THE TYPICAL CIA POLITICAL ANALYST AND WHAT HE DOES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 1, 1977
• Content Type: MISC

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May 1977
The Typical CIA Political Analyst and What He Does
The typical analyst in the Office of Regional and Political Analysis is a
38-year-old male, (one of every four analysts is female), married, has done
graduate work beyond the Master's degree, has a working knowledge of at
least one foreign language, and has 12 1/2 years of CIA experience. The
typical analyst is a GS- 13 and has traveled to the area he is currently working
on at least once in the last four years. His range of working contacts-apart
from those in the Agency-include the NSC Staff member working on his
area, the State desk officer and intelligence officer dealing with his country,
as well as his counterparts in DIA and NSA and occasionally in USIA, ISA,
Treasury, and Commerce.
He is a member of a learned society and has attended one of its recent
conventions. He is conversant with the work going on in the universities on
his subject and knows some of the more illustrious academicians in his field
either by virtue of studying with them or under them in graduate school or
through participation in professional conferences and seminars. He is also
familiar with foreign experts, both governmental and nongovernmental, and
is a> regular reader of scholarly publications and journals containing articles
on his specialty.
Within the past year, our analyst will have briefed or debriefed the US
ambassador to his country or countries of responsibility and several members
of the country team, including the Department of Defense attache. He will
He will, in addition, have contributed to articles appearing in the
President's Daily Brief, the National Intelligence Daily, the Regional and
Political Analysis publication for his area, and the Weekly Review. He will
have written at least one intelligence memorandum, and within the past two
years he will have produced a basic research report in his field of expertise.
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In the course of the average day, our analyst scans hundreds of pages of
text. He makes at least ten phone calls and receives more in return.
During the day, he will have to coordinate an item for a current
publication that impinges on his area if he has not written one of his own
requiring coordination. In the latter case, he will often receive a phone call in
the evening from the night duty officer regarding newly received information
bearing on his piece. On the average of once a week he will be involved
directly or indirectly with the preparation of an item to be transmitted to
the White House situation room in a hurry. He will have spent at least part of
his day on a Presidential Review Memorandum-either writing, coordinating,
or attending an agency or interagency meeting. In the course of the previous
two weeks he will have evaluated the reliability of a report from a covert
source for the Directorate of Operations and within the previous month will
have prepared a specific set of priority requirements to be used by a
particular collection asset.
When he arrives in the morning, the analyst faces the overnight collec-
tion of State cables, Defense attache reports, DDO reports, FBIS output,
and foreign and US press reporting. His first couple of hours are spent
processing this mail and deciding whether there is anything that must be
done immediately with it, such as volunteering an item for the daily
newspaper. By midmorning, he will have waded through about 75 individual
reports.
Should he decide to proceed with a current item, he will consume the
better part of the day seeing it through the substantive review and editorial
and , coordination processes; coordination is usually particularly trying. There
are also a good number of meetings to attend, such as working sessions on
proposed Presidential Review Memorandums and National Estimates that
can easily take two to three hours. In between the phone calls, the requests
for memorandums, the drafting, and the coordinating, our typical analyst
must keep abreast of the constant flow of mail throughout the day,
discarding the junk and deciding what to do with the rest-where and how to
file it.
Trying to husband enough time to sit back and think or to prepare a
long analytical memorandum is a real challenge in a phone jangling office of
four or more analysts. This often requires that the analyst stay late or come
in on the weekend.
In addition to keeping up to speed on his own area of responsibility,
our analyst will have a back-up responsibility for another area. This is
required to maintain the necessary flexibility in coverage to cope with such
unpredictables as sickness, leave, and, above all, crises. If, for example, there
is a flareup between Greece and Turkey, the analyst assigned that respon-
sibility for the area cannot possibly handle it all by himself. Task forces must
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be manned around the clock to meet the demands for current information.
Moreover, every crisis invariably produces its wave of requests for basic
information and new assessments or estimates-to which the analyst strug-
gling with the current situation must also make an input.
There is, of course, no such thing as the typical analyst. We have tended
to stress the current demands placed on the analyst's time. The Office of
Regional and Political Analysis, however, is committed to basic research, as
well as current and midterm analysis, and our goal is to have 20 percent of
our work devoted to long-range, in-depth analysis. To do this, it is necessary
for us to shelter the analysts involved in this kind of research from all
current demands. We want our analysts to be able to do long-term analysis as
well as current and midterm analysis, and they have a shot at all three.
To appreciate the analysts' role it is necessary to keep in mind the key
aspects of his job. Among these are: (a) the many occasions which require
him to produce from his available fund of time, knowledge, experience, and
wisdom; (b) the material he receives in the way of current informational
input and what he must do with it; (c) his essential data base and how he
goes about acquiring it; (d) the process of analysis and how he goes about
producing what he proposes to write or say; (e) his role in the progression
from first draft to disseminated analytical product; and (f) what still may be
required of him after he has presumably finished. The procedures for
intelligence production are by no means cut and dried, and the ways in
which analytical problems are solved are as numerous and varied as the
problems that require analysis.
The Sovietologists and Sinologists are a special breed. They are dealing
with closed societies whose newspapers are intended to proselytize, not to
inform, their readers, and whose leaders strive to conceal the political
process from their people as well as from foreign observers. The available
data base is composed of disjointed, unverifiable, and often distorted frag-
ments that must be woven into a coherent picture to be meaningful and
useful to our consumers. In the labyrinthine world of Chinese politics, some
major political events come as a surprise to the leadership itself.
The analytical process for all our analysts requires: marshaling what
data are at hand, researching other data if there is time, levying requirements
if it is determined that essential information is missing, finding out what
others can contribute, thinking (exploring alternative answers is an essential
part of the thought process), and self-review once an individual text is at
hand.
To get to the writing, however, the analyst must decide how to utilize
the data base available to him, and this will depend on: what has inspired his
analytical undertaking, the kind of interpretative problem he faces, and how
much time he has. All analysts personally retain records of previous
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production, standard reference works, and current information files. How
elaborate the last is, and how usefully assembled, will vary a good deal. In
every case, space is a seriously limiting factor on how large a collection of
data any analyst may retain immediately at hand, and frequently he will
have to resort to retrieval of information from the Office of Central Refer-
ence or the Agency records[::::
A few examples may serve to demonstrate the diversity of approaches
that may be involved in the effective use of the data base in producing an
analytical memorandum.
(1) Assume, for instance, that an analyst is requested to
comment within two hours on a press wire report of a new
statement on a comprehensive test ban by a Soviet official in
Geneva. With this kind of deadline, there are not a great many
things the analyst will have time to check into. But before even
attempting to make an evaluation, he would at least look into such
things as the following: whether the wire service is a reliable one
and the statement complete and accurate; when, where, and on
what. occasion the statement was made; who the official is and
whether he is anyone of importance; what else he has recently said
relevant to the test ban and how that relates to the known Soviet
position; whether other delegates to the Geneva disarmament
talks have recently made proposals on a test ban to which the
official may have been responding; and what in general is the
status of the negotiations. The analyst can, of course, be expected
to know or recall some of these things, but if he does not, then he
will have to try his best to find them in his files or appeal to those
who may be in a position to lend assistance.
(2) At the other extreme, assume that a recent bombing
episode in Madrid has been attributed to a far-right terrorist
organization with Europe-wide connections and that the episode
has inspired a member of the NSC Staff to request the Agency to
"look into" the possibility that rightwing movements may be
making a comeback in Europe generally. The deadline is a month
away. Chances are there is no analyst who regularly follows this
topic (in fact, none does). In this instance, then, the problem is
one of assembling a data base. Without going through the whole
process, the sorts of things the assigned analyst will do would
include: searching the files of his fellow European analysts, calling
upon his DDO colleagues to do likewise, initiating an OCR
machine run and retrieval, consulting any work that State or DIA
may have done on the subject, researching the material available in
the public domain, and perhaps even seeking the assistance of
better known experts in the field.
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(3) A third example might be the production of a basic
research paper on Iran within a six-month period. Here is a case
where the analyst has ample time to sink his teeth into the
problem. He might well start with a list of essential questions he
would like answered. In addition to talking to knowledgeable
people who have served in Iran, he would visit various archives and
libraries that might have basic source material. He would not
overlook the various foreign experts who have written books on
the subject. Finally, he would plumb the Intelligence Com-
munity's data base for answers still eluding him. Out of all this,
and from his own personal knowledge and feel for the country, he
would produce a first draft to try out on his supervisor and other
reviewers in the office standing further away from the problem.
He would incorporate their comments as appropriate and send the
draft on to the editors and finally the printers. In some cases an
analyst working on a research paper of this sort might be autho-
rized a trip to the country or area of concern in order to gain
firsthand knowledge of the problem.
As we have seen, the basic charge laid on our corps of analysts is to
keep abreast of developments, trends, and happenings around the world,
ranging from the balance of power among the members of the Soviet
Politburo to a change of government in Bangkok. They are called on to issue
a quick analysis of an event whether it be a coup, a major policy statement,
the Katangan invasion, or state elections in India. They are also expected to
render interpretations of a series of events or trends. in countries or regions.
And while they may be called "political" analysts, who in today's world
really understands what is going on without some capability in the other
disciplines?
Thus, the deeper requirement, rather than merely keeping up with the
daily "take," is for the analyst to maintain a broad competence along with
an area or substantive specialty. This is done by relying on books, scholarly
and journalistic articles, travel, attendance at meetings, and interchange with
experts. The input may not be directly relevant to intelligence for policy-
makers, but it is necessary in order to enable the analyst to acquire new ideas
and to develop new insights.
Two other groups journalists and scholars-treat foreign areas or af-
fairs. Both make a useful input to the world of intelligence analysis; neither
is a substitute for it. The journalists report, quite a few of them analyze, and
a smaller number are able to interpret events and trends. The scholar, on the
other hand, can do such interpretation, but for the most part he writes in a
different time frame and rarely addresses issues relevant to policymakers.
The scholar is driven more by what he wants to write than by what events
and customers dictate.
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Maintaining intellectual capital for the individual analyst is a most
difficult task given the demands and near-instant deadlines for briefings,
analyses, and commentary. To acquire and then maintain a deep under-
standing of how a country or region or political system works requires time
to read, to reflect, and to commit the results of reflection to paper for the
consideration, argumentation, and reassessment by others. The pressure of
reactive analysis is the enemy of this process. But this intellectual capital
must be maintained, or the vital perspective that separates our people from
the better journalistic analyst will be lost.
Another problem is maintaining a balance between expertise in depth
on principal subjects and areas and the capability to shift resources to areas
of interest as they develop throughout the world. Africa is a hot topic today.
Three years ago a handful of people were all that it required. Now it
constitutes a separate division, and we had to bring a number of people up to
speed very fast to cope with the demands of those we serve. Next year's hot
area might be Indonesia or Mexico, and we have to have people prepared to
assume responsibility for such areas on a moment's notice.
Our, typical analyst does not necessarily remain on one desk throughout
his career. He will probably have shifted assignments at least once in the last
10 years. If he has not, and if for any reason he needs a change of pace, there
are several possibilities open to him including such things as: a sabbatical
year at a university, attendance at a senior service school, a rotational
assignment in another office, a night senior duty officer position, or, very
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The Analyst's Viewpoint
Perhaps the major factor complicating the life of the average regional
and political analyst is that he is many things to many people.
? To the Current Reporting Group, he is the logical person to
produce articles on his country for the National Intelligence Daily
and the President's Daily Brief;
? To his office's management, he is the source of midterm analysis
for its regular publications and for intelligence memorandums
focused on longer range questions;
? To the National Intelligence Officer for his area, he is almost
always the best qualified analyst to respond to ad hoc requests
from various consumers and to draft National Intelligence Esti-
mates,and other interagency assessments;
? To the Director of Central Intelligence, he is the source of Con-
gressional and Presidential briefings and of ad hoc memos on
particular aspects of his country;
? To the Assistant for Press Relations, he is the person to turn to for
"no attribution" political briefings requested by various journal-
ists;
STAT
? To the Directorate of Operations, his office is the only one
qualified to evaluate clandestine political reporting on a con-
tinuing basis;
? And to a legion of people around town, his office-with the most
extensive political files in Washington and the longest political
memory on most countries-is the most reliable place to turn for
quick answers to both esoteric and basic questions and for brief
analytical comments on fast-breaking developments.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that, generally
speaking, none of these requesters seems to know what the others are doing.
As a result, the average analyst frequently has to juggle requests from several
sources at the same time. If an overload develops, the only way to parcel out
time-short of an analyst's own common sense and management instincts-is
to ask the immediate superior to set priorities.
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At present, for example, I am working simultaneously on current,
midrange, and long-range projects. The political situation in my country
requires frequent coverage in the National Intelligence Daily and the Presi-
dent's Daily Brief. When the current production pressures ease, I switch to a
memorandum--about one-third completed-on the internal party problems
facing the Communist chief in my country. At the same time, I am com-
mitted to draft this month for the National Intelligence Officer, portions of
a National Intelligence Estimate (on nuclear proliferation) and of an Inter-
agency Memorandum on the prospects for West European Communism.
Each day, meanwhile, a stack of mail 2 or 3 inches thick must be read and
marked for filing.
While all of this is taking place, the average analyst on a busy country is
fielding a seemingly endless stream of phone calls, responding to various ad
hoc requests. When some crisis erupts-a government collapse, a coup, an
assassination-it is. not at all unusual to spend most of the morning handling
phone requests from people in the building and around town who turn
instinctively to the regional and political analyst for the latest word on
what's happening-usually in order to brief the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, an undersecretary in one of the executive departments, or a general at
the Pentagon. Frequently, it is early evening before the furor dies down
sufficiently to permit enough reflection to draft a comprehensive article for
the morning publications.
As hectic and frustrating as all this is, it is not without advantages. My
personal view is that the pressure to stay on top of events, and to formulate
concise and accurate judgments quickly, helps keep one in analytical trim.
And' the constant dialogue with people interested in the country exposes one
to a wide spectrum of views and consumer concerns. Thus, when a memo-
randum does have to be done on a short deadline, much of the research has
been frequently done in the course of coping with various daily pressures.
The system is far from perfect, however. Perhaps the greatest problem
is that during a particularly hectic period some aspect of an analyst's work is
bound to suffer from lack of time and someone is bound to think that his
request is getting short shrift-even if, as frequently happens, one has put in
a long string of 12-hour days.
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