MR. ROBERT W. GALVIN'S MEETINGS WITH NIO AND CIA PERSONNEL, 22 DECEMBER 1975

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100010002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 23, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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7 _S
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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Nat:-,nal Intelligence Officer,
SP - 146/75
23 December 1975
i ~; iORANDU 1 FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Calvin's Meetings with 14IO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975
1. At the invitatio r. Carver, Mr. Robert 1-1. Galvin* spent the
bulk of the day, Monday, 22 December 75, at CIA Headquarters to receive
briefings and engage in discussions in connection with the PFIAB's concerns
about the NIEs on Soviet strategic forces. He was accompanied by C_mmande-r_
Lione_1 Olmer whn is an assistant_tot':r-.-4I#eate yers,_thaFYac-iI ivP
Secretary of the PFIAB.
Morning Session
(Attended by Messrs. Carver, toertz, DeBruler and
2. The t;;o-hour morning ses~~on, held in Mr. Carver's office, began
with a briefing by Mr. Carver on the NIOs and their functions in comparison
to the defunct Board and Office of National Estimates. Mir. Carver pointed
out that the NIOs made the necessary "diplomatic arrangements" to get the
best talent available in the intelligence community for the preparation of
NIEs. The NIO for Strategic Programs, Mr. Stoertz, was described as a
unique NIO in several respects: he is the only RIO with two assistants
because his concurrent service as senior intelligence advisor to the SALT
delegation requires his presence in Geneva for lengthy periods; and his
account is the most complex, structured, and formalized of all. Mr. Galvin,
who said he was making his visit in a spirit of cooperation and communication,
asked for, and was provided with, some short briefing papers on the identity
of all of the other NIOs and their responsibilities.
Member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of Motorola, Incorporated; Director of Harris
Trust and Savings Bank; Director and past Presi,'g-+ of the Electronic
Industries Association; and former member of th?5X,sident's Commission
on International Trade and Investment.
u11,~.~c.
I .
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SP - 146/75
SUBJECT: Mr. Robert U. Galvin's Meetings with NI0 and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975
3. Mr. Stoertz discussed the work of the N110/SP and the annual "cycle"
of intelligence production on Soviet strategic forces beginning with the
intelligence research program and culminating with the issuance of NIE 11-3/8.
The program was described as "ponderous" and the consumer's name was said to
be "legion." For the NIE, intelligence "teams" were established to prepare
individual sections; annexes were also prepared for special problems that
may not have received attention in the intelligence research program. For
example, this year the NIE had an annex on Soviet ICBM accuracy because it
was thought by some that the 1974 NIE left this problem in an unsatisfactory
way, despite the finding in that NIE that US Minuteman ICBMs faced an increas-
ing threat. Mr. Galvin commented to Commander Olmer that he wanted to go back
to the NIE and zero in on the paragraphs containing that judgment so Foster
and the rest of PFIAB could focus on them.
4. Concerning NIO/SP-sponsored studies of "specialized" subjects, V.
Galvin expressed interest in the findings of NSSM 242 on Soviet and Chinese
reactions to the US policy of flexible uses of nuclear weapons. He said
his questions about what was on the minds of the Soviets and Chinese was his
way of letting the NIO know what was on the minds of certain PFIAB members.
He wondered .,whether or not there should be more paragraphs in the NIE 11-3/8
on Soviet thinking and if these could be drawn from other, more detailed
studies. Mr. Carver pointed out that this material already was contained in
other NIEs such as the one covering the Soviet assessment of the US (NIE 11-5).
He said that Mr. Galvin, in effect, was raising the issue of an "omnibuta-
estimate" which he had to think more about but uhi_r_h Lloui.d.__amount to a.n_
"enormous un ertaking. Pr. toertz said his slant on this perceived need
was to to e on an 'arT~inibus research program" as suggested by the list of
published reports in the NIE 11-3/8-75, which he pointed out. He nonetheless
felt strongly that NIE 11-3/8 should be self-contained. Mr. Galvin suggested
that this year the PFIAB could help by providing intelligence with "supple-
mentary" key questions and "burning issues" in connection with Soviet
intentions, for example.
5. Mr. Stoertz outlined the present NIE process in comparison to
earlier arrangements and noted that it now ensured that views held by anyone
of the Community's analytical groups were taken into consideration early in
the game. Ranges of uncertainty in estimates were discussed and certain
factors were said to be not susceptible to quantitative analysis such as
the effect of wind on the accuracy of ICBi-1s. In the end, it was most
important that the NIE illuminate options available to the adversary so
that US leaders could take actions to offset or effect these either through
negotiation or unilateral action.
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SUBJECT: Mr. Robert I.J. Galvin's Meetings ith NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975
6. Mr. Galvin then emphasized that he will be looking into the matter
of how the decisionmaker actually uses the ;1E. He said he would like to
ask the President this question directly; in the meantime, it was his
feeling that the President used the NIE as a "frame of reference" to do his
work and that it was quite possible that the NIE was as good now as it ever
would be. Fraymentar evidence_to r__~ atP i ndiratad o him that each user saw
the issues through his own ?-?r. Carver pointed out that there
were problems of the "abstract" audience, and difficulties in getting feed-
back.
7. In connection with seeing a "few senior customers" in the future,
Mr. Galvin would be asking whether or not there would be any value to them
of putting a "limitless" time frame on the key judgments in the NIE. He
asked if there would be any point in using this "infinity factor" on certain
subjects. He explained his question with a scenario: if the Soviets
continue to spend more than we are spending on strategic programs, it seems
quite reasonable that sometime--maybe after the ten-year period covered in
the NIE--they will accomplish a "superiority" that they would perceive as
giving them the capability to launch a first strike against the US. Mr.
Stoertz said that rather than pushing the estimates to 1990 or 1995, he
would favor better illustration of trends by combining the two separate
tables depicting past and future Soviet forces. Mr. Carver commented that
looking beyond a decade or two involved too many interacting imponderables,
e.g., the kind and composition of future Soviet and US governments.
Furthermore, there was the question of whether or not the Soviets were
right if they ever were to have a perception that they possessed a first
strike capability.
8. Mr. Galvin had an "imperfect" analogue: some smart people in his
company evaluate the plans for servicing its markets and project negative
cash flows for each year to 1985 which, they say, the company can "live
with." If negative balance sheets in fact are produced as the years pass,
somebody will finally conclude, "let's stop this" because the company,
sometime in the future, will not be able to accept negative cash flows.
Mr. Galvin felt that the President was competent to come to that judgment
concerning the strategic situation, because if the Soviets were putting more
effort into their programs, it would be clear that they would be getting
more out of it. In any case, Mr. Galvin concluded that at some point
intelligence would have to tell the PFIAB if the "limitless" time frame
could be addressed in the NIE in practical terms. The morning session
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SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings ti-with NIO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975
was concluded with the injection, By Mr. Galvin, of a "modest degree of
cynI_ism" concerning what the user wanted intelligence to produce. He said
he would like to know the extent of the influence of the user on the "system."
Afternoon Session
the NIO Conference Room and attended by Messrs. Carver. tnert~
De3ru l er
9. During the three-hour afternoon session, Mr. Galvin received a
number of briefings on developments in Soviet strategic forces which were
followed by a discussion of the PFIAB-proposed study of the "track record"
of the N1Es. Mr. Stoertz explained that the briefings were somewhat like
those given to the USIR ac part of its consideration of the draft of
of which Mr. Gaivin sal he understood-"a very~substan1tial IaL dir Herthens
t." He then
raised the matter of whether or not intelligence was familiarrwith related
developments in US industry which were,being accomplished on behalf of the
US military. said that this was not a great problem, but that
the situation was uneven. Mr. Galvin said he would check into having people
in his company meet directly with intelligence as a "test case" of the system.
- a y UT )oviet
ICBMs about which he noted there were no disagreements within the Intelligence
Community (during this presentation, Mr. Colby briefly entered the room to
extend his greetings to Mr. Galvin). Mr. Galvin said the presentation was
impressive to a layman. Commander Olmer reassured him that its message came
through to the full PFIAB.
11. After his presentation on fu r Soviet forces and interactive
analysis, Mr. Galvin asked who it was that injected the
who
if's" into the futur mo e s. replied that the models
represented an informal concensus of the pants which was struck at
the beginning of the NIE 11-3/8-75 process. Mr. Stoertz expanded by noting
that he personally had queried the NSC staff about the utility of the kinds
of force alternatives to be explored by intelligence. The latter also
selected a couple of alternatives and the DIA requested one--that hniti
do with the least-threatening Soviet posture. In general,
_ _ , , .
commented that the interacti
l
ve ana
ysis of
stand and planning scenarios and it was not intended yt
r
di
u
op
e
ct
the outcome
of a nuclear war. Mr. Stoertz said a "purely intelligence" document dealing
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SUBJECT: Mr. Robert W. Galvin's Meetings with P;IO and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975
only with Soviet forces would be "very sterile." Mr. Galvin commented that
this entire case had never been made as emphatically as it had in this
discussion and he questioned whether anyone on the PFIAB, but Dr. Foster,
understood it. Commander Olmer said there was "logistic confusion" about
what the PFIAB wanted to say about this matter in its 8 August letter to
the President. He said the PFIAB always had understood the need for
intelligence to do interactive analysis; the Board only questioned whether
intelligence was able to do it.
12. There followed a briefing by on the results of a post
mortem on N1E 11-3/8-75. Several spec c areas tor greater attention were
mentioned including Soviet ASW which, I said, depended on our
understanding of US R&D. The latter subject prompted Mr. Galvin to ask about
the trailing of US submarines by the Sovi ,X and whether there was a
special NIE on this topic. Messrs. and Stoertz explained that the
Soviets had a long way to go to be able to accomplish trailing partly because
of the noisiness of their submarines. Mr. Galvin was told that this subject
was treated in detail in a forthcoming interagency intelligence memorandum
on Soviet approaches to ASW.
13. Mr. Stoertz asked Mr. Galvin if he would provide some of his
thinking about the- NIE "track record" project PFIAB w-a-s proposing (see PFIAB
letter to D/DCI/wIO, 11 December 1975). Mr. Galvin said the project was
thought to be of value because members of the PFIAB and "some users" (not
identified) had the "impression" that there was a rather consistent under-
estimation of Soviet strategic capabilities in each successive NIE. If this
indeed were the case, this situation ought to be "unmasked;" if not, we
should get it behind us. The project should involve an evaluation of the
MIEs in terms of two classes of issues: quantitative and qualitative. In
any case, nothing that gives balance to the evaluation should be disqualified;
and the PFIAB does not intend to have this project completed unless it will
be of value to intelligence. Mr. Stoertz summarized, with Mr. Galvin's assent,
that the project should be a look at the uantit ualit,, and timing of
the various Soviet weapon systems in relation to the viability of the "triad" (
of US strategic offensive forces. It would be performed by a group composed
* This subject apparently was a matter of special concern tr Mr
Galvin; he
presentation,
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the context of which did not suit a comprehensive rep y.
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SUL:J C r : i;r. Robert !d. Calvin's Meetings with ,.:,0 and CIA Personnel,
22 December 1975
or four people to -include a former NIO for Special
ct Activities (i1r
a former CIA/OSR Executi
O
.
ve
fficer (iir. ewitt), and
Commander Olmer as the completely "uninvolved, unprejudiced perhaps
group s! present party." The
could their opinion about why intelligence was over or under
the car, where it is found to have been either. Commander Olmer emphasized
this part of the project as something Dr. Foster strongly desired. Mr.
Galvin siad a first draft of the paper should be ready before the meeting
of the PFIAB during the first week of February 1976.
14. In closing the session, Mr. Carver said he would like the PFIAB
to devote a part of one of its meetings in the near future to intelligence
collection resources, 'i.e., (a) to a consideration of the potential "take"
of future intelligence collection systems and (b) to the activities of the
iiIO/SA, Mr. Barry Kelly. Since the PFIAB had some "speed matters, Mr. Galvin said the entire PFIAB should be involved; Commander
Olmer commented that such a discussion would be "right up our alley."
c
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