UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES AND TRANSMITTAL OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94B00280R001200130035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2009
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: December 19, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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ILLEGIB ~~(~i)L?e r_.Gff/ of [_
9.3d Congress
2d Session
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES AND
TRANSMITTAL OF CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENTS
0
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
?
REP-ORT
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1974
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9uJ i9t )
"Positive Vetting"-A Review
By Your Editor
The United States and Great Britain have had a fruit-
ful (and sometimes fretful) intelligence exchange pro-
gram for many years. It bore its greatest and sweetest
fruit during World War 11 with the ULTRA exchanges
between British and American code breaking organiza-
tions. Historians in earlier books reviewed in this In-
telligence Report leave little doubt that the war was
shortened by reason of intelligence operations and coor-
dination between the two nations.' The foes during
World War If were the Nazis and the Japanese. The
Russians were our allies. And when that relationship
ceased in the immediate post-war years, a whole new
reorientation of intelligence exchange, with sometimes
ai
f
l
p
n
u
results, began.
Perhaps the best description of the triumphs and
tragedies of the new cooperation in the field of decryp-
tion, formalized in the UKUSA Agreement, is contained
in the recently published book The Circus by Nigel West
(Stein and Day, New York, $16.95).
There are two editions of The Circus, one American
(which will be reviewed here) and one British-and
thereby hangs a tale. When MI5 (British Security Ser-
vice) learned that a book entitled A Matter of
Trust-MIS Operations 1945-1972 was about to be
published, a copy of the manuscript was purportedly
stolen by a senior MI5 officer (according to the author)
and an order was sought (and granted) in the High
Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, enjoining
publication-all without prior notice to the author or
his publisher.
It developed that a copy of the manuscript had been
hand carried to the United States by the publisher a
month prior to the issuance of the injunction and thus
was beyond reach of the British court. Intensive
negotiations then took place between MI5 and the
author, which resulted in certain deletions from the ver-
sion to be published in Britain. Upon agreement, the
court order was discharged and the English edition came
out. But the American edition is relatively unex-
purgated, except for certain name omissions in the MI5
Organizational Charts in the frontispiece. Whether or
not all the allegations of the author and publisher are
true, it's great "hype" for the book!
The Circus has much to say about the ineffectiveness
of the so-called "positive vetting" system which is sup-
posed to root out security risks in what we in America
would call sensitive and critically sensitive positions. In
English parlance, positive vetting means "to subject to
expert appraisal" but, in practice, as explained in our
June issue in the review by Lord Bridge and colleagues
of the Prime case, the vetting procedure was neither
positive nor effective. Again, our June issue sets forth
the recommendations of the Lord Bridge Report to the
Prime Minister and the Parliament for improvement of
3
the positive vetting system. They are. for the most part,
patterned after procedures followed by our CIA and
NSA. As the report puts it: "The most important con-
clusions we have reached in this inquiry have, we readily
acknowledge, resulted from the visit of members of the
Commission to Washington and the direct experience
gained from this visit of the personnel security pro-
cedures adopted by the United States intelligence and
security agencies."
Perfect as our intelligence security procedures may
now be, it has not always been so. As The Circus points
out (p. 181) we had our own defections from NSA in
1960 of the two homosexual cryptologists (Martin and
Mitchell) followed by Victor Hamilton and Cornelius
Drummond, and the suicide of Jack Dunlap. The Circus
concludes: "Perhaps most embarrassing of all, the
NSA's Director of Personnel, Maurice Klein, was found
to have falsified his own original NSA application form
and the NSA Director of Security, a former FBI agent,
S. Wesley Reynolds, admitted having discovered Klein's
secret without taking action. Both men resigned, and
were followed by 26 other NSA officials who were later
described as `sexual deviates.' "
There's an old saying to which the British are apt to
relate when overly criticized about the Prime case and it
is, "People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw
stones." Maybe our glass house has been rendered im-
penetrable by reason of past "break outs. If so, the
British should be given the formula! As the Security
Commission Report (Lord Bridge) put it: "We have felt
it essential to subject to fresh and rigorous examination
those security procedures, in particular, which affect the
most secret agencies and especially to consider what
lessons can be learnt by a comparison of the relevant
procedures adopted in this country and, the United
States, with a full appreciation of the importance to the
continued cooperation of the two countries in the in-
telligence field that our security procedures should, so
far as practicable, be made as effective as theirs to pro-
tect our common secrets." (Emphasis added.)
And there you have it. If our shared secrets are to be
protected, both sides must work together to devise the
best procedures possible to protect the whole in-
telligence community against infiltration of communist
moles. Just one mole, as in the case of Prime, who gave
away British and American signals intelligence for some
13 years, can do incalculable damage. In fact, one mole
can go far toward losing a whole war (not to mention
thousands of lives) as Roy Medvedev has pointed out in
a recent article in The Washington Post (June 19, 1983)
about the defector Donald Maclean.
Think back to General MacArthur's
great Inchon
landing which put the troops of Kim 11 Sung in a hope-
lessly cut off position. As our troops advanced north to-
ward the Yalu River and an almost complete victory,
President Truman sent a dispatch to MacArthur order-
Continued on page 4
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0
"Positive Vetting"
Continued front page 3
ing him not to cross the Chinese border under any cir-
cumstances, and not to use atomic weapons (so relates
Medvedev).
At the time Clement Attlee was Prime Minister and
was visiting this country with the head of the American
desk of the British Foreign Office, one Donald Maclean
-a Soviet mole. Stalin had been bringing pressure on
Mao Tse-tung to. intervene, but Mao did not want the
war to spread into China. But, when Maclean passed the
Truman order to MacArthur to Stalin, and Stalin
relayed it to Mao, the Chinese invaded North Korea en
masse and the result was today's stalemate. Thus, can
one mole, says Medvedev, alter the whole course of bat-
tle.
This brings us to the deficiencies in our own
"vetting" or Screening Federal Employees, published
by The Heritage Foundation and researched and written
by this publication's Associate Editor David Martin.
While we have pardonable pride in David Martin's
work, it would be better to describe the worth of his
pamphlet in the words of the nationally syndicated col-
umnist John Chamberlain. Of David Martin and his
work he said:
He probably knows more about the ins and
outs of subversive infiltration of government
than anyone else in the country. So when he says
our government has been open to the placement
of communist "moles" ever since the FBI was
forbidden, under the so-called Levi guidelines, to
conduct "full" domestic surveillance of radical
organizations, his voice should be heard.
Well, David Martin's voice has been heard. The Levi
guidelines are gone to be replaced by the William French
Smith guidelines (see our April issue) and a series of
recommendations in the "quick fix" area are in the pro-
cess of at least partial implementation. David made 11
of them and they are reproduced below:
1. The lax 1975 suitability guidelines for ad-
judicators, currently in use by OPM, should be
completely rewritten.
2. The directives promulgated by the chairman
of the Civil Service Commission or the chief
counsel of the CSC going back to 1965 should be
reexamined with a view to eliminating or
rewriting all those weakening directives not ab-
solutely required by law.
3. The entire body of. Supreme Court rulings
relating to federal employment should be reex-
amined with a view to replacing the extremely
constrictive interpretations, passively accepted
for some two decades now, with viable, more
conservative interpretations.
4. The quality of investigation and adjudica-
tion should be improved by funding more inten-
sive training courses, plus refresher courses, for
investigators and adjudicators.
5. There should be a tightening up on the
waiver of the pre-employment Background In-
vestigation (BI), which has now become the rule
in most agencies.
6. There should be a firm return to the require-
ment for a reinvestigation at five-year intervals
of all employees in sensitive-or at the very least,
critical-sensitive-positions.
7. Adequate funding must be provided for the
manpower requirements that would be made
necessary by such improvements. This will need a
budgetary assist from Congress.
8. DOD should, at the earliest possible date,
abandon the IBI and return to the requirement of
a full field Background Investigation for all
those with access to Top Secret or higher
classifications.
9. Some formula must be found for recasting
the "nexus" provision so that agencies are not
placed in the ridiculous position of having to hire
employees whom they have many valid reasons
for not hiring, but about whose flaws and
weaknesses they cannot provide a definite nexus
to ability to perform the job.
10. The OPM and the Justice Department must
team up to represent the-interests of the Federal
Employee Security Program before the courts far
more vigorously and effectively than heretofore.
Il. A new executive order should be issued,
making it clear that it is the intention of the Ad-
ministration to maintain an effective program to
ensure that applicants for employment in sen-
sitive government positions possess the qualities
of integrity and unswerving loyalty to the United
States.
David would be the last person to suggest that all the
changes that have come about since the publication of
his pamphlet flowed directly from his recommenda-
tions. But there is no doubt in your editor's mind that
they have had, and will continue to have, considerable
impact.
The Circus and Screening Federal Employees disclose
vital weaknesses in the vetting procedures in England
and the United States. In our country the data base,
which David calls our "priceless reservoir of domestic
security intelligence at state and local levels, has for
the most part been destroyed or locked up. It will take
five to ten years to build again and require certain
legislative changes in the FOIA and Privacy Act to
render it inviolate. At least here, the British are ahead of
us. As pointed out in The Circus, the so-called
"Registry" in the A section of MI5 is intact and even
more valuable today, since it's been automated, than it
proved to be in World War 11.
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We both have faults and cracks in our "vetting" pro-
cedures-we in the federal government generally (out-
side NSA, the CIA and the FBI) and the British across
the board. The Circus is an utterly fascinating "case
study" of the post-war successes and failures of MIS in
rooting out moles, and David Martin's study a resource
book to build improvements into our own security pro-
cedures.
Copies of Screening Federal Employees may be ob-
tained from The Heritage Foundation, 513 C Street NE,
Washington, D.C. 20002, $3.00 each.
Senate Hearings on FOB Amendment
Continued from page 2
to designate other
exempt. Such a
Americans their
about files main
ians and schola
aliens) may request
tion of documents
Order 12356.
hat the president be authorized
telligence components as similarly
(citizens and permanent resident
andatory review for declassifica-
the provisions of Executive
In view of our understandi
ppose its approval,
CIA support of S. 1324 we do no
but we strongly urge that the other en
ities of the intelli-
reatment as is
gence community be accorded similar
CIA.
Among the other points made by Gener
the folio wing:
-The time limits for intelligence agenci
to requests, which, when not met, convey
to file suit, have been demonstrated to
and should not be in the law.
-The provision for de novo revie
added in the 1974 amendments t
by President Ford as being u
who simply disagrees with
of the Executive bran
authorized to release
is in our view a us
bility constitutio
Mark H. Lync
The ACLU
portant pieces o
by the judiciary,
FOIA, was vetoed
onstitutional. A judge
e experience and expertise
as to what is classified is
uch information. This provision
'rpation of the intelligence responsi-
itively implements the principle,
protected by the first
committed to informed,
endment, that this nation is
bust debate on matters of
public importance. Accordin
wary of all proposals to limit th
, the ACLU is extremely
FOIA....
ncy's filing system on
The assumptions about the Ag
by the committee....
By making all gathered intellig
ed and substantiated
ce accessible, this bill
is a significant improvement ovfr past proposals which
would have made only finished intelligence reports,
otal exemption leaves available to
ghts under the Privacy Act to inquire
ained concerning them. Also, histor-
'ally vested in the president.
ards the FOIA as one of the most im-
legislation ever enacted by Congress
such as national intelligenc estimates, accessible. This
is an important develop nt, because finished intelli-
gence may omit raw i ormation that is important to
understanding event ....
Only the operat' nal files of the CIA's Directorate of
Operations, Dir ctorate of Science and Technology,
and Office of ecurity will be eligible for exemption
from search a d review. Thus, operational information
located elsewh re in the Agency will be subject to search
and review....
Another issuk which requires clarification is judicial
review. Indeed, he CIA's testimony last week on this
matter was quite isturbing. We believe that it is essen-
tial for courts to ha a the authority to conduct de novo
review whenever a q scion is raised as to whether a
non-operational file ha been improperly characterized
as an operational file. Mk~out this check,. the public
will not have sufficient conft ence that the Agency has
not succumbed to the temptati to broaden the desig-
nation of files beyond the definiti s established by the
bill....
If this bill will not result in the los of information
now available under the FOIA, if it w ll result in im-
proved processing of requests, and if the a her problems
I have identified, as well as any other le itimate prob-
lems which may be identified by others, are resolved,
the ACLU will support this bill.
Steven Dornfeld, National Presiden , Society of Pro-
fessional Journalists, Sigma Delta i
As the chairman knows, jo alists in this city do not
need official government ources of information when
there are always plent of people ready and willing to
leak unofficial inf mation. (Why, sometimes, those
folks even dispens classified information in pursuit of
political advantag .) Thus, the Society of Professional
Journalists comes here today not so much on its mem-
bers' behalf, as on public's behalf. It is, after all,
the public that truly be fits from access to the sheer
authenticity of official gov ment records as opposed
to people's interpretations of th records....
Last week's public testimony the CIA suggests
that the Agency seeks this legislatio in order to allev-
iate its administrative work and enh nce its internal
security. To the extent that this prop sed bill merely
alleviates administrative burden witho t decreasing the
kind of information presently av table under the
FOIA, the Society does not oppo the bill. To the ex-
tent that the CIA harbors d er aspirations for this
bill we oppose it since th ase for a broader exemp-
tion from the Act has si ly not been made.
Our position here t day should explode the myth
that the press always 4pposes the CIA's legislative re-
quests. Obviously, wh a trying to approach this bill
reasonably, the Society till has reservations about its
effects... .all our question come in the context of the
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Approved For Release 2009/02/05: CIA-RDP94BOO28OR001200130035-4