THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020037-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 37
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020037-2
328 THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITX-
MANAGING INFORMATION AJ6CESS AND ANALYSIS 329
input to national estimates as well as to inform officials in farious departments
who need detailed intelligence. Thus, it is necessary to ens a that departmental
intelligence production is consistent with national prioritie
As with other types of intelligence activities, manag ent of the analytical
process is handled through NSCIDs, DCIDs, various c mmittees, and require-
ments documents, NSCIDs No. 1 and No. 3 being th~ general guidance docu-
ments for all aspects of intelligence production.
Section 6 of NSCID No. 1 defines national int ligence as intelligence re-
quired for the formulation of national security polic , concerning more than one
department or agency, and transcending the exc sive competence of a single
department or agency. It authorizes the DCI to pr duce national intelligence and
disseminate it to the President, the NSC, and of r appropriate U.S. government
components. Section 6 also stipulates that nati al intelligence will carry a state-
ment of abstention or dissent of any NFIB ember or intelligence chief of a
military department.13
NSCID No. 3 of February 17, 1972, "C ordination of Intelligence Produc-
tion," distinguishes between different type of intelligence-basic intelligence,
current intelligence, departmental intellig nce, interdepartmental intelligence,
and national intelligence-and assigns resp nsibilities for the production of basic
and current intelligence to the CIA and a variety of other agencies.
The Directive also specifies that
1. The Department of State shall produce political and sociological intelli-
gence on all countries and economic intelligence on countries of the Free
World.
2. The Department of Defense s11 produce military intelligence. This pro-
duction shall include scient/fic, technical and economic intelligence
directly pertinent to the missi n of the various components of the Depart-
ment of Defense.
3. The Central Intelligence A ncy shall produce economic, scientific and
technical intelligence. Furt er, the Central Intelligence Agency may pro-
duce such other intelligen a as may be necessary to discharge the statu-
tory responsibilities of the irector of Central Intelligence.
It assigns to all NFIB members harged with the production of finished intelli-
gence the responsibility for pr ducing atomic energy intelligence. In addition,
when an intelligence requirem t is established for which there is no existing
production capability, the DC , in consultation with the NFIB, is responsible
for determining which departments or agencies of the intelligence commu-
nity can "best undertake th primary responsibility as a service of common
concern." 54
On the basis of NSCIDs N 1 and No. 3, the DCI issues DCIDs in the 1/1 and
3/1 series to further impleme t the Directives. The original DCIDs governing the
national intelligence process were issued in July and September 1948. DCID 3/1
of July 8, 1948, "Standard Operating Procedures for Departmental Particination
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in the Production and Coordination of Nati al Intelligence," required, except
under exceptional circumstances, that upon/nitiation of a report or estimate the
CIA inform departmental intelligence org izations of
1.
the problem under consideration;
2.
the nature and scope of the repor
or estimate involved;
3.
the scheduled date of issuance o
the first draft;
4.
the requirements for departme tal contributions ... ; and
5.
the date upon which such de rtmental action should be completed.55
Under normal procedures t CIA was to prepare an initial draft and then fur-
nish copies to departmental ' telligence organizations with a request for review
and preparation. If the co ents received indicated differences of opinion, the
CIA was instructed to arr ge for an informal discussion with departmental per-
sonnel. The CIA was th to prepare a final draft and distribute it to depart-
mental intelligence org izations for concurrence or statements of substantial
dissent which would be ncorporated in the final paper.
DCID 3/2 of Sept ber 13, 1948 complemented 3/1. Entitled "Policy Gov-
erning Departmenta Concurrences in National Intelligence Reports and Esti-
mates," the Directi a specified three options for departmental intelligence orga-
nizations: concur, oncur with comment, or dissent. The Directive further stated
the consideration that should be involved in choosing among the options.56
Subsequently DCIDs 3/1 and 3/2 were superseded by DCID 3/5 of Septem-
ber 1,1953, ent' led "Production of National Intelligence Estimates." The Direc-
tive reflected t e changes that occurred in the intervening years-particularly the
establishment of the Board of National Estimates (BNE) and the Intelligence
Advisory Co mittee (IAC). It was required that by January 1 the BNE present
to the IAC production for NIEs and SNIEs.57
In 1950 an Office of National Estimates (ONE) was established within the
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence with the responsibility for drafting national and
special national estimates. The Office consisted of a Board of National Estimates
and its staff. The Board consisted of between seven and twelve senior officials
with expertise in particular areas with the responsibility for managing the pro-
duction of national estimates. Members of the Board were initially drawn from
academia and subsequently from the CIA.sa
The Board was serviced initially by fifty professional analysts, subsequently
by thirty. In theory, the Board reacted to specific requests from the NSC. In
emergencies this was often the case. Thus, as noted, several SNIEs were commis-
sioned during the Cuban missile crisis. However, the subject of NIEs became
routinized on the basis of the Board's judgment as to the requirements of policy-
makers.s9
The process for drafting NIEs was that initially established by DCID 3/1:
initial drafting by BNE/ONE, interagency review, revision, and submission to the
USIB with dissenting footnotes, if any.60 During the process, the BNE operated
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330 THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
in collegial fashion, taking collective responsibility for the estimates produced
and exercising collective judgment in approving it.
The ONE suffered a decline of prestige and influence during the Nixon ad-
ministration for a variety of reasons, including Henry Kissinger's unhappiness
with its product.61 In June 1973 John Huizenga, the BNE Chairman, retired on
an involuntary basis. DCI William Colby decided not to replace him and abol-
ished ONE.62 Colby gave two reasons for his decision:
One, I had some concern with the tendency to compromise differences and
put out a document which was less sharp than perhaps was needed in certain
situations. Second, I believed that I needed the advantage of some individuals
who could specialize in some of the major problems that we face around the
world and look at these problems not just as estimative problems but as broad
intelligence problems. They could sit in my chair, so to speak, and look at the
full range of an intelligence problem: Are we collecting enough? Are we pro-
cessing the raw data properly? Are we spending too much money on it? Are
we organized right to do the jobs?63
Colby created the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) system in which spe-
cific individuals were held solely responsible for producing a particular estimate.
NIOs are recruited mainly, but not exclusively, from the CIA and are specialists
in a specific functional or geographic area. The number of NIOs has varied from
thirteen to eight to the present seventeen. In addition to three at-large NIO's
there are NIOs for Africa, East Asia, Europe, the Near East and South Asia,
Latin America, the USSR, Counter-Terrorism, Foreign Denial, Science and Tech-
nology, Economics, General Purpose Forces, Strategic Programs, Warning and
Narcotics. The NIO for Warning serves as the focal point for the receipt of all
Indications and Warning intelligence for its evaluation. Initially, NIOs were
purposely not given a staff but were expected to draw on the resources of the
CIA, DIA, INR, and other analytical units to produce the required estimates."'
Subsequently, the NIO process was further revised with establishment on
January 1, 1980 of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), giving the NIOs a
collective existence.6S The NIOs are specifically tasked with
1. becoming knowledgeable of what substantive intelligence questions policy-
makers want addressed;
2. drawing up the concept papers and terms of references for the NIE;
3. participating in the drafting and draft review of the NIE;
4. chairing coordinating sessions and making judgments on substantive ques-
tions in debate; and
5. ensuring that the final texts accurately reflect the substantive judgment of
the DCI 66
In addition to NIEs, the NIOs are responsible for the SNIEs and IIMs.
Besides giving NIOs a collective identity, creation of the NIC also provided
the NIOs with a staff-the NIC Analytical Group-so as to provide the Council
with control over production resources.67
When created, the BNE/ONE was firmly a part of the CIA. Under DCI John
McCone and BNE was attached to the DCI's office, responsible to him alone.68
Under the Carter administration the NIOs became part of the National Foreign
Assessment Center (NFAC) and hence under the direct control of the CIA's
Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment.
As noted earlier, one of the earliest Reagan administration actions concerning
intelligence as the downgrading of the NFAC to its previous identity: the Direc-
torate of Intelligence. With that change the NIOs were once again placed under
the control of the DCI. According to the Director of the NFAC at that time,
John McMahon, that was a decision that
the Director and I debated long and hard because at the time that happened I
was in charge of the national foreign assessments, and I did not want it to
happen out of the symmetry of management. The Director wanted to have it
because he felt that intelligence was so vital, so important that it should not
be left to one person to manage and control. And so by having the NIOs
separate and under himself, he could insure that he could get a balanced view
coming out of the agency on one hand and the rest of the intelligence com-
munity and the NIOs on the other. And it was just his way of assuring that
all alternative views ... bubbled to the top.69
In addition to the NIC, several NFIB committees play a significant role in
managing the intelligence production effort-the Economic Intelligence Com-
mittee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Scientific and
Technical Intelligence Committee, the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence
Committee, and the Intelligence Producers Council
DCID 3/3, "Production of Atomic Energy Intelligence," governs the respon-
sibilities of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee. The Directive,
pursuant to NSCID No. 3, notes that atomic energy intelligence is the responsi-
bility of all NFIB committees and further declares that
the mission of the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) shall
be to foster, develop and maintain a coordinated community approach to
problems in the field of atomic energy intelligence, to promote interagency
liaison and to give impetus and community support to the efforts of individ-
ual agencies.70
The JAEIC's specific responsibilities are officially classified but certainly must
include assessing major developments in the nuclear weapons development of
the nuclear powers, considering the possible impact of atomic power programs
on proliferation in countries not yet possessing nuclear weapons, providing
national decisionmakers with advice on the possible authorization of U.S. for-
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eign sales in the nuclear energy area, providing warning of a country "going
nuclear," and assessing the regional impact of such an event.
On February 28, 1950 the Committee issued a memorandum stating that the
Committee, "after considering certain information which has become available,
is of the opinion that this information should be interpreted as an indication that
a Soviet bomb test may take place in Central Asia as early as March 1950." 71
The Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC) was cre-
ated in 1956 as the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee and subsequently
became the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC).
According to DCID 3/4, "Production of Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intel-
ligence," the Committee's membership consists of representatives of all NFIB
agencies plus Army, Navy, and Air Force representatives. Its Chairman is named
by the DCI with approval of the NFIB.72 The CIA was made responsible for pro-
viding secretariat support. In addition to coordinating the guided missile and
astronautics intelligence activities of the intelligence community, the WSSIC has
performed technical studies on Soviet missiles as inputs to the NIEs. These
papers have been coordinated in the same manner as NIEs but have been di-
rected at informing the intelligence community.73
At one time, functions of the Economic Intelligence Committee were gov-
erned by DCID 15/1, "Production and Coordination of Foreign Economic ligence.,,74 The Directive, as noted earlier, allocated primary production respon-
sibilities for economic intelligence among the Department of State (INR) and
the CIA, the former being responsible for economic intelligence for all non-
Soviet Bloc countries, the latter with Soviet Bloc economic intelligence. The
Economic Intelligence Committee was assigned responsibility for periodic review
of the allocations and interpreting the provisions of the Directive in areas of
common or overlapping interest.
As discussed earlier, the present Committee plays a significant role in estab-
lishing economic reporting requirements. It also probably plays a similar role in
coordinating the production of economic intelligence, especially since the impor-
tance of economic intelligence relative to military and political intelligence has
increased in recent years.
Management of intelligence productions is also partially a function of the
requirements documents discussed in Chapter 13-documents such as the Key
Intelligence Questions, Key Intelligence Requirements, and National Intelligence
Topics. The same documents that state collection requirements when issued by
the NSC, DCI or, Secretary of Defense also establish guidelines for forthcoming
intelligence production, both for the NIOs and the various NFIB committees.
1. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on NSA, America's Most
Secret Agency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).
2. Ronald Reagan, "National Security Information," Executive Order 12356,
April 2, 1982, Federal Register 47 no. 66 (April 6, 1982): 14874-84.
3. Ibid.
4. DOD, Department of Defense Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding
Classified Information, DOD 5820.22-M (Washington, D.C.: DOD, July
1981).
5. Quoted in David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government Deception,
Secrecy and Power (New York: Vintage, 1973), p. 86.
6. Ibid.
7. Ronald Lewin, The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers and the Defeat of
Japan (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1982), p. 17.
8. Anthony Cave-Brown, The Last Hero (New York: Times Books, 1982),
p. 193.
9. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 314.
10. Ibid.
11. Nigel West, M16: British Secret Intelligence Operations 1909-1945 (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1983), p. 163.
12. Cave-Brown, The Last Hero, p. 182; David Martin Wilderness of Mirrors
(New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 15.
13. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, p. 314.
14. Ibid.
15. F. W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (New York: Harper & Row, 1974).
16. Procedures for Handling ULTRA DEXTER Intelligence in the CBI (Rear
Echelon, HQ U.S. Army Forces, China, Burma, India Theater, March 22,
1944) RG 457, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division SRH-
046, U.S. National Archives.
17. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, The Gulf of
Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1968), pp. 35-39.
18. Wise, The Politics of Lying, p. 83.
19. Jack Anderson, "Syrians Strive to Oust Arafat as PLO Chief," Washington
Post, November 10, 1982, p. D-22.
20. Bob Woodward, "Messages of Activists Tapped," Washington Post, Octo-
ber 13, 1975, pp. 1, 14.
21. Seymour Hersh, The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House
(New York: Summit, 1983), p. 183.
22. Woodward, "Messages of Activists Tapped."
23. Hersh, The Price of Power, p. 92n.
24. James Ott, "Espionage Trial Highlights CIA Problems," Aviation Week and
Space Technology, November 27, 1978, pp. 21-22.
25. Robert Lindsay, The Falcon and the Snowman: A True Story of Friend-
shin and Esoionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), pp. 214-45.
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