ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1980
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020026-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
14
Document Creation Date:
December 27, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 3, 2012
Sequence Number:
26
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 15, 1980
Content Type:
MEMO
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I MEMORANDUM-FOR:
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NFAC #6849-80
EO/NIC File Copy
15 October 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM . Hal Ford, Acting Chairman
National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT : Annual Report for FY 1980
Overview
1. FY 1980 saw the National Intelligence Council created (De-
cember 1979) and off to a promising start. As outlined below, tan-
gible progress is being made in this effort to retain the many strengths
of the NIO system while strengthening the NIO corporate structure and
providing a much-needed in-house drafting capability. This invigor-
ation of the estimative process has been noted in the Community and
among our consumers, and present programs will further increase the
quality and impact of NIC's contribution during FY 1981. At the same
time, a number of problems and constraints need to be overcome.
2. Accomplishments:
(a) The NIC has been organized. Following weeks of staff
studies and planning discussions among the NIOs and senior officers of
NFAC, the DCI approved and created the NIC on 3 December 1979 and an-
nounced it to NFIB on 14 January 1980. Now, at the end of the fiscal
year, the NIC consists of the following officers: a Chairman and NIO
for Warning (Richard Lehman); an Associate Chairman (Hal Ford); eight
NIOs with regional or military portfolios (Robert Ames, David Brandwein,
Gray Cowan, Jack Davis, John Holdridge, Arnold Horelick, Ennis Whitehead,
and Joe Zaring); two NIOs-at-Large (Jeremy Azrael and Hans Heymann);
14 Assistant NIOs; eight staff members (Analytic Group); and supporting
administrative and clerical officers.
(b) Centralized substantive review and administrative pro-
cedures have been established. Various directives have been produced
and revised after circulation to NFIB members and NFAC offices which
redefine the major kinds of estimative papers we produce, regularize
and clarify procedures for producing them, and set up new guidelines
for handling estimative dissents from other agencies.
(c) Production of estimative materials is increasing in
quantity and quality. Ten NIEs and 31 other estimative pieces were
produced under NIU auspices in FY 1980, as compared with six NIEs and
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30 other estimative pieces during the previous year. An estimative pro-
duction program for the July 1980 to June 1981 period was produced and
refined after review by NFIB members and NFAC production offices. This
program is an ambitious one, put together with considerable care; it
will result in a further increase in the number of estimative pieces
produced by the NIC, and in a heightened proportion of estimates which
cross geographic lines and academic disciplines. Comments from a number
of NFIB members and principal consumers attest to their awareness of a
new spark in our efforts to produce estimates of greater utility, to
increase the Community's participation in the process, and to be imagi-
native in generating ideas for new estimative undertakings.
(d) Progress has been made in making the NIO function a more
orderly and collegial one. This has resulted from a number of factors:
the central managerial role of a Chairman and Associate Chairman; new
procedures which expand opportunities for meeting and discussing sub-
stantive issues within the NIC; creation of informal panels of NIOs to
review estimative drafts; creation of the NIC Memorandum as an in-house
art form for enhancing exploration of estimative issues by NIOs, assistant
NIOs, and AG officers; creation of the NIO-at-Large function to facilitate
the collegial review process; the discipline and coordination imposed by
the process of assembling an estimates program; and improvement registered
in the operating relations among NIOs and NFAC production offices.
(e) Progress has been made in creating an elite drafting staff
AG within the NIC. Here NIC has begun to repair one of the chief prob-
lems of the pre-NIC system: the demonstrated unevenness that resulted
from NIOs having literally to scrounge drafters as best they could for
each new estimative endeavor. Much of the progress is thanks to the
cooperativeness of certain NFAC offices in making some of their best
people available to the NIC for duty on rotation. The NFIB agencies
have reacted in various fashion to our invitations to them to nominate
Analytic Group candidates. Although we have one good IC officer aboard
and other promising ones in the pipeline, some agencies have anted up
no nominees thus far. Still other candidates for the AG from outside
the Community are in the pipeline, although bringing non-CIA people into
the NIC continues to prove a terribly difficult process. Our eventual
goal continues to be a staff of 20 estimates officers, roughly half of
whom will be from outside CIA. Experience to date confirms our confidence
in (1) a desired AG of broad-gauged scholars of diverse backgrounds;
(2) the deliberate care and pace with which we have been adding AG staff
members; (3) the merit of havin a substantial proportion of our AG of-
ficers from outside CIA; and (4) our setting of exacting standards of
performance.
(f) Progress has been made in tying the NIC and NFAC efforts
more closely together. This has been effected principally through two
means: 1 with a few exceptions, the improvement in personal working
relationships between NIOs and NFAC officers; and (2) deliberate coordi-
nation of the NIC estimative and NFAC research programs, with more NFAC
"building block" projects scheduled to be folded into future estimates.
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(g) NIC has expanded estimative contact with and use of out-
side consultants. Contact takes various forms: many individual, in-
formal meetings outside; individual consultants brought into CIA; and
the holding of formal seminars. Seminars held in FY 1980 included
sessions on African issues, Japan, the USSR, the Western alliance, and
measures of military effectiveness, to mention a few. All such meetings
have involved some of the finest authorities available. And in all such
contact, attention is being focused directly on particular NIEs or other
distinct estimative problems; this is done early-on in the processes of
conceptualization and comprehension.
(h) Progress has been made in substantive quality control and
policy relevance. The various procedural innovations mentioned above have
been guided by an explicit determination that NIC's estimative materials
must make unique, sophisticated, and policy-relevant contributions to
our consumers, if NIEs and other estimative pieces are to be read and
are in fact to enrich the policymaking process.
(i) Progress has been made in enhancing the warning function.
Systematized procedures have been devised to facilitate the warning role
of the NIO and his colleagues in NFAC and in the Community, in being
especially sensitive to warning matters and in issuing warnings in a
speedy and timely manner. Of the 17 Alert Memorandums issued in FY 1980,
quite a few were directly on target; those concerning Poland, the Iraq-
Iran war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are particular cases in
point.
(j) Objective integrity of the estimative process has been
maintained. There is no party line in the NIC other than to go where
the evidence takes us. NIC management is also sensitive to the needs
of guarding against analytic bias.
3. Problems Encountered:
(a) We still have a long way to go toward achieving the kind
of product quality and impact we seek. We recognize that the NIC starts
from a situation in which, with certain notable exceptions, there has
not been a terribly ready market for NIEs and estimative materials. There
is much more the NIC can do, and expects its officers to do, to help
fill the gaps that exist in the Community's analytic effort. In partic-
ular, we have in mind the need better to discuss trends, indicate aware-
ness of the US factor in given situations, explore the larger "so-what?"
implications of events, and in general provide a unique analytic in-
gredient which goes beyond current intelligence and crisis support cover-
age.
(b) We continue to be nibbled to death by bureaucratic ob-
stacles. The DCI and DD/NFA have commissioned NIC to put together a
vib- new office, including the best substantive drafting staff we can
assemble. Yet we encounter countless roadblocks that tell us in effect
that we can't do it: e.g., delays in clearing and processing outside
applicants for NIC positions; getting knocked down on the salaries of-
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fered to deserving applicants; the need to arrange follow-on assignments
elsewhere in NFAC for NIC people after two or three years here as a
precondition of staff employment; the interminable delays sometimes
involved in bringing people from other agencies into the NIC; delays
encountered in the estimative process after the NIEs and other estimative
materials have been essentially coordinated; and the loss of two particu-
larly strong NIC officers to other CIA enterprises. Also, though not a
problem at the moment, NIC will have serious space problems (especially
re the A/NIOs) when the NIC gets up to full strength.
(c) More progress is needed in making the NIOs and the AG
into an orderly enterprise. This will take time, even though the NIOs
are to be congratulated for the resilience and responsiveness they have
shown to date. As for the AG, we will need to carry through on plans
for a somewhat tighter organizational structure, even though this group
of top scholars will not require a lot of Prussianizing.
(d) We have had difficulty in maintaining the strongest possible
stable of NIOs and Assistant NIOs. During FY 1980, the NIC lost to re-
tirement Associate Chairman John Whitman, NIO for Africa Bill Parmenter,
NIO for Strategic Programs Howard Stoertz, and Assistant NIO for USSR and
Eastern Europe In April, Maj. Gen. Paul Gorman left after 25X1
one year as NIO for General Purpose Forces to take on a senior Army assign-
ment. Assistant NIOs for Near East-South Asia, Latin America, and Strategic
Programs, and the Associate Coordinator for Academic Relations were trans-
ferred to new assignments outside the NIC. In all cases the NIC was for-
tunate to find capable replacements relatively quickly, but the turnover
contributed to making it a somewhat hectic year for all who were directly
involved. Other NIO and Assistant NIO vacancies loom ahead, and the un-
certainties of the present election period (about the Agency's future)
make this a difficult time in which to recruit people of the high calibre
we seek for these very responsible positions.
(e) The process of introducing AG members to the production
stream needs improving. Part of the problem involves the need to demon-
strate to the NIOs that the AG constitutes a high-quality resource upon
which they can confidently call for sophisticated, integrative drafting
help. Part concerns filling out the AG -- and maintaining it -- with
people expert in areas and disciplines that are now under-represented,
or not represented at all.
(f) Progress is needed in perfecting the quality control
function performed by NIOs with respect to materials prepared outside
the NIC.
(g) Progress is needed in making the contact with senior policy -
makers of some NIOs as full as is that of other s.
4. There follow individual summaries of FY 1980 activities by each
NIO and the Coordinator for Academic Relations.
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Near East-South Asia
5. Without question, this NIO account continued in FY 1980 to be
our most active and most demanding in terms of production, DCI support,
and consumer demand for intelligence coverage and analysis -- and no
let-up is in sight. The seizure and captivity of the US hostages in
Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were only the most critical
of the many developments and situations in the area requiring major
attention by the NIO and his staff. The NIO played a key role in pro-
viding intelligence regarding the hostage situation; he was the primary
link between NFAC and DDO in preparing for two rescue missions, and he
participated in more than 100 meetings in support of the NSC on the
hostage issue. On Afghanistan, the NIO and his staff have played a key
role in working with OSR, the Strategic Warning Staff, and others in
providing timely and accurate warning of the invasion and in keeping the
DCI and policymakers abreast of unfolding developments in the area and
their implications.
6. In addition to briefing numerous SCC and PRC meetings on
regional implications of the Afghan situation, NIO/NESA has played an
instrumental role in developing plans for a new US security posture in
the Middle East-Indian Ocean area. This has required him to participate
in some 20 Security Framework SCC meetings. In a related effort, he has
represented CIA in interdepartmental working groups dealing with Middle
East peace negotiations and the Iran-Iraq conflict.
7. Formal estimative production during FY 1980 was highlighted by
major NIEs on , providing com-
prehensive studies of those countries' prospects over the next decade,
and a two-volume re-do of the periodic detailed assessment of the Arab-
Israeli military balance (August and September). Other production
included numerous briefings, ad hoc special assessments, Alert Memo-
randa, SNIEs, and special memoranda on Egypt, Israel-Iraq, the Yemens,
Pakistan, Libya, Lebanon, and Western Sahara.
8. FY 1981 will provide no surcease in the conflicts and tensions
in the area that will require NIO attention. We anticipate that Iran,
Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf will be the primary areas
of our concern, and we believe that instability is likely to increase
still further as aging leaders and unstable regimes leave the scene and
the more subtle march of societal change creates new tensions. As a
consequence, we believe this raises three important organizational
issues the NIE and NFAC must address early in the year: (a) the need to
find at least one Middle East specialist for the NIC Analytic Group; (b)
consideration of filling an NIO-at-Large position with a Middle East-
South Asian expert; and (c) the need for OPA, NIC, and NFAC to explore
ways of lightening the burden on the NIO to provide representation and
substantive guidance to numerous intra-Agency and Intelligence Community
groups and activities.
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USSR and East Europe
9. FY 1980 began at the tail end of the flap over the Soviet
brigade in Cuba, the single most time-consuming of all issue clusters
dealt with the NI0/USSR-EE in FY 1979. In early FY 80, the NIO and his
assistants completed a series of briefings on the subject given to
Congressional committees, senators, and other key officials, but the NIO
continued to be involved in periodic follow-up assessments as the year
progressed.
10. The central event in the Soviet work of the office, however,
was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, which resulted
in requirements for numerous briefings, NIO memoranda, and direct sup-
port of the DCI in briefing the President and Congressional groups in
briefing Afghanistan and Southwest Asia. The NIO
office was also heavily involved in analytical work on Soviet military
preparations in the Transcaucasus opposite Iran; in producing Alert
Memoranda and other assessments in the 4th Quarter on the strike move-
ment and subsequent political crisis in Poland; and on intelligence
monitoring of the long illness and subsequent death of Yugoslav Presi-
dent Tito.
11. Important formal estimates produced wholly or in part by the
office of the NIO/USSR-EE during the year included an NIE on Sino-Soviet
relations (June); a rapidly-produced SNIE on Soviet military options in
Iran; a Memorandum to Holders of an 1979 NIE on prospects for post-Tito
Yugoslavia (February), and an IIM on Soviet intentions and options in
the near-term in Southwest Asia (March). As already noted, however, the
office also was heavily engaged in writing or contributing to many less
formal memoranda, briefing notes, and assessments throughout the year on
a variety of Soviet and East European topics.
12. Most of the same substantive issues that dominated FY 1980 will
continue to demand NI0/USSR-EE attention in FY 1981. We will remain
centrally preoccupied with the impact of Soviet political and military
self-assertiveness on US interests. Issues that seem likely to require
more attention include the Soviet leadership succession picture and the
nature and scope of Soviet ambitions in the Middle East. Major papers
we anticipate producing during the year include NIEs on Poland, Soviet-
West European relations, central trends in Soviet forei n olicies, and
on Soviet responses to emergent economic stringencies.
General Purpose Forces
13. FY 1980 was a year of high productivity for those concerned
with general purpose forces. The year saw the continuation of efforts
to assess the capabilities of Soviet conventional forces, gauge the
progress in NATO force modernization,
new initiatives as well, some occasioned by events in Southwest Asia,
others by a need to sharpen the Community's focus on the armor/anti-
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armor problem, and others by a desire to improve our ability to measure
NATO/Warsaw Pact force effectiveness.
14. Significant accomplishments during the year included publica-
tion of an IIM on the readiness of Soviet naval forces -- described by
the DCI as a seminal work in military intelligence analysis. Other
major products included an NIE on Chinese defense policy and armed
forces, a quick-turnaround SNIE on Soviet military options in Iran, and
an IIM on Dutch force modernization in the series on NATO countries. An
IIM on the implications for warning of the Soviet move into Afghanistan
was nearly complete as the year ended.
15. In May 1980, Maj. Gen. Ennis Whitehead, USA, replaced Maj. Gen.
Paul Gorman as NIO/GPF. During his one-year tenure, Gen. Gorman had
significantly expanded the production schedule on general purpose forces
issues; prepared numerous innovative briefings for the DCI, the President,
and Congress; and materially advanced working ties between his office
and key figures in the Department of Defense.
16. The outlook for FY 1981 includes an important shift in priorities
resulting from a decision to defer production of a major estimate on
the warning of war in Europe in favor of an earlier start on an NIE
examining Warsaw Pact forces opposite NATO, and on another NIE on Soviet
military capabilities to project power into distant areas. Other pro-
jects will include an NIE on Soviet military forces in the Far East, an
IIM on Soviet naval capabilities to interdict sea lines of communication,
and more studies in the NATO force modernization series.
Strategic Programs
17. The list of major issuances in the strategic programs area in
FY 1980 should begin, of course, with NIE 11-3/8, the annual mammoth
Soviet strategic capabilities estimate. The 1979 version of this com-
plex interagency assessment appeared in three volumes, published in
April and May. Other significant NIO/SP assessments completed or almost
completed during the year include an NIE on Soviet military intentions
and capabilities in space (August), an NIE chaired by
of the Senior Review Panel on prospects for Soviet military
technology and R&D, and IIM on the likelihood of interference with the
US space shuttle, and a Memo to Holders of a 1977 IIM on Soviet civil
defense.
18. Howard Stoertz retired in March 1980 and was replaced as NIO by
David Brandwein, a senior DDS &T officer with wide experience on Soviet
strategic problems. one of two Assistant S
office, left for another assignment and was replaced by a
DIA officer.
19. In FY 1981, we anticipate a need to spend even more time in the
analysis of Soviet strategic intentions and options in an environment in
which either SALT III is in negotiation or SALT II is dead. Specific
projects planned for the year include the completion of NIE 11-3/8-80
and much of the following year's version; the production of a special
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paper for the President on Soviet strategic programs, written in con-
junction with NIE 11-3/8-80; and an interagency study on the extent of
Chinese missile deployment.
NIO-at-Large
20. One of the NIC's most significant products of FY 1980 was an
exceptionally felicit
, written by
of the NIC/AG under the aegis of NIO-
at-Large Hans Heymann. Not a typical NIE in style or format, the esti-
mate also included an innovative checklist of indicators of potential
instability. By carefully laying the groundwork and through skilled
diplomacy, the NIO-at-Large was able to guide the paper through the
interagency coordination process despite the paper's somewhat uncon-
ventional approach.
21. The NIO-at-Large also presided over the first attempt by the
Intelligence Community to put together in a single study everything we
know about Soviet mobilization -- military, economic, and civil defense --
including concepts, approaches, and capabilities. It calls attention to
the peculiarities and asymmetries in Soviet practice that should be of
prime concern to US defense planners.
22. Topics that will preoccupy Mr. Heymann in early FY 1981 will
include an extension of the mobilization assessment to include the
entire Warsaw Pact; an IIM examining in depth for the first time the
opportunities and risks of developing an accord between oil producing
and consuming nations on provision of oil supplies; and a SNIE examining
the ramifications a Soviet bloc-wide oil shortfall beginning by the
mid-1980s.
Africa
23. The conflict in the Horn of Africa and the signing of the US
agreement with Somalia were the chief substantive preoccupations of the
NIO for Africa and his staff in FY 1980. The NIO was a member of the
interdepartmental Somali Review Group that met almost weekly over a
three-month period before that agreement was signed, and substantial
time was spent in preparing an IIM on Somalia and in briefing the DCI on
events in the area.
24. IIMs were also completed during the year on Zaire, South
Africa's external strategy, Sudan, and Zimbabwe; IIMs now under way on
Zambia, Liberia, and internal South African political developments
should be finished before the end of the calendar year. The draft of a
major NIE on developments in the northwest Indian Ocean area was com-
pleted by the end of the fiscal year and is awaiting NFIB approval.
25. Other highlights of the year included the retirement in January
of Bill Parmenter as NIO and the appointment of Professor Gray Cowan
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(Columbia University) as his successor; the DCI's trip in June to
Africa
Conferences on Angola and on Soviet
intentions and objectives in Africa will be held during the next few
26. The problems of Southern Africa, Zaire, Sudan and Nigeria will
undoubtedly continue as especial preoccupations during FY 1981. And,
either a change of U.S. Administration or the renewal of the present one
could, if it resulted in substantial alteration of US policy toward
Africa, become a major factor in changing the NIO's FY 1981 activities.
Western Europe
27. Substantive developments in Western Europe that preoccupied the
NIO and his assistant in FY 1980 included security issues -- TNF, CSCE-
CDE, and the NATO defense response to Afghanistan -- and politico-
economic ones -- strains within the Western alliance, reactions to
crises elsewhere (Iran, Afghanistan, Poland), and preparations for the
aftermath of national elections in
28. Significant production during the year included two special
papers: a special assessment of the CPI's role in the Italian governing
process achieved agreement among CIA and INR analysts despite the domi-
nance of a quite different point of view in some circles at State; and a
SNIE on the Western alliance (June), which in a week's time reached an
agreed interagency analysis of the strains in the West and the outlook
for the alliance after Afghanistan. Other production included an esti-
mate on Turkey (December) and IIMs on French foreign policy (March) C
A major IIM on
Spanish politics was brought to the verge of completion and a SNIE on
Portuguese politics was initiated.
29. Major NIO/WE policy support activities included preparation for
and participation in DCI Presidential and Congressional briefings and in
numerous PRC and SCC meetings. He sponsored a mini-seminar on Italy as
part of the elaboration of the PCI paper, and sponsored a major, very
lively seminar involving representatives of government and academia on
the subject of US-West European policy issues in the 1980s. The office
also participated actively in the work of the Political Intelligence
Working Group, especially on Turkey, and NIO/WE conducted two FOCUS
exercises and chaired frequent session with
mission and station chiefs outgoing to and returning from European
posts.
30. Significant activities in the immediate future will center on
completion of two major assessments: an NIE on US-West European policy
issues, and a difficult IIM on Organiza-
tional issues that NIO/WE sees as important to address in FY 1981 are
measures to improve the overall quality of the NFAC product, to effect
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substantial reductions in production times, and to bring about fuller
participation of all components in the estimative process.
East Asia
31. The substantive highlights of FY 1980 for the NIO and his staff
concerned the assassination of South Korean President Pak, its unsettled
aftermath, and the rise to power of Chun Doo Hwan; the continuing con-
flict in Indochina, its implications for Thai internal security, and for
US and international efforts to come to grips with the Indochinese
refugee problem; and internal political developments in China, particu-
larly the major party plenum and a late summer session of the National
People's Congress. Increasing uncertainty about the stability of the
Marcos government in the Philippines and concern over problems in the US
relationship with the Suharto government in Indonesia also took an
important share of the time and effort of the NIO and his staff. The
NIO played a key role in directing policy-level attention to growing US-
Indonesian problems.
32. NI0/EA production durin the year featured the completion of an
NIE on the Philippines (February); participation with the NI0/USSR-EE in
completing an NIE on Sino-Soviet relations (June); and two Alert Memo-
randa and a SNIE on the politically turbulent South Korean situation.
The NI0/EA staff also made substantial contributions to an NIE produced
by NI0/GPF on China's military forces and policies.
34. Issues and activities to be featured in FY 1981 will include
the completion of major estimates on the military balance on the Korean
peninsula, prospects for China in the 1980s, and Indonesia's domestic
political situation and relationship with the US.
Latin America
35. Continuing instability and violence in Central America, the
problems posed by the latest tidal wave of Cuban refugees coming into
the US, and the growing political contest between extreme leftist
backers of the Manley government and the moderate opposition in Jamaica
were perhaps the dominant substantive issues for the NIO and his staff
in FY 1980.
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36. Production during the year included an IIM in January on pros-
pects for leftist extremists in El Salvador, a rapidly produced SNIE in
August on short-term prospects for Jamaica; two memoranda for the DCI on
Central American and Caribbean challenges to US interests and on Man-
ley's options in Jamaica; several PDB feature articles on El Salvador,
Cuba, and Bolivia; and two Alert Memoranda on El Salvador. A major NIE
on Cuban policy toward Latin America is now well along in the drafting
process.
37. A major portion of the efforts of the NIO and his staff was
taken up during the year by activities in support of the DCI. The NIO
represented the DCI at numerous PRC and SCC meetings, mostly on Cuba and
Central America; he made, with strong support from OPA/LA, major con-
tributions to the development of US policy on Cuban refugees. In ad-
dition, the NIO was involved in developing and presenting many briefings
for Congressional committees and individual congressmen on Nicaragua and
Central America and helped prepare briefing materials for the DCI's
Presidential briefings on Central America and Jamaica.
38. Prominent issues to be addressed in FY 1981 will include those
involving Cuban developments -- particularly in Cuban-US relations --and
continuing instability in Central America and Jamaica. Major estimates
are scheduled on Central America and South America.
Warning
39. A principal accomplishment of the office of the NIO for Warning
in FY 1980 was getting Community agreement on revised and streamlined
procedures for producing Alert Memoranda and coordinating them quickly
throughout the Intelligence Community. The revised procedures were
promulgated by NFIB in February and have enabled subsequent Alert Memo-
randa to be produced much more quickly than previously. In a similar
vein, A/NIO/W revised and coordinated with the rest of the
Community the procedures governing the use of the National Operations
and Intelligence Watch Officers' Net (NOIWON).
40. The office of the NIO for Warning supervised the issuance of 17
Alert Memoranda during FY 1980.
41. FY 1981 will involve continuing attention to the timely pro-
duction of Alert Memoranda and to the issue of the possible realignment
or reorganization of the Strategic Warning Staff.
Coordinator for Academic Relations
42. This office, previously tied administratively to the office of
the Director, NFAC, was linked with the NIC at the end of CY 1979 when
the NIC was created. Significant CAR accomplishments of FY 1980 in-
cluded organizing a visit to the Agency by a group of university pre-
sidents in February 1980; managing six DCI discussion meetings/dinners
in which numerous academics and officials of other government agencies
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participated; and continuing to function as the principal bridge between
the Agency and the academic world, providing a focal point for inquiries,
exchanges of information, and efforts in general to improve the degree
of mutual understanding between CIA and the academic world. Real prog-
ress was made in this last area in FY 80.
43. The CAR staff had an active year in fulfilling its NFAC func-
tions. It assisted the NIC Chairman, Associate Chairman, and NIOs in
selecting and recruiting academic consultants and in arranging con-
ferences in which consultants and other academics participated. CAR
arranged programs for 17 college or university groups visiting the
Agency. The office served as clearing house for individual briefings
and debriefings by NFAC personnel of academics visiting the Washington
area and for requests from colleges and universities for NFAC volunteer
speakers. Some 19 volunteers were enlisted to speak on a variety of
topics. The CAR staff also continued to monitor requests by NFAC em-
ployees to publish books or articles, or speak at conferences or attend
them; there were some 520 NFAC participants in over 200 conferences
during the year.
44. FY 1981 will see a continuation of all these activities. A
discussion meeting/dinner on Germany is slated for 28 October, and
another visit by a group of university presidents is planned for 13
November.
Harold P. Ford
Annexes
XFY 1980 and FY 1979 Production
B: Minority Hiring
C: Training
D: Travel
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