INITIATIVES TO COMBAT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94B00280R001200010020-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2009
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 6, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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DCI/ICS 84-3007
6 April 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Eloise R. Page
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Initiatives to Combat Unauthorized Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence Information
1. On 30 March 1984 I convened a meeting in response to
your charge to develop administrative, security and legal
initiatives which could be taken to help deal with the
problem of unauthorized disclosures. At this meeting, which
was attended by the Executive Director, the General Counsel,
the Director of Security, the Deputy Director of Legislative
Liaison, the Chairman of the Security Committee and senior
General Counsel representatives, including the Chairman of
SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee,
the papers at Tab A were presented. After some discussion,
it was decided that the following proposals should be
submitted for your consideration.
Nothing is more necessary at this point than to break the
cycle of futility by finding an appropriate leak case, having
it thoroughly investigated and having the leaker identified
and appropriately disciplined.
A. Presidential Statement
-- Congressional and media focus on certain
aspects'of NSDD-84 diverted attention away from
the problem of intelligence leaks and, if
anything, the problem has gotten worse. More
recently there has been some Congressional
recognition of the seriousness of such leaks and
we again need to signal Executive Branch concern.
DOWNGRADE TO UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM TAB A
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Eloise R. Page
Deputy,Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Initiatives to Combat Unauthorized Disclosures
of Classified Intelligence Information
1. On 30 March 1984.I convened a meeting in response to
your charge to develop administrative, security and legal
initiatives which could be taken to.help deal with the
problem of unauthorized disclosures. At this meeting, which
was attended by the Executive Director, the General Counsel,
the. Director of Security, the Deputy Director of Legislative
Liaison, the Chairman of the Security Committee and 'senior
General Counsel representatives, including the Chairman of
SECOM's Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee,
the papers at Tab A were presented. After some discussion,
it-was-decided that the following proposals should be,
submitted for your consideration.
I. INVESTIGATION
Nothi-ng is more necessary at this.point than to.brea.k the
cycle of futility by finding an appropriate leak case, having
it thoroughly investigated and'having theleaker identified
and appropriately disciplined.
A. Presidential Statement
-- Congressional and media focus on certain
aspects of NSDD-84 diverted attention away from
the problem of intelligence leaks and, if
anything, the problem has gotten worse. More
recently there has been some Congressional
recognition of the seriousness of such leaks and
we again need to signal Executive Branch concern.
25X1 DOWNGRADE.TO UNCLASSIFIED
WHEN SEPARATED FROM TAB A
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*We recommend a forceful Presidential
statement to his Cabinet and senior White House
officials, decrying the harmful effects of leaks
upon the national security, holding them
.personally responsible for security in their
respective organizations, and directing the
Attorney General to vigorously investigate
intelligence leaks even if administrative
sanctions, rather than criminal prosecution will
be the end result. Expressions of Congressional
support from the intelligence oversight
committees would help immeasurably.
B. Use of a Special Prosecutor
-- Current investigative timidity may
derive from the recognition that there are
political costs in pursuing an aggressive
investigation of media leaks.
*We recommend Attorney General appointment
of a special prosecutor (independent counsel) to
pursue sensitive leak investigations. The
special prosecutor should have all necessary
.powers, including the ability to bring witnesses
before a grand jury.
-- Use of a special prosecutor in
appropriate cases will help assure the.public,
and particularly the media, that the investi-
gation will be impartial and objective and
neither politically motivated nor politically
constrained.
C. Creation of a Separate FBI Leak Investigation Unit
Although we report a significant number
of leaks to Justice each year, very few are
.investigated.because Justice is not. sanguine
about solving such cases and prefers to use FBI
resources on other types of cases.
*We recommend creation of a special unit
within the FBI to do nothing but investigate
intelligence leaks.. The Intelligence Community
should support a line-item appropriation to
finance this unit. .
Bureau assistance is necessary because
certain key government components have no
investigative staffs and in other departments. and
`'S.`E.C R-E"`T '
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agencies responsibility and authority are. solely
internal,. with one agency unable to investigate
what happened to its information when
disseminated to a second agency.
-- Intelligence Community security
organizations and the DCI Security Committee must
provide appropriate assistance and work closely
with this FBI unit.
II. REGULATION OF.GOVERNMENTAL CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA
*We recommend:
a) Centralizing within each
agency the regulation of all press
contacts so a single official is aware
.of all authorized contacts;
b) Elimination of press building
passes giving unsupervised or
.unrestricted access to government
buildings;
c) Requiring employees to record
all press contacts relating to their
official positions and duties; and
d) Establishment ofguidelines
,for backgrounders and indoctrination of
employees on press tactics and proper
responses.
III SECURITY EDUCATION
The public generally regards intelligence leaks as
.interesting, even titilating and perhaps useful in exposing
governmental excess but basically harmless. Leakers are seen
as vaguely heroic figures akin to whistleblowers, and leaks
are viewed as a kind of game in which the government tries to
:S tE. C; R'E
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-- Contact between government officials and
the press very often is salutary, contributing to
public knowledge and informing public debate.
.Government officials, however, have no license to
jeopardize intelligence sources and methods or
mishandle classified information. Nevertheless,
newsmen regularly brag that they have daily
.access to some of our most sensitive intelligence
.;publications.
 S R C R E T
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hide information while the media trys to find the secrets.
Until the public understands that compromises of intelligence,
sources and methods erode our ability to obtain vital
intelligence and hurt the national security more than they
contribute to public debate, public support for needed
security measures will be lukewariq at best.
A. Presidential Commission
*We recommend creation of a Presidential
Commission to review intelligence leaks, to
examine steps which can be taken to protect
intelligence sources and.methods from
unauthorized disclosure, to review existing
investigative and legal constraints and to make
recommendations to improve the situation.
-- Intelligence leaks have been a problem
in both Democratic and Republican administra-
tions. A nonpartisan blue ribbon panel could
help to generate greater public understanding of
the problem and support for appropriate remedial
steps.
Defense Departments, the National Security
reach policy level officials in the State and
Security Briefings
*We recommend a redoubling of efforts to
Council, and on the staff of the intelligence
recitation of rules. Instead, the. briefing must
focus on the specific audience, citing the actual
official being briefed listens passively to a
oversight committees. These security briefings
should not be in a lecture format in which the
damage caused by leaks and explaining how, with a
,modicum of care, intelligence sources and methods
could have been protected with minimum impact on
the underlying news story or policy issue. There
on how intelligence material must be safeguarded
in dealing with the press.
awareness of the fragility of intelligence
Outreach Program
*We recommend an effort to increase public
. sources and methods and the national security
implications of intelligence leaks. Senior
intelligence officials and public affairs
officers should take the time to develop this
issue .in speeches, articles and other programs
which,_.riii,ll r.e:ach mpor;ta,ntseg.m;ent of the public.
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IV. LEGISLATION
Arguably, unauthorized disclosures of classified
information are in violation of the espionage laws but
Justice has never successfully prosecuted a leaker under
these statutes. In part, this may be because it is necessary
to prove that the individual transmitting the national
defense information did so with reason to believe it would be
used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage
of a foreign nation and in part, because of a reluctance.to
treat leakers as spies.
A. Criminalizing Leaks
*We recommend new legislation (Tab B)
criminalizing the willful unauthorized disclosure
of classified information by government employees
or other persons with authorized access to
classified information.
- Such legislation would be free of the
intent requirements in the current espionage laws
and would make willful unauthorized disclosure of
classified information illegal per se.
-- It is unlikely that this could be passed
in this session of Congress and we might consider
deferral of this legislation until next year.
Injunctive Relief
-- At the appropriate time after passage of
legislation criminalizing the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information, we might
consider seeking legislation (Tab C) providing
for injunctive relief in leak cases similar to
that available under the Atomic Energy Act.
2. To the extent appropriate, implementation of these
committees. In this manner, we can capitalize on the growing
Congressional concern about damage to intelligence from leaks
and,can avoid triggering a partisan political response to
actions which seek to deal with a very serious and very
.urgent problem facing the Community.
recommendations should be discussed with our oversight
Eloise .R. ,Page
Attachments: : As .::stated..
S., E C :R:`E: T
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MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel
SUBJECT:
Associate General Counsel/Chairman,
Unauthorized Disclosures Investigation
Subcommittee, SECOM
Intelligence Leaks
1. Unauthorized disclosures have become so commonplace,
investigative action has been so timid, success in solving
leak cases has been so infrequent, punishment of the few
leakers actually found has been so mild and so hidden and
prosecution of leakers has become so improbable that leaking
has emerged as a virtually risk-free activity. Indeed, a
recent expression of presidential concern about leaks was
greeted not by a renewed national resolve to protect fragile
intelligence sources and methods, but instead by the concern
that security might actually be tightened and that leakers
might actually be inhibited. Leakers were turned into heroes
and security officials into villains. Leakers have been
emboldened and security officials intimidated.
2. It.really is time to turn this around by a more
vigorous program of security awareness within the Government,
and by educating the public at large about the pernicious
-nature of disclosures which do great damage to our
intelligence sources.and to the continued availability of
vitally needed information while contributing only minimally
to public debate. We must pursue leak investigations more
vigorously. We must remove those who violate their trust
from Government service in a very public and visible way and
deal even more harshly with senior officials who should know
better and who should set a responsible example for the rest
of the bureaucracy.. Finally, we need better laws.. We need a
mechanism to make leak investigations a bipartisan
undertaking and we need to stop confusing leakers with either
whistleblowers or spies. We must have a law, separate from
the espionage statutes, which criminalizes the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information by Government
employees. But most of all we must reject the conventional
wisdom that nothing can be done and eschew those who, as.a
result Of .frustratian, counsel..inactivity and urge us to
accept. and be resigned .too ,the current :deplorable state of
affairs.
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3. "Security is not an exact science and even the best
system occasionally will fail. Nevertheless, the CIA has put
together what must be regarded as a model system. Security
processing of applicants is rigorous and security
indoctrination begins from the moment the employee comes on
board. A loyalty to the Agency and an esprit de corps is
fost'ered and a value system geared to protecting intelligence
sources and methods is inculcated by security education and
security awareness programs. Media contacts are centralized
and controlled. The probationary and reinvestigation
polygraph programs serve not only to deter unauthorized
disclosures, but also to catch the few who become sloppy or
who don't care. Leaks are investigated. Security breaches
.yield predictable punishment and potential leakers know that
their jobs will be forfeited.
4. The problem is that CIA and the other intelligence
.agencies are in the business of disseminating intelligence
but the same security controls as exist, for example, at CIA
and. NSA, do not exist in the consumer agencies. We have,
therefore, a security edifice which is very much like a bank
with a door of steel 12 feet thick in front but with a
rickety screen door in back and until we can insist on the
same standards on both. the producer and consumer side of the
business we will find it very hard to reassure our depositors.
5. There is no single solution, no panacea but there are
a number of steps which can be taken. To soir:e extent we must
get back to basics and practice the fundamentals. For
example, we must more carefully scrub our finished
intelligence so that intelligence sources and-methods are
better protected. We must periodically prune dissemination
lists and stop confusing "nice to know" with "need to know."
We should make consumers justify their need for continued
access to particular publications. We should have more
flexible publication formats so that those who need to know
about Denmark don't routinely receive reporting on Iran. We
should increase our "read and return" programs. We should
have exit search programs in Government buildings where
,.classified information is present so people cannot casually
walk out with a briefcase full of classified documents, or
build up a cache of documents at home.
6. To some extent we need'to change the way we routinely
do business and to develop new approaches. For example, it
simply is not a good idea to give newsmen building passes
which enable them to wander at will through Government
offices. .
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7. We should be moving now to try to build into
computer-assisted dissemination systems, the kind of security
modules which will provide a record as to which document was
disseminated to which person, and also to indicate when a
hard copy is printed out. Indeed, the computer can generate
a unique number for each document which is printed.
8. We need to focus on the growing use of personal
microcomputers since this technology can mean that
individuals can put highly classified data into the memory of
extremely small and highly-portable personal computers. At a
minimum, sources and methods information should be protected
against being incorporated into such personal computers.
9. We need to cut down the practice of photocopying
highly-classified intelligence publications, avoid having
them "lying around" and worse yet being passed from desk to
desk. As we move more and more into a computerized
environment, we can do this by developing for senior policy
customers outside the Intelligence Community a "classified
executive suite,".an attractively furnished room where senior
officials can go to read classified intelligence
publications. The individual with a key to this "classified
executive suite" will log onto a computer terminal and
receive his classified mail on the screen. He or she will be
able to go to this facility at any convenient time to read
the NID or other publications which he is entitled to see.
The key to the executive suite will give the consumer the
required status and prestige, but the actual reading material
can be tailored to his particular needs. The custodian or
librarian in the "classified executive suite" can take care
of any requests for hard copy and can keep appropriate
records as to who received what.
10. When intelligence leaks do occur they must be
investigated or at least reviewed. At present this is not
done in a systematic way. More needs to be done to evaluate
leaks, to prepare damage assessments and to conduct post
mortem reviews of the investigation and of the damage after a
sufficient passage of time has occurred. Investigations
conducted by the various agencies often are inadequate
because in many cases responsibility and authority stops at
the water's edge and one agency cannot easily investigate
what happened to its information when disseminated to a
second agency. Thus, it is necessary for the Department of
Justice and the FBI to rigorously investigate the
unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence
information especially when intelligence %sources and methods
are involved.
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11. The problem is that very,few of the.leaks reported
to Justice by CIA are investigated. We routinely receive as
a response to our leak report a form letter which states:
"In view of the acknowledged level of dissemination of the
information, we are reluctant to direct the FBI to
investigate this matter unless you are in a position to
identify likely suspects or suspect organizational
components. Accordingly, we are unwilling to commence an
inquiry until such time as you can narrow the list of
potential subjects."
12. The notion that the FBI will not investigate until
we identify the suspects is incredible. It is akin to the
police saying that they will not investigate a bank robbery
at 42nd Street and Fifth Avenue because too many people were
in the area but if the bank identifies likely suspects, then
the police will investigate. Not only is this bad policy, it
proceeds from a false factual predicate. Not all recipients
of classified information are equally probable suspects. In
most cases, the more junior officers are not credible
suspects. In most cases, individuals involved with the
intelligence program have equities which are damaged by the
unauthorized disclosure and they would have no incentive to
leak. Thus, a simple examination of who stands to benefit
from the leak can help to focus an FBI investigation.
Unhappily, even when our Office of Security has lead
information, we rarely find Justice interested in pursuing
the matter Indeed, the decision not to investigate unless
the number of persons exposed to the material is very small
means, in effect, that leaks from the NID and other similar
intelligence publications simply will not be investigated.
13. The reason for this apparent reluctance to
investigate leaks derives from the perceived payoffs or lack
.thereof. The Department of Justice has clearly stated that
it regards the chances of solving a leak case as poor and it
preferred to husband scarce FBI resources for espionage
rather than leak investigations. Justice openly stated that
before a newsman could be interviewed by the Bureau, the
Attorney General himself needed to give permission and that
such permission was not likely to be forthcoming. In sum, it
is fair to say that Justice and the Bureau do not see much
glory or career enhancing statistics emerging from leak
investigations and they act accordingly.
14. One solution would be to create a special unit
within the FBI to do nothing but investigate leaks. The
Intelligence Community might detail experienced security
officers to help staff the unit and support a line-item
appropriation to finance the unit. If the unit would analyze
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the intelligence leaks reported to it and then simply
question a few individuals who stood to benefit from each
leak, the perception of federal interest in preventing leaks
would be dramatically strengthened. In addition to this
limited effort, major components of the Intelligence
Community could be informed as to how many major leak
investigations could be undertaken in view of the unit's
manpower and budget. If the DCI, for example, knew that the
unit could handle ten major CIA leak investigations in the
current fiscal.year, Agency recommendations could be made to
Justice as to which leaks the DCI wanted the unit to focus
upon.
15. A number of other initiatives need to be taken to
improve leak investigations. One step is to loosen the
restrictions on interviewing the press. Although it is not
practical to turn-every leak case into a First Amendment
confrontation,. FBI interviews should be a far more routine
practice. Moreover, in an appropriately serious case, the
only way to proceed may be to call a member of the press
'before a grand jury. It is recognized that there could be a
political cost in doing this but that could be dissipated by
use of a special prosecutor so that the leak investigation is
not perceived as a political exercise but rather as an
impartial and independent effort to stop the hemorrhaging of
national security information. There is now authority for
the Attorney General to appoint a non-statutory special
counsel and there is authority (28 U.S.C. ? 591(c)) for the
Attorney General to petition the court for' appointment of a
special counsel when he determines that an investigation may
result in a political conflict of interest.' Despite these
authorities, consideration should be given to recommending
separate legislation to specifically authorize the President
to appoint an independent counsel to investigate leaks upon
the recommendation of a senior official such as the DCI. A
draft bill is included at Tab A.
16. In addition to improved investigations of leaks, two
additional legislative initiatives should be considered. The
,first is to seek legislation which would criminalize the
unauthorized disclosure of information by federal employees
and others who have authorized access to classified
information. Arguably, such disclosures of classified
information already are covered by the espionage laws, (i.e.,
18 U.S.C. ? 793) but Justice has never successfully
prosecuted a leaker under these statutes. In part, this may
be because it is necessary to prove that the individual
transmitting the national defense information did so with
reason to believe it would be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, and in
part because of a reluctance to treat.leakers as spies.
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17. The draft legislation at Tab B would eliminate the
intent requirement and make it unlawful for a Government
employee or contractor or any person with authorized access
to classified information to willfully communicate such
information to a person who is neither a Government employee
nor a person with authorized access to such information. In
order to ensure that an individual does not evade the law by
making such disclosure after leaving the Government or after
the termination of authorized access, the draft legislation
also would criminalize such disclosures made within five
years after leaving the Government or losing access. This
legislation (without the five year after-service provision)'
was drafted by Gary Chase and George Clarke in 1982, and it
was coordinated with the Justice Department and cleared by
the Administration for transmittal to the Congress, but it
never actually was sent to the Hill.
18. The second and related legislative initiative is to,
seek legislation allowing for injunctive relief when an
individual has engaged or is about to engage in any acts
which would violate the proposed law prohibiting unauthorized
disclosures of classified information. (Tab C) At present,
similar language is contained in the Atomic Energy Act.
19. There are many other steps which can be proposed but
there are practical limitations on the implementation of
additional,-security controls, the imposition of more
effective administrative procedures, the resort to more
powerful, investigative techniques or the development of new
legal remedies. The first constraint is cost. It is well
understood that security cannot be made. so tight that
necessary dissemination or use of intelligence is inhibited.
There is a tradeoff, for example, in the clearance process
between speed and efficiency on the one hand and care and
h
as a
thoroughness on the other. We all know that security
price tag and we regularly engage in a cost-benefit analysis
in, an effort to achieve a proper balance.
20. The second, and perhaps more important constraint,
~Js public opinion, but we rarely pay sufficient attention to
.this factor. Nevertheless the public mood sets the limits as
to what is tolerable and acceptable. Requiring persons who
have had access to sensitive intelligence information to
submit writings on intelligence for prepublication review is
regarded within the Intelligence Community as a sensible
measure to ensure against the inadvertent disclosure of
classified information. Media and congressional judgments on
this.procedure.have:been quite different and quite negative.
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Even though the intelligence agencies can do nothing more
than advise the author as to the existence of classified
information, and must go to court in order to enjoin
publication.of classified information, prepublication review
is labeled "life-time censorship" stifling public debate and
the free flow of ideas. On the other hand, a far more
intrusive practice, the search, without a shred of probable
cause, of all passengers and their luggage at airports,
although initially controversial, now excites little
opposition or criticism. In the one case, the security
measure is poorly understood and the need for it even less
understood. In the second case, the overriding concern for
personal safety makes a far more draconian security measure
totally acceptable. The public must come to realize that
disclosure of legitimately classified information -- and
there should be no other kind -- poses a clear and present
danger to their security and their safety in an ever more
dangerous world. They must come to realize that intelligence
sources can easily dry up, that expensive technical systems
can become subject to countermeasures and intelligence
relationships painfully built up can quickly be lost.
Depriving policy makers in the defense and foreign policy
arenas of information needed to make rational choices among
policy alternatives, harms each and every one of us, hurts us
in our pocketbooks, and erodes the quality of life for
American citizens.
21. The current rather casual public attitude toward
leaks has not sufficiently been challenged and a climate of
opinion conducive to leaks has been allowed to develop
virtually unchecked. It is extremely important, therefore,
.that the Intelligence Community embark upon a public program
of security education. It is only when the reasons for our
profound concern about intelligence leaks are understood that
we will be able to count on public support for protecting our
vital intelligence sources and methods. Only then will
leakers be outcasts and not vaguely heroic figures.
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OFFICIAL [!SE 011LY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
securitycommittes
SECOM D-069
29 March 1984
STAT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
FROM:
Chairman
STAT
SUBJECT: Intelligence Leaks
REFERENCE: DCI MEMO, dated 23 March 1984,
Subject: Intelligence Leaks and Counterterrorism
Capabilities
1. The referent memorandum and the recent SSCI hearings have raised new
hopes that something can be done at last about those who breach their oaths
and reveal classified intelligence to the news media. The following
observations- on the leak situation may be useful to you in carrying out the
DCI's charge.
2. While Senator Biden's helpful attitude is gratifying, there is a need
to stimulate public opinion against leaks of classified information. There is
a great groundswell of apathy about leaks, both within the government and
among the general public. It is essential that new leak legislation, if it
can be passed, not be regarded with the same enthusiasm as the Volstead Act.
3. There has been little opportunity to take the anti-leak message to
rank-and-file government employees. Even worse, the public receives all its
information about leaks and anti-leak efforts from the news media. While the
DCI videotape has been shown to high-level audiences in some, not all,
Intelligence C,\ommunity agencies, it has not been generally presented to middle
and lower graded personnel, even in CIA.
4. We are not doing enough to create a climate of acceptance for anti-
leak efforts. Almost without exception, audiences viewing the DCI leak
videotape have expressed the belief that no progress will be made until senior
officials of the government stop leaking classified information for their own
purposes. The opinion persists that the public chastisement of one or more
identified high level leakers is essential to marshalling any anti-leak
support. The message is clear--mere words are not enough. The government
must demonstrate that leaks are a sufficiently severe problem to warrant
decisive, well-publicized action against senior,,.well-connected officials.
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5. There is a reasonable reluctance to use the Espionage Act to
prosecute leakers. Legislation is needed to deal specifically with the
disclosure of classified information by cleared individuals to unauthorized
persons. No matter how one views it, this is a different crime from
espionage. Nevertheless, it is no less a breach of trust by a federal
official than illegal use of a limousine, disclosure of crop futures, or
misappropriation of federal funds. It deserves its own law. We should not.-
drive tacks with a sledge hammer. We have offered, then withdrawn,
legislative proposals on this topic for the past two years.
6. As the leak situation grows worse, our posture to combat leaks,.also
seems to be going downhill. The Brooks Bill, if passed, would hamper the
anti-leak effort. More important, it would send a message that efforts to
combat leaks are somehow immoral, unconstitutional, or worse. It is essential
that Congressional liaison officers throughout the Community do everything
possible to educate members of both Houses on the pernicious nature of leaks.
and the extremely disadvantaged posture of the government in combatting
them. A solid defeat for the Brooks Bill is an indispensable step in our
effort to turn public opinion around.
7. CIA and the rest of the Community need to determine as precisely as
possible what the leak story is and how much of that story can be told
publicly; how much more can be told to Congressional leaders, and how much can
be told to top Administration officials. Unless we can present a credible
story that the US intelligence effort is being significantly damaged by leaks,
no amount of hand wringing is likely to have any effect,. whatsoever.
8. We need to determine ways to get the general story before the public
and the specifics to those who can help lead the way back from apathy. Having
a good story doesn't help unless we can get people to listen. The DCI anti-
leak videotape has been an excellent counsciousness-raising exercise, but
there has been a constant uphill struggle to get audiences to view it. We
need to produce a new, hard-hitting, factual message on leaks and obtain
authority to require cleared personnel throughout the government to attend.
9. The fact that after four decades, the DCI still finds the slogan -
on their part.
".loose lips sink ships" useful indicates that posters are a powerful medium..
We should mount a poster campaign against leaks throughout the government.
,Posters provide the message to masses of people without requiring any action
.10. As has been reiterated, the current procedures for--investigation of
..unauthorized disclosures are geared to failure. The fragmented, agency-by-
agency approach to investigating leaks of information that is disseminated
government-wide doesn't provide a uniform effort. In order to ensure that
competent investigative resources are concentrated on areas most likely to
yield results, an overall, coordinated effort by a single agency is
required. The FBI is the only agency capable of doing the job. It is also
essential to the continued protection of intelligence sources and methods that
the investigation. be closely coordinated with senior Intelligence Community
2
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officials who can determine the risk of additional revelations of classified
information at every step of the investigation and recommend appropriate
action to avoid compounding our problems.
11. The fragmented approach to investigation does not permit any
analysis of leaks for possible patterns. Centralized investigation and
coordination would afford the opportunity to analyze the content, apparent
intent, possible sourcing, etc., in order to focus investigative efforts where
they are likely to yield results. Sophisticated investigative and analytical
techniques, as currently being applied to the fight against narcotics, need to
be used against leaks. The current simplistic approach does not work.
12. To avoid having an anti-leak effort evaporate in a cloud of
frustration, there should be personnel and other resources dedicated to the
investigation and prosecution of leaks, preferably with a Congressional
mandate. The current unsophisticated, relatively low level, effort appears to
result from reluctance to devote resources to a no-win situation. If the
resources and appropriate guidelines can be made available, we can win, at
least some of the time. A concerted effort to mount a strong pilot operati
offers the best chance of success.
13. Senator Biden's concern about lack of utilization of "graymail"
procedures illustrates two points that must not be ignored. The first is that
the passage of legislation, per se, is not enough to cure a bad situation.
The second is that nothing can be done about the leak problem unless some of
the offenders-are identified and penalized.
14. 1 have telephoned all the members of the Security Committee and
requested their thoughts on new approaches to the leak problems. Their
responses will be provided to you when received.
15. Finally, I propose that we consider recommending appointment of a
presidential commission on unauthorized disclosure of classified
.information.. A bi-partisan group of distinguished present and former members
of all three'branches of government could be given all the facts and asked to
report and recommend remedial action. Coming from such a broad-based group,
the recommendations should command widespread support and would provide a
.'means of informing the American people of the gravity of the threat, if not
the details of it. Formation of a commission would provide a way to meet
several of the needs enumerated above. The primary drawback is that this is
an' election year. Although timing is important, the action could be taken
after the election, because the problem will still be with us.-
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Director
Intelligence Community Staff
Washington. D.C. 20505 ICS-0802-83
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central. Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information
1. Senior members of the Intelligence Community Staff have met to
consider responses to your call for proposals to-Counter the unauthorized
disclosures of classified intelligence which are increasing in number and
severity. The recommendations of the group are in five basic categories --
education, legislation, investigations, media interface and information
control. This memorandum discusses proposals in each of these categories.
2. Edncatiao - There appears to be a lack of appreciation of the
consequences of t e unauthorized revelation of classified intellipence
information, both to the national security and to the individual making the
disclosure. Each recipient of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) is
indoctrinated on the potential damage to the national security of such
revelations, as well as the penalties prescribed in Title 18, Sections 793
through 798. Nevertheless, incidents continue which indicate that these
elements of risk are not being taken seriously. Recipients of classified
intelligence must be convinced that its.unlawful- revelation is reprehensible,
and that individuals who take it upon themselves to decide when the system may
be' ignored place the national security and themselves in jeopardy.
3. In wartime, the population recognizes .the need to keep military
secrets. The concept that "loose lips*sink-ships"?is well accepted. We need
a campaign, beginning with the President, to convince all concerned that
classified information must be protected if we are to avoid national
disaster. A vigorous Presidential charge to the Cabinet and the Executive
Office. of the President, relayed through channels to all levels, is an
essential element of this campaign.
4. Awareness of the importance of security to intelligence must be
extended to the Congress. The whole-hearted cooperation'of both- legislators
and staff members is indi-spensab e. Not only is Legislative Branch support
needed to safeguard the materi.al provided to the Congress, but also to put
teeth into the anti-leak effort.
CL BY SIGNER
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5. To make this effort credible, documents must be classified properly
and concern about disclosures should be limited to those affecting national
security.
6. A one-time effort to sensitize the government and-the public to the
disastrous consequences of illegal disclosures, even one kicked off by the
President, has a limited half-life. There must be a planned follow-up. In -
addition to the obvious reindoctrination efforts, consideration should be
given to an ongoing program of damage-oriented "lessons learned" presenta
tions. These are envisioned as timely,'specific, succinct and technically
competent videotape shows detailing the nature of the unauthorized disclosure
-and the specific losses suffered as a- result. They would be shown to
audiences cleared for the compromised information as a means of reinforcing
.the need for strong security.
7. Because of the general derision with which the media regard
government efforts to stop leaks and because the generic term "leak" is
associated with disclosures that are politically Embarrassing, It may be
advisable to avoid that term and speak only of "unauthorized disclosures of
classified information."
8. Legislation - The existing espionage laws were drafted to protect
U.S. secrets from foreign agents. They did not contemplate the hemorrhaging
of. classified data that has followed the media explosion. The divulgence of
classified -information to the Russians by way of Jack Anderson's column, for
example,. is a relatively new phenomenon. Even though the intentions of the
'leaker may be to nobly inform the public of facts he thinks. should be known,
the results are the same as directly transmitting the information to the KGB.
.9. Attached is*a copy of the proposed bill to prohibit certain
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Formulated on the basis
of the Willard Report, it is an excellent vehicle for closing the .l oophol e
that allows individuals to ignore classifications and make their own decisions
about what must or must not be kept secret. Passage of such a bill would make_
it clear that both the legislative and executive branches are serious about
.preserving our ability to keep our national security secrets. It would then
:remain for the judiciary to show the same resolve.
10. The chances of passing the unauthorized disclosures bill are,
directly related. to the Congress's perception of how responsibly the Executive
Branch uses its classification powers. As noted above, the effort to educate
government employees (and the-public, to the extent possible) on the need for
effective secrecy must also include the Congress and legislative staff
personnel. The means of reaching this objective are he same for both
branches of government -- graphic demonstrations _tt unauthorized disclosures
are costly in terms of money, national defense, intelligence capabilities, and
sometimes, human lives.
11. Legislation also: is needed to make the unauthorized possession of
classified material a. crime. ItNis`illogi`cal forl,the~:U.S.'Government .:to,:be
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unable to bring charges against, or at least sue to recover classified
material from, Jack Anderson, who makes a mockery of classification, or from
Aviation.}leek_and_Space_?.echnalo.gy, which has printed classified satellite
imagery. the U.S. would take action against an ordinary citizen, it should
act with the same vigor against journalists who damage the national security.
The Attorney General and the General Counsels of the Intelligence community
should begin a crash program to draft a legislative proposal and to review the
.possibilities of action even without'a new law.
12. Whether or not the effort to pass new legislation is successful, it
is vital that Congress be included in any awareness-raising program. A
.secondary objective would be to raise the security standards of the congres-
sional staffs. Many staffers have access to more sensitive information than
some CIA or NSA personnel, who are polygra-plied as well as backgrounded,. and.
are subject to periodic reprocessing. Congressional staffers are not steeped
in the discipline of security as are the intelligence professionals, and would
almost certainly benefit from a greater appreciation for the need for secrecy.
13. ? Finally, the problem of reinforcing the.. responsi bil i ties of formerly
cleared recipients of classified information to continue to maintain secrecy
requires attention. A periodic reminder by mail might be considered, but
except for CIA and NSA, it could be difficult to identify those who should-
receive them. In the future, the archival file of the Community-wide,-
Computer-assisted Compartmented Control (4C) System, which will contain the
identities of individuals formerly approved for access to SCI, should assist
with -this problem. Meanwhile, the message needs to be spread that our "old
boys" can do a lot of harm by talking too much. Cleared persons still
employed in government must be reminded frequently and forcefully that those-
who have retired, or. taken jobs in the industrial sector, may not legally
receive classified information unless they are specifically cleared for it.
14. Investigations - The investigation of._ unauthorized disclosures has
rarely proven successful over the years. The broad dissemination require of
intelligence reporting, the lack of an effectual investigative program
-throe hout the government, an Apparent tolerant attitude toward those who make
;Illicit disclosures, and the absence of a legislative basis for action have
-made for a highly frustrating situation. NSDD-84 offers hope for greater
success in the future, but there is muc to :be done.
15. Although leak investigations are searches for needles in haystacks,
occasionally good investigative work will produce results. - Unfortunately, R '--
unauthorized disclosures to the media are consensual acts between two parties,
neither of whom is likely to admit participation, and one of whom enjoys a
special degree of privilege under the First Amendment. Legislation will help,
but there can't be a trial until a defendant is identified. The abysmal track
,record of leak investigations to date dictates that the Federal Bureau of
,Investigation is the only agency with any chance of success. Fragmented.
singy le-agency efforts simply do not work. Nor does the proposal to form
interagency units to -investigate unauthorized disclosures offer any reasonabl
hope for improvement.
3
SECRET
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 There seems no reason why the government cannot re,qu.i,re. the reporting of,
contacts with the 'news-imedta, during or ,outside ofy,':duty hours, in which
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? SECRET 0 .
16. Even the FBI will require some help -- the full cooperation of other
agencies, the legislation discussed earlier, and _guidelines that permit the
use of as full a range of investigative tools as: possible. The Attorney
General and the Director of the 51 sou be ins ruc e y the President to
provide the most permissive guidelines possible, consistent with the protec-
tion of civil liberties, for FBI investigations of!unauthorized disclosures of:
classified information. In addition, appropriate manpower allocations to the
FBI should be made to ensure a vigorous effort to solve unauthorized disclo-
sures. Without this, the Bureau cannot be expected to neglect other important
investigations to undertake tasks that offer a low probability of success'and
almost certain criticism in the press.
17. Because of the nature of unauthorized disclosures, the likelihood of
developing conclusive evidence is low. In fact, the investigative tool most
likely to*succeed is the polygraph, if conventional investigation can narrow
the number of suspects sufficiently to employ it. If a suspect confesses as a
result of polygraph interview the case is solved. If, however, in the face of
clear-cut polygraphic evidence of deception he continues to deny culpability,
the problem of acceptability of polygraph evidence arises.
.18. While prosecution on the basis of polygraph charts is extremely
unlikely to succeed, the government could revoke the individual's clearances
or access , approvals on'that basis. This would effectively neutralize future
disclosures by that individual, but could result in a lawsuit to regain the
approvals. The Justice Department and Intelligence Community legal counsels
should be tasked to research the grounds-upon which such a suit could be
defended and the likelihood of success.
19.. Action based primarily upon polygraph results is certain to bring -
strong media criticism. he al aph__pr=ess is little understood and the'
press has fostered this misunderstanding by pressing the theme that e
i nstrument itself is unreliable. Consideration should be given to. preparing
an educational program to be used first with senior officials of-the Executive
Branch and with legislators. It should demonstrate-that the effectiveness of
the process doesn't depend totally upon the machine, but is a technique to aid
a skilled interrogator. If a convincing.-,effort can be mounted, it could be
brought to the public and even to the news media.. If the Intelligence
Community can't provide objective, rational.- evidence, that .the palygrapb'
process is reliable, the entire effort to-'comba't unauthorised disclosures may
e in serious trouble.
20. P_ress_Interiace -JSDD-84 'mandates policies to govern contacts ...
between media representatives and agency personnel, leaving implementation to
the individual agencies. The effort to eradicate u~a'uthorized disclosures
would be assisted greatly by the adoption of uniforln rules, for all agencies.
21.. The discussion'of government information, especially secnsitivt
intelligence, by a government employee is not a'private, personal matter.
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? JG\.RG 1
government business is discussed. Failure to follow such a rule could be
made subject to administrative sanctions of varying severity. Data on such
contacts could be computerized, by names of government employees, names of
media representatives, subjects of discussions and dates of contacts, pro-
viding a means of determining a great deal of information that could take
inordinate amounts of investigative effort. It wouldn't tell who made
unauthorized disclosures, but it would provide a means of determining who
might have had the means and the opportunity, and possibly even the motive
to have done so:.
22. It would be ideal, from the standpoint of security, to abolish back.
grounders. Recognizing that this isn't going to happen, there should be firm
control of background briefings to-the-press. There must be clear-cut -guide-
lines on who may authorize and present backgrounders. Every such briefing
should be attendedby a security or public affairs officer who._knnws_Xhat._is
sensitive about the topic being discussed an is ca a e o offering guy ance
to the briefer. A record should be kept of briefings by names o par icipants
? and authorizing officials,. dates and topics, preferably in a computerized
mode. Presenters of background briefings should tie required to prepare
summaries of what was presented. These should be cross-referenced to the
automated index of background briefings. The documentation of this informa-
tion and its retrievability will not only serve as an invaluable investigative
resource, but its existence will promote prudence in the presentation of
backgrounders._and in other. dealings with the press.
23. Even if'all these proposals were adopted, there would be individuals
who would continue to divulge classified information to the press. But they
would find themselves. operating at considerably greater risk. Simple failure
to comply with. the reporting requirements would be cause for administrative
sanctions, and it would become easier to detect such failures by having a
reliable record of compliance. It is likely that associations between
government personnel and media representatives are known to at least some
associates of both, and the possibility of being reported by a concerned
colleague would be enhanced by the revised rules. An effective education
program about leaks should have the salutary effect of highlighting to their
associates those who may deal with the media without -observing the reporting
requirements. If those who comply are sufficiently convinced of the need for
regulation of press contacts, they mad be::inc)ined' to blow, the whistle:" It
would then be necessary for the government to demonstrate the. seriousness of
.its intent by taking administrative action against the nonreporting
individuals, regardless of their positions
24. The matter of "authorized" or."official" leaks needs close atten-
tion. If the appropriate official determines it is-4n the national interest
to release for publication information that was classified until that point,
there should be a means of recording that fact. Such a record would
appropriately be kept somewhere in the Executive Office of. the President.
This record could provide a2means of avoiding the expenditure of resources
to investigate such disclosures as "leaks." -
5
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rrrn~
25. Finally, the revolving door practice of appointing national media
personalities as top level government press officers should be carefully
reexamined. Such appointments must face the incumbents with conflicts of
interest and severely ambivalent feelings, both during and after their federal
service. It may be unrealistic to expect them to deny their colleagues
.information which they feel is unjustifiably classified and to expect theme
to forget, and never use, information they received officially.
26. 1nfnnaation-Control - Some people believe there are enough -
information control po icies, procedures and regulations on the books to bring
the government to a complete halt if they were strictly applied. While this
view may have some merit, it should not serve as an excuse for not trying to
secure our sensitive information. The concept that security is everybody':s
business must not be given lip service and then cast aside.
27. Except for the need for developing a strong, national information
control program for the emerging electronic information systems, it is
unlikely that more document control regulations are needed or practicable.
What is needed is for everyone to be educated in-the existing policies and
procedures and to make a renewed effort to comply. While everyone claims to
know the regulations, it is likely that few could pass a comprehensive test on
information security and control.
28. Steps to,improve information control would include detailed
comparison of practices with policies; 'the reeducation of all personnel in
in orma 'ion security, an a motivations program to enhance awareness of the
consequences of improper handling of sensitive intelligence. Better
information control is needed, but it must come from motivated people. More
.
regulations are not the answer.
29. Summary - Unauthorized public disclosures of classified information
in the news media are damaging to the national security. Our defense against
them must come from within, from those who are cleared for access to, and who
have signed agreements to protect, classified information. It is clear that
some of these people, for reasons of their own, have not kept their word. It
also appears that neither the overall level of concern about this situation
.
.''action is up to the job.
nor the government's capability for remedial
30. To encourage wholehearted support of our efforts to protect classi-
fied information, we must convince those who have agreed to keep the secrets
that they have a moral and legal obligation to keep that conversant. The rules
on SCI are simple and-clear. -It is inconceivable that-,anyone who gives such
information to uncleared individuals is unaware of?what he is doing.
Therefore, such persons must be unconvinced of the/seriousness of the security
program.
31. 'A massive reeducation program for all legitimate recipients of
classified information is:-the first s:teP in ..attempti ng! to achieve the
-
necessary change in attitude.
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?
32. A policy and resource commitment to the solution of at least the
most flagrant cases of unauthorized disclosure is also needed. This means the
devotion of sufficient FBI assets to investigations and an all-out effort to
obtain passage of unauthorized disclosure laws.
33. A severe tightening of policies concerning relationships of cleared
individuals with media representatives is essential. To be meaningful, this
must include strict guidelines, reporting procedures, information retrieval-
capabilities, and impartial administrative penalities for noncompliance.
34. Renewed awareness of information'control policies and procedures and
their importance to the national security is needed. If classified documents
can be turned over to the media or other unauthorized persons without being
noticed, the system isn't working. .It must be made clear that the system"
really is the people who operate-it. '
35. If you wish elaboration or action on any of the above items,
appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community Staff are prepared to
assist in any way possible.
Attachment: -
Draft unauthorized disclosures bill
.All paragraphs of the text
_ are classified SECRET
,7
"SECRET
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New version of proposed 18 U.S.C.-791
is attached. Note that the cover language
specifies that the proposal would have
to be recoordinated within the Administration
before being sent to the Congress
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In the course of Administration development of the Fiscal
Year 1984 Intelligence Authorization Bill, the Intelligence
Community obtained from the Office of Management and Budget
clearance of a proposal to establish criminal penalties for
certain unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
The proposal was based in part on the report of the Interagency
Group on Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information,
chaired by Deputy Assistant Attorney General (Civil Division)
Richard K. Willard. It was coordinated with Deputy Assistant
Attorney General (Criminal Division) Mark Richard, as well as
with the Office of the Secretary of Defense/Legislative Affairs.
For a number of reasons, including the issuance of NSDD-84
just before the Authorization Bill was forwarded to the
Congress, and in deference to the intelligence committees'
preference for handling the Intelligence Authorization in as
unobtrusive a manner as possible, the unauthorized disclosures
proposal ultimately was not transmitted as part of the
Authorization Bill. The climate for transmittal of the
proposal as part of the Fiscal Year 1985 Intelligence
Authorization Bill also was considered unfavorable, due to
continuing controversy over NSDD-84.
=?.The proposal.(attached) has been modified to include former
officers or employees for a period of five years following
termination of their government service. It has been
reconfigured as a separate bill, and prepared for transmission
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at an opportune moment as an initiative from the DCI. The
proposal would have to be recoordinated within the
Administration before being sent to the Congress.
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? W
To protect against injury to the national defense and foreign
relations of the United States by prohibiting certain
unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House cf Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
Chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the beginning thereof the following new section:
"S 791. Unauthorized Disclosures
or havihp within the last five years been
(a) Whoever, being/an officer or employee of the United
States or a person with authorized access to
classified information, willfully discloses, or
attempts to disclose, any classified information to a
person who is not an officer or employee of the United
States and who does not have authorized access to it,
shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
(b) Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United
States, willfully discloses any classified information
to an officer or employee of the United S tates,with
the intent that such officer or employee disclose the
information, directly or indirectly, to a person who
is not an officer or employee of the United States and
who does not have authorized access to it, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both.
(c) As used in this section-
(i) the term "classified information" means
information or material designated and
clearly marked or represented, pursuant to
the provisions of a statute or Executive
order, as requiring protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of
national security; .
(ii) the term "disclose" or "discloses" means to
communicate, furnish, deliver, transfer,
impart, provide, publish, convey, or
otherwise make available;
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 :ICdSC LUU~/UJ/LJ L,IH-MUI"t7'+DUULOUP000 ILUUU IUULU-J
(iii) the term !authorized access" means having
authority, right, or permission to receive
information or material within the scope of
authorized intelligence activities or
pursuant to the provisions of a statute,
.Executive order, directive of the head of any
department or agency who is empowered to
classify information, order of any United
States court, or provisions of any'Rule of
the House of Representatives or resolution of
the Senate which governs handling of
classified information by the respective
House of Congress.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
establish criminal liability for disclosure of
classified information in accordance with applicable
law to:
(i) any court of the United States, or judge or
justice thereof; or
(ii) the Senate or House of Representatives, or
any committee, subcommittee or joint
committee thereof.".
SEC. 2. The table of contents of Chapter 37 of title 18,
United States Code, is amended to include the following caption:
"791. Unauthorized Disclosures".
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SECTION BY SECTION ,EXPLANATION
Section 1 of the Bill amends chapter 37 of title 18, United
States Code, to include a section 791 prohibiting certain
unauthorized disclosures of classified information. Section 2
of the Bill makes the corresponding changes in the table of
contents for chapter 37 of title 18.
Proposed section 791 of title 18, United States Code,
provides criminal penalties for willful unauthorized
disclosures of classified information by federal employees and
others who have authorized access to classified information,
such as government contractors. With the narrow exceptions of
unauthorized disclosures of atomic energy Restricted Data,
communications intelligence/cryptography information, and the
identities of covert agents, willful unauthorized disclosures
of classified information by those entrusted with it by the
government are not per se offenses under existing federal
criminal statutes.
Subsection (a) of S 791 prohibits willful disclosure or
attempted disclosure of classified information, by a federal
civilian or military officer or employee or other person with
authorized access to such information, to any person who is ,
neither a federal civilian or military officer or employee nor
a person with authorized access to such information. The
subsection provides criminal penalties of not more than three
years imprisonment or a $10,000 fine, or both, for such willful
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Subsection (a) of 9 791 would prohibit unauthorized
.disclosures by persons who are, or who have within the last
five years been, officers or employees of the United States.
It also would apply to persons who have authorized access to
'classified information or who have nad such access witnin the
`last five years.' This limited retroactive-feature is important
to ensure that criminal liability under proposed section 791 is
not evaded by an individual who begins to make unauthorized
disclosures shortly after leaving government service or having
had authorized access.
Subsection (b) of 5 791 prohibits willful disclosure of
classified information by a federal civilian or military
officer or employee to'.an_other such officer or employee with
the intent that the latter disclose the information, directly
or indirectly such as through a chain of intermediaries, to a
person who is neither a federal civilian or military officer or
employee nor a person with authorized access to the classified
information. The criminal penalties for such an offense are
identical to those provided for the offense defined in
subsection (a).
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Subsection (c).of.S 791 defines key terms employed in
subsections ('a) 'and (b) in defining the offenses of willful
unauthorized disclosure. Paragraph (i) defines "classified
information" to consist of information or material designated
as requiring protection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national security pursuant to a statute or Executive
order. Paragraph (ii) defines the term "disclose" or
"discloses" to include all forms of disclosure enumerated in
the existing provisions of 18 U.S.C. SS 793-798 and 50 U.S.C.
S 426. Paragraph (iii) defines the term "authorized access" to
include authority or permission to receive information within
the scope of authorized intelligence activities or pursuant to
the routine security clearance processes of the Executive
branch, orders of the courts of the United States, or rules of
either House of Congress. Authorized intelligence activities
are those conducted pursuant to statute or Executive order,
such as the current Executive Order 12333 governing United
States intelligence activities.
Subsection (d) of S 791 assures that no criminal liability
will attach under subsections (a) or (b) to otherwise lawful
disclosure of classified information to the Congress or the
courts.
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a IV
Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Speaker:
This letter transmits for the consideration of the Congress
legislation to provide criminal penalties for the unauthorized
disclosure of classified information by individuals who have had
authorized access to such information. The legislation is
designed to deter unauthorized disclosures of classified infor-
mation, which damage the national security interests of the
United States and raise grave questions about the ability and
willingness of the United States Government to protect its
secrets.
With.the exception of disclosures of information in the
narrow categories of atomic energy Restricted Data, communi-
cations intelligence or cryptography, and identities of covert
agents, disclosures of classified information by government
employees and others with authorized access to classified
information, such as government contractors, do not constitute
per se criminal offenses. In many circumstances such conduct
would violate the Espionage Act or statutes protecting
.government property from theft, but a variety of legal and
practical problems usually prevent such prosecutions. The
proposed legislation contains straightforward, easily
understood, and readily enforceable provisions prohibiting
willful unauthorized disclosure of classified information by
government employees and others)U authorized access to
'classified information. who have had
':The proposed legislation has been narrowly tailored to
establish criminal sanctions for unauthorized disclosures of
....classified information only when. committed by individuals who,
by virtue of their acceptance of employment in positions of
trust involving the national security, have freely undertaken
the legal and moral obligation to protect classified
information. The legislation has also been crafted carefully
to preserve access to classified information by the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government.
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Timely consideration of this legislation of great
importance to the continued security of the nation would be
greatly appreciated. The Office of Management and Budget has
advised that enactment of the proposed legislation would be in
accord with the President's program.
Sincerely,
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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to 1w Is
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? V
Two versions of the
Injunction Provision
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 ai
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?
Version 1
Injunction Against Violation of Proposed ? 791
To protect against injury to the national security and foreign
relations of the United States by preventing certain
unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
Chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding the following new subsection:
791a.
Injunction Proceedings
Whenever in the judgment of the Director of Central
Intelligence any person has engaged or is about to engage
in any acts which constitute or will constitute a violation
of any provision of section 791 of this title, the. Attorney
General on behalf of the United States may make application
to the appropriate federal district court tor an order
enjoning such acts, and upon a showing that such person has
engaged or is about to engage in any such acts, a permanent
or temporary injunction, restraining. order, or other order
may be granted.".
SEC. 2. The table of contents of Chapter 37 of title 18,
United States Code, is amended to include the following caption:
"791a. Injunction Proceedings".
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0 7
Version :.2
Injunction Against Violation of Proposed S 791
and Against Publication of Information Disclosed in Violation
of that Section
A BILL
To protect against injury to the national security and foreign
relations of the United States by preventing certain
unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
Chapter 37 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
adding the following new subsection:
"S 791a..
Injunction Proceedings
Whenever in the judgment of the Director of Central
Intelligence any person has engaged or is about to engage
in any acts which constitute or will constitute a violation
of any provision of section 791 of this title, or has
published or is about to publish information disclosed in
violation of that section, the Attorney General on behalf
of the United States may make application to the
appropriate federal district court for an order enjoning
such acts or publication, and upon a showing that such
person has engaged or is about to engage in any such acts,
or in the case of publication that such publication would
,cause grave, immediate, direct and irreparable harm
'constituting a clear and present danger to the national
.'security or foreign relations of the United States, a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or
'other order may be granted.".
SEC. 2. The table of contents of Chapter 37 of title 18,
United States Code, is amended to include the following caption:
"791a. Injunction Proceedings".
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