UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA, NSDD-274

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01142R000100210013-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: May 7, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 7, 1987
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CONFIDENTIAL Wi_d E71 ,EM 8/-1789X SY T M II
SECRET ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, UNITED..STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
SUBJECT: United States policy Toward Angola,
- a
rue rresiaent nas approved
policy toward Angola. IC)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Frank C. Carlucci
Attachment
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
SECRET ATTA-MMENT
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SECRET SECRET SYSTEM II
THE WHITE HOUSE 94470
WASHINGTON
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION May 7' 1987
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 274
UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA (C)
All"
National Security Decision Directive 212 of February 10, 1986
determined that the policiesof.the Angolan MPLA regime and
increased Soviet bloc military assistance to that government
posed a threat to important political, strategic, and economic
interests of the U.S. and its allies in southern Africa. NSDD
212 enumerated U.S. policy objectives in the Angolan context and
established a U.S. strategy of a) continuing to negotiate with
the MPLA and South Africa on Cuban troop withdrawal in the
context of Namibian independence while b) applying pressure on
the MPLA to negotiate seriously, and to accept a negotiated
settlement. (S)
Since the approval of NSDD2, the Angolan military conflict has
stabilized. Neither the MPLA n r-UNITA is in a position to
achieve a military victory,espite.;Moscow's interjection of
almost $1 billion in new'Soviet military assistance in support of
a continuing attempt byAthe vfet Un ~n and its MPLA client to
achieve a military solution "'o the,ci 4l war. U. S. efforts to
negotiate Cuban troop w the iwal in t context of Namibian
independence have been stal &`n'd by the `nwillingness of the MPLA
regime to negotiate seriously:"-,4s)
UNITA has made some progress n its efforts to develop broader
international ties, but the MPLA remains unwilling to afford
UNITA a fair share of power in the context of national
reconciliation. Although Soviet/Cuban costs have risen, Moscow
and Havana remain committed to the Luanda regime and to the
maintenance of their presence and influence in Angola. (S)
In light of these developments, U.S.'policy has been reviewed,
and it has been determined that our objectives and strategy as
established by NSDD 212 remain valid:
--To seek an internationally acceptable solution to the
Namibian problem based on UNSCR 435, linked to Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola.
--To achieve an equitable "internal settlement of the Angolan
conflict that affords UNITA a fair share of power;
--To reduce and, if possible, eliminate Soviet and
Soviet-proxy influence, military presence, and opportunities in
Angola and southern Africa ,,(S)
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The two-track strategy for achieving the objectives established
by NSDD 212 has also been reviewed and, fundamentally
valid. However, additional-actions are warranted on both tracks
to achieve U.S. policy objektives.'(S)
With regard to negotiations with the=MPLA and South Africa:
--The U.S. will continue-to use all available diplomatic
opportunities--including direct contacts with the parties to the
Angola/Namibia negotiations--to bring negotiations on Cuban troop
withdrawal and Namibian independence to a successful conclusion.
--The U.S. will continue to insist on withdrawal of Cuban
forces in the context of a settlement. The U.S. will also
continue to insist that any initiative for Namibian independence
outside the framework of UNSCR_435 meet the test of international
acceptability.
--With UNITA's interests in"mind, the U.S. will actively
promote diplomatic initia?ves,to?include talks on the reopening
of the Benguela Railroad, hick advance the objective of national
With regard to pressures on the MP
--The U.S. will acfive1y seek`and implement effective means
of increasing pressure on.the""t4PLA toigree to a negotiated
settlement. ,Rsv
--A review will be conducted in order to ensure that U.S.
support for UNITA is: consistent with our overall strategy;
responsive to UNITA's needs; effective in raising the costs
incurred by the MPLA regime and its Soviet and Cuban backers;
acceptable to key African partners whose support is essential;
and sustainable in Congress and with ,the. American public.
--As a follow-up to the present,, interagency review, the
Department of State shall convene an` interagency group to
consider feasible and effective means of increasing economic
pressures on the MPLA regime and recommend appropriate options to
me within one month. Pending completion of that review, the
specific economic pressures against the MPLA government set forth
in NSDD 212 will remain in force.
--The Department of-State, together with other appropriate
agencies, will explore means of increasing UNITA's stature within
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Angola and internationally through more effective information
programs. The U.S. information efforts will also seek to
undermine Cuba's ability to deploy troops to Angola through
specially focused radio&programmi 4'br dcast t-to Cuba by Radio
Marti and through Spanish lihqua. pr rams aimed at the Cuban
troops deployed in Angola. T6 r.
g~ test possible extent, the
U.S. should seek to exacerbate diferences between the MPLA and
their Soviet bloc supporters`andat dermine Soviet/Cuban efforts
to portray themselves as assisting a legitimate and embattled
African government.
--Diplomatic efforts to obtain the support of our allies and
other international parties in pressing the MPLA regime for a
peaceful settlement and to assist UNITA in expanding its
international ties will be continued and, if possible, expanded.
The Department of State wiil otinue efforts to engage the
Soviet Union in serious discuss io s to diminish and eventually
eliminate Soviet military a9sist ce to Angola, to advance
negotiations on Cuban troop'vit wal and Namibian
independence, and to promote na '1 reconciliation between
TTLTTT'A
--The U.S. will co tin a dev opm nt, security assistance.
~-.-&ML9caa%.O it.L IIU-Ly
to the U.S. which are t iea 'tined t Angolan conflict or
strained by refugee flows froth-- t country. (S)
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(C)
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