INFORMATION FROM PAVN PRISONERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000100150011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 28, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: September 2, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
Copy` _ of 65 Copies
2 Septembers 1965
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MEMORANDUM FOR WATCH COMMITTEE MEMBERS
SUBJECT: Information from PAVN Prisoners
10 In furtherance of our continuing effort to focus greater collection
effort, research and reporting on the North Vietnamese Army and its
methods of operation in Laos and South Vietnam, we are attaching herewith two
summaries of recently available information obtained from a total of 12 PAVN
prisoners captured in 1964 and early 1965 in Laos, one group from the 335th Brigade
and the others from the 304th Division o Together they have provided more information
on the introduction and operations of specific PAVN units in Laos than has ever been
available previously, as well as considerable information relating to the North Vietnamese
Army.
20 We believe that this information is of more than historical interest
and has provided some useful insights into PAVN methods of operation in Laos in
general and which may be of more than incidental relevance to recent and future
infiltration of PAVN units into South Vietnam o
3. Specifically, we believe these interrogations, together with cumulative
information which has been obtained from recent infiltrators into South Vietnam, tend
to support the following conclusions:
0. The PAVN has developed a system for the movement into Laos
and South Vietnam of regular army units in battalion strength, which may be dispatched
at any time, leaving behind in the DRV either the major elements of the parent division
or brigade or merely a nucleus which serves as a cadre for the recruitment and training
of additional units.
b. There are indications that this system, which has probably been
employed in Laos for years, was extended to South Vietnam in 1964 when the supply
of regrouped southerners was apparently virtually exhausted. It seemingly could pro-
vide a method for the continuous dispatch of regular PAVN battalions and the formation
of new ones within the existing division/brigade order of battle structure without the
creation of any additional major PAVN units. The movement of probably all infantry
elements of the PAVN 325th Division into South Vietnam thus for is an exception to this
method of operation
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e. The interrogations of the prisoners from the 304th Division pro-
vide some basis, although tenuous, for believing that in 1965 North Vietnam was dis-
patching units to Laos and possibly South Vietnam which included substantial numbers
of new recruits who had received little military training and political indoctrination as
to their missions. This could have reflected a sudden requirement to move more troops
into Laos and South Vietnam.
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5. The attached summaries, which are Confidential only, may be
removed to permit wider distribution
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Summaries as stated
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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
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2 September 1965
STORY OF A PAVN UNIT -? 3D BATTALION, 9TH REGIMENT,
304TH DIVISION
On 9 March 1965, Communist forces estimated at 400 to 500 PAVN and
Pathet Lao attacked Bong Rene on Route 9 in the Laos Panhandle. Although the
town was defended by only 80 men attending the local military academy, the re-
sult was a spectacular government victory, largely because of highly effective
RLAF support of the defenders. Friendly forces were reported to have buried 112
enemy dead and other reports placed Communist casualties even higher; the enemy
retreated from the area and has not since attempted a major action along Route 9,
A byproduct of the action was the unprecedented capture of nine North Vietnamese
prisoners, whose detailed interrogations have recently become available and provide
the basis for the fo owing account.
Comment on the sources: Of the nine prisoners, seven were from the 3d Bat-
talion, 9t Regiment, P V 04th Division, Dinh Binh. Three of these were un-
able to name their regimental or divisional subordination but it was clear from their
other statements that their battalion was subordinate to this regiment. Three were
members of the 12th Company of the 3d Battalion, and one each was from the 11th
Company, 13th Company and the heavy machine gun platoon of the 3d Battaliion.
The affilitations of the other two prisoners are obscure; one had come froma training
unit at lac Quan, Nam Dinh Province, and the other claimed to have come with a
?2d Independent Company" from Bach Mai to suburb of Hanoi).
All sources were privates with very limited or no formal education (one had
reached the sixth grade), had come from small villages or farms, apparently had very
little knowledge of or interest in the political situation in North or South Vietnam
and no military knowledge beyond their immediate units. They ranged in age from
17 to 25 a The longest military service any had had was about two years, seven had
been in the army for a year or less, and of these four had been called up since
November 19640 Despite these obvious limitations on their value as a source of
information on the PAVN, the men within the limits of their knowledge gave generally
consistent stories, and were cooperative o There appears generally to be no reason to
question the validity of the information which they gave and which is believed more
reliable than the first cabled ~ report received lost March of their initial interrogation.
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Movement of the 3d Battalion, 9th Regiment, 304th Division into Laos-. The
men t h i s eon are in agreement that t ey left NI-WT, n , North V1 am6
between 2 and 4 February 1965, after a few days or hours notice that their units were
going on a military operations Three said they were told that they were going to South
Vietnam, one that they were going to the South to assist in the "war of liberation,"
while all others (including the two men from the units at Lac Quan and Bach Mai) were
told only that they were going on an unspecified military operation. None was told that
they were going to Laos and some never learned that they were in Laos until after their
capture
The men?s stories leave little doubt that the entire 3d Battalion left Ninh Binh
All stated that their whole platoons or companies departed, and none referred to the
assignment of any cover designations or infiltration group numbers such as have usually
been given to groups headed for South Vietnam o The men traveled in PAVN uniforms,
taking with them their individual weapons ammunition, an extra uniform, other per-
sonal equipment, and rice rations. They departed Ninh Binh in trucks driven by PAVN
soldiers (not assigned to their units), with one platoon (about 20 to 30 men) to a truck
and accompanied by extra trucks which carried food.
Although this movement began several days before the start of US air strikes on
North Vietnam,. the truck movements south from Ninh Binh were made entirely at night,
and the men dispersed into the jungle to sleep during the day. In addition, the trucks
were completely enclosed to prevent observation by the troops of the route they were
taking
As a result of these security measures, some of the men had no idea as to where
they entered Laos or in fact that they had. From the reports of others who were able to
trace the route, however, and the time required for the trip, it is evident that the 3d
Battalion entered Laos via Route 12 and the Mu Gia Pass, and that all companies arrived
at the Laos border at about the same time. The men variously stated that the trip by truck
took from four to six nights, after which their units left the trucks and proceeded on foot
One man stated that his platoon travelled 10 to i 1 days by truck and was well inside Laos
when a supply truck hit a mine and the men then disembarked. It appears that the other
platoons probably left the trucks at about the Laos border or close to it. From then on
for nearly a month, the men moved on foot largely or entirely at night through the jungle
and deserted villages, marching by platoons and usually seeing no other troops from the
battalion or any other people. From their lack of reference to movement on a rood, it
appears that they did not travel down Route 23 but along jungle trails
About 0300 on 8 March all three companies of the 3d Battalion apparently
reached Dong Hen after marching alI night and attacked immediately. (Reports at the
time gave the date of attack as 9 March but interrogations consistently give 8 Marche)
Although some of the men were unaware of the presence there of any units other than
their own platoons or companies, two sources reported that the three companies met at
Dong Hene and attacked together, and one reported that two Pathet Lao companies also
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participated in the attack 4 Among the PAVN dead was the commander of the 3d
Battalion . Most of the prisoners stated they were wounded in the early stages of the
action, became separated from their units and were captured several days later after
wandering in the jungle o None apparently had any idea of the plan for the attack,
had not rehearsed it or trained with any of the other attacking units, nor had they
apparently received any information on what they were to do
Possible movement of other elements of the 304th Division: Two of the
prisoners c aimed that two other battalions o t e t Regiment t e 1st and 2d Battalions)
had also left Ninh Binh,, allegedly for South Vietnam, within a day or two of the de-
parture of the 3d Battalion. One stated he had been told this by has platoon leadetr, and
the other did not say how he knew it. Neither source had apparently witnessed the de-
parture of any other elements of the 9th Regiment and had no further information on such
a movement. Contrary to the first cabled reports, none of the sources reported that
elements of any other regiment of the 304th Division had left for South Vietnam o The
sources had no information on any other regiments of the division o Except for the report
from the prisoner who claimed to have moved with the "2d independent Company" from
Bach Mai to Dong Hens, there is no indication that any other PAVN units participated
in the bong Hene attack o
PAVN conscri tion and terms of service: All men are eligible for conscription
in their 48th year andtEus may Fe cal ed up at age 17 o None of the sources had
volunteered for the Army; all had been conscripted. Four said their terms of service
were for two years, four had been drafted for three years, and the other did not know
his term of service. One stated that for healthy recruits the form is three years and for
others less physically fit, -it is two years. The subjects reported that they had received
medical examinations which they considered quite thorough prior -to induction; they
generally had no idea what percentage of men were conscripted although one believed
that 70 percent of those examined were not accepted for military service o Three of the
men inducted had previously been deferred, two because the family needed his assistance
and the other for medical masons. Normally caliups do not occur until after the Viet-
namese New Year (early February); however, two of the sources had been called up in
January 1965 which was apparently considered somewhat unusual
Training and equipment: Sources confirmed that the SKS 7a62mm semiautomatic
carbine (either the Soviet or C inese model) is standard equipment in PAVN infantry
units. The heavy machine gun platoon of the battalion also was equipped with three
Soviet 7o62mm heavy machine guns and the AK assault rifle. None of the men knew
of any radio or other communications equipment at company level although some believed
there might be radios at battalion level
Not only the new recruits (two of the prisoners had left Ninh Binh after only
a month's service) but also the men with longer service appear to have had extraordinarily
little training to prepare them for guerrilla warfare in either Laos or South Vietnam,
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Although equipped with modem rifles, some had never had live firing practice and
most of them had fired live ammunition only once. They had little tactical training
and apparently none at company or battalion level, very little if any night training,
and little practice in live grenade throwing or assembly or disassembly of their weapons,
and apparently none in guerrilla warfare, camouflage or more sophisticated subjects.
Political indoctrination: Although some subjects reported attending political
lectures Toni__ attended fur during 18 months at Ninh Binh), they had received
very little if any indoctrination concerning the war in South Vietnam or North Viet-
namese assistance to the Viet Cong < None mentioned being given any instruction prior
to the departure of their units or en route as to the purpose of the war in South Vietnam
or Laos or why they were being sent
NIC comments: It would be hazardous to draw any sweeping conclusions from
the statements of these low level sources concerning either the general level of training
in the PAVN or the infiltration of units into Laos and South Vietnam o Nonetheless,
certain tentative assessments may be made:
1 o There are several reasons to question whether this battalion was in fact
on route to South Vietnam at all o The normal route of groups or units moving to South
Vietnam is well to the southeast of Routes 12 and 23, entering Laos just north of the
DMZ and following a series of trails close to the South Vietnamese border generally
close to new Route 92 and its connecting routes into South Vietnam). In addition, some
infiltrators in recent months have reported moving directly across the DMZ. It is believed
that no infiltrator has ever reported that he moved through the Mu Gia Pass and down or
close to Routes 12 and 23. The sources also travelled in full PAVN uniform whereas units
destined for South Vietnam normally ore reequipped with different clothing in the southern
DRV prior to starting the infiltration trek and are also assigned cover numbers or new
designations. Just why a unit en route to South Vietnam would be sent such a circuitous
route as the 3d Battalion's and diverted to launch an attack well to the west even of
Route 23 is obscure, unless it was simply to give the men some "combat training" in an
operation which was probably regarded as a pushover by the Communists. In any event,
the battalion apparently sustained such heavy casualties that it is doubtful, if it was
en route to South Vietnam, that it arrived as a combat-effective unit o There is only
hearsay information that two other battalions of the 9th Regiment had left for South
Vietnam although this could of course be correct. If so, their route of movement is
unknown.
2. The fact that all known overland infiltration into South Vietnam has
followed trails to the southeast of this unit's and that the 3d Battalion apparently did not
walk down Route 23 but followed trails through the jungle only increases the mystery of
what has become of the several thousand PAVN troops reported by road watchers to have
either moved by truck or walked down Routes 12 and 23 during the past nine months. It
would appear that only a portion of these can reasonably be accounted for as AAA units,
road repair units or replacements for casualties in southern Laos
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3, If these prisoners are a representative sample of the troops in the 3d
Battalion, it would indicate that North Vietnam in early 1965 was sending very poorly
trained and indoctrinated units into Laos and possibly South Vietnam a This in turn would
suggest an increased requirement for manpower for South Vietnam o It may be that the
steps taken by North Vietnam within the past few months to extend PAVN terms of con-
scription and increase the numbers of men inducted into the armed forces, as well as to
increase the training of the militia, are intended as much to anise the quality as the size
of the armed forces o
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NATIONAL INDICATIONS CENTER
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2 September 1965
OPERATIONS OF THE PAVN 335th BRIGADE IN LAOS (1964) AND
GENERAL INFORMATION ON THE PAVN
In September 1964, three PAVN prisoners, all members of the 335th Brigade
(home station Mac Chou, DRV Military Region Northwest) were captured near Tha
Thom, Laos, These three prisoners present an intereFsting contrast with those from the
304th Division in that all were for more knowledgeable on their units and the situation
in the DRV in general, had considerable useful information on the PAVN, and were
better trained and seemingly more intelligent.
Ent into Laos and o erations of the 335th 114 od
All
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pr
soners were from
the 1st Latta eon, t Brigaded ne ad enters Laos on 1 March 1964, when the
bulk of the battalion arrived; the second entered about 1 July 1964 with a group of
about 150 replacements for the 335th Brigade; the third arrived in Laos in August 19640
All sources reported that their movement from Moc Chou to Laos was via Route 6
to Thanh Hoar, and thence via Routes I and 7 into Laos to Khang Khay, the total trip
consuming less than 10 days by truck, The source who arrived with the group of replace-
ments stated that a stop was made at Muong Sen (on Route 7 in the DRV near the Laos
border) for the troops to change into Pathet Lao uniforms; the other sources apparently
did not comment on whether they wore PAVN or Pathet Lao uniforms in Laos.
Two of the sources gave virtually identical information on the structure of the
335th Brigade as composed of: five infantry battalions (numbered ist, 2d, 3d, 4th., and
7th), two artillery battalions (numbered the 10th and 12th), an engineer battalion (the
13th), plus other support companies.
The entire 1st Battalion (minus one company which moved later) apparently
left Mac Chou about 21 February 1964 for Laos. The source who left at that time stated
further that by September 1964, five battalions of the 335th Brigade (the 1st, 2d, 3d
and 7th infantry battalions and the engineer battalion) were all in Laos, together with
the brigade headquarters which was established at Khang Khay. One of the other men
had heard that all infantry battalions and the engineer battalion of the brigade were
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operating in Laos in 1964, but probably not artillery battalions. The 335th Brigade
field hospital was permanently stationed at Khang Khay.
The source who left Moe Chou with the remaining company of the 1st Battalion
in late August has provided some interesting information which may help to explain
how the "some" battalions of various PAVN units have sometimes been reported moving
into South Vietnam more than once. He stated that his company remained behind until
a new unit of three companies had been formed; he did not know whether it was organized
into a battalion. The brigade in 1964? thus appears to have been split into a forward brigade
headquarters at Khang Khay and a remaining group at its home station at Moe Chou which
may have been serving primarily as a training unit for the formation of new units. The
sources apparently did not know or did not state whether the brigade commander had moved
to Khang Khay. However, one of the men stated that the commander of DRV Military
Region Northwest, Lt. Gen. Bang Mange was in Khang Khay in June 1964. PAVN
operations in upper Laos are directed by the commander of this military region, while
PAVN operations in central and lower Laos are directed by the Commander, Military
Region iV
The battalions of the 335th Brigade evidently played a major role in the
Communist offensive which drove the Kong Le and FAR forces from their positions in
Xieng Khouang Province in the spring of 1964. The first source reported that his unit
participated in the attacks on Phou Nang and the Plaine des Jarres. The 1st Battalion
was subsequently moved to the Muong Ngan area near Tha Thom where the sources were
captured in the successful Lao Government operations in mid-September 1964.
Until this operation, where the PAVN forces were hampered by heavy rains,
supply seems to have been adequate. Apparently most of the supplies for the PAVN
units were trucked in from North Vietnam. The sources reported minimal or no contact
with the Pathet Lao, raising a question as to whether the numerous reports from Laos of
combined Pathet Lao/PAVN units are accurate and suggesting that PAVN units probably
operate largely independently.
PAVN conscription: The sources report an annual conscription, usually in
February, a though actua inductions apparently may be delayed in some cases. Two of
the men, as well as one of the prisoners from the 304th Division, reported various
classifications of men eligible for conscription, as follows: A?1 - no physical defects;
Amt - minor defects but acceptable; A-3 ? serious ailments and acceptable for service
only in times of emergency or great need; B or B?1 m physically unfit and not acceptable
for service; and C disabled. (Thus, any references to the callup of men from the A?3
category should be watched as an indicator that emergency conscription is under way and
would probably signify that :considerably accelerated callups had been initiate) The
sources all reported service in the militia as compulsory for men not accepted for regular
army service.
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Assignment of new APO numbers for foreign service: It was reported that units
were assigned new Q numbers on transfer to Laos and that these carried a different
letter suffix (NY for Laos as opposed to SK numbers in the DRV). However, it is not clear
whether there is a permanent set of special letter suffixes for DRV units operating in Laos.
Recruitment for service in South Vietnam: One of the sources reported that in
his unit only vo unteers were sent to Sout Vietnam and not all who volunteered were
selected,. Personnel could submit written requests to be sent to South Vietnam at any
time; those selected were told not to expect to return home before the end of the war.
Three months, special training was given men selected for service in South Vietnam. Many
individuals had been sent to South Vietnam from the 1st Battalion. In addition, he
reported that a new battalion, the 8th Dien Bien Phu Battalion, had been organized from
veterans of this campaign in June 1963 and sent into South Vietnam.
.CONFOENTIAL
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