TWENTY DAYS IN OCTOBER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: June 23, 1974
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
BEST COPY
AVAILABLE
I I AF. ? ?A II SI Asee.-1
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIALRIDP94T00754R000100140006-0
The part called for someone taller, slimmer, more
adept at reviewing Arab honor guards, more tra-
ditional in his diplomatic style, a connoisseur of
couscous and Casbah conventions, a WASP. No pro-
ducer had ever dreamed of Henry of Arabia!
And yet, eight short months after the Yom Kippur
war?a war that left the United States at the wrong
end of an Arab oil embargo and in a weakened
strategic position throughout the Arab world?
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has become the
hero of the Middle East. After six whirlwind trips
through the area (the last as tour guide for a
wounded President eager to recapture his image as
a statesman), Kissinger has been hailed by the
Arabs as a "superman" and "mediator of peace."
Ironically, at the same time, he was being subjected
to renewed criticism at home?over his controver-
sial role in the Nixon Administration's wiretapping
of public officials and newsmen?criticism that led
? him angrily to threaten to resign.
Against stiff odds, Kissinger, In November, 1973,
launched an extraordinary diplomatic peace effort:
He pushed for Israeli withdrawal from occupied
Arab territory, but within the context of Israeli
security; encouraged the re-emergence of Arab pride,
but within the context of realism and responsibility;
sought to build up the stature of the moderates
By Marvin Kalb
and Bernard Kalb
By 9 P.M. on Friday, Oct. 5, 1973, Ray Cline, then
head of the U. S. State Department's Bureau of In-
telligence and Research, had reviewed his latest in-
formation, and he concluded that war would break
out in the Middle East the following day, or even
sooner. Others at the State Department shared his
alarm, but somehow, they couldn't communicate it
to Henry Kissinger; no one wanted to take the re-
sponsibility for disturbing t4 Secretary of State at
the Waldorf Towers on a Friday evening after
hours. He was In New York attending a United
Nations meeting.
Marvin Kalb is a diplomatic correspondent and
Bernard Kalb a Washington correspondent for CBS.
This article is adapted from the Kalb brothers'
forthcoming book, "Kissinger."
. ? ?
;:opyrieht AD 1971 by Marvin Kalb and ',m "
ord Kelb from "Kissinger.
used by permission of time. Brown and yomoany: Inc
,Approved For ,Release 2005/02/2.e',.;
After the cease-fire: Kissinger with Sadat in Cairo.
within the Arab world, starting with Sadat of
Egypt; tried to rebuild America's strategic position a
in a critical part of the world, gently elbowing Rus-
sia out of her prewar pre-eminence; attempted to
persuade the oil-producing Arab states to lift their
embargo against the United States; and, last but
not least, hoped that he would be able to inject a
Actually, there had been a steady flow of intelli-
gence for several weeks indicating that an Egyptian-
Syrian attack on Israel was imminent; and yet
Kissinger and most other political leaders in both
Israel and the United States misread the evidence.
Most of them still believed there would be no war.
The next day, Oct. 6, was a very special day.
For Moslems, it was the 1,350th anniversary of the
Battle of Badr, which launched Mohammed's entry
into Mecca. For Jews, it was Yom Kippur, the
holiest day in the Jewish calendar. For Kissinger,
It was more than simply the end of his second
week in office; it was also the beginning of a 20-
day baptism of fire?the start of the fourth Arab-
Israeli war in one generation.
At 6 A.M., he was awakened in suite 35A at the
Waldorf Towers and presented a telegram from the b
American Ambassador to Israel, Kenneth Keating. ? t
Keating had been summoned two hours earlier in, A
Jerusalem to an urgent meeting with then Prime f
Minister Golda Met., who told him she had just re- ' ti
ceived word that Egypt and Syria were in the final
hours of a countdown for war. She urged the united d
States to use all its influence to try to head them
, off, .suggesting appeals to Egypt, Syria and the Sc-':
,
??
, ? , ?,
4RDF.?94T0054R00010014,0110,67,
cirikteleate, 28 .
/iiktfit!it-0611.4
V,
revolutionary goal in the Middle East?that Arab
and Israeli alike could begin to believe in the possi-
bility Of a Peaceful accommodation.
Within a few months, his "shuttle diplomacy"
began to work. He coaxed and charmed Egypt into
concluding a historic agreement with Israel, per-
uaded King Faisal and his friends to lift their oil
mbergo, and, late last month, capped a photos
inish diplomatic extravaganza ?33 days of
shuttling between Damascus and Jerusalem?by
bringing these two old enemies into an agreement
to disengage their military forces along the hot
Golan front. The disengagement is scheduled to be
completed next week.
The SeCtetary needs no experts to tell him now
that a good part of the new look in Arab policy is
based on the premise that he will continue to help
the Egyptians and the Sgrians obtain a further pull-
back of Israeli troops, and that delicate diplomacy
will still ,be needed. Nevertheless, his performance
thus far has indeed been a personal tour de force,
an achievement that rose from the very ashes of
the October war. And those dark days did not look
even remotely. promising then, as a new Secretary
of State moved into Foggy Bottom only to find?
himself confronted by what he soon perceived as a
"murderously dangerous" situation?M.K; B.K.
viet Union, and she assured Keating that Israel
wotild not launch a pre-emptive attack.
Kissiaggr called President Nixon, who was at Key
Biscayne, with the disturbing news, and, after hear-
ing the Secretary's ireport, the President tolta him to
telephone the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel
to urge "restraint." Kissinger called and exhorted
them to "avoid undermining. . . the cease-fire." To
Israel's Abba Eban he also repeated the warning he
had made many times during the previous months:
"Don't preempt.".
The ,Secretary of State then converted his hotel
suite, into a command post, and summoned his top
aides: In quick order, Kissinger called Soviet -Am-
bassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin in Washington and
urged him to do what he could to prevent the out-
break of war. The Russian envoy said he would
try to help., Kissinger cabled King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia', and King Hussein of Jordan, two , of the
friendlier 'Aiab leaders. and asked theta to "use
their good offices." And Kissinger called U. N. Sec-
re407, General Kurt Waldheira, alerting him to the ?
Secretary then asked for the latest
jfligce.ItIt revealed that the Egyptian and Syrian
lied in fact swilOS; 100 offensive forma-
14
,
k,a
A
,
Approved For Releae 2005/02/28: :':CIA7RDP94T00754Rp00100140006-0
4
rna
ttissT
a tae e ,f.
ael
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
The well-coordinated Arab assault (an Egyptian bridgehead on
the Suez Canal) shook Kissinger's assumption that the
spirit of d?nte would encourage the Soviet Union to use
its influence to head off the war. Instead, the
Russians contributed directly to the initial Arab
success by shipping massive quantities of ammunition,
tions, but that Israeli military units of both fronts
had reacted to this clear-cut threat in an odd way.
For the most part, they remained in static positions.
Kissinger assumed, despite Mrs. Meir's messages,
that Israel was really seeking to lull her Arab
neighbors into a false sense of security and then,
at just the right moment, planned to deal them a
punishing pre-emptive blow.
At 7 A.M., there was more bad news. The Situa-
tion Room at the White House had monitored a
garbled report from Israel, which was interpreted as
meaning that the Jewish state planned to launch a
pre-emptive strike against Egypt and Syria "in six
hours." Kissinger, puzzled by the crisscrossing sig-
nals, angrily called Mordechai Shalev, Israel's
Charg?'Affaires in Washington, and warned once
again against any pre-emptive action. As a double
check, he instructed Keating to repeat the warning
to MA. Meir, saying, in effect that if Israel struck
first, then the United States would feel no moral
obligation to help. Israel would be alone.
As it turned out, Keating's warning was unnec-
essary. Mrs. Meir at just that moment was con-
vening her "Kitchen Cabinet," which really met in
her kitchen. She conferred with Deputy Prime Min-
ister Yigal Anon, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan,
and Minister Without Portfolio Israel GaMi. She re-
jected the urgent pleading of her military Chief of
Staff, .Gen. David Elazar, who argued for a pre-
emptive strike to disrupt what he now regarded as
a certainty?an Arab attack. The Prime Minister
decided that Israel would accept the first blows.
Her decision proved historic. By reversing 25
years of Israeli strategy?a strategy based on quick,
bold surprises that invariably carried the battle to
the enemy?she placed Israel on the defensive. She
assumed, as did so many others, that Israel, even if
attacked first, could rapidly repulse and rout the
enemy. Mrs. Meir ? instructed Elazar to alert some
units, but she refused to put the country on full
alert. She refused even to call up the reserves. She
didn't want to disrupt Yom Kippur; she didn't want
to provoke the Arabs; she didn't want to spend
$11-million, which a full alert would have cost
(there had been two expensive false alarms earlier
in the year); but, perhaps most important, she didn't
want to go against Kissinger's injunctions.
Keating informed Kissinger about .Mrs. Metes
decision. Kissinger informed Egypt's Foreign Min-'
ister Mohammed el-Zayyat and Dobrynin. Then he
called Shalev one more time, apparently even then
harboring some doubts about Mrs. Meir's assur-
ances. "We took the responsibility upon ourselves,"
he told the Israeli diplomat, (Continued on Page 42)
The Soviet airlift and and alert changed Kissinger's attitude
about Israel's capacity to win a quick victory. He determined
to open a massive airlift of American military
supplies to Israel. (Evacuating Israeli wounded in the Sinai.)
? e:The New. York Times Magazine/Auto 23, 1994
Approved For 1eIease 2005/02/28 :,CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
A pp 170.Y.P FP rRetpase :20t)/132/28:, C
ofi mow
Continued from Page I
"that you will really act ac-
cordingly." Shalev repeated
his earlier assurances.
At 8 A.M., Egypt and Syria
attacked. The war began.
Within minutes, el-Zayyat
was on the phone, accusing
Israel of having provoked the
Arab military moves by send-
ing her naval force against
the Syrian port of Latakia.
This struck Kissinger as
strange. If Israel were to start
a war, he was absolutely
sure that it would begin with
an air strike, not a naval at-
tack. At 8:25 A.M. Shalev
called. "Egyptian and Syrian
forces have commenced mili-
tary action against Israel," he
announced solemnly. Kissin-
ger told him about el-Zayyat's
accusation. Shalev denied it.
'What are you going to do
now?" Kissinger asked.
"We'll take care ? of our-
selves," Shalev replied.
Kissinger returned to Wash-
ington by midafternoon, con-
vinced that the Arabs had
started the war. El-Zayyat's
claim?that Israel had struck
first?made a few converts at
the Pentagon. But by evening,
when W.S.A.G., the Washing-
ton Special Actions Group, re-
convened in a crisis atmos-
phere, additional information
had convinced the top United
States officials that Egypt
and Syria had broken the
cease-fire and that Israel had
merely responded. Joining the
Secretary at this meeting
were former Deputy Secretary
of State Kenneth Rush, Under
Secretary of State Joseph J.
Sisco, Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger, C.I.A. Director
William Colby and Adm.
Thomas Moorer, Chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
was the same group which,
with the President, was to
make most of the basic de-
cisions throughout the war.
That evening, they ordered
the commander of the U. S.
Sixth Fleet to move four ships
?the attack aircraft carrier
Independence and three de-
stroyers ? from Athens to
Crete, 500 miles from the
coast of Israel. They ordered
all American embassies in
the Middle East area to pre-
pare for an evacuation of de-
pendents. They considered
calling for an emergency
meeting of the U. N. Security
Council, but made no deci-
sion then.
On Sunday. Oct. 7. Kissin-
42
ger got permission from the
President to push for a Secur-
ity Council meeting; but, be-
cause of Soviet reservations,
the United States did not im-
mediately appeal for a cease-
fire. Kissinger, who had never
been noted for his enthusi-
asm about the U. N., concen-
trated instead on the battle-
field situation, which he knew
would determine his diplo-
matic tactics. He checked the
latest intelligence. Israeli re-
servists, , he learned, had
broken away from Yom Kip-
pur religious services and
rushed to assembly points all
over the country and then,
depending on their units, to
the Golan or Suez fronts.
Now the Israelis, once con-
sidered militarily invincible,
were on the defensive; the
Arabs, once ridiculed as mili-
tarily incompetent, were on
the attack. Syrian tanks were
blasting big holes through the
undermanned Israeli lines on
the Golan Heights. On the
southern front, there was
even more dramatic news.
Thousands of Egyptian troops,
supported by hundreds of
tanks and armored vehicles,
had crossed the Suez Canal
in a surprise move that
caught the Israelis completely
off guard, and established
bridgeheads on the eastern
bank for the first time since
1967. The famed Bar-Ley Line
began to crack.
Overnight* this
sated Arab assault on the
Jewish state shook Kisakager'S
cherished assumption that tha.,
spirit of detente ? ?would ,,en!??
courage the Soviet Union to
use its influence to head off ?
the war. Instead, it turned
out that the Russians not ?
only had known about the
war in advance and alerted
no one to the "threat to the
peace," but, in additiOn, they
had contributed directly to
the initial Arab successes by
shipping massive quantities
of ammunition to Cairo and
Damascus in the two or three ,
weeks immediately preceding
the outbreak of hostilities.
Kissinger was angry and dis-
appointed; angry at the Rus-
sians, disappointed. in himself.
Years before, he had written:
"The test of statesmanship is;
the adequacy of its evalua-
tion before the event." He
took another took at the pre-
war intelligence and conclu- '
ded belatedly that the Rus-
sians must have calculated
that they could have both de-
tente and war. To what de,
gree Watergate influenced
their judgment, Kissinger
could not be sure.
Although he wilt angry at
the Russians, he realized that
he needed their cooperation
to contain the fighting and to
establish a framework for ne-
gotiations. He talked with
Dobrynin several times that
day. pi one occasion, he
gave him a personal letter
from the President to the So-
viet's Leonid Brezhnev, ap-
pealing for a cease-fire and a
commitment to contain the
fighting. Nixon reminded the
Soviet leader that they had
Syrian casualty on the road to Damascus. As the 13ras
within 20 miles of the Syrian capital, the Russians
Approved For Release 2005/02/28: CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
got permission from the
esident to push for a Secur-
Council meeting; but, be-
Ilse of Soviet reservations,
3 United States did not hn-
allately appeal for a cease-
e. Kissinger, who had never
en noted for his entbusi-
n about the U. N., concen-
ted instead on the battle.
Id situation, which he knew
tild determine his diplo-
tic tactics. He checked the
est intelligence. Israeli re-
vista, he learned, had
ken away from Yom Kip-
religious services and
hed to assembly points all
r the country and then,
'ending on their units, to
Golan or Suez fronts.
'low the Israelis, once con-
ered militarily invincible,
re on the 'defensive; the
'be, once ridiculed as mili-
ly incompetent, were on
attack. Syrian tanks were
sting big holes through the
lermanned Israeli lines on
Golan Heights. On the
thorn front, there was
n more dramatic news.
lusainds of Egyptian troops,
ported by hundreds of
ks and armored vehicles,
crossed the Suez Canal
a surprise move that
ght the Israelis completely
guard, and established
igeheads on the eastern
k for the first time since
7. The famed Bar-Lev Line
an to crack.
Overnight, this well-coordi-
nated Arab assault on the
Jewish state shook Kissingees
cherished assumption that the
spirit of d?nte would en-
courage the Soviet Union to
use its influence to head off
the war. Instead, it turned
out that the Russians not
only had known about the
war in advance and alerted
no one to the "threat to the
peace," but, in addition, they
had contributed directly to
the initial Arab successes by
shipping massive quantities
of ammunition to Cairo and
Damascus in the two or three
weeks immediately preceding
the outbreak of hostilities.
Kissinger was envy and dis-
appointed; angry at the Rus-
sians, disappointed in himself.
Years before, he had written:
"The test of statesmanship is
the adequacy of its evalua-
tion before the event." He
took another look at the pre-
war intelligence and conclu-
ded belatedly that the Rus-
sians must have calculated
that they could have both d?
tente and war. To what de-
gree Watergate influenced
their judgment, Kissinger
could not be sure.
Although he wet angry at
the Russians, he realized that
he needed their cooperation
to contain the fighting and to
establish a framework for ne-
gotiations. He talked with
Dobrynin several times that
day. On one occasion, he
gave him a? personal letter
from the President to the So-
viet's Leonid Brezhnev, ap-
pealing for a cease-fire and a
commitment to contain the
fighting. Nixon reminded the
Soviet leader that they had
signed two special communi-
quas---in May, 1972, in Mos-
cow, and in June, 1973, 111
Washington-at:sledging "to do
everything in their power so
that conflicts or situations
will not arise which would
serve to increase internation-
al tensions." Later that night,
Dobrynin returned with a
letter from Brezhnev to the
President, agreeing to con-
sider a cease-fire at the U. N.
and expressing the hope that
the fighting could be con-
tained. Kissinger was moder-
ately pleased, because the
letter seemed to suggest that
Russia's aims in the Middle
East were modest; and if Rus-
sia's aims were modest, then
Arab aims might be, too.
At 6 P.M., he met with
Israeli Ambassador Simcha
Dinitz at the State Depart-
ment. The Israeli envoy had
returned to Washington from
Jerusalem with a modest arms
request from Mrs. Meir?es-
sentially, an update of her
plea of the week before to
expedite the delivery of the
48 Phantom jet fighters, as
well as tanks and electronic
equipment.
Kissinger responded sym-
pathetically, and promised to
help. But despite the initial
Arab successes, Kissinger ex-
pected a quick Israeli victory
?an expectation that was en-
couraged by Dinitz's upbeat
report about the plans for
Israeli counterattacks, then
in the final stages of prepar-
ation?and he did not feel
that it would be necessary to
open a massive emergency
pipeline of supplies to Israel.
He did not want to be provoc-
ative. He did not want to
casualty on the road to Damascus. As the Israelis went on the
20 miles of the Syrian capital, the Russians began pressing
attack, driving to
for a cease-fire.
antagonize the Russians, . Or ?
the Ara'. The Aelministraieote
was under heavy pressure
from the oil lobby to give the
Arabs a chance to recover
their occupied territories or.
at the very le at, to take no ,
pro-Israeli action that could
goad the Arabs into imposing
an Oil embargo on the United
States at a time of increasing
energy shortages. If the Is-
raelis were successful, as
he fully expected, he did not
believe that he would have
to change his over-all strat-
tegy.
Early on the morning of
Monday, Oct. 8, as the war
picked up momentum on both
fronts, Schlesinger met with
his top aides and, according
to reliable sources, rejected a
request that Israeli planes be
allowed to land in the United
States to pick up ammunition
and spare parts. Israel's Gen-
eral Elazar had predicted
that morning that his forces
would soon go on the offen-
sive, but his prediction was
based, in part, on the expec-
tation of increased American
supplies. When Dinitz learned
about Schlesinger's rejection,
he was puzzled. He called Kis-
singer and pointed out that
Russia was not embarrassed
about helping her friends;
why did the United States ap-
pear to be so reluctant about
helping Israel? Kissinger said
he would check. After an ex-
change with the Pentagon, he
called back and announced
that permission had been
granted for "a limited number
of Israeli planes" to land at
United States bases and pick
up supplies, "provided they
paint their tails," that is, paint
over the identifying six-
pointed Jewish star. Clearly,
the Administration was try-
ing not to offend the Arabs or
the oil lobby.
At 1:15 P.M., Kissinger
called Dinitz again. He had
good news. He said the Presi-
dent had given his "approval
in principle" to replace Israeli
plane losses, which were run-
ning quite high.
At 5 P.M., Dinitz called
Kissinger. He had just been
on the phone with Mrs. Meir,
who pleaded that "top pri-
ority" be placed not only on
the delivery of planes and
tanks already requested but
also on a new shopping list,
necessitated by the intensified
fighting and Israel's heavy
losses. Kissinger said he
would consider the new list;
meanwhile, he disclosed that
he had been able to get two
planes out of the Pentagon,
no more. Tanks, he said, pre-
(Continued on Page 48)
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
:11
lade to the size and shape you need; round,
or square. For the dining room, living room,
r office. Unique construction of 2 inch thick
walnut, oak or maple to give a butcher block
better. Combine walnut and oak to get a
striped look. To finish simply oil or vf3rnish.
ce of 4 different bases; leg and apron, H-type
? oak or chrome pedestal. Come in and see
I really special at a price you can afford. Also
3ther ready-to-finish solid hardwood chests,
)eds, bookcases, desks, shelving etc.
intry Workshop
/room: 95 SOITIO St., Newark, N.J. '
5. Closed Sun. 8 Mon. [phone]
cent to Rt. 1 near Newark Airport.
J. Rt. 1, next to the Prince Theater, [phone]
tiess. 2327 Mass. Ave. [phone]
-0
A rare new flower
has bloome.cl.
The Tennis Flower?
by H.Stern.
*t,,
3
.cies. Examine the graceful petals. What do you
rid look in the center. That's right-14k gold tennis
e leafy tie at the base.-yes, a towel. The tennis
te gold while the rest of the brooch is yellow gold.
- for a rare person. It's not meant to commemorate
asion but just to tell someone who happens to
or tennis that you happen to have a very deep
See it in our elegant showroom or order by mail
mice $250. New York residents please add 7%
cCAN EXPRESS CREDIT CARDS ACCEPTED
0
.South America's Leading Jewelers
Is, inc., 681 Fifth Ave., N.Y., N.Y. 10022 ? 212-688-1740
Continued from Page 42
? ,
sented an even nxore coin-
plicated problem. It Would
take "many weeks" to spring
them. What about transferring
the tanks from an American
base in Western Europe, sug-
gested Dinitz. Kissinger said
he would check. Why was it
so difficult to get the planes,
asked Dinitz, if the President
had given his "approval in
principle?" Kissinger hinted
that he was having "bureau-
cratic difficulties at the Penta-
gon." Dinitz requested a
meeting with Kissinger.
At 6:40 P.M., he was
ushered into Kissinger's
White House ofgce. He told
the Secretary of State that
Senators Henry Jackson, Wal-
ter Mondale, Birch Bayh,
Charles Percy, and other Pres-
idential aspirants had volun-
teered to help Israel get weap-
ons. Dinitz, fully aware of the
pressure Israel's American
supporters could exert, said
he didn't know how long he
could hold off the public out-
cry that Kissinger feared
could complicate his d?nte
with the Russians. Israel
needed planes and tanks, and
needed them immediately.
Intelligence had poured into
Kissinger's office all day in-
dicating that Israel was hav-
ing a rough time. He revised
his estimate that the Israelis
would need no more than
three days to seize the offen-
sive and defeat the Arabs;
now, he thought, they would
need five days. The Secretary
told Dinitz, at last, that Israel
would be getting the two
Phantoms within 24 hours.
Two! Dinitz exclaimed. Israel
needed dozens! Kissinger
claimed that if it weren't for
his personal intercession, Is-
rael would not even have got-
ten those. The Pentagon op-
posed any Phantom deliveries
at this stage. Kissinger implied
again that he was fighting
Dinitz's battles in the Amer-
ican bureaucracy.
In between these calls and
meetings with Dinitz, Kissinger
was carrying on a similar
series df calls and meetings
with Dobrynin. That evening,
in an address at the Pacem in
Terris conference, he issued
an indirect warning to the
Russians. "We shall resist ag-
gressive foreign policies," he
said firmly. "D?nte cannot
survive irresponsibility in any
area, including the Middle
East." Kissinger had no doubt
that Dobrynin would be filing
his carefully worded warning
to the Kremlin that night.
But the warning had no effect.
On Tuesday, Oct. 9, the Sec-
retary received a series of dis-
turbing reports. One cited an
increase in the number of So-
,
vlet ' supply h1ps stearain&
toward Syrian and Egyptian '
ports. Another focused on', a
big boost in , the number of
Soviet warships in the Med-
iterrartean. Still another sug-
gested that Brezhnev had
changed his mild tone. In a
message to President Houari
Botunediene, the , militant
leader of Algeria, the Soviet
party chief urged the Algerian
people to "use all means at
their disposal and take all the
required steps with a view to
supporting Syria and Egypt in
the difficult struggle imposed
by the Israeli Aggressors."
Brezhnev seemed to be en-
couraging Algeria to join the -
Arab war against Israel. In
Kissinger's mind, that was a
far cry from urging restraint.
Kissinger and Dinitz met for
the first time that day at 8:15
A.M. The Israeli diplomat wts
back in the Secretary's White
House office, repeating his ,
urgent demand for planes and'
tanks. Israel, he pleaded, had
already lost at least 15 Phan-
toms and 45 A-4 Skyhawks,
light attack bombers. That
amounted to a loss of 20 per
cent of all the planes Israel
had ever received from the
United States. The new mo-
bile SAM-6 missile, supplied
by the Russians to Egypt and
Syria, had been deadly accu-
rate. Electronic jamming
equipment, similar to that
used by United States fighters
against other SAM missiles
over North Vietnam, was des-
perately needed. What was
holding up deliveries? Kissin-
ger cut short the meeting, ex-
plaining that he would deal
with the entire problem on
an urgent basis.
At 11:45 A.M., Kissinger
called Dinitz, complaining
again about, difficulties with
the bureaucracy, implying that '
he was engaged in a one-man
fight with the Pentagon. By
this time, Kissinger had a pri-
vate, secure line put into
Dinitz's office at the Israeli
Embassy. The Secretary asked
the Ambassador to return to
the White House at 6:15 that
evening. In the meantime, Kis-
singer conferred with Nixon
and that night was able to tell
Dinitz that the President had
approved "all" the Israeli re-
quests. All plane and tank
losses would be replaced. All
electronic equipment, includ-
ing jamming devices, would be
furnished, and Israeli trans-
port planes would be permit-
ted to land at the Oceana Na-
val Air Station at Virginia
Beach, Va., to pick up Spar-
row and Sidewinder air-to-air
missiles and other sophisti-
cated hardware.
There had been increasing
Congressional pressure on the
Administration all day to send
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
Picture a pe
brown-hal
thirty years
tering The
ticipation.
but for her fl
retary to th
sterer and d
Plaza. Tod
Arendt, a
Yorker for
back, occup
office with
and marble
answers to
rector of "R
At The PI
track of o
? guest room
Ballroom, th
eleven of th
ful parlor s
for wedding
business co
her job to re
Catherin
sponsible f
suites are k
visiting roy
taries. And
Catherin
to preservi
heritage. In
dowalls, p
solescence,
its exquisit
ings, crysta
candelabra
ties, tableau
sculpture, g
antique mi
nishings, is
bastions of
splendour, in
Catherine
dian of our
landmark* a
F. Bart Mo
same dedic
weddings, s
tions and b
ings that C
to "Rehab".
at 212 PLaz
7-2
A Soneta
Fifth Avenue a
New Vor
?The Plaza oar
been designet
New York b
Comm
?zr
Pictuos a petite, dark-eyed,
brort-haired girl some
thirtyetears ago. She is en-
terinThe Plaza with an-
ticipa&n. Not as a guest?
but for her first job: as sec-
retanpoto the head uphol-
stere4nd decorator at The
Plaza o Today, Catherine
Arent, a native New
Yorkstofor six generations
back,c8ocupies a spacious
officdwith gold curtains
and ngirble fireplace and
answegs to the title of Di-
rectolrof "Rehab".
? Ate Plaza she keeps
track-of one thousand
guesigrooms, the Grand
Ballro8m, the Terrace and
eleverkof the most beauti-
ful pallor suites available
for wtirddings, parties and
business conferences. It's
her Oh to rehabilitate them.
_Catherine is also re-.
7.riqz2 for insuring that
-cnz-3:qe kept perfect for
johy and digni-
c11. - -
dedicated
priceless
htnmeraof win-
more military supplies to Is-
rael?Jackson taking the lead
?and Dinitz wondered if it
was this pressure that had
produced the Presidential de-
cision.
At 8:45 P.M., Kissinger
called Dinitz to say that
Schlesinger would be available
on Wednesday to discuss lo-
gistical details. Apparently
there had been some Presi-
dential arm-twisting.
By dawn, Wednesday, Oct.
10, American and Israeli intel-
ligence picked up the first
clear signals of a Soviet air-
lift into Damascus and Cairo.
Its full dimensions were not
yet known.
At 10:45 A.M., Kissinger
called Dinitz to discuss it.
Both diplomats were obvious-
ly concerned: Kissinger, be-
cause the airlift was hardly
an example of Soviet "re-
straint"; Dinitz, because his
enemies had no trouble get-
ting help, while he, as he put
it, had to spend his time
Nixon exploded at Schlesinger: 'To hell with the
charters! Get the supplies there! Get moving!'
"painting Jewish stars off Is-
raeli planes." The Secretary
switched subjects. How was
the war going? He was begin-
ning to question his own rosy
assumptions. On the Golan
front, the Syrians had been
stopped, but there was still
heavy fighting. Israel was sus-
taining heavy tank losses,
largely because Syria had
been equipped with an un-
usually effective antitank mis-
sile, the latest in the Soviet
arsenal. On the Sinai front,
Dinitz said, the Egyptians had
smashed or encircled the Bar-
Lev Line of Israeli defense on
- the east bank of the canal.
More than 20,000 Egyptian
troops, 400 tanks and other
armored vehicles had crossed
the canal, and they were dig-
ging in. Again, Israeli losses
were heavy, in men and ma-
teriel. Elazar's promised
counteroffensive could not get
rolling, and one major reason
was the dwindling ordnance.
What about supplies?
Kissinger called Schlesinger
and asked him to organize ci-
vilian charters to carry Amer-
ican military ?aid to Israel
as quickly as possible. The De-
fense Secretary showed little
enthusiasm, but he offered no
opposition. Kissinger wasn't
sure, at that point, if Schles-
inger intended to help.
At the Pentagon, Schles-
inger was well aware that
Dinitz wanted to see him to
discuss military supplies for
Israel. A tentative noontime
date had been set. At the last
minute, the Defense chief can-
celed the meeting. His deputy,
William P. Clements Jr., a
wealthy Texas drilling con-
tractor with close ties to the
oil industry, had apparently
persuaded him that he needed
more information about Amer-
ican inventaies before he
could provide the Israelis with
an exact timetable for deliv-
eries. No new appointment
with Dinitz was set.
At the White House, Nixon
and Kissinger briefed 10 Sen-
ators and 9 Congressmen.
Senator Mike Mansfield, be-
fore the hour-and-a-half meet-
ing, told reporters that the
United States must not get in-
volved in the war. "I want no
more Vietnams," he said.
From Beirut, there were re-
ports that Brezhnev was ex-
horting all Arab leaders to
join the fight against Israel.
Jordan decided to send a lim-
ited force.
That afternoon, the Admin-
istration's attention was sud-
denly absorbed by still an-
other major political crisis.
Spiro Agnew resigned as Vice
President, pleading no contest
to a charge of tax evasion in
Maryland, his home state. His
resignation, on top of the
growing Watergate scandal,
weakened the Administration
even more. Its effect was to
increase the pressure on Kis-
singer to avoid a foreign-
policy disaster that could end
up toppling the President.
Dinitz returned to the
White House at 3:30, and it
was a scene of frantic ac-
tivity. Kissinger was in the
Oval Office. Maj. Gen. Brent
Scowcroft, 1Cissinger's deputy
CABLE CAR C1LOTHIERS
ROBERT KIWI...Ltd.
S., F-.. Reek& Goods Stow Use ISM
rson we're took-
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
on. the National' Security
Council, told Dinitz that the
Russians had just switched
tactics on a U. N. cease-fire.
U. N. Ambassador John Scan
reported that Moscow was
now proposing an immediate
end to the fighting. The Rus-
sian move was clearly an at-
tempt to freeze the battlefield
situation at a point at which
the Arabs had the initiative
and the Israelis had not yet
been able to mount a counter-
offensive. Dinitz angrily re-
jected the proposal. Israel, he
said, would never accept a
cease-fire until Syrian and
Egyt?tian forces had been
driven back to the prewar
lines: He urged the United
States to open an immediate
airlift of supplies to Israel to
match the Soviet airlift. Scow-
croft promised to convey his
appeal to Kissinger.
Late that afternoon, the Na-
tional Security Agency, which
specializes in electronic in-
telligence, and the CIA. re-
ceived urgent reports from the
Middle East that Russia's larg-
est transport plane?the Anto-
nov-22--was spearheading the
Soviet airlift and that these
lumbering giants were com-
ing into Damascus and Cairo
at fairly regular intervals, sug-
gesting the airlift was becom-
ing "massive." When these re-
ports reached Kissinger's at-
tention, he quickly called
Dinitz. Could the Israeli Am-
bassador come to the White
House at 8 P.M.?
The meeting that evening
lasted for an hour and 15
minutes. It focused on Rus-
sia's call for a cease-fire.
Dinitz repeated his opposition.
"The Russians are hardly in a
position to appear as the paci-
fists," the Israeli Ambassador
stated, with some annoyance.
"They are the ones who
caused the war. They knew of
the impending attack and
didn't warn you and didn't
prevent it. Now they are coax-
ing other Arab Governments
to join the fight against Israel,
and they are sending a big
airlift. And, after all this, they
dare to ask to freeze the
situation!" Kissinger did not
argue. He had been making
the same points to himself.
After Dinitz left, Kissinger
called Dobrynin and per-
suaded him to delay his cease-
fire call.
Late that night, Kissinger
received more disturbing in-
telligence. The C.I.A. had
learned that three Soviet air-
borne divisions in Eastern
Europe had been put on alert.
Why? Russia's clients were
fighting well; better than any-
one had anticipated, in fact.
And direct Soviet intervention
could only trigger American
counteraction, which could
spiral into a nuclear war. It
IF.044014.0.
was, as Kissinger would later
put it, "a murderously dan-
gerous situation, much worse,
much more dangerous than
the 1970 Jordan crisis." He
called Dinitz and recommend-
ed a 7:45 meeting on Thursday
morning.He did not tell him
about the Sciviet alert.
D .
initz's car pulled
into the circular
drive at the dip-
lomatic entrance
of the State Department at
7:40 A.M. The Ambassador
and Charg?'Affaires Shalev,
both bleary-eyed from fatigue,
hurried through the quiet lob-
by, past the giant, rotating
globe and a few reporters too
surprised to get in a question.
Then, for over an hour, Dinitz
and Kissinger focused on one
problem?getting the Penta-
gon to supply Israel with
planes, tanks and electronic
equipment on an emergency
basis. ,
During the night, Kissinger
had reached a major decision:
Russia had to be stopped?
not only to save Israel, but
also, in his mind, to spare the
world the possibility of
a big-power confrontation.
The Soviet airlift and alert
had changed his attitude about
Israel's capacity to win a
quick victory. Just as he had
misjudged prewar intelligence,
so too had he misjudged the
will and capability of the
Arabs and the duplicity of the
Russians. ' He was now de-
termined to open a massive
airlift of American military
supplies to Israel.
"We tried to talk in the
first week," Kissinger later ex-
plained. "When that didn't
work, we said, fine, we'll start
pouring in equipment until we
create a new reality."
Kissinger told Dinitz to see
Schlesinger. In the afternoon,
Kissinger himself again urged
Schlesinger to charter 20
American transport planes to
fly supplies and again Schles-
inger resisted, warning of a
possible oil embargo. Their ar-
gument was resolved only
after Kissinger had won the
President to his point of view.
Nixon ordered Schlesinger to
charter the 20 planes; but by
the end of the day Dinitz still
had heard nothing of the air-
lift, and Israel, meanwhile,
was still suffering heavy
losses.
At 6 P.M., Friday, Dinitz,
accompanied by Gen. Morde-
- chai Gur, then Israeli Defense
Attach?finally got his meet-
ing with Pentagon leaders.
Dinitz reviewed the massive
Soviet contribution to the
Arab cause and then lamented
the "unbelievably slow re-
sponse of the Americans."
Schlesinger did not dispute
the Ambassador's rundown,
(Continued on Page 52)
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
Approved For Release 2005/02/28: CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140008-0
Philadelphia area, make the
With the Stouffer extras that'll
i about choosing us.
The good morning dividend.
Ask for a
morning wake-up
call, and we'll
bring complimentary
hot coffee and a
hot-off-the-presses
copy of the morning
paper to your room.
To get your day
started right.
The instant check-in. And out.
Thanks to our exclusive Prime
Minister Club. When you belong,
you simply pick up your key and
go straight to your room on arrivaL
No registration. No waiting.
Then, just drop off your key when
you leave. We bill you later. Ask
to join the Prime Minister's Club
when you call for reservations.
illy us just once. And see how
good it feels to stop at
toufiri
Valley Forge Hotel
480 N. Gulph Road
of Prussia, Pa. (Philadelphia)
1.97-1
*J1.4
Continued from Page 50
but he explained that "politi-
cal considerations" had
caused the United States to
"slow down." The U. S. did
not want to destroy its "posi-
tion and image in the Arab
world." Private airline charter
companies feared Arab terror-
ism or reprisals and therefore
refused to help Israel. Insofar
as United States military
transports were concerned,
Schlesinger carefully empha-
sized that they would be per-
mitted to carry military sup-
plies to the Azores islands,
but no further. Israel would
have to make other arrange-
ments to get the supplies
from the Azores to Tel Aviv.
Dinitz was flabbergasted. He
said, in that case, the supplies
wouldn't get to Israel "in time
for this war."
Schlesinger moved on to
other subjects, none more
critical to Israel than the
delivery of planes and tanks.
Here he paused for a moment
and then disclosed that the
rate of delivery for Phantoms
would be "one and a half per
day"; but, after "a couple of
days," the deliveries would
be stopped so that, as Schle-
singer explained, the United
States could "read Arab reac-
tion before we decide on fur-
ther shipments." In any case,
there would be no more than
16 Phantoms earmarked for
Israel. The United States, he
continued, intended to do no
more than replace Israeli
losses. Dinitz pointed out
that Israel had already lost
more than 16 Phantoms.
Schlesinger did not dispute
his statistics, but he explained
that the United States had to
"operate in low profile in or-
der not to create an Arab
reaction." Schlesinger was al-
luding to a possible cutoff of
Arab oil, but in his comments
he made no specific mention
of it. "Mr. Secretary, with all
due respect," Dinitz said, "you
are not giving us an answer."
Schlesinger stuck to his guns.
The meeting with the Israeli
Ambassador had turned into
a confrontation. "Mr. Secre-
tary," concluded Dinitz, "in
the recent period, we have
undergone two crises in the
Middle East. One, the Syrian
and Jordanian crisis of 1970,
and the other one we are
going through now. In 1970,
your country needed some-
thing from us. Now we need
something from you. I must
humbly say that we acted dif-
ferently at the time of that
crisis than you do now." The
meeting ended with a cold
handshake.
Shortly after 11 o'clock
that same night, Mita was
ushered into Kissinger's White
House office for a brief, but
dramatic meeting. Dinitz be-
gan by filling in the Secretary
on his talk with the Pentagon
chief. He placed special em-
phasis upon Schlesingees in-
sistence on shipping what
would amount to one and a
half planes a day for only a
couple of days and then paus-
ing to gauge Arab reaction.
One and a half Phantoms a
day, for a couple of days, he
told Kissinger, was "a mock-
ery to the poor." He repeated
Schlesinger's statement that,
in any case, no more than 16
Phantoms would be sent to
Israel?even though Israeli
losses in that one category
alone had more than doubled
the Pentagon ceiling, and Nix-
on had issued a specific order
to replace "all" Israeli losses.
Israel, he stated, needed a
minimum of 32 Phantoms. "II
a massive American airlift to
Israel does not start immedi-
ately," Dinitz emphasized,
"then I'll know that the
United States is reneging. . .
and we will have to draw very
serious conclusions from all
this."
Dinitz did not have to trans-
late his message. Kissinger
quickly understood that the
Israelis would soon "go pub-
lic" and that an upsurge of
pro-Israeli sentiment in the
United States could have a
disastrous impact upon an al-
ready weakened Administra-
tion. A high State Department
source later expanded on that
theme: "There were enough
people in the country just
looking for a breach of con-
fidence in foreign affairs,
above and beyond Watergate.
We had always told the Is-
raelis, 'When the chips are
down, we're with you.' Well,
the chips were down, and it
looked as though we were
not with them. At least, that's
what they thought. They had
taken a terrible beating from
the Arabs. They were the vic-
tims of aggression. No doubt
about that. They held their
hand, because Kissinger told
them not to strike first. And
after all that, we reneged. We
didn't come through. That's
all Jackson needed. If Dinitz
had gone public with every-
thing he knew, it could have
toppled the Administration."
Kissinger promised Dinitz
that he would do "everything
in my power" to overcome
"bureaucratic difficulties"
and launch a massive Ameri-
can airlift. He then summoned
Scowcroft into his office and?
according to one knowledge-
able source, asked if the
Pentagon had been dragging
qu
? tit
tli
to
th
as
te
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R00 100140006.L0-:
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
its feet. Yes. Scowcroft
nodded, but added that the
charter problem had been and
remained "real enough." Kis-
singer became very angry. He
_ quickly got Schlesinger on
the phone and warned that
the President would "blow his
top" when he learned about
the delays. Kissinger described
the charters as a "matter of
urgent national security."
"Every morning I come in and
ask, 'What about the char-
ters?' and I'm told everything
is all right," Kissinger said.
"But in the evening, I'm told
nothing has moved. Now what
Kissinger called
Alexander Haig.
'We must put the
fear of God in
Schlesinger and
Clements,' he was
quoted as saying.
'They are working
against Presiden-
tial orders.'
Is going on?" Schlesinger tried
to refute the Secretary's
charges. but Kissinqer inter-
rupted him with an order to
get busy implementing the
President's policy.
When Kissinger finished
talking, be immediately called
White House aide Alexander
Haig. "We must put the fear
of God in Schlesinger and
Clements," he was quoted as
saying. "They are working
against Presidential orders."
Kissinger demanded that the
problem of Israeli "resupply"
be solved "urgently." Haig
was surprised to learn that
the charter problem still had
not been solved. He suggested
that Scowcroft be put in per-
sonal charge of It.
? Deputy Defense Secretary
Clements. for his part, has
denied that he was even
aware of a problem with char-
ters or that be was in any
way sabotaging U. S. policy.
On the contrary, he has main-
tained that he followed White
House orders during the crisis.
But a high Defense official
said that because of "poor
communications" between
Kissinger and the Pentagon?
"he was five miles away,
across the river, and we
couldn't read his mind"?he
often did not know exactly
what Kissinger was going to
do next. Another Pentagon
Official was less charitable.
"Henry tried running the Gov-
ernment by telephone that
week," he said, "and it can't
he done that way." The Pen-
tagon defense, in short, was
that Kissinger was attempting
to run the war out of his vest
pocket, controlling the flow of
'information even to the top
civilian managers of the Pen-
tagon, and that he never fully
explained his tactics or strat-
egy. The Pentagon maintained
that the strain across the
Potomac existed only during
the first week of the war and
then cooperation between the
State and Defense Depart-
ments improved considerably.
Later Friday night, Kissin-
ger asked Haig to arrange a
meeting with Nixon. Kissinger
reviewed the day's develop-
ments with the President, and
it would have been extraor-
dinary if he did not lay partic-
ular stress on the Pentagon's
obstructionist tactics. Nixon
took immediate action. He in-
structed Haig to order Schle-
singer to send 10 C-130 trans-
port planes, loaded with mili-
tary supplies, to the Azores
at once; then to fly 20 C-130's
directly to Israel; and finally
to facilitate a quick Israeli
pickup of the cargo left in the
Azores. When Kissinger in-
formed Dinitz about the Presi-
dent's latest order, aimed at
breaking through all bureau-
cratic roadblocks, the Israel
envoy expressed his gratitude
but asked if it Was possible
for all of the American planes
to fly directly to Israel. He
explained that Israeli pilots
were needed for combat duty.
At 1:45 A.M. Saturday
morning, Kissinger called
again. The President, he said,
had issued still another order
to Schlesinger: to make ab-
solutely certain that 10 Phan-
toms reached Israel by mid-
night Sunday. Nixon was
aware of the danger of a
strong Arab reaction, but he
was equally aware of the dan-
ger of a Soviet miscalculation
of American intentions. He
felt he had to make a strong,
visible show of support for Is-
rael. Dinitz thanked Kissinger
but warned that Israel needed
more than 10 Phantoms. The
war had cut deeply into Is-
rael's air force.
At 10:30, the President
summoned all his top advisers
to an emergency meeting at
the White House. Kissinger
had alerted Nixon to the need
for an unambiguous Presiden-
tial order launching an Ameri-
can airlift of supplies for Is-
rael. Kissinger, in his dual
capacity as national security
adviser and Secretary of
State. joined Schlesinger,
Moorer, Haig, Colby and other
officials. They heard the Presi-
dent ask one key question:
Why had there been a delay
Willie Mays. Fresh Air Rind E
Willie IV
why he joine
team. To hell
of the city for
summer. To (
to rim and sh
instead of rul
You can
dollar donat:
two weeks in
any donatiot
Please h
Air Fund tea
why New Yo
the big leagt.
?
Mail to:
300 West 43rd Sheet Newlbrk
IEnclosed is my contribution of
Contributions are tax deductible. Cancelled ch
receipt. Please make checks prryable to The Pt&
Name Address
City State
LaliMPaIMOOMM?????????????????
GARDEN
UMBRELLAS
LADNDERED.REFRINDED.
- RECOVERED
CUSTOM MADE
Pickup and Delivery in all
United Parcel areas
Request 8 roohure and Prio3L ist
12121 CY 9-0288
ZIP-JACK SERVICENTER
103 1 Tram! Ave.. bon. 111 1001
Mail-order
advertising
pays off .?. .
in The New York Times
Magazine. For full details,
write The New York Timet
Mail-order Advertising
Dept., Times Square,
New York, N.Y. lea=
The Afect, Yerttlr
? ' ?`: ? *.".,
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0,
uhlde-Takahama
s Rennie Macintosh.
ther or suede.
it Dorm Locus.
st 1 Si Nrw rtrrk '10022
2720 Ra710rg
ranilil:.
. 1974-75 season. Naturally
era House are reserved for
ibscribers also receive first
; Night, the New Year's Eve
Ring cycle. As a Subscriber
ter, and a Subscriber Card
extra tickets by telephone,
e by personal check. For a
all Mrs. Gardner at (212)
ubscription Department,
the11 F
ter,
irst.
METROPOLITAN OPERA
CLEAR SKIN
IN 6 DAYS
inmate ACNE, LARGE PORES,
Ill% DRY, OLOTCNY- SKIN, AGE
NES, EYE SHADOWS ana
ACOINEADS
PEELER.PAK ?
irofessional peeling treatment proven by a
time of experience by skin specialists It is
a superficiaL quickie, smear-on method.
that is required is 35 minutes for 6
isecutive nights. No inconvenience from
r day routine. In the privacy ot your home,
PEELER-PAK actually peel away the
id skin on your face, layer after layer,
in clear and untilemithed skin comes to
? surface. That's the look you want
gee
over 40 years, thousands of men,
nen and young people have visited our
ces for the very same PEELER-PM treat-
nt. They eliminated their complexion
imams and have overcome the ern
rassrnent that comes with not looking
ir very be
,rt your 6 day PEELER-PAK treatment
VI/ Do it today! Send $20 in check or
nay Cam with your name and address to:
SIGN CULTURE COMPANY
Vied412 Street taw Yak, N. Y. 10036
In implementing his previous
orders about supplies for Is-
rael? Schlesinger tried to ex-
plain his difficulty in char-
tering civilian transport
planes. "To bell with the
charters," Nixon exploded,
according to one eyewitness.
"Get the supplies there with
American military planes! For-
get the Azores! Get moving!
I want no further delays."
By 3:30 P.M. Dinitz was in-
formed that a fleet of larger
C-5's had just left the United
States for Israel. The Ambas-
sador cabled Mrs. Meir that
"a massive American airlift"
had begun. Kissinger had won
what one of his aides later
called the "Battle of? 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue."
V2y ithin a few days,
as one C-5 after
another rumbled
into Tel Aviv,
each one a signal of U. S. de-
termination, the Kissinger
strategy began to affect both
the military and diplomatic
sides of the war. In the dead
of night on Oct. 15, Israeli
commandos, their faces dark-
ened to avoid detection,
crossed over on rafts to
the western bank of the Suez
Canal just north of Great Bit-
ter Lake. On Oct. 16, Israeli
armored units drove an iron
wedge through Egyptian lines
on the east bank and then
built a pontoon bridge across
the canal to the west bank?
to "Africa," as the Israelis ?
called it. Hundreds of Israeli
troops and dozens of tanks
and other armored vehicles
crossed into "Africa" in a
dramatic move that turned
the tide of battle on the Suez
front.
This cross-canal operation
had been under intensive
study since the fourth day of
the war, but it had been put
temporarily on a back burner.
Defense Minister Moshe Da-
yan and General Elazar, wor-
ried about a growing shortage
of ammunition and equipment,
had restrained General Ariel
Sharon, commander of Israeli
forces in the Sinai, from
launching this daring mission.
Only when Dinitz's cable an-
nouncing the airlift reached
Mrs. Meir's desk on Saturday
night did final preparations
begin.
At first, the Egyptians tried
to destroy the Israeli bridge-
head; instead, it was widened
and deepened, and Sadat be-
gan to realize that his armies
on the east bank could be cut
off from supplies and dev-
astated. The Israelis, after 72
hours in "Africa," were al-
ready 40 miles west of the
canal and but 50 miles east
of Cairo.
The airlift, as Kissinger had
expected, stimulated activity
on the diplomatic front, too.
On Oct. 16, Soviet Premier
Aleksei N. Kosygin flew se-
cretly into Cairo for three
days of urgent consultations
with Egyptian President An-
war el-Sadat. He carried a
four-point "peace" proposal,
obviously conceived before
the Israelis crossed the canal:
(1) a cease-fire in place; (2)
Israeli withdrawal to the 1967
boundaries, after some minor
changes; (3) an international
peace conference, at which
the final agreement would be
negotiated and ratified; and
(4) most important, a "guar-
antee" by the Soviet Union
and the United States of the
entire agreement, including
the cease-fire.
From the moment Kosygin
arrived in the Egyptian capi-
tal, it was clear that the Rus-
sians wanted the conflict to
come to an end. Kissinger
would later note that they did
not press their call for a
cease-fire when their allies
were on the offensive and
they were the only ones run-
ning an air and sea lift of sup-
plies into the war zone; but
once the United States opened
its own airlift and the Israelis
suddenly went on the attack,
they began energetically to
press for a cease-fire. Dur-
ing the last of Kosygin's long
and occasionally bitter talks
with Sadat, the reluctant
Egyptian leader raised a cru-
cially important question:
What would happen if Cairo
agreed to a cease-fire in place
and Israel didn't, or, even
worse, if Israel agreed to a
cease-fire, and then massively
violated it? Kosygin, accord-
ing to Egyptian sources, told
Sadat that the Soviet Union
stood ready to help enforce
the cease-fire?alone, if neces-
sary.
In Washington, on the night
of Oct. 18, Dobrynin gave Kis-
singer the draft of a Soviet
proposal for a U.N.-sponsored
cease-fire. The Secretary was
puzzled by its extreme de-
mands, including a call for a
total Israeli withdrawal from
"all" occupied Arab lands, in-
cluding the Old City of Jeru-
salem. It was such an obvious
"nonstarter" that Kissinger
quickly rejected it.
The following morning, at
10 A.M., Dobrynin presented
an invitation to the Secretary
from Brezhnev asking him to
fly to Macow for "urgent
consultations on the Middle
East." The Soviet party
chief, after considering Ko-
sygin's report, had con-
Introducing
an attractive
new program
for
apartment
ownership
at
303 East 57th St.
?47 Stories?
Distinctive and spacious
apartments in New York's
Tallest Cooperative Resi-
dence, nqw featuring: ?
? Liberal long term financ-
ing at an annual percent-
age rate of 7.95%.
? Membership in the Ex-
celsior Club, with its su-
perior dining room, year
'round indoor-outdoor
swimming pool, sundeck
and other club facilities.
?
A limited number al
apartments of 2 to 71/2
rooms are available for
immediate purchase and
early occupancy.
Room dimensions are unus-
ually impressive and many
apartments have 3 expos-
ures including breath-tak-
ing river and skyline views,
balcony and extra powder
room. 24 hour doorman.
Lobby desk. Attended ele-
vators. Garage in building.
Quality apartments that
rank with the finest ever of-
fered in New York City.
ID
Sales Agent for
Sponsors Apartments
OUGLAS
LUMAN a CO. 'I ?
Phone [phone]
Sales Agent on Premises ?
Mr. Wechsler
Phone [phone]
Daily and Sunday
This advertisement is not on
offering which can be mode
only by a formal
prospectus.
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
I
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
eluded that Sadat's forces were in bad
trouble, and Syrian President Hafez al-
Assad's were in worse shape. In his
judgment they needed an immediete
cease-fire. If Kissinger had refused to
accept his invitation, he would have
been prepared to dispatch Gromyko
to Washington. Time was critical. The
Israelis were advancing on Damascus.
Their big guns were little more than
20 miles away, within firing range of
the outskirts of the city. In the south,
we Israelis were continuing to expand
their bridgehead in the very heartland
? Of Egypt, building up their fighting
force there to more than 300, tanks
and 13,000 troops.
Kissinger spent very little time de-
bating whether to snap up Brezhnev's
invitation?for a number of reasons.
First, he thought a rejection would
probably force the Russians to go di-
rectly to the U.N. Security Council
and propose a cease-fire. He believed
that such a proposal would have been
adopted unanimously. Next, by going
to Moscow, Kissinger purchased an ad-
ditional 72 hours for Israel to improve
? her military position; Kissinger also
=.1111311====21111111
The Israeli Ambassador
cabled home that 'a
massive American air-
lift' had begun.
Kissinger had won
the 'Battle of 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue.'
wanted to be in personal charge of
the negotiations. Despite his assur-
ances, less than a month old, that as
Secretary of State he was going to -in-
stitutionalize policy," he could not
shake his style of playing .a command-
ing role in every negotiation, particu-
larly in a ceisis. And finally, perhaps
most important, Kissinger believed, ac-
cording to one close aide, "that the
Russians were getting very anxious
and very upset" and might even be
considering "unilateral military action
to stop the fighting." The Secretary
considered the over-all situation "mur-,.
derously dangerous," an assessment
he was to repeat time and again. After
checking with Nixon. he told Dobrynin
that he would leave for Moscow that
night.
While he prepared for his journey,
the President was sending a signal to
? Moscow?and to the Arab states, too.
In a special message to Capitol Hill,
Nixon asked Congress for $2.2-billion
In emergency military aid for Israel.
For, the first time in many years, the
United States proposed giving, rather
than selling, this military equipment
? to the Jewish state. "The magnitude
of the current conflict, coupled with
? the seete of Soviet supply activities,"
? Nixon said, "has created needs which
exceed Israel's capacity." Noting that
the Middle East had become "a flash
point for potential world conflict," the
President added: "The United States i$
making every effort to bring this con-
flict to a very swift and honorable
conclusion, measured in days, not
weeks. But prudent planning also re-
quires us to prepare for a longer strug-
gle." The President's message seemed
packaged to enhance Kissingees bar-
gaining position in Moscow.
Kissinger's plane landed at Vnukovo
Airport, Moscow, at 7:30 P.M., Satur-
day, Oct. 20. While he was airborne,
the Secretary received two signals.
One came from the White House; the
other from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The
signal from the White House was high-
ly unusual. The President flashed Kis-
singer what amounted to a "power of
attorney" to sign any agreement in
Moscow in his name. Nixon knew that
Kissinger was planning to bring any
agreement reached in Moscow back to
Washington for Presidential perusal
and approval: that was the standard
operating procedure. The President,
who was about to fire Archibald Cox,
the first Watergate Special Prosecutor
?an action that would also force the
resignation of Elliot Richardson and
William Ruckelshaus from the two top
jobs at the Justice Department, in
what became known as the Saturday
Night Massacre?was either too pre-
occupied with his political problems
to think about urgent diplomatic mat-
ters or so worried about the possibil-
ity of a world conflagration that he
decided to dispense with normal dip-
lomatic procedure and give Kissinger
the power to take immediate, binding
action in his name. The Secretary
was surprised by the White House
signal but didn't question it.
The second signal, from Riyadh, had
the impact of an economic H-bomb,
but Kissinger was too absorbed with
the problems of war and cease-fire in.
the Middle-East to give it more than
a passing thought. The supposedly
pro-American Government of Saudi
Arabia, denouncing the United States
airlift of arms to Israel and the Presi-
dent's special aid message to Congress,
slapped a punishing oil embargo on
the United States. For months Faisal
had warned that he would use his oil
weapon in the Arab struggle against
Israel; besides, he had committed him-
self to use this weapon in secret pre-
war negotiations with Sadat. On Oct.
17, the oil-producing states had voted
to reduce their production by 10 per
cent. On Oct. 18, Abu Dhabi had im-
posed an oil embargo on the United
States. On Oct. 19, Libya had acted.
On Oct. 20, it was Saudi Arabia's
turn, and the following day Algeria
and Kuwait followed suit. In the
months ahead, the oil embargo was
to have damaging impact on the Amer-
ican economy and way of life. It would
eventually force Kissinger to acceler-
ate his diplomatic peacemaking efforts
but tilled weekend in Moscow, Kissinger
had a more immediate aim: to exploit
Russia's nervousness about the Israeli
offensive.
Less than two hours after his arrival
in the Soviet capital, Kissinger was es-
corted into Brezhnev's Kremlin office,
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
?
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RpP94-100754R000100140006-0
,
the gentle waters of
ibbean . the faith-
-n you while constant
iou . . ? Dutch-clean
ding. ? . and ruins of
liven your picnics
Neicome vou tor
-estz.-.;:ants th orange
orzi liutch
noat?,in i t_nonese
una a swinwhou pow
iii he ,orar. ',toads
oies that toeed vE:L2
nere roans with
slow you to see what's
e.
asinos and nightclubs
awake all night and
it casinos and night-
nights are your own
have strayed to new
.y?reach up and move
almost that close.
n rates from New York
4, American or Eastern
many airline and travel
age plans offer even
and water and people
id. casinos and food
learn more... colorful
hotel descriptions ...
the coupon today!
N'ff-a
imitation Center
xvenue
, New. York 10036
ore...about Aruba!
,
. .
and the two men began to ex-
plore ways of ending the war
and salvaging the Policy of
detente. At .the, same; time
they kept a clope:thick on the
battlefield. Brezhnev reviewed
the result's of Kosygin's visit
to Cairo and emphasized the
need for an immediate cease-
fire. He warned that the situa-
tion was extremely grave.
Kissinger agreed with his grim
assessment and with the need-
for a cease-fire; but he' in-'
sisted that a cease-fire had to
be linked to peace talks, or
else it was sure to break
down all over again. Their
meeting ended well past mid-
night. There was no deal, but
Kissinger had the impression
that Brezhnev was so eager
to preserve at !east the spirit
:dtente,
come to CO
ii rule. that he wouid make
inalor concession at their
%ILA:A scneutueci- for
;Iernoon,
most. ,4.M. Sunday when
zissinger tinatly got a cnar.re
to call Haig at the White
House to check on a couple.of
annoying problems. He found
Haig totally preoccupied and
it was only then that Kissin-
ger learned about the Satur-
day Night Massacre.
On Sunday afternoon, Brezh-
nev and Kissinger met for four
hours. In the intervening time,
Israeli troops continued their
advance on Damascus and
their flanking operations west
of the Suez Canal. The two
negotiators hammered out the
details of a cease-fire arrange-
meat that would lead to direct
talks between Egypt and Is-
rael. It was, for the Secretary,
an immensely satisfying re-
sult. He knew that the Is-.
reeks would not be happy
about the cease-fire coming
'at a time when they needed
only a few more days to de-
feat the Egyptian and Syrian
Armies, but he also knew that
they would appreciate the op-.
portanity,- at long fast, for di-
rect talks with Egypt. In- the.
President's name, he sent an
urgent appeal to Mrs. Meir to
accept the cease-fire.
"We were hardly in a posi-
tion to pay no," one high Is-
raeli official said. "We had
no real choice. Here was a
hersonal appeal from the Pres-
'dent of the United States at
wncit Israel was inure
flenendent than ever on
c'nited States."
'von iattat's
ibreernent to direct talks with
zs Pala?.t troai ?sypt
accented nefore?
n*T01:' senuing ins addi.
tional assurance that Russia
would?if necessary; alone?
guarantee the observance of
the cease-fire. ,
After reaching agreement
with Brezhnev on the exact
wording of the joint Soviet-
American call for a cease-fire,
Kissinger conferred with
Gromyko and then the Am-
bassadors of Great Britain,
France and Australia, all
members of the U.N. Security
Council and then sent special
instructions to Ambassador
Scali in New York to call for
Solutions to Last Week's Puzzles
1IC
ovol
ULEU
QCMJLIU
fIIUfl
T
AflTfS'IUL
LI i
0
III.
Rf
WI,A
TUL
ABE
M I
PI
r
f'
I
0
A
S
N
i i
g m
O
b
S
T
'
0
I .?
E
SIR
(.110N
L I
NE
E
ED
R
t
caCoGRAPtaaa,5
E
P A
I S
TERSE
5 ISMA
5
oe
DS
EL ir 1,z
T E ,
i piaErSh
RGUE
SON
NN Ep
E
E R
LUIII
Ts
.1 I
A
UN 7
N TO
IAN
ORE
NA 5
Al
S TJAITI
7
RI
A
7
I
Ot
'.
?A
BLJBNT
11 tiAt. L:: 8._ i
R RE
ILlIgi4f)?oR
(SE S
lio.aslAsTOt
AL.
L IO&
ION
A 111,
HRIOMY
OARS
teiCIE
I 5
STS
Si'
0C
1 C4Ei
I ,S
IL
E
'PAMELA
'.'MINARET
IIS
E
,m0-7170
1)!A
AIL?ARMS
L ANt,
I,
5
S P.
5!
L PIS
E SIA
LB E N
,
AIDIE
RAY
A !tilt E
Lill! 5

,-,, C1,A
L
NEN
DAI
IIN
R
5
NG
El
T'ECIHNY
BROOD
BOTTS
0
ASKS
ArrqUIS
H
E Itil 11
EIO
E E
IIP:
011E4
pH
i
13A.
"Od"
IRIBM
y,ir
a
Alw
i,
tip
M
!
lEi1
,$,IiNT
a.
R
p Fi
1. H
R fEf
NAg6.1N
.?,.-E.
*V*
HU
F3
moon
,
an emergency meeting of the
Security Council. The council
convened early Monday morn-
. Ing, Oct. 22, and unanimously
adopted the superpower call
for, a cease-fire in place. Res-
olution 338 was to go into ef-
fect within 12 hours Or, at
the latest, by 6:52 P.M., Mid.
die East time.
issinger left Mos-
cow at 10 A.M. On
his way back to
Washington, he
stopped for five hours in Jeru-
Sa!em and two hours in Lon-
don. His stop in Jerusalem?
designed to explain the terms
of the cease-fire--proved to be
an emotional experience for
aim. The crowds it the air-
tiort cheered his arrival. Kis-
the eeeiing, after
..ailting with Israel's oolitfaai
..nd military leaders, that they
.re :tructous to
oic war, .?/( cnriv needed
? :anger
. 'Oil id ?-1.:r?? ? " r'no it for
....issirner was fuhniing
the role.
His stopover in London?to
brief Sir Alec Douglas-Home,
then British Foreign Secre-
tary, about the Moscow nego-
tiations ? gave Kissinger his
first insight into the political
significance of the Saturday.
Night Massacre. He picked up
a couple of British newspa-
pers, and the headlines stunned
him. He had no, idea, up to
that moment, that Nixon was
in such deep, deep trouble.
The newspapers also ran
headlines about the Middle
East cease-fire, and he was
gratified that, at a minimum,
he was still able to come UD
with achievements in foreign
policy that Americans could
support?achievements that -
reminded the world that the
United_ States, despite Nixon's
Watergate difficulties, was
still a - major, influential
power.
On his return flight Kis-
singer kept track Of the
cease-fire. There were viola-
tions. He had expected them.
But he believed that they
were manageable.
. He. arrived in Washington
at 3 A.M. Tuesday and had
hardly finished his breakfast
in his White House office
later that morning when there
was a frantic call from the
Soviet Embassy complaining
that the Israelis had massive-
ly violated the cease-fire. Kis-
singer called Dinitz. "What
the hell is going on here?" he
wanted to know. Kissinger
had been given the Prime
Minister's word that Israel
would respect the cease-fire;
he had communicated that
? (Continued on Page 60)
'
a
as it i
Pappagall
of a very d
footwear a
things; of
taste; of a
of-view.
Pap
make ha ri
:rid sales
.Ino, yes.
o, Rut it
'nem anti
Ind flat' at
? ,t
? r%intt ale
rIK
Orenidc
1250
(212)
'Enjoy the res
country. Rich
over 1,000 ye
I& forest vet
A commit'
1 Each top
I. NO 2 PIER
All sizes appr
_Natural wood
split. We gua
2 separate 0
Mall orders
collect. Open
TREE TOP CO.
Y2 cup sal
Yr cup vin
teaspix
Yr cup Go
Mixed sal
Golden B
Beat vigo
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R60010040006-0
Continued front Page 56
word to the Russians. Now,
the Russians could suspect
Kissinger of duplicity, which
could have a detrimental ef-
fect on his role as a middle-
man. Dinitz argued that it was
not Israel, but Egypt, that had
broken the cease-fire. Kissin-
ger urged Mita in the
strongest terms to tell Mrs.
Meir that the United States
expected Israel to live up to
the terms of the cease-fire?
"scrupulously," he added.
The Secretary then checked
with his own intelligence ex-
perts. They confirmed the es-
sence of Dinitz's account but
added one important fact?
that the Israelis had taken full
advantage of the initial Egyp-
tian violation to extend their
lines on the west bank of the
canal. Apparently what hap-
pened was that the command-
er of the Egyptian Third
Corps, trapped on the east
bank of the canal opposite the
Egyptian city of Suez, ignored
specific cease-fire orders from
Cairo and attempted to break
out of Israeli encirclement.
The Israelis; still smarting
over Egypt's original aggres-
sion, beat back that attempt
and then intensified their mili-
tary pressure on both sides of
the canal. On the west bank,
In particular, the Israelis kept
edging toward the strategic
prize of Suez itself. U the city
fell under Israeli control, then
there would be no way for the
Egyptians to resupply the
Third Corps. After only a
short while, the Israelis would
be in a position to destroy
the best fighting force in the
Egyptian Army.
Kissinger resolved that he
would stop the Israelis and
save the Third Corps and thus
guarantee a military stale-
mate. The Israelis would be
on the west bank, the Egyp-
tians on the east bank, and
each side would have leverage
over the other. From the
earliest days of the war, it had
never been Kissinger's policy
to encourage the Israelis to
win another decisive victory,
such as they had won in 1967.
Such a victory would not buy
peace, but rather create ten-
sions that would trigger still
another war. Besides, Kissin-
ger believed that in the cur-
rent diplomatic. climate, a
clear-cut Israeli victory would
contribute to a further isola-
tion of Israel, and, given
America's close ties to the
Jewish state, encourage a new
wave of anti-Americanism in
the Middle East. The oil em-
bargo might then become a
permanent feature of Arab
policy, rather than a tactical
weapon. Finally. if Kissinger
,
Was able to gain acceptance
as a go-between in the Mid e
East, as was his aim, he vrok, d
have to demonstrate his im-
partiality. Saving the Third
Corps would be such a test?
for him and his policy.
In a series of talks with
Dinitz, Kissinger cajoled,
pressured, urged, implored,
warned, threatened and
pleaded with the Israeli en-
voy to understand his logic
and accept his policy. At the
same time, he told Dobrynin
that he expected the Soviet
Union to restrain the Egyp-
tians. Stating the obvious, the
Secretary said that continued
violations on either side could
only end up hurting both
sides?and the cause of
d?nte.
By dusk, the number of
violations had gone down, but
Kissinger's anxieties had gone
up. He postponed a visit to
China after his intelligence ex-
perts alerted him to two sud-
den developments. They had
detected a sharp and sudden
drop-off in the number of So-
viet planes carrying military
supplies to Egypt and Syria?.
from about 70 flights a day
down to half a dozen. In ad-
dition, they had picked up sig-
nals from the Ukraine indicat-
ing that a number of Soviet
Army and logistical units had
been put on alert.
That night, Kissinger and
Dobrynin worked behind the
scenes to arrange a second
U.N. call for a cease-fire. The
Security Council met in al-
most continuous session.
By 1 A.M., Washington
time, Wednesday, Oct. 24, the
second cease-fire went into
effect; but, moments before
the guns were ordered si-
lenced for the second time in
48 hours, the Israelis an-
nounced that their forces had
reached the outskirts of Suez
and the Third Corps was ef-
fectively surrounded. When
Kissinger got the news, he
was furious. This time, when
he called Dinitz, his voice did
not boom, as it often did; he
spoke softly, very softly, and
Dinitz knew he was seriously
worried. He warned the Is-
raeli diplomat that the cease-
fire would have to be re-
spected, and he urged Dinitz
to allow humanitarian con-
voys?food, water, medical
supplies?to reach the Third
Corps.
Kissinger's press conference on the morning of the U.S.
alert. When Marvin Kalb (front, fifth from right) asked . . .
Later Wednesday morning,
after further talks with Dinitz
and Dobrynin, Kissinger at-
tended a high-level meeting
at the White House, where he
learned about a series of So-
viet military moves. Four
more divisions of Soviet air-
borne troops had been put
on alert, bringing the total to
seven divisions, or roughly
50,000 troops. Five or six
Soviet transport ships had
crossed into the Mediter-
ranean, raising the Russian
naval presence in that area
to an unprecedented 85 ships.
About a dozen Antonov-22
planes had been spotted fly-
ing toward Cairo. The analysts
wondered if they might be
carrying some of those air-
borne troops. An airborne
command post had been estab-
lished in southern Russia.
And, finally, special military
orders had been intercepted,
suggesting the Russians might
be preparing to intervene in
the Middle East.
Kissinger and Dobrynin ex-
changed urgent calls. The Sec-
retary wanted to see if Dobry-
nin had hardened his bargain.
Kissinger believed that a decisive
Israeli victory would not buy peace,
but rather create tensions that
would trigger still another war.
lag position. He detected no
such sign.
At 3 P.M., Sadat radioed an
?
urgent appeal to Brezhnev
and Nixon to send a joint
Soviet-American peace-keep-
ing force to the Middle East,
basically to police the Suez
cease-fire. He accused Israel
of continuing violations. Kis-
singer rejected his appeal. He
opposed the idea of sending
big-power troops to a volatile
area, believing that their pres-
ence would only eiacerbate
existing tensions.
At 4:15 P.M., Dobrynin ar-
rived at Kissinger's State De-
partment office to discuss the
organization of a Geneva
peace conference following a
cease-fire. In the course of
their talk, Scali called twice
from the U.N.: first, to inform
the Secretary that the Secu-
rity Council would be called
into session that evening; and
second, to say that the "non-
aligned nations" had begun to
echo Sadat's appeal. Kissinger
immediately warned Dobrynin
that the United States op-
posed a joint Soviet-American
peace-keeping force. The Rus-
sian diplomat said that, so far
as he knew, his colleague,
U.N. Ambassador Yakov Malik,
had no instruction to support
such a force. Dobrynin left.
A little while later, at 7:05
P.M., Dobrynin called. He had
unintentionally misled Kissin-
ger, he said: Malik did have
Approved For Release 2005/02/28: CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
. . . if it had been called because of Watergate, he said no:
"The President had no other choice as a responsible leader."
instructions to support a non-
aligned nation proposal for a
big-power police forceAissin-
ger suspected that the Rus-
sians were actively encourag-
ing such a proposal, and, in
fairly blunt language, he urged
Dobrynin to tell Moscow that
the United States vigorously
opposed the idea.
Kissinger then informed the
President that the Russians
seemed to be switching sig-
nals. Nixon reiterated his per-
sonal opposition to a big.
power peace-keeping force.
At 7:25 P.M., Kissinger
called Dobrynin, principally to
convey the President's views
on the subject. The Soviet
Ambassador then added a dis-
quieting new note. He said
that Malik might not wait for
the nonaligned nations to in-
troduce the proposal for a big-
power force; he might intro-
duce it himself. Dobrynin ar-
gued that the Israelis were
continuing to violate the
cease-fire, and that Russia and
America were responsible for
maintaining it. Kissinger re-
peated his opposition to the
proposal and warned that
their countries might be head-
ing for trouble.
At 9:25 P.M.. Dobrynin
caned Kissinger with a "very
urgent" message from Beech-
am to Nixon. The message
Was, within hours, to bring
the two ellitelPnwern into di-
rect confrontation. Normally
Dobrynin Would not have
read the message on the phone
but, this time, he said it was
"so urgent" that he would
make an exception. Slowly he
dictated the message to Kis-
singer; a secretary, listening
in on an extension, took down
the four-paragraph text in
shorthand.
The message began with an
unusually cool salutation ?
"Mr. President," rather than
with the usual Brezhnev open-
er, "My dear Mr. President"?
and its tone was unmistakably
tough. Brezhnev denounced Is-
rael for "brazenly challenging
both the Soviet Union and the
United States" and for "dras-
tically" violating the cease-
fire. Then. echoing Sadat's
line, the Soviet party chief
said: "Let us together. . . ur-
gently dispatch Soviet and
American contingents to
Egypt." The cease-fire had to
be observed "without delay."
Brezhnev then dropped his
diplomatic bombshell. "I will
say it straight," he said, "that
if you find it impossible to
act together with us in this
matter, we should be faced
with the necessity urgently to
consider the question of tak-
ing appropriate steps unilater-
ally. Israel cannot be allowed
to get away with the vio-
lations."
Kissinger could see the
hedge: "consider the ques-
tion. . . ." But he suspected
Brezhnev meant business. The
Russian leader had extracted
Sadat's agreement to a cease-
fire, linked to direct talks with
Israel, only on condition that
the two superpowers?or Rus-
sia alone ? would guarantee
the cease-fire. He had received
1Cissinger's word that Israel
would respect the cease-fire.
Now, four days later, Israel
had blocked access to Suez
city, effectively encircled the
Third Corps, and threatened
to destroy the cream of the
Egyptian Army and perhaps
topple the Sadat regime in the
process. Kissinger believed
that Brezhnev could not "tol-
erate" another decisive Israeli
victory over Egypt. Kissinger
also knew that the United
States could not tolerate un-
ilateral Soviet intervention.
The United States and the
U.S.S.R. were on a collision
course.
Ten minutes later, just to
double check, Kissinger called
Dobrynin and read the text
of the Brezhnev note back to
him. "Is it correct?" Kissinger
asked. "It is correct," Dobryn-
in answered. The Russian
added that he had to have an
immediate response. The Sec-
retary advised him respect-
fully not to "press" the United
States.
Kissinger immediately called
Nixon. The President at that
time was upstairs at the
White House. The Secretary
gave him a complete fill-in
and stated? that the United
States might have to alert its
military forces as one way to
deter any unilateral Soviet
move. The President concurred
and empowered Kissinger to
take charge of the American re-
sponse. He added that if there
were any problems, he .would
be available immediately.
Kissinger hastily assem-
bled three panels of experts
?at the White House, the
State Department and the
United Nations?and, while
they quickly reviewed the ac-
cumulated intelligence, Kissin-
ger, in his capacity as na-
tional security adviser, sum-
moned an emergency meeting
of the President's top advis-
ers, a rump N.S.C. gathering
of Schlesinger, Colby, Moorer,
Haig and Scowcroft. They met
at the White House at 11 P.M.
By that time, Kissinger had
the opinion of the experts.
There was, in their view, a
"high probability" of some
kind of "unilateral Soviet
move." He informed the Presi-
dent's top advisers about the
experts' opinion. Then he dis-
tributed copies of all re-
cent Brezhnev communica-
tions; plus the latest note, and
Franconia College,
located in the White
Mountains, is a co-ed
liberal arts community
based on tolerance,
mutual respect, and
dedicated to academic
and social responsibility
as one route to
individual growth and
maturation. There are
450 students in
residence. The faculty,
student ratio is 10:1.
For more general
information and
brochure, contact: Box
TM, Franconia College,
Franconia, New
Hampshire 03580.
See today's Education Section
for interview appointment.
CONDOMINIUM
VACATIONS?
FOR PEOPLE WHO
DON'T OWN
A CONDOMINIUM.
Experience this new way of living?in
a totally new kind of international club.
CLIC?the Concepts for Living
International Club, Ltd. Our quarterly
bulletin lists condominiums for rent
around the world. So you can travel
whenever and wherever you want,
yet save money?and experience
the freedom and ease of condominium
living.
Find out more. Write CLIC ,499A Ole
Street, Glens Falls, New York 12801.
(Pp
d 4a
Concepts for Living
International Club Ltd.
I arb ue
this Hone
Mustard (laze
3 tbs. Golden Blossom Honey
1 tbs. prepared mustard ,
Combine 3 tablespoons Golden
Blossom Honey with one
tablespoon prepared mustard.
Split frankfurters, spread with
mixture and either broil or grill.
,G4.11(1yo f, oft Vaw
With 41 Oomplace.
130 orn
or Release 2005/02/2'8 : CIA-RDP94T0075414000100140006-0
The New IrtgrrhrTi.
asked everyone present to
study the package. Without
except/on, they Concluded that
the tone of the note, recehied -
that night, was "totally dif-
ferent" from the earlier
communications ? "harsh,"
,"blunt," "leaving nothing to ,
the imagination."
While his colleagues con-
? tinued to deliberate about a
proper American response,
Kissinger called Dobrynin and
urged him to make -sure that
Moscow did nothing "rash or -
unilateral," at least not until
the United States had com-
posed an answer to the Brezh-,
Bev note.
The U.S. answer came in
two parts: military and diplo-
matic.
The first part was a military
alert. Since the experts had
concluded that there was a
"high probability" that Soviet
airborne troops would. soon-
be flown to the Middle East,
the Secretary quickly. decided
?
that the United States had to
alert its military forces?
ground, sea and air, both
conventional and nuclear
units. Schlesinger agreed. Both
men felt that the Soviet Union
had to be made aware that the
United States would resist its-
efforts to tilt the military bal-
ance against Israel.
At 11:30 P.M., Schlesinger
instrueted Moorer to tell the
service chiefs to alert most
but not all military commands.
For example. the Coast Guard,
with its key air-sea rescue
system, was not alerted until
the following morning; and
Strategic Air Command tanker
planes operating over the
mid-Atlantic along the United
States-Israel air lanes, were
not moved north to handle the
possible refueling of B-52
bombers. Two hours later, at
1:30 in the morning, Schlesin-
ger returned to the Pentagon
and widened the alert. The
Panama Command was in-
cluded. The aircraft carrier
John F. Kennedy, carrying
dozens of A-4 attack jets, was
dispatched toward the Medi-
terranean. Fifty to 60 B-52
bombers were ordered from
Guam to the United States.
The 15,000-troop 82nd Air-
borne Division, based at Fort
Bragg, N. C., was added to
the alert; it was told to be
ready by 6 A.M., Thursday, if
Happy ending: After the Syrian-Israeli agreement for separa-
tion of forces last month, Kissinger gives Mrs. Meir a fare-
well kiss. Recalling pictures of him kissing Arab leaders,
she joked: "I didn't know you kissed women."
necessary. *Finally, the entire
Strategic Air Command (SAC)
was put on- alert; SAC was a
critical signal to the Russians,
because it controls nuclear
strike forces.
There are five degrees of
military alert, ranging from
Defense Condition, or DefCon
5, which is least alarming, to
Defense Condition 1, which is
war. That night, during the
various stages of the alert.
most United States units were
put on DefCon 3. In one case
?the Pacific Command?that
represented no change, be-
cause the Pacific Command is
always on DefCon 3. SAC usu-
ally operates on DefCon 4; it
was moved up one notch. The
fleet of Polaris submarines,
carrying nuclear-tipped mis-
siles, ranges between DefCon
3 and 2; that night, it was
put at 3. The Sixth Fleet,
cruising the Mediterranean,
was on DefCon 2, and it
stayed. at that level.
As the second part of the
American answer to Brezhnev,
the Secretary of State com-
posed a Presidenti61 response.
He checked it with Schlesin-
' 0: ,011,44,0 4wo,
1,4
A soldier stopped for speeding
explained to the police, a reporter
read the police blotter?and the U.S.
alert was public knowledge.
ger and Haig and cleared it
with Nixon. In the message,
the United States reaffirmed
the terms of the Kissinger-
Brezhnev understanding that
the two superpowers would
cooperate in the search for
peace in the Middle East. It
disputed Brezhnev's claim that
Israel was "brazenly" violat-
ing the cease-fire. By late
Wednesday night, in fact,
there were comparatively few
violations, on either side. The
situation, the note said, did
not warrant sending Soviet or
American forces to the Middle
East. The idea of one super-
power taking "unilateral" ac-
tion would cause great con?
cern throughout the world.
The United States could not
accept such action by the
Soviet Union; it could not but
jeopardize the entire pattern
of Soviet-American d?nte.
The Nixon message focused
instead on U.N. observer and
peace-keeping forces com-
posed of nonveto or non-
nuclear members of the U.N.
In this respect, the United
States promised to cooperate
with the Soviet Union. The
note did not refer to the alert
of American military forces;
that was not considered nec-
essary. "The alert itself," one
official said, "was a signal
which we knew they would
get through their own elec-
tronic intelligence."
It is curious that, consider-
ing the seriousness Kissinger
ascribed to the crisis, the Sec-
retary never saw the ?teal
that night. Hilton, who struck'
a number of his close advisers'
as "remote," remained in his
living quarters, upstairs, while'.:
his advisers conferred dovm-
stairs. Kissinger talked with ?
the Chief Executive only once
?on the phone. , All other
messages were relayed
through Haig. The last one,
at about g A.M., set the stage
for a 7:30 A.M. meeting With
the President and Haig.
Before leaving the White
House, Kissinger started the
process of informing Amer-
ica's allies. He called Lord
Cromer, who was apparently
in a snippy mood. The British
Ambassador is said to have
responded: 'Why tell us,
Henry? Tell your friends?the
Russians." Then Kissinger
sent a cable to Brussels, head-
quarters for the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization, in-
structing United States offi-
- cials to inform all NATO allies
about the alert of American
forces. Because of a break-
down in the NATO 'communi-
cations system, it took hours
before the allies actually got
the word. Kissinger's final call
was to Dinitz.
At 7 A.M., Kissinger turned
on the television news. He
was, he later said, "surprised
as hell" to learn that the alert
had already become public
knowledge. (An Army sergeant
had explained to a policeman
why hq was speeding; a re-
porter read the police blot-
ter.) His expectation was that
the American people would
not learn anything about a
worldwide nuclear alert for
another 24 hours. By that
time, either there would have
been a major crisis, in which
case the alert would have been
justified, or the crisis would
have blown over, in which
case the alert would have been
eased. Keeping such news,
? from the public was not a
new tactic for the Adminis-
tration?or the Secretary.
By the time Kissinger got to
the White House for his 7:30
A.M. meeting With the Presi-
dent, the C.I.A. had come up
with an alarming report from
Egypt ? that the Russians
might have landed nuclear
weapons there. For several
days, American reconnais-
sance planes had kept track
of a Soviet ship carrying
radioactive material and head-
ing toward Port Said. In the
early morning hours of Oct.
25, the ship docked. It was
presumed by intelligence ex-
perts that the radioactive ma-
terial was a nuclear warhead
or, more likely, several war-
heads, and that they had been
sent to Egypt to be tipped to
SCUD missiles, which had-
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
reached Egypt earlier in the
year. The experts had no de-
finitive information on wheth-
er the radioactive material
had actually been unloaded.
The C.I.A. report tended to
harden Kissinger's judgment
that the Russians were going
.to ,,send airborne troops to
Egypt. Nuclear weapons could
serve as backup protection
for a sizable Soviet force. On
the other hand, Kissinger
could not dismiss the possibil
,ity that the Russians were
moving nuclear weapons into
Egypt because they believed
that the Israelis had nuclear
weapons and intended to use
them against Egypt. In the
United States Government,
there was no hard intelligence
that the Israelis had nuclear
weapons. Kissinger immedi-
ately ordered a study of Is-
raeli nuclear capabilities.
With the President and
Haig, Kissinger reviewed the
military and diplomatic situ-
ation. After a few hours, they
reached several conclusions:
first, that the United States
would continue its efforts at
the U.N. to set up a -peace-
keeping force that? excluded
the major powers (early that
morning, the Security Council
had consideredi a resolution
that, while not including the
major powers, did not exclude
them either); seeded, that Is-
rael would have to be per-
suaded to observe the cease-
fire; third, that the American
airtift of supplies to Israel
would continue until all of
her losses were replaced; and
finally, that Kissinger would
hold a news conference to ex-
plain the alert and Nixon
would postpone, for at least
one day, the news conference
he had scheduled to explain
his firing of Cox.
When America went to
work that morning, it was
aware from news reports that
United States nuclear forces,
on a worldwide basis, had
been put on standby alert,
apparently in a dramatic move
to dissuade 'Russia from tak-
ing "unilateral action" in the
Middle East. The news of the
alert came like a bolt of light-
ning out of a sky darkened
by Watergate suspicion and
upheaval. For many people,
still stunned by the Saturday
Night Massacre, it was im-
possible not to connect the
alert to Watergate. After all,
only one day before, spokes-
'men had asserted that 'the
number of violations was
dropping and the crisis
seemed to be passing. There
was instant speculation on
Capitol Hill, in news offices
MI at political party headie
uarters ? both Republican
Dernoreatic ? that thee
.routei Mao'been catisied,
at least to some degree, by
the President's desire to de-
flect attention from Water-
gate and talk of impeachment.
Kissinger has always
claimed that the Watergate
connection never entered his
mind as he planned and or-
dered the alert; that only the
urgent requirements of diplo-
macy governed his actions.
That was why his news con-
With the
benefit of hind-
sight, not
even Kissinger
has given
Kissinger a
straight A for
crisis
management.
ferenc,e so shocked him. One
of the first questions focused
on Watergate.
"Mr. Secretary," the ques-
tion began, "could you tell us
whether the United States re-
ceived a specific warning from
the Soviet Union that it would
.eend its forces unilaterally
into the Middle East? Do you
have intelligence that the Rus-
sians are preparing for such
an action? The reason I raise
these questions ? as you
know, there has been some
line of speculation this morn-
ing that the American alert
might have been prompted as
much perhaps by American
domestic requirements as by
the real requirements of di-
plomacy in the Middle East.
And I wonder if you could
provide some additional in-
formation on that."
Kissinger answered slowly
? as columnist Elizabeth
Drew later put it?"in a tone"
that was "more in sorrow."
"Marvin," he said, "we are at-
tempting to conduct the for-
eign policy of the United
States with regard for what
we owe not just to the elec-
torate but to future genera-
tions. And it is a symptom of
what is happening to our
country that it could even be
suggested , that the United
States would alert its forces
for domestic reasons. We do
not think , it is wise at this
moment to go iatO the details
of the diplomatic -exchanges
that prompted this decision.
Upon the conclusion of the
present diplomatic efforts,
one way or the other, we will
make theerecord available, and
we .will be able to go into
greater detail. And I am ab-
solutely confident that it will
be seen that the President had
no other choice as a responsi-
ble national leader."
The news conference ran
from noon to 1 o'clock, during
which time the Secretary tried
to be tough and conciliatory
at the same time. Having con-
firmed the American alert, he
warned the Russians not to
send their troops into the
Middle East and not to expect
the United States to join them
in a Big Two peace-keeping
force. Such an arrangement
would only "transplant the
great-power rivalry into the
Middle East"?to him, an "in-
conceivable" proposition that
could lead to a nuclear clash.
He said, "We possess, each of
us, nuclear arsenals capable
of annihilating humanity. . .."
The remarks were classic Kis-
singer. "We need a combina-
tion of extreme toughness,
when we're challenged," he
once said of the Russians. but
with enough flexibility "to
give them the option of going
to a more responsible course"
without losing face. "It's in
their nature" to probe any
soft spot, but the United
States "must be willing to
face them down when they
step across the line."
The news conference was
being carried live on nation-
wide TV and radio, and U.N.
delegates paused to listen, de-
laying Security Council de-
liberations still longer. The
delay gave Malik extra time
to call Moscow for new in-
structions, which became evi-
dent almost immediately. Per-
suaded, no doubt, that the in-
fluence game in the Middle
East was getting too expen-
sive for the Soviet Union,
Brezhnev sought a face-saving
compromise at the U.N. He
told Malik to stop pushing for
the inclusion -of, the super-
powers in the peace-keeping
force and instead to yield to
American insistence that they
be specifically excluded. Malik
told Scali. Scali told Kissin-
ger. Kissinger told the Presi-
dent. Although there was not
yet any sign that Russian air-
borne units had been returned
to their prealert status, Kis-
singer interpreted Malik's
message as a signal that
Russia had abandoned its go-
it-alone tactic. The 15-hour
crisis then eased considerably.
The Security Council, swayed
by Kissinger's warnings and
apprised of the Soviet switch,
passed Resolution 340, setting
up a U.N. emergency force
"composed of personnel
drawn from states members
of the United Nations except
permanent members of the
SecuritY, covineiv? Th vote
'
ope
for
alcoholic
"I AM AN ALCOHOLIC:* Writ
by one who has been the
If you are, or someone
know is,an alcoholic. . . f
the road to recovery tod
Write for this FREE book. Sc
for help now! Mailed in pl
envelope.
CID
INTERNATIONAL
LUTHERAN LAYMEN'S LEAGUE
Dept. 95.2185 Hampton Ave.
St. Louis, Missouri 63139
Please send a FREE copy of
1 Am An Alcoholic"
Name
Address
City'
State
Zip Code
I s so is me ow ime me ass ess issmat
A mass media teleistry
The International
Lutheran Lalueres League
Were, tba foople
blatTe.11
ICAO 117115ii I3 Lb'
New ,,Y Times Nag , 2;1'$ei
ppriziVddTtir-Midaie 2005102/28...:ClA.RDPgerti0164420001001.4ti0O6-6
dooms rosewood
eliminate burnt
a hostess ... or
Boa Of Eight $3.50.
Add 50c pOstage
Cataiog. . 25c
TREE
ngftm AUL 20795
ON OWN MITT
Or
bordered dispOs-
Ot Of Geld goods.
. or for a gift that
(2 dozen only
shipping chgs.
lFa'
1110 Jersey 07070
New York,
guide book to
to kIentify
vreadows.
.40 handling
oats
urgis,t4.Y. 12901
tea
aniroash
moround..,
antes.,
elloaPPIlsocoo.
orCell
IN dlhathAse.
Yellt41.Y.
07-$103te.v
U0SO4.1400
? 1"
Approved For Release 2005/02/28 : CIA-RDP94T00754R000100140006-0
was 14 to 0, with China ab-
staining.
After a frightening exercise
in nuclear muscle flexing, the
two superpowers returned to
the twilight zone of detente.
The following day, Oct. 26,
Schlesinger relaxed the alert.
The speed with which Wash-
ington cranked up the alert,
and then cranked it down,
gave rise to postmortem spec-
ulation that Kissinger, for one,
had overreacted to the Soviet
warning about "unilateral ac-
tion." NATO allies, who had
not alerted their forces,
shared little of the Secretary's
anxiety about Russian inter-
vention in the Middle East,
and they protested "a lack of
advance consultations." They
accused Kissinger of being
"highhanded," and Kissinger
accused them of being "cra-
ven." The Secretary also came
in for criticism from sources
closer to home. Schlesinger,
to take only one example,
publicly disputed Kissinger's
version of the events. At a
Pentagon news conference,
the Defense chief asserted
that there were "mixed re-
actions and different assess-
ments of the probability" of
Soviet intervention. Although
Kissinger described the Presi-
dent s top advisers as being
"unanimous" in their judg-
ment that there was a "high
probability" of a "unilateral
Soviet move," Schlesinger
said: "I think the probability
of Soviet forces being en route
was considered by someto be
low." Later, when queried
about the possibility that the
Soviet transport planes
spotted flying toward Cairo
could have been carrying
troops, Schlesinger added:
"Nobody under those circum-
stances could dismiss that as
a possibility, no matter how
' low he placed the probabil-
ity."
With the benefit of hind-
sight, not even Kissinger has
given Kissinger a straight A
for crisis management on the
night of Oct. 24-25. The Sec-
retary has privately acknowl- ?
, ? edged, for one thing, that the'
consultation process with the
allies was "inadequate" and,
for another, that the global
nuclear nature of the alert
was too extreme. The South-
? ern Command is Panama, for
example, did not have to be
Welted; nor did the Alaskan
? Command.
More important, he mis-
calculated the reaction of the
American people to the sud-
? den alert, But, unlike his crit-
ics at home and abroad, Kis-
singer tias consistently main-
isipd. that the alert' was
sio
"vital" to American security
and that it was not prompted
by Watergate. In his opinion,
"if we had not reacted vio-
lently," the Russians would
almost certainly have put
their airborne troops into
Egypt "to force the Israelis
back to the Oct. 22 line," thus
liberating the trapped Third
Corps and saving the Sadat
regime from humiliation and
a likely coup d'etat. Kissinger
assumed that If the Russians
had managed to establish
themselves in the Middle East
as the saviors of the Arabs,
it would have been very diffi-
cult to get them out. Their
influence over future oil ship-
ments would have increased.
The United States could have
survived, but Western Europe
and Japan could not have
gotten along without an ex-
panding flow of oil. At his
most pessimistic, Kissinger
could imagine a situation in
which Soviet domination of
the Middle East might lead to
the communization of West-
ern Europe and Japan in 5 to
10 years.
r2 he alert was clearly iw
not Kissinger's finest
hour, but he has in-
sisted that it was one
of those necessary exercises
in big-power politics, which
firmed up the United States
position in the Middle East
and opened the door to a di-
rect American role in mediat-
ing the dangerous Arab-Israeli
conflict. As he saw it, the
cease-fire imposed by the two
superpowers produced a mili-
tary stalemate. The alert pro-
duced the crisis atmosphere
so necessary in the Secretary's
scenario to scare the belliger-
ents off dead center. The tim-
ing?always a crucial element
?seemed right, at long last,
for Kissinger, as Secretary of
State, to plunge into the poli-
tics of the Middle East. As
Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi Ara-
bian Foreign Minister, had re-
marked the week before: "We '
think the man who could
solve the Vietnam war . . .
can easily play a good role
. . . in our area." N
Picture Credits
1?CAMERA 5/PETER BORSARI
0-9--SYGMA/SOBI: GAMAWJEAN-
ClAUDE FRANCOLON
10-111?GAMMA/URI DAN: STOMA
20-29?UNITED PRESS INTERNA-
TIONAL; CAMERA 5/KEN REGAN
31?CAMERA 5/KEN REGAN
36?PICTORIAL PARADE/FRANK
EDWARDS, FOTOS INTERNA-
TIONAL
42?SYGMA/CHRISTIAN 5I300N-
PIETR1
60-61-7NE NEW YORK TIMES/MIKE
LIES
62-41S'* SOCIATED PRESS
Pi?Pi941.100:,
CO-EDUCATIONAL
Founded
19110
VT:
Rut Pert
Moder
,(f)
BETTER TYPE CAMP FOP
Private lake, otyrnpic pool requi
water sports, atm Melia:ling
skiing, water bicycling
412 Miniature sports car Ir
arts & recreations including di
Painting,11031Giatwarts & crafts
horseback riding. Laundry. Mani
ical insurance & transportation
tipping except waiters. Severe
waiters. 16-17 (Part fee).
Mature, exp. staff; 2 R.N.s & P.
ALWAYS oput FOR INSPECT'
1330 52nd Sean, Brooklyn, N.Y
?,A111/1F.
?Co."
Ge be
shires
GoKar
a fin
make
Camp
WEST COPAKE, N. Y.
The Schaffer Family Invites You To Jo
Camper Waiter Teen Program-6986-8 weeks,
Highly skilled Staff & Programs for y,
UNITED NUMBER OF OPEN!'
ERIC SCHAFLER. B.S., 31.A., Ill Wool*, La
FOR BOYS AND GIRLS AGE 8-16
Mbc
ON A PRIVATE LAKE IN WARGO
SIM a specialty program In MUSIC,
Sports Clinics: Water-siding, ter
Still available, last of our 3-week set
MIKE FLAMHAFT, 9544 tadpole St., Seaford, Long I
RON SCOAEFER, 121 Franklin Ave., Staten Idand, Net
BERKSHIRE
Our 58th Year
Fos, adventure and skill development.
Openings
July 24-Aug. 21
Tennis & Golf Featured
Golf Course ? Clay Courts
Land & Water Sports
Judo, Pioneering & Crafts
Camp Berkshire, Wiasted, Ct 203-379-1222
HORSES
In White Mts. of N.H.
? 2-9 wks.?from $293
ENGLISH or WESTERN RIDING
Expert ring & field training ? Trails
All land/water marts ? Mountain hiking
Morse shows ? Watordti ? Bers/Oirls 0-10
DIAMOND J RANCH [phone]
19 Hampton Ave., Yonkers, NY 10710
liginhousE ART ANd music
CAMP, DINE quovE,
Orch., Concert & Jam
Bands, Ensembles, All
Instruments, Drama,
Dance, Fine Arts, Co-ed
10.176 weeks $776
P.O. Box 4104.
Phila.. Pa. 19144
Tele. 21541494744
"4119GOOD
44....,.NEVIScgt COD
Separate camps for boys and girls 6-10.
40th season, same management. 207 acres.
SPotts, trips. swimming canoeing, 8a
handcraft. horses, tennis. Tutoring.
Resi-
dent physician & R.N. We aim to build
Christian character. 534 wits $300: 7 irks WOO.
Write: Chaplain wyetis Willard. Porentdale,
Mass. 02644. Tel: [phone].
940-HILL CAMP
Lake Como, Pa.
2 wk semis= 41/ $225 haeludee harashaels
Riding.7/23
eertake riasb:rintMehrouraltivri2
irre6. 'resident MD: Itaa Itna onsal*ra ffEr
specialty: ACA appored; Pocono
um 5-14 card; nen-scrtarica: eff)
tikoni Itra N. flic2"14akeig? fraii;4411T04732
feta 942-00211 ?
01001.400061
,
7th
Se
on
Ju
an
75
4
an
de
me
? ..v
set
we
pta
C91
be:
dei
We
Ga
Na
fros
Ba
Pr(
1)11-
Ab,
01)B