguses are stationed
in Comox, B.C., and Greenwood, N.S.
From there it is from 2,000 to 2,500
miles to the entrances to the North-
west Passage, 22 to 28' flying hours
costing probably from $55,000 to $70,-
000 .for a 'single round trip before the
principal patrol area is even reached.
This Is bad enough, but still not all
that is wrong. The Arguses were built
for anti-submarine warfare and as re-
connaissance aircraft-a . job they
were given only as an afterthought-
they can perform effectively only in
fair weather. This makes the whole
concept of Arctic surveillance flights
as they are carried out now ludicrous.
Their only valid purpose can be to
show the flag and that, at unconsciona-
ble expense.
Needs planes
Canada needs both modern long-
range patrol aircraft (LRPA) withal]-
weather reconnaissance ;capabilities,
and fully equipped advanced bases in
the Arctic from which aircraft smaller
than LRPA, and thus cheaper to main-
tain, could operate.
An interdepartmental committee
and a project office have by now been
searching for almost three years for
an LRPA that would replace the Ar-
gus. Design studies by Lockheed. and
by Boeing have been subsidized to the
tune of $11.2-million. . '
There has been no decision yet and,
according, to Defence Minister James
Richardson's latest statement on the
subject, there won't be any "until
later this year", provided the Govern-
ment's plans to "restructure the Cana-
dian airframe industry" (whatever
this may mean) have come to fruition.
As for proper advanced bases in the
North, there have been -reports that
the establishment of at least one, on
the south shore of Devon Island near
the eastern entrance to the Northwest
Passage, is being seriously contem-
plated.
From such a base properly equipped
aircraft even of the modest size of a
De Havilland of Canada Dash-7 could
patrol the waterway much more effec-
tively than Arguses are able to do at
present. Work hasn't been started yet
on Devon Island, though. The scheme
seems to be as much in abeyance as
the procurement of a modern LRPA.
Meantime, a Gedenia can sail with-
out authorization 350 miles into the
Northwest Passage without being spot-
'ted and, after making its : presence
known voluntarily, avoid further ob-
servation the moment a bit of fog cov-
ers the area.
The next time it could be a rusty
and leaky old tanker or a foreign war-
ship.
As for under-the-ice transits. we
know of some by U.S. nuclear submar-
ines, but only because Washington had
the courtesy of telling its about them.
So much for Canadian control of
land and sea north of Sixty, control
which is a condition of any valid claim
to sovereignty.
Canadian governments have been
making that claim for a long time,
more stridently ' of late than ever be-
fore and rightly so because of =the
growing danger of our sovereignty
being put to the test. What govern-
ment has not done. and continues to
postpone doing, is to invest the more}
and effort which are necessary to bac:l,
up that claim.
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100230009-7