MILITARY ROLES FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00837R000400060002-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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Military Roles for the Mediterranean
Regardless ot how or where a limited US-Soviet conflict starts, the
Mediterranean is likely to become a theater of military operations before
hostilities cease. There are situations--a confrontation originating in a
non-European, non-NATO context for example--where it is possible the
Mediterranean would remain outside the scope of the immediate conflict.
Nevertheless, even if fighting centered elsewhere, the chances still are
good that military action would occur in the Mediterranean. A US-Soviet
conflict actually beginning in the Mediterranean, while increasing the
probability of some littoral states' involvement, would not necessarily mean
that major military operations involving most or all littoral states would
ensue. Should a limited US-Soviet conflict eventually escalate to general
war, however, Mediterranean military operations probably would be both
inevitable and extensive.
Shape of the Conflict
US-Soviet fighting from the outset is apt to take on East-West/
NATO-Warsaw Pact overtones 'for a number of reasons. First, there are the
Turkish Straits. Even a clash in a non-European setting (e.g. Angola)
eventually could necessitate Soviet logistics movements through the
Mediterranean to sustain their engaged forces. In such cases, to ensure
passage from the Black Sea the Soviets would require unimpeded Straits .
access; without Turkey's consent, the NATO issue would be joined (The
Mediterranean Feud, Andrew Borowiec, Praeger, 1983, p. 5). Next, 1T?in the
course of the initial US-Soviet fighting US territory were struck, US
invocation of the NATO charter's "attack on one is an attack on all"
provisions would throw the conflict into a NATO context. And, the US
probably would not find itself battling the Soviet Union alone; other
nations' international ties and commitments, linked in some fashion to
worldwide European interests, quite likely would give events an East-West
cast.
Additionally, US and Soviet perceptions of and preparations for conflict
with each other have, since World War II's end, focused largely on
Europe--in particular the Central Front--as the likely battleground. On the
one hand, this means the Mediterranean would not necessarily provide the
spark igniting US-Soviet hostilities; on the other, however, such prolonged
concentration by both sides upon European terrain heightens the possibility
the initial clash would have its genesis there, and thus be NATO-related.
Again, it appears the Mediterranean could not escape some degree of military
involvement because of NATO Southern Flank links and Alliance
responsibilities flowing therefrom.
Finally, a limited confrontation by definition would mean that neither
the US nor the Soviet Union would resort to nuclear weapons at the outset,
and both sides, at least initially, would attempt to contain the conflict.
This latter point could affect the dimensions of Mediterranean military
'operations. Realistically, however, attempts by either side to restrict the
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fighting at some point probably would succumb to arguments of strategic
necessity, and therefore would have little effect in preventing fighting
from spreading to or from the Mediterranean.
The Mediterranean Connection
Both the US and the Soviet Union have considerable stakes in the
Mediterranean, interests whose span transcends the Mediterranean basin,
whose complexities prevent easy isolation and analysis, and whose
neutralization or loss would strengthen the other side's hand. There are
weaknesses in both camps whose successful exploitation could influence the
scope and outcome of any Mediterranean fighting. Also, the Mediterranean's
17 littoral states have distinct interests which do not always coincide with
either US or Soviet objectives, and which cannot be overlooked.
Accordingly, military operations of whatever dimension amidst such
Mediterranean dynamics quickly would become an integral part of the larger
US-Soviet clash as opposed to a minor sideshow of negligible consequence.
Combatants' Mediterranean Interests
To the Soviets, the Mediterranean is both a commercial and a military
lifeline to much of the rest of the world. It is, as well, a potential
strategic vulnerability--successful Western penetration of the Black Sea
from the Mediterranean in wartime could wreak industrial and agricultural
havoc on Mother Russia (Borowiec, Mediterranean Feud, pp. 4-5). In
addition, the Mediterranean and its periphery present opportunities for the
Soviets to influence regional and world events through power projection
efforts launched from eastern and southern Mediterranean littoral states
hostile to the West. In recent years, military aid to and political support
for Syria and Libya, for example, have gained the Soviets increased access
to military facilities in both countries, springboards for injecting
themselves into Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf affairs at US and European
expense, a key Gorbachev objective (Soviet Military Power 1987, pp.
139-40). Regionally, they are increasingly well-positioned to undermine
Western efforts to promote NATO cohesion and general economic prosperity.
Of the Soviet military forces that could be brought to bear in furtherance
of these wide-ranging interests, the Soviets' Mediterranean Squadron, the
5th Eskadra--composed of Black Sea Fleet elements and routinely numbering
some 40-45 vessels--is the most visible reminder of Soviet Mediterranean
concerns and inroads (Power, p. 17).
US Mediterranean interests challenge the Soviets' in scope, direction
and importance. NATO's Southern Flank is the keystone for US Mediterranean
involvement, and with this association comes a US defense commitment to the
NATO nations along the Mediterranean's northern shore. Of strategic concern
are the US military facilities positioned there, installations which
represent everything "from basic logistics and supply operations to highly
sophisticated communications and intelligence activities." Most of these
bases in a NATO war would be controlled by NATO's military leadership and
could be used by military forces assigned to NATO commands (US Military
Installations in NATO's Southern Region, Report to the US House of
Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1986, p. 1). Complementing
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Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1986, p. 1). Complementing
these military activities ashore is the US Sixth Fleet, whose presence both
exemplifies NATO's forward defense strategy and represents a strategic risk
in terms of vulnerability to Soviet land-based airpower, particularly in the
Eastern Mediterranean. This US military presence carries with it concern as
well for events outside NATO's traditional geographic envelope, developments
in the Middle East and Southwest Asia which impact directly on European and
NATO well being. Thus, the region's political stability, Western
orientation and social cohesion are major adjuncts to US defense objectives
in the greater Mediterranean area.
It is unlikely either major combatant's Mediterranean interests could be
expected to change in a limited conflict. If anything, each would be drawn
to the Mediterranean to protect them, and could be expected to pursue this
goal despite any objections which might be raised by littoral states.
Littoral States' Interests, Reaction to Conflict
A US-Soviet conflict commencing in and centering on the Mediterranean
would be guaranteed to capture all littoral states' and island nations'
immediate and undivided attention. Sovereignty/territorial integrity and
economic survivability would be paramount concerns to all littoral nations,
and if threatened directly these considerations could be expected to hasten
individual country decisions as to whether or not to adhere to peacetime-
contracted defense obligations.
Uncertain reactions likely would be encountered, however, if a US-Soviet
confrontation originated on the Mediterranean's perimeter, or ultimately
were transferred to the Mediterranean from totally outside the region.
Littoral states' national interests easily could take precedence over
peacetime defense ties, much as they did in 1973 when only Portugal
permitted the US to use its bases in conjunction with the Arab-Israeli
dispute (US Military Installations, pp. 58-9). At the least, parochial
interests could be expected to prompt deliberate and perhaps protracted
reflection by littoral states generally over the merits of attempting to
maintain a neutral stance, especially if territorial violation remained a
remote possibility. This question of littoral states' "priorities" could be
complicated further for the US by very real and deeply divisive
intra-Mediterranean disputes, the most serious of which center on Greece and
Turkey. Over the years, NATO defense planning for the Eastern Mediterranean
has become almost painful, with Western goals often taking a backseat to
contradictory Greek-Turkish objectives involving the Aegean Sea and Cyprus
(Mediterranean Feud, p. 9). That this fruitless bickering swirls around a
part of _tRe Mediterranean crucial to the Soviets, and thus to the US,
pinpoints the area as one ripe for Soviet meddling and fraught with
frustration for US military planners.
Mediterranean littoral states' interests probably would have little or
no influence in preventing the expansion of a US-Soviet conflict into the
Mediterranean if either protagonist felt it necessary to move in this
direction. Similarly, littoral states' interests probably would be of
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secondary concern to the US and the Soviets if truly "limited" warfare and
objectives could not be pursued in the Mediterranean.
Mediterranean Conflict Scenarios
The range of options for limited US-Soviet hostilities involving the
Mediterranean embraces two broad categories--conflicts clearly of non-NATO
origin, and those equally clearly having their genesis somewhere on NATO
territory.* (At some point, the non-NATO/NATO distinction could become both
difficult and potentially crucial to how Mediterranean military operations
would develop.) At the extremes are the unlikely propositions that no
military operations would occur in the Mediterranean proper or in adjacent
states, and that the Mediterranean would be the sole military theater of
US-Soviet conflict, a self-contained limited confrontation which spread no
further.
1. No Mediterranean involvement. By definition, the conflict would
originate elsewhere. In order to wholly exclude the Mediterranean from the
fighting:
-- All Soviet resupply would have to be carried out through other
than Black Sea ports, and the US and Soviet Mediterranean
fleets' proximity to each other would not be permitted to become
a factor; or,
-- The Soviets would make use of their traditional Black
Sea-Mediterranean resupply routes and the US would refrain from
? interfering with such operations.
In the first instance, the fighting's locale would figure prominently in
determining how Soviet logistical operations would be carried out. Soviet
non-use of its Black Sea assets in certain circumstances would be a
possibility. A decision to eschew Black Sea ports for whatever reason,
however, would carry with it presumptions that Soviet naval and merchant
marine assets were both adequate and properly positioned at the time to
carry out the task, and any delays encountered in moving Soviet men and
materiel overland to non-Black Sea shipping points would be acceptable to
the Soviet military. An equally unpredictable component of this course of
action would be whether or not the impetus behind the initial US-Soviet
clash would carry over into the Mediterranean, if for no other reason than
it is here the US and Soviet navies regularly cross paths in peacetime,
perhaps moreso than anywhere else. (The unlikely possibility of a US-Soviet
agreement to limit fighting to the area of the initial conflict would be one
way to prevent Sixth Fleet-5th Eskadra encounters.)
*Although a limited US-Soviet conflict theoretically could take place
anywhere in the world, realistically the Soviets' traditional fixation on
homeland defense, combined with their disinclination to deploy substantial
military assets abroad when surrogates can be used, would reduce sharply the
number of locations where a "non-NATO" clash would be likely to occur.
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In the second case, the fighting's locale also would be a major factor,
especially if time were. essential to the Soviet resupply effort and the Black
Sea offered the shortest route. In such circumstances, it would be as
illogical to expect the Soviets, already militarily engaged with the US, to
stint on resupply (e.g. depend on whatever aerial resupply or surrogates
could provide) or to redirect supplies over longer routes as it would be to
expect the US to stand aside and permit the Soviets unrestricted
Mediterranean access, thereby directly contributing to a possible US defeat
elsewhere. Even if the Soviets were to gain all requisite access (Straits,
Gibraltar, Suez) by peaceful means, the US would be impelled to challenge
these Soviet reinforcements, ideally before they reached the high seas.
Thus, in times of extreme tension, such as could be anticipated with a
limited US-Soviet conflict in progress somewhere in the world, the variables
inherent in the first set of requirements and the imperatives associated with
the second would make it highly unlikely that a Mediterranean without
military operations of some kind could long exist. This argument pertains as
well to the possibility of both the US and the Soviet Union assuming
defensive Mediterranean postures: because it would be advantageous to the
Soviets in some other military theater, the US could not permit such a
situation to exist.*
2. Conflict of non-NATO, non-Mediterranean origin. Soviet Straits
access for military resupply and a US need to intercept these forces would
constitute the minimum level of Mediterranean fighting in a limited US-Soviet
conflict, as outlined above. Conceivably, this could be restricted to naval
and naval air exchanges as the Soviets attempted to enter the Aegean or tried
to make headway into the Eastern Mediterranean. Soviet land-based aircraft
would complement 5th Eskadra and Black Sea Fleet elements escorting supply
and transport craft. ?Military operations would center in the Eastern
Mediterranean, and the US rapidly could find itself in an increasingly
exposed position requiring some form of outside reinforcement and certainly
resupply.
In an effort to isolate the Sixth Fleet and the US effort generally, at
some point the Soviets could be expected to launch a complementary campaign
to convince world opinion, and particularly Turkey and Greece, that the
*Restraint and a defensive approach do not seem to figure prominently in
contemporary US Navy planning, which stresses a more "venturesome,"
offensive use of its assets. At some point this apparently includes
Marine amphibious operations in the Black Sea, as part of a "horizontal
escalation" of conventional hostilities with the Soviet Union (Jack Beatty,
"In Harm's Way," The Atlantic Monthly, May 1987, pp. 37-53). As much of what
would happen militarily in the Mediterranean, as postulated in the various
scenarios considered by this paper, would revolve around US Sixth Fleet and
Soviet 5th Eskadra actions, the Navy's offensive strategy would have
considerabrITTEit on subsequent military operations once initial contact
occurred.
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conflict was strictly a bilateral affair between ?scow and Washington. The
Soviets would disavow any intent to violate either Turkish or Greek
territory, perhaps going as far as forestalling moves toward the
Mediterranean by either Soviet or Warsaw Pact ground forces. The Soviets
would respect Greek and Turkish territory (the latter only if Straits passage
granted) and would not attack either country unless the US were permitted to
use its bases, or US military aircraft/ships were permitted to recover/refuel
at Greek or Turkish facilities. Faced with a carefully crafted and executed
pitch of this sort, one which stressed the non-NATO, non-Mediterranean nature
of the conflict and also played upon Greek-Turkish differences, strong
incentives would exist for neither Greece nor Turkey to enter the fray. US
entreaties/threats and overt attempts to use US military facilities in either
country (assuming they were still in existence and functional) might
encounter formidable opposition and the closest scrutiny. In such
circumstances, neither the unrestricted use of US facilities nor ready Greek
and/or Turkish subscription to the US position in the Mediterranean at that
moment could be assumed.
Additionally, all the while others along the Mediterranean littoral and
in Europe would be closely analyzing the Soviet approach, US countermoves and
ultimately the Greek and Turkish responses. If the Soviets, in similar
fashion, rendered appropriate assurances regarding European/Western
Mediterranean commercial concerns, a desire to appease the Soviets could
grow, particularly if either Greece or Turkey knuckled under.
Even if the Soviets infrequently display the degree of finesse necessary
to pull off such a scheme, and recognizing that time constraints probably
would blur events here deliberately measured, what is pointed up is the fact
that from the minimum level of US-Soviet Mediterranean confrontation forward,
Greek and Turkish cooperation--with each other and with the US,-or lack
thereof would have immense and lasting consequences for the US. If the
Soviets could achieve Turkish and Greek neutrality, particularly Turkish,
they could enter the Mediterranean relatively uninjured, challenged only by
the Sixth Fleet and within range of support from Libya and Syria. In short,
a limited US-Soviet conflict with no visible NATO or Mediterranean connection
probably would be the most difficult situation for the US to confront
militarily in the Mediterranean. Rebuffed by Greece and Turkey in the worst
case, the US could find itself on the defensive in an unwinnable Eastern
Mediterranean situation. This could continue uninterrupted until the US
upped the ante, the initial conflict outside the Mediterranean engulfed some
other area(s) and escalated to general war (with this scenario adding to the
possibility of such an eventuality), or the differences prompting the
original US-Soviet conflict were resolved.
3. Conflict of non-NATO, Mediterranean origin. Two general theses
suggest themselves as reasons for an extra-NATO, limited US-Soviet conflict
having its genesis in the Mediterranean:
-- Either the US or the Soviets would decide their Mediterranean naval
assets were the most appropriate means by which to force a
settlement (i.e. limited conflict) on the other over some issue
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Mediterranean-related or no. (The previously-noted peacetime
proximity of the two sides' Mediterranean fleets would contribute
to selecting this as a course of action.) Or,
-- Spillover from another Arab-Israeli flare-up or some eastern/
southern littoral state's adventurism would draw the US and the
Soviet Union into direct confrontation in the Mediterranean.
Militarily, in either instance action would not necessarily focus on the
Eastern Mediterranean, as the initiating force could select the attack
location. Eventual Soviet resupply efforts (via the Straits) in support of
the 5th Eskadra could force the Sixth Fleet to divide its attention between
fighting the sea battle(s) and preventing 5th Eskadra replenishment. The
further west in the Mediterranean the conflict occurred, the less opportunity
the Soviets would have to employ land-based air assets. If no clear victor
emerged almost immediately, at some point both sides would require port
facilities to accomplish repairs and resupply not performed under way.
Theoretically, if one side were incisive enough a strictly US-Soviet
naval encounter could be conducted and terminated without recourse to any
Mediterranean littoral states. Nevertheless, the sequential nature of such
fast-moving events would make itextremely likely that both sides would have
the time, the ability and probably the need to seek reinforcements.
Accordingly, previous political arguments regarding Straits access and Greek
and Turkish neutrality would continue to be valid, particularly if the
conflict were a spinoff from some Arab-Israeli dispute (witness 1973).
Additionally, Italian, Greek and Turkish economic ties to the Arab world and
the presence of citizens from all three countries in various Arab states,
particularly in Libya, undoubtedly would influence any decision to side with
the US. If the Soviets turned out to be scrupulous in observing northern
littoral states' boundaries and offered solid assurances of intent
(accompanied by equally clear warnings about what would happen if the US were
allowed access to its bases), it would be by no means certain that the US
would have the local support it required. Depending upon how these non-NATO
events unfolded, less-involved Mediterranean/European onlookers also might be
given all the incentive they needed to remain on the sidelines. Once again,
then, Turkish control of the Straits, Greek cooperation in blocking the
Aegean and US use of bases along the northern littoral would hang in the
balance, a situation not dissimilar to the non-NATO, non-Mediterranean
scenario and from the US perspective certainly one no easier to solve.
4. Conflict of NATO, non-Mediterranean origin. By definition, the
initial US-Soviet clash would occur somewhere on the Central Front or the
Northern Flank. (A confrontation which from the outset involved only US (or
Canadian) territory, would display Soviet intent to carry hostilities beyond
a reasonable definition of "limited" conflict because of the distances and
scope of preparations such an undertaking would encompass.) Also by
definition, at least one other NATO nation besides the US would be involved
because its territory had been violated. Because the Soviets would have
direct overland access to the scene of any Central Front--and possibly some
Northern Flank--fighting for resupply purposes, they would not be obliged to
use the Mediterranean to sustain their operations. Nevertheless, with Sixth
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Fleet and 5th Eskadra elements undoubtedly at highest alert, and with
palpable tension ailting throughout both the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact,
there would be a very good chance that fighting could spread spontaneously to
the Mediterranean. Any 5th Eskadra or Black Sea Fleet movement to support
the Soviet Northern Fleet, for example, would prompt a US response for the
same rationale applied in former scenarios when Soviet resupply through the
Straits was the issue.
Politically, the US would be somewhat better off in the Mediterranean
than it was in previous scenarios:
Although US leverage inherent in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty might
be sorely tested, there would be from the very beginning definite
and direct NATO linkage. At a minimum, this would mean all NATO
Southern Flank members would be hard pressed to disallow US use of
its bases and supplies on their territory. (While a unified NATO
response is not ruled out, lack of agreement on the existence and
extent of the threat could prompt foot-dragging by some Alliance
members.) Even if a nation (e.g. Spain) were to reject the NATO
linkage because it was not threatened directly, the US probably
could exert enough pressure (unilaterally and through other NATO
allies closer to the fighting) to be able to extract US forces and
supplies in country and perhaps even covertly continue operations
at selected installations in that country.
-- Any hint of Bulgarian mobilization or Soviet Trancaucasus military
activity would prompt greater Greek and Turkish attention to the
events unfolding to their north. Depending upon how close the
fighting was to the Eastern Mediterranean and whether a threat to
Greece and Turkey seemed to be shaping up, at this juncture the
hatchet might be buried between the two with voluntary cooperation
with the US and NATO forthcoming from that point forward. Turkey,
because of its Straits responsibilities and Common border with the
USSR, probably could be expected to react first to the threat.
Although a recalcitrant Greece, holding out until the end before
siding with the US, is a possibility, Turkish mobilization probably
would prompt the Greeks to do likewise, if only to remain on an
appropriate defensive footing vis-a-vis Turkey. A neutral Greece,
also a possibility, would decouple Turkey from Italy, and depending
upon how military action in the Mediterranean proceeded, could
prove Turkey's undoing. So, yet again Greek and Turkish
cooperation would be of primary inuortance to larger US goals.
-- Assuming the US had the support of principal NATO players,
especially France and Italy, its Mediterranean position would be
strengthened as a result of the shore-based logistics
infrastructure available and the non-US military forces that could
be brought to bear should the situation warrant.
Certainly, in this scenario restraint by both the US and the Soviets would
determine the extent of Meditetranean military operations. Nevertheless,
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even if the Soviets sought to assume a defensive Mediterranean stance, any
decision to move vessels out of the Black Sea to support the Northern Fleet
or reinforce the 5th Eskadra could prompt a US response and render relevant
previous arguments re7JEENErT5- Greek and Turkish cooperation. The timing of
such a move, in terms of a threat developing from the north, could be crucial
to Greece's and Turkey's decision either to remain neutral or to join the US.
5. Conflict of NATO, Mediterranean origin. By definition, the initial
US-Soviet clash would occur somewhere along the Southern Flank, and, as in
the previous scenario, at least one (Southern Flank) NATO member besides the
US would be involved because its territory had been violated. (A unified
NATO response is not precluded in this scenario, either.) Unlike a Central
Front confrontation, however, where US and Soviet ground forces could clash
directly and immediately, Soviet ground force action on the Southern Flank
(as on the Northern) probably would come first against non-US troops--either
Turkish (common border with USSR or through Bulgaria) or Greek (through
Bulgaria)--before the US became directly involved. Otherwise, for a
NATO-related clash to originate in the Mediterranean, the Soviets would have
to employ 5th Eskadra units within the territorial waters, or against the
naval forces, of at least one Southern Flank nation. Although some pretext
undoubtedly could be found to challenge Portuguese, Spanish, French or
Italian forces or interests, more fruitful ground would lie to the east,
where previously-noted Soviet Mediterranean interests (the Straits) would
suggest pressure against Turkey or Greece. Such Soviet action, however,
would precipitate a Sixth Fleet response against the 5th Eskadra, with
subsequent military action developing along the lines of previously-discussed
scenarios.
In this instance, with Turkey or Greece being the primary focus for
Soviet ground or naval forces, the threat to either would be direct and
unambiguous. Traditional Turkish concern over long-term Soviet intentions,
responsibility for control of the Straits and recognition of the developing
threat would make Turkey's response equally unambiguous. Pronouncements by
Athens regarding the "threat" from the East not withstanding, in this
situation, being militarily challenged through (or by) Bulgaria, Greece could
be expected to abandon all pretense for non-cooperation with NATO. The Greek
Armed Forces would vigorously defend the homeland and all territorial waters
while actively seeking allied support. The Soviets surely realize that
Greece, if provoked directly, probably would fall back upon its NATO ties to
protect its territorial integrity. This could prompt the Soviets to work
more indirectly, and even harder than they have been in recent years, to
split Greece from the Alliance, to exacerbate Greek-Turkish differences and
to play to Greece's current penchant to pursue its "independent,
multidimensional foreign policy." The Soviets' hope would be that better
peacetime ties between Athens and Moscow could make a Greek decision to
depend upon NATO in wartime as difficult a choice as possible. Whatever
issues the Soviets might choose to exploit, and regardless of the degree of
success they might achieve, it once again shows how Greece and Turkey could
dominate US and allied planning to respond to Soviet military initiatives
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6. Mediterranean as the sole military theater. Whereas fairly objective
reasons can be advanced for some degree of Mediterranean involvement in any
limited US-Soviet conflict, as well as for a limited US-Soviet confrontation
eventually gravitating to or even starting in the Mediterranean, an equally
clear-cut explanation why Mediterranean-originated fighting would not be able
to be contained within the Mediterranean basin is not as readily apparent.
These factors, however, would argue for expansion:
The confluence of US, Soviet, European, North African and Middle
Eastern interests that occurs in the Mediterranean, and the
frequently contradictory objectives inherent in these competing
goals, means it would be next to impossible to limit repercussions
and reactions stemming from Mediterranean events to the
Mediterranean itself. Peacetime pursuit of these conflicting
interests by both major and minor Mediterranean players gives ample
evidence of their worldwide and often essential character (e.g.
oil); the dimensions of these ties would ensure eventual, if not
immediate, conflict elsewhere.
-- Limited military operations in the Mediterranean basin which
appeared to be going against one of the major combatants would
undoubtedly prompt an effort by the losing side to aid its
embattled forces, or otherwise retaliate in a fashion relieving
pressure in the Mediterranean.
-- Southern Flank members' NATO membership makes it unlikely that a
situation could evolve in the Mediterranean and involve at least
one NATO nation, yet preclude some larger, NATO-wide response.
Although the Southern Flank has been publicly identified as a weak
link in NATO, the Soviets cannot count on a failure of that linkage
should limited war break out in the Mediterranean.
The fact that the US and the Soviet Union actually were fighting
would do more to inflame passions than reduce them; accordingly,
chances for added conflict elsewhere, either by design or by
accident, would increase as the result of fighting in the
Mediterranean. Emergence of a "winner" in a limited-conflict
scenario could be expected to prompt military action, as well, by
previously uninvolved parties for purely parochial reasons having
little to do with either the original US-Soviet confrontation or
the Mediterranean aspects of the conflict.
Limited Conflict expands to General War
It has been established from the foregoing representative scenarios that
a limited US-Soviet conflict, regardless of where it originated, would
involve the Mediterranean in some way, and probably would not be confined to
that area. Subsequent Mediterranean involvement, assuming u-oviet
hostilities escalated to an all-out effort (including nuclear weapons) by
each to defeat the other militarily, could be expected to include:
-- Sixth Fleet and 5th Eskadra actions to render each other militarily
ineffective;
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-- Soviet attempts to seize the Straits (if not already held) and US
efforts to block or to breach same;
-- US facilities along the northern littoral being attacked.
It is difficult to foresee whether any state which had opted for neutrality
in a limited-conflict scenario would remain so; much would depend upon who
was "winning" locally and how far into the Southern Flank fighting had
spread. Assuming something less than total involvement by some Southern
Flank member in the overarching US-Soviet, NATO-Warsaw Pact struggle,
Mediterranean instability could give rise to attempts to settle old scores on
anything from Spanish .control of Gibraltar and reinforcement of its Moroccan
enclaves to an adjustment of Greek-Turkish-Bulgarian borders and "resolution"
of the Cyprus conflict. Breakdown of international discipline is foreseen as
an adjunct to any US-Soviet general conflict. This effectively precludes
quantification of Mediterranean involvement beyond the recognition that
because it would be part of any limited US-Soviet conflict, the Mediterranean
could not escape the larger conflagration that would follow.
Conclusions
A limited US-Soviet conflict, whatever and wherever its origins, would
prompt some degree of Mediterranean military involvement.
Although compelling arguments can be made that irrespective of where it
starts a limited US-Soviet conflict would quickly become NATO/Warsaw Pact- or
Bast/West-oriented, conflicts arising from clearly non-NATO causes, if
properly handled by the Soviets, could put the US at a severe disadvantage
when conducting military operations in the Mediterranean. A corollary to
this is the more NATO linkage there is to the initial limited US-Soviet
conflict, the greater the likelihood Southern Flank members would support the
US and the more leverage the US would have to ensure it would not face the
Soviets alone.
Military operations in the Mediterranean would be more likely to begin as
the result of naval activity from which military action ashore would flow,
not vice versa.
Turkey and Greece would figure prominently in every limited-conflict
scenario postulated for military operations in the Mediterranean.
Satisfaction of US Mediterranean goals would depend upon these nations'
unstinting cooperation. A corollary to this is that while resolution of
Greek-Turkish differences could facilitate such cooperation, non-resolution
plays to long-term Soviet advantage.
11
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_
- This letter confirms our recent telephone conversation
abOut the Workshop/Seminar I am organizing here at the Foreign
Service Institute the morning of Thursday, May 28, on the subject;
"NATO's Achilles Heel: Is the Southeastern Flank Beyond Repair?"
-To facilitate productive discussion / am limiting participation to
about twenty-five experts, in and out of government, and look
forward to your being one of them.
United States Department of State
Foreign Service institute
1400 Key Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209
^
May 1987
The focus of the Workshop will be on the effect that
Greek-Turkish differences have on NATO's military posture and what
the alliance can do to address underlying problems. There will be
two papers, one by Colonel Dwight Beach, U.S. Army, setting forth
? key military factors, and the other, which / am preparing, on
diplomatic aspects. These will be sent to you in the next two
weeks. Colonel Beach and I will make brief oral presentations to
get discussion underway.
The Workshop will convene at 08.45am on Pay 29 and will
last until 12.30pm. It will be held in Room 210 at FSI's main
building at 1400 Key Blvd. in Rosslyn. Although the Workshop is
unclassified, its restricted size and the special qualifications
of the participants should enable us to discuss a wide range of
related issues and come to some constructive conclusions.
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, ?
-
-2
We do not intend to publish anything based directly on?
the-Workshop, although I hope that all of us wilrfind-that-ithss
sharpened_ouF thinking on Greek-Turkish problems and their
implications for NATO. We will tape the proceedings and thus have
permanent record of our discussions on file at
- . .
? - ?
. - .
- - '
questions, please give me,a call on 003
35-4848: Questions on administrative arrangementirJorthe -
Workshop can-also bi*iddresied to Ms. Deborah Chambers, (703) -"
?235-2109. Thanks for your interest and / look forward to seeing
you on May 28.
Sincerely,
Monteagle Stearns
-
- ? . .
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NATO's ACHILLES HEEL: IS THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK BEYOND REPAIR?
by Monteagle Stearns
A Workshop Discussion Paper
Place : Foreign Service Institite, Center for the Study
of Foreign Affairs, 1400 Key Blvd., Room 210, Rosslyn, Va. 22209
Time : 08.45 a.m., May 28, 1987
Monteagle Stearns is a Senior Reseasrch Fellow at the
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs at the State Department's
Foreign Service Institute. The views in this paper do not
necessarily represent the views,of the State Department or the
United States Government
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NATO's ACHILLES HEEL: IS THE SOUTHEASTERN FLANK PEYOND REPAIR?
Discussion Paper for Workshop May 28, 19P7
An inherent paradox of NATO seems to be that the more
successful the Alliance is in containing the Soviet threat
that brought it into being the more vulnerable it becomes to
internal antagonisms unrelated to its original purposes. A
case in point is the confrontation between Greece and Turkey
which paralyzes the southern flank of NATO and sharply'.
limits its ability to counter Soviet military deployments in
the Mediterranean. While Greek-Turkish differences have
vexed NATO councils almost from the time the two states
joined the Alliance in 1952, the situation has deteriorated
markedly in the past decade: since the Cyprus crisis of
? 1974, military cooperation between the two allies has been
non-existent; since the Unilateral Declaration of
Independence by Turkish Cypriots in 1983, Greece has refused
to participate in NATO exercises in the Aegean. Viewed from
this perspective, if the central front of NATO represents
the heart of the Alliance, its Achilles Heel is
unquestionably located in the southeastern sector.
NATO's political leadership has consistently taken the
position that, despite the damage inflicted on the
Alliance's military posture by Greek-Turkish differences,
NATO itself is powerless to resolve them. The memory of
futile interventions by third parties--ranging from the
Dulles parallel letters to Greece and Turkey in 1955 to the
Geneva conference of guarantor powers in 1974--has doubtless
contributed to the general impression that the Greek-Turkish
confrontationsis a problem that time alone can solve and
that the Alliance's principal obligation is to limit the
damage. Accordingly, NATO has confined itself to empowering
senior allied military commanders--usually SACEUR himself
and CINCSOUTH in Naples--to resolve, if possible, purely
military differences, such as those arising regularly over
the modalities of NATO exercises, while refusing to address
the political context which produces disagreements in the
military sphere. Not surprisingly, as the political
problems fester, the military ones become more intractable
and NATO's southeastern flank less defensible.
At present no dialogue exists between Greece and
Turkey. Continuing talks between the Secretaries General of
the two Foreign Ministeries were broken off by the
Papandreou Government in 19'61 on the grounds that there was
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"nothing to negotiate". This, however, has meant that
communications, to the extent they have been carried on at all,
have been largely conducted through the Greek and Turkish press.
When Turkish military exercises in the Aegean result in Turkish
aircraft penetrating the ten miles of air space that Greece claims
around its _islands--something that has occurred frequently--Greek
aircraft are scrambled and the risk of a dog fight between NATO
allies becomes palpable. In effect, the responsibility for
avoiding an incident with irreversible consequences rests with
young TACAIR pilots on both sides. Nor are the dangers of a
Greek-Turkish clash confined to disputed Aegean airspace. On
December 19, 1986 one Greek and two Turkish soldiers were killed
in an exchange of fire that occurred along the Evros River, which
delineates the borders of Greek and Turkish Thrace.
Military Effects of Greek-Turkish Confrontation
If the most obvious benefit NATO gained when Greece and
Turkey joined the military organization in 1952 was a coordinated
defense of its southeastern flank, the most obvious liability that
NATO incurs from the present situation is a lack of coordination
that loudly calls attention to itself in every forum where the two
allies are represented. Greek and Turkish armed forces have not
exercised together regularly in 15 years. The last NATO military
exercise in which the two governments permitted their forces to
cooperate directly, even on a limited basis, was in the spring of
1982. Most of the exercising that Greece and Turkey have done in
the' Aegean since 1974 has not been directed against a common foe
but against each other.
The damage to NATO's preparedness, however, goes well
beyond this. Greek-Turkish antagonism also disfigures the military
structure of the alliance. When Greece withdrew from the military
organization of NATO in 1974 its forces were withdrawn from NATO's
Izmir headquarters which accordingly, in 1978, became an entirely
Turkish command subordinate to CINCSOUTH in Naples. The
reintegration of Greek forces into the military'structure of NATO
in 1980 envisaged, not the return of the Greeks to Izmir, but the
creation of a separate "Greek NATO headquarters" in Larissa in
central Greece. Due to disagreements between Athens and Ankara
over the interpretation of the reintegration agreement, this
Larissa headquarters, and its projected air arm, the 7th Allied
Tactical Air Force, has never come into being. As a result there
are no agreed command-and-control lines between Greek and Turkish
forces in the Aegean; no mechanism to assure coordinated air
defense if hostilities were to break out between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact; and no provision for joint planning in any sector by
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Greek and Turkish forces whose national and NATO military missions
are clearly contradictory.
Even if the alliance can manage to keep Greece and Turkey
members bf NATO and nominal allies in the years ahead, it is
painfully 'clear that the vulnerabilities of the southeastern flank
are too deep and far-reaching to be eliminated by improvised
crisis management after hostilities with Warsaw Pact forces have
broken out. Either NATO begins to face the military implications
of Greek-Turkish antagonism or it must risk having to abandon the
eastern Mediterranean theater - and perhaps also the western -. in
the event of general hostilities. The effect of such a decision.
would of course affect not only Greece and Turkey, but Italy,
France and Spain, as well. As Edward Luttwak has observed, in a
general war "Redeployment of the Sixth Fleet from the narrow seas
of the Mediterranean into the broad expanse of the Atlantic could
be at once an act of tactical wisdom and political folly" (Sea
Power in the Mediterranean. CSIS, Georgetown University, 197T.
What is the Military Value of the Mediterranean?
According to Admiral William H. Rowden, Sixth Fleet
commander from 1981 to 1983, "one half of the oil consumed by
France, Spain and West Germany, and all that of Italy,
Switzerland, and Austria, arrives through Mediterranean ports"
(NATO and the Mediterranean, edited by Kaplan, Clawson, and
Luraghi, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985). Western Europe's -
dependence on the Mediterranean trade route for other important
commodities is comparably heavy. The question for NATO planners
is, therefore, how best to keep that trade route open in the event
of hostilities.
Viewed purely in geostrategic terms it could be argued
that from the standpoint of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact alike a
neutral Mediterranean would protect the vital interests of each
alliance as well as, or better than, a belligerent Mediterranean.
Assuming the continued membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO,
and thus the continued availability of US/NATO facilities located
there, a neutral (or effectively neutralized) Mediterranean would
appear to serve the logistic needs of the western allies without
imposing on them the need to engage naval forces in an area where
they would be at a tactical disadvantage due to the proximity of
Soviet airpower.
For the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact the
Mediterranean stakes are lower, but by no means negligible. It has
been estimated that 70-80% of .the Soviet Union's supplies to
Vladivostok are shipped via the Mediterranean, which is also the
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principal Soviet trade route to its Arab and African clients and
customers. If the Soviet Union is better positioned than the
United States to interdict maritime LOCs by means of air assets
based in the Crimea, Moscow nevertheless has its own tactical
disadvantages if it seeks to turn the Mediterranean into a major
theater of war. All of the Mediterranean choke points, from the
Bosphorus to the Straits of Gibraltar, are in hostile hands, and
NATO air assets operating from Turkish and, to a lesser extent
Greek bases would represent a significant threat to the Soviet
Black Sea fleet and to Warsaw Pact facilities in the Balkans.
The Soviets and the Warsaw Pact, therefore, have military
and logistic reasons almost as compelling as those of the United
States and NATO for seeking to limit the level of hostilities in
the Mediterranean. The factor that might tempt them not to do so
is political rather than military: the Greek-Turkish dispute and
the opportunity it provides to drive a wedge into NATO's
southeastern flank that could turn into a mortal wound for the
alliance.
How Greece and Turkey Joined the Club
In fact, until North Korean forces crossed the 38th
Parallel to attack South Korea on June 25, 1950, there was
relatively little enthusiasm among NATO's founding members for
extending the alliance beyond its original boundaries. Even the
implications of inviting Italy to join the organization had been
debated, and it was U.S. pressure (inspired by our dependence on
the Azores as a stepping stone to Europe) that proved the
determining argument for bringing in Portugal.
The arguments against including Greece and Turkey in the
alliance, at a time when both countries were pressing for
admission, were summarized by U.S. officials in London to the
Permanent Under Secretary of the British Foreign Office, Lord
Strang, in the spring of 1951 (Aide-Memoire from Ambassador
Gifford and NAC Deputy Representative Spofford to Strang, May 15,
1951): (a) the conception of an alliance composed of socially and
economically homogeneous countries did not "readily lend itself to
the thought of Greek-Turkish participation"; (b) "most parties to
the North Atlantic Treaty would probably be reluctant to see a
broadening of their security commitments, the immediate benefits
of which they (could) not perceive"; and (c) there would be
"obvious complications resulting from enlarged membership".
In fact; these arguments would probably have been more
prevalent in the alliance the year before. By May, 1951 they had
been overtaken by events in Korea, and at the next meeting of the
North Atlantic Council, in Ottawa in September, the members
unanimously invited Greece and Turkey to join NATO, with only
Norway and the Netherlands still expressing reservations.
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At a time when NATO strategists and opinion-leaders in
Europe and the United States saw Korea as the Soviet Union's
opening gambit, perhaps to be followed by military pressure on
Kars and Ardahan in eastern Turkey, or a refueling of the Greek
Civil War as a preparation for moves on Thrace and the
Dardenelles, the immediate advantages of admitting Greece and
Turkey far outweighed other considerations. Confronted by what
looked like an imminent Soviet threat, no one, least of all the
United States, was disposed to dwell on the longer term
implications of admitting two states with historic bilateral
differences and little inclination to resolve them.
When the British Embassy in Athens, a month before the
Ottawa meeting, raised with U.S. Ambassador Peurifoy the
desirability of warning the Greeks "to refrain from stirring up
issues (i.e. Cyprus) that might cause difficulties with fellow
---,members", Peurifoy "pointed out Dept's reluctance appear to attach
conditions of any kind to Greco-Turkish adherence to NATO and
presumed this would apply to any formal change of Greek policy re
Cyprus" (Telegram from EmbAthens to SecState, August 31, 1951.
Archives).
The Worst of Two Worlds
Greek and Turkish willingness voluntarily "to refrain
from stirring up issues" lasted only two years beyond the end of
the Korean War - until the beginning of September, 1955, when
Turkish nervousness about diplomatic developments in London
affecting Cyprus resulted in anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and the
virtual elimination of the historic Greek minority there. Since
that time there has been scarcely a year when Greeks and Turks
were not more preoccupied with their bilateral differences than
with the Soviet threat. Since 1974 there has been scarcely a day.
From the strategic standpoint NATO has the worst of two
worlds: the political commitment to defend Greece and Turkey
without the military capability to do so. It is true that both
countries provide important facilities which enable NATO to
operate more effectively in the eastern Mediterranean and to
monitor Soviet military activities more accurately than would
otherwise be the case. Whether these facilities would be
defensible in the event of hostilities with the Warsaw Pact is
doubtful, however, in the absence of wholehearted and efficient
Greek-Turkish military collaboration. Furthermore, as we have
seen, antagonism between Greece and Turkey is an open invitation
to the Soviets to exploit their differences diplomatically in
peacetime and militarily in time of war.
As Henry Kissinger wrote twenty years ago, "Of course no
alliance can perfectly reconcile the objectives of all of its
members. But the minimum condition for effectiveness is that the
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requirements of the alliance not clash with the deepest
aspirations of one or more of the partners" (The Troubled
Partnership, by Henry Kissinger, published for the Council on
Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1965).
For over a decade this minimum condition has not been met
on NATO's southeastern flank. The alliance, ever wary of involving
itself in "political" issues, has tended to look the other way
whenever the Aegean pot has boiled over. NATO's initiatives have
been confined to the military sphere, as though military problems
existed in a political vacuum. Generals Haig and Rogers
conducted intensive diplomacy to find a basis for the
reintegration of Greece into the military structure of NATO. Much
time and imagination have been devoted to constructing scenarios
for military exercises that both Greece and Turkey could accept as
not prejudicing their legal positions on Aegean airspace, shelf
and related issues. Yet the result of all this effort has been
?efewer joint exercises in the Aegean, a Greek reintegration
tigreement inoperative in its essential provisions, and a steady
deterioration of Greek-Turkish relations.
From fear of jeopardizing existing facilities in Greece
and Turkey, and the silhouette of an allied military structure in
the northeastern Mediterranean, NATO has failed to take any
serious initiatives to resolve underlying Greek-Turkish problems.
It is now time to consider whether the risks of a more active
diplomacy, and a willingness to address the substance of their
bilateral problems, outweigh those of continuing to close our eyes
to the disintegration of the southeastern flank.
A History of Failed Diplomacy
Since, for differing reasons, NATO, the Cyprus guarantor
powers, and the United Nations, have all been equally helpless to
redress a worsening situation, the United States has repeatedly
found itself taking initiatives it would have preferred to forgo
to resolve crises no one had been able to avert. Whether it was
the Dulles demarche of 1955, the Johnson letter and the Acheson
Plan of 1964, the shuttle diplomacy of Ball in 1963, Vance in
1967, Sisco in 1974, or Nimetz in 1978, these intiatives have
failed to produce a lasting settlement and have usually resulted
in a worsening of U.S. relations with both Greece and Turkey.
One characteristic of all these diplomatic interventions
is that they were fire-fighting operations designed primarily to
prevent general hostilities between Greece and Turkey and only
secondarily to resolve underlying differences. It is true that
settlements can sometimes be negotiated under pressure of a crisis
that would be impossible to achieve otherwise -- the Lausanne
Treaty of 1923, to which Greece and Turkey were signatories, is
one example. It is doubtful however that issues as complex as
Cyprus, the Aegean shelf, territorial seas and airspace, and the
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interpretation of-treaties affecting the Aegean islands, combining
as they do political, economic and legal factors, bristling as
they are with ancient animosities, can be settled in crisis
conditions. Agreements hastily pieced together to avoid or
terminate hostilities would be likely to last no longer than the
London-Zurich accords of 1960.
There is therefore a case to be made for attempting to
find durable solutions before the next crisis rather than during
or immediately after it. There is also, from the standpoint of the
United States, every reason to share with other NATO members, and,
if possible, with NATO itself in the person of the Secretary
General, the responsibility for assisting Greece and Turkey to
resolve their differences. This, in turn, entails amplifying
NATO's scope in ways not envisaged, indeed specifically
discountenanced, by the founding fathers.
NATO's Mandate
There is no doubt that NATO's mandate, as conceived by
the original signatories, did not include a responsibility for
addressing internal disputes among the members. According to Sir
Nicholas Henderson, in 1948 Second Secretary of the British
Embassy in Washington and a member of the NATO Working Party, when
the French suggested that an "article of conciliation" be
introduced into the draft treaty, the other representatives
rejected the idea as duplicating existing mechanisms, notably
those provided by the United Nations and the International Court
of Justice. Henderson comments, "Furthermore, the possibility of
disputes between parties to the Pact of such serious nature as to
defy solution by these existing agencies or under existing
treaties seemed to some members of the (Drafting) Committee so
remote as to make it unnecessary to establish a further agency of
conciliation as between the parties" (The Birth of NATO, Sir
Nicholas Henderson, Westview Press, 1983).
The point was underscored later when plenipotentiary
representatives agreed that in public statements all signatories
would define the primary purpose of the Treaty as collective
self-defense, under Article 51 of the united Nations Charter, but
would not term it a "regional arrangement" under Chapter 8. This
was thought to avoid any implication that the Treaty aimed at
regional conciliation and therefore encroached on U.N.
prerogatives. The parties did however reaffirm "their existing
obligations for the maintenance of peace and the settlement of
disputes between them" (Henderson, Agreed Minutes of
Interpretation, Birth Of NATO, p. 104).
The present Greek Government's position, first enunciated
by Prime Minister Papandreou at the meeting of NATO Defense
Ministers in Brussels in December, 1981, is that the Treaty must
be elaborated by a Resolution of the members affirming that its
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provisions cover not only an attack on a member by a non-member,
but on a member by another member. This Greek proposal, repeated
on many occasions since, has been consistently rejected by the
other members on the grounds that it is redundant, not envisaged
in the Treaty, and gratuitously insulting to another member,
Turkey, which asserts it has no aggressive intentions toward
Greece.
That such a contingency was not envisaged in the original
Treaty we have already seen. It is not true, however, that NATO
has always taken the position that internal disputes between the
members are beyond its purview. On the contrary, in the period
1957-1958 two NATO Secretaries-General, Ismay and Spaak, acted as
mediators in successive attempts to restore harmony to
Anglo-Greek-Turkish relations in the face of mounting violence in
Cyprus and the expulsion of the Greek minority from Istanbul in
1955. Unsuccessful though they were in achieving a settlement,
these efforts did bring about a resumption of talks between Greece
and-Turkey which eventually made possible the London-Zurich
accords of 1959-60.
The Ismay-Spaak initiatives provide a precedent, if one
is. needed, for a more energetic diplomatic role by the present
Secretary General, Lord Carrington, who has already offered his
good offices to the Greeks and Turks following their confrontation
over oil exploration and drilling rights in the Aegean in March of
this year. This offer, which the Secretary General says still
stands, was accepted by the Turks but rejected by the Greeks, a
response that seemed to bear out the fears of those uneasy about .a
more active NATO diplomacy.
NATO's Diplomatic Disabilities
It is assumed by many NATO officials, and has become holy
writ to their governments, that undertaking to resolve
Greek-Turkish differences is a no-win proposition for the
alliance, which has as much as it can handle keeping the countries
of the central front marching in the same direction without trying
to call the tune for those of the southeastern flank, which are
considered to be less schooled in team play. If NATO proves its
impartiality with an attitude of detached concern, it is sometimes
argued, Greece and Turkey will eventually realize that the
alliance is not going to bail them out. Only then will they
accept the responsibility for resolving their own differences.
This reasoning ignores the fact that neither Greece nor
Turkey presently believes that NATO is impartial. Each is
convinced that the alliance tilts in favor of the other. The
Greeks believe that strategic considerations - the notorious
realpolitik - invariably give Turkey more weight in NATO councils
because of its larger population (50.7 versus 9.8 million), troop
strength (560 versus 210 thousand), and 600 km. border with the
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Soviet Union. The Turks, on the other hand, believe that the
weight of their membership is limited by its purely strategic
character: whenever Turkish and Greek interests collide, they
contend, NATO tends to side with Greece for historic and cultural
reasons. Greeks and Turks both, in other words, consider that NATO
undervalues .their membership, albeit for different reasons.
Paradoxically, NATO's present hands-off policy, although
intended to project the alliance's impartiality and encourage
Athens and Ankara to settle their own differences, is more likely
to be having the opposite effect. Both capitals are apt to
interpret this attitude as proof that NATO does not take them
seriously and, accordingly, to see less prospect for compensation
from the alliance if they adopt more flexible policies. It is also
logical to suppose that what Greeks and Turks alike see as the
relatively low priority accorded by NATO to the southeastern flank
gives them little reason to place NATO priorities before their own
tben it comes to force planning and deployment.
-
And Its Advantages
From the standpoint of the United States, sponsorship of
Greek and Turkish membership in NATO was really a way of
institutionalizing, and at the same time sharing the
responsibility to implement, the commitment to defend them
undertaken in the Truman Doctrine. For their part, Greece and
Turkey initially regarded their NATO membership as essentially a
reinforcement of American guarantees.
Since 1952 the significance of the NATO link has changea -
perceptibly for both countries. Greece has come to regard its NATO
membership as a buffer not primarily against the Warsaw Pact but
against Turkey, and as a reinforcement of its ties not to the
United States but to Europe. Indeed one of the significant
.benefits of NATO membership to the Greek Government is that it
"Europeanizes" to some extent the small but conspicuous U.S.
military presence in Greece. While NATO has not been popular in
Greece since 1974, its security policies are less suspect than
those of the United States, which are believed by many Greeks to
be unduly influenced by Turkey and by internal Greek political
considerations . Thus when the two governments have discussed the
question of shared military facilities in Greece, it has usually
been easier to discuss their NATO than their bilateral aspects.
Turkey has also come to look on NATO to some extent as a
buffer against over-reliance on the U.S., but in its case against
the uncertainties of doi-ng business with the united States, whose
security policies, in Turkish eyes, are unduly influenced by
Greece and by internal American political considerations. During
the period of the U.S. arms embargo between 1975 and 1978, Turkey
relied heavily on the continuing flow of military assistance from
another NATO partner, the Federal Republic of Germany, to
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compensate for the Interruption of supplies from the United States.
To offset its diplomatic liabilities, NATO enjoys
therefore at least two important assets: it can offer its good
offices to Greece and Turkey with the assurance that extraneous
political factors can be kept to a minimum, and that whatever
settlement is reached will be backed by states allied to both
Greece and Turkey but with varying degrees of intimacy, based on
political complexion, historic links and the chemistry of their
leaders. As mediator NATO can employ a combination of flexibility
and leverage unavailable to any single member, including the
United States.
To employ these assets effectively will require
convincing both states that the potential diplomatic and economic
advantages of a NATO-sponsored settlement are more important than
the political risks. The very complexity of their differences, and
the consequent array of trade-offs available to a mediator, can be
helpful here. In addition, NATO must demonstrate that it takes
Greek-Turkish differences seriously enough to devote full
attention to resolving them and that it recognizes that no
settlement can be reached which causes one state to bear
disproportionate political or economic costs, or which does not
serve the security interests of both to the same degree.
How To Get Started
The Greek Government's rejection of the Secretary
General's offer of good offices following the March crisis need
not be considered its last word on the subject. As we have noted.
earlier, NATO has some diplomatic disadvantages to overcome in
Greece -- notably resentment that the alliance did not prevent
Turkish landings on Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and has not
brought about the removal of Turkish troops in the years since --
but there is reason to believe that if a NATO initiative were
presented in a politically favorable light, the Greek Government
would not rebuff it.
The best way to do this would probably be for NATO to
explore in Athens and Ankara the feasibility of the two powers
concluding a pact of non-aggression, to be guaranteed by the
alliance. The Evros border incident in December and the recent
Aegean confrontation over petroleum rights make this a,logical
subject for the Secretary General or his designated representative
to address. Furthermore, since Greece has been seeking a NATO
guarantee of this very kind, the Greek Government would presumably
be willing to discuss it. Turkey, for its part, would enter such
discussions on the same footing as Greece, not as a presumed
aggressor, and would have no prima facie reason to object to NATO
guaranteeing an agreement of the kind that the Turks themselves
have publicly proposed.
A concommitant of NATO-sponsored negotiations could be
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development of confidence-building measures and improved bilateral
communications to replace those the alliance's military
organization would provide if the armed forces of both sides were
fully integrated and it was functioning normally: observors at
national military exercise, hot lines, advance notification of
unusual military deployments, and so on.
While it is true that the Papandreou government, which
pursues what might be called a non-aligned policy within NATO, has
an inherent reluctance to associate itself with NATO in any but
the most discreet and inescapable ways, an initiative of this kind
could be accurately depicted as one which seeks to achieve an
avowed Greek objective -- an alliance guarantee against aggression
"from any quarter". From the Turkish standpoint, it does so
without making political assumptions disobliging to either side.
If this approach were adopted it would focus NATO
(14plomacy on the most urgent aspect of the Greek-Turkish
cOnfrontation in the most politically neutral way. It would be a
valuable test of NATO's ability to treat differences between its
members that are not of an exclusively military nature but have
direct bearing on the alliance's military posture. If successful,
it might embolden NATO to address the more complicated and
far-reaching issues that regularly generate military tension
between the two states.
Is Cyprus a Greek-Turkish Problem?
This is not the place to construct the model of a possible
settlement of all the issues dividing Greece and Turkey. We can
however analyze the minimum objectives that each would seek to
achieve, see how they might balance out, and whether an overall or
partial agreement -- including or excluding Cyprus, for example
offers the greater chance of success.
The obvious drawback in trying to exclude Cyprus is that
no issue has provoked greater Greek-Turkish acrimony in the past
twenty-five years and none has a more dangerous potential for
disrupting peace in the future. Nor is any of their other
differences harder to insulate from external factors, since Cyprus
itself is independent and non-aligned, the subject of numerous
U.N. resolutions, and the object of almost as much attention from
the Soviet Union as from the United States. The difficulty of
excluding Cyprus is however the best reason for trying to do so.
The human side of the Cyprus problem - the displaced and
missing persons, the violence and the threat of violence, the
frustrations involved in uniting peoples in a modern state who are
divided by so much history -- all this is agonizing and enough to
baffle the will of the most resolute mediator. By contrast, the
bilateral - the Greek-Turkish -- aspects of the problem need not
be so complex.
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Turkey's principal interest in Cyprus is to protect the
Turkish Cypriot minority and its own southwestern flank. To secure
this interest Turkey has a? geostrategic advantage that is
decisive, as it proved most recently in 1974 when Turkish troops
crossed the forty miles from Anatolia to the north coast of Cyprus
without any effective military response from Greece, five hundred
miles away. No treaty reaffirming Turkey's links with the Turkish
Cypriots or its legitimate concern for international developments
affecting Cyprus could constitute a guarantee remotely as reliable
as the one revealed by any map of the region. By the same token,
whatever diplomatic restraints on future Turkish intervention
Greece might obtain in a treaty would be feeble compensation for
its strategic disadvantages.
If the military imperatives are virtually unalterable, so
are the political and economic factors. The de facto partition of
Cyprus resulting from the Turkish Cypriot declaration of
independence in November, 1983, is not regarded as a permanent
solution to the problem of the Turkish minority, even in Ankara,
which almost certainly seeks by its support of the "Turkish
Federated State" to enhance the bargaining position of the Turkish
Cypriots rather than to annex northern Cyprus, a move that would
create endless international problems for Turkey. Furthermore, the
economic partition of the island has been no more successful than
the political. Northern Cyprus has no trading partners or sources
of foreign investment other than Turkey, and the backwardness of
its economy, despite the traditional richness of the land,
contrasts sharply with the prosperity of the rest of the island..
The very immutability of the strategic, political and
economic factors affecting Cyprus is reason enough to treat it, if
possible, as a discrete problem. Another, and more fundamental
reason is that no solution, even one acceptable in Athens and
Ankara, can endure unless it conforms to the wishes of the
Cypriots. Cyprus is their island and they, more than the mainland
Greeks and Anatolian Turks, will have to live with the solution.
It is almost certainly in the longterm interests of Greece and
Turkey that this should happen. The Cyprus problem costs them
resources they can ill afford, needlessly engages their national
prestige in an area which neither controls, and makes it harder
for them to resolve their differences in the more sensitive areas
they do control.
Athens and Ankara have not facilitated settlement of the
Cyprus problem because they have had less to lose at home by
backing the maximum demands of the two communities than by urging
compromise. This will not always be the case. It may not be the
case at the present time. If de facto partition of Cyprus hardens
into something more permanent, and permanently divisive, Greece
and Turkey could find themselves drawn into a confrontation which
would be costly and destabilizing whether they advanced or
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retreated. Their militaryforces on the island would become
hostages difficult to reinforce or remove. Logistics would favor
the Turkish position, but all other factors, not least that of
international legitimacy, would favor the Greeks.
If Athens and Ankara can be induced to recognize how
damaging to their interests it would be if they crossed this point
of no return, it may not be too late to persuade them to work for
a settlement between the communities rather than to obstruct it.
While the non-aligned status of the Republic of Cyprus precludes
any NATO role in bringing about a resolution of communal
differences, the alliance can certainly use its influence more
effectively with Greece and Turkey to reduce their obstructionism ?
and increase their support for the efforts of the United Nations
Secretary General. NATO's own diplomacy, and the proven skills of
Lord Carrington, are better reserved for problems like airspace,
territorial sea, the Aegean shelf, and the multitude of military
?disputes to which they give rise. Difficult these problems may be,
blit a serious attempt to eradicate them is overdue and, in any
case, less dangerous than permitting them to continue gnawing
away the foundation of NATO's southeastern defences.
Aegean Problems
Andrew Wilson, whose Adelphi Paper, The Aegean Dispute
(Adelphi Papers, #155, Winter 1979/1980, IISST7?is a meticulous
and dispassionate analysis of Aegean problems, concludes, "The
more one studies the (Greek-Turkish) dispute and talks with those
involved, the more one realizes that what is often largely at
issue, apart from lack of confidence, is national pride."
Anyone who has had occasion to discuss these matters with
Greeks or Turks will agree. It is for this very reason that an
outside mediator is needed. Where national pride interprets
flexibility as weakness and concessions as defeats, the mediator
can sometimes assume enough of the short-term political risk to
enable the parties to reach a settlement that serves their
longer-term interests. In assuming the risk himself the mediator
of course may endanger his own interests -- NATO, for example,
could alienate either Greece or Turkey to the point where one of
them left the alliance. The danger is only worth running if there
is reason to believe that the parties, once relieved of a portion
of the political risk, are capable of agreement. In the case of
Greece and Turkey there are arguments for and against this
proposition.
On the negative side are the strongly nationalist and
ambiguously non-aligned policies of the Papandreou government,
which little dispose it to compromise with Turkey and even less to
do so under the auspices of NATO. The Ozal government, for its
part, has reacted to Papandreou by adopting a tougher line towards
Greece. TO maxe matters worse, tnere are tnose in both
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countries who argue that the status quo works in their favor.
There are also positive factors however. Of these,
perhaps the most significant is that Greece and Turkey have
repeatedly shown by their prudent handling of past Aegean crises
that they do not want hostilities. Their words rather than their
actions have been intransigent. Strong language on national issues
reduces political risks in all countries; the most audible Greek
and Turkish voices -- government leaders and the press -- are
those which are most sensitive to such risks. Other elements have
shown by their actions that they would support attempts to improve
relations and thereby lift a threat which distorts the defense
posture of both countries, stifles trade, and discourages Aegean
tourism, a key source of foreign exchange earnings for Greece and
a growing one for Turkey.
If the element of national pride is put aside, and with
it the heightened sensitivity to political risk that national
pride entails, it is clear that the status quo works in no one's
faVor. The petroleum resources, if any, of the Aegean shelf remain
unexploited by either party. Territorial sea and airspace have
become weak points to be defended rather than strong points in the
common defense. The Athens Flight Information Region loses
operational effectiveness as an air traffic control center to the
extent that Greece invests it with political authority which
Turkey disputes. Aegean command and control lines, which assure
interlocking defenses when they are compatible, have produced
military gridlock ever since they became disputed in 1974. Neither
side benefits from a situation in which all of their longer-term
economic and military interests are subordinated to inconclusive...
tests of national sovereignty.
On balance the reasons for Greece and Turkey to resolve
their differences are stronger than those not to. The same can be
said of the reasons for NATO to ,run the admitted risk of helping
.them.
Balancing Aegean Interests
The most complicated and fundamental of the Aegean issues
is the shelf. It also has the greatest number of legal
ramifications. In January, 1979, responding to a Greek appeal with
which Turkey refused to associate itself, the International Court
of Justice ruled that it lacked jurisdiction in the case. Should
Greece and Turkey in the future reach agreement on the terms of a
joint appeal, the case could be resubmitted. The disadvantage of
such a procedure is that, like all judicial appeals, it is
time-consuming, and, in addition, the Turkish side insists that it
will associate itself with the case only after bilateral
negotiations have been tried and found unable to resolve it.
Keeping in mind that the shelf benefits neither party in
present circumstances, NATO might approach the matter in one
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of two ways. It could either offer to facilitate bilateral talks
aimed at framing the terms of reference for a new submission to
the ICJ. Or it could propose some form of non-judicial
arbitration, perhaps by a panel of Wise Men acceptable to Greece
and Turkey and drawn from the ranks of elder statesmen in NATO
countries. It. ought not to be impossible to come up with a panel
of three arbiters whose eminence and impartiality enabled Athens
and Ankara to accept them without appearing to give anything away
in advance. In both procedures Greece would be able to point out
that the case was being submitted to arbitration, and Turkey that
arbitration would be preceded by direct talks.
If there were agreed procedures for arbitration of the
shelf issue, airspace and territorial sea problems would be easier
to handle. While the latter also have economic and legal
implications, they are essentially military in nature. Still
operating on the assumption that Greece and Turkey do not really
want hostilities, there are trade-offs which would seem logical
and equitable. The first would be demilitarization of the
Dodecanese by the Greeks (stipulated, in any case, by the 1947
Treaty of Paris) in exchange for demobilization of the Turkish
Fourth Army, the so-called "Army of the Aegean". Both moves would
benefit the alliance as much as Greece and Turkey, since present
Aegean deployments bear no relation to NATO missions and
priorities.
A second trade-off would be Turkish acceptance of the
Greek claim that its airspace extends to ten miles (something that
Turkey lived with before 1974) in exchange for a Greek undertaking
not to extend its territorial sea to twelve miles (something that ?
the Greeks say they have the right to do but not the intention).
If accomplished, this would simultaneously eliminate the threat of
a Greek action which Ankara considers a casus belli and Turkish
actions which Athens views as highly provocative.
Success in these undertakings would greatly simplify the
drawing of Aegean command and control lines, creation of the 7th
ATAF headquarters in Larissa, and the solution of other problems
left over from Greece's still incomplete reintegration into the
military structure of NATO. The trade-offs themselves should be
politically defensible in both countries, especially if they were
preceded by the conclusion of a NATO-guaranteed non-aggression
pact, as outlined earlier. Individual NATO members, notably the
United States, could add immeasurably to the attractiveness of the
package by offering bilateral inducements.
In a climate of.improving relations other mutual
concessions would look less forbidding. Greece, for example, could
drop its opposition to Turkish association with the FEC, a Greek
policy which actually runs counter to Greece's long-term
interests; and Turkey could drop its objections to the
militarization of Limnos, a Turkish position which increases the
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vulnerability'of_an island vital to the defense of the Turkish
Straits.
?
Restoring NATO's Political Consensus
Because national pride is often a poor guide to national
interest, tfle.undoing of much that has been done by Greece and
Turkey in the name of national defense would actually strengthen
the security of both countries. It would unquestionably also
strengthen NATO, which is the best reason for NATO to take the
problem seriously. There will always be arguments for letting time
take its course, for trying to keep NATO out of a family quarrel,
for continuing to treat military consequences as though they had .
no political causes. None of these arguments addresses the need to
restore the southeastern flank.
Alliances languish in two ways. Either their military
strength ebbs away or their political will to use it. Ironically,
-except for the U.S., Greece and Turkey are the only two members of
the alliance which are meeting NATO force and defense expenditure .
goals. They are doing so not because they have a better
appreciation of the Soviet threat than their allies, but because
as the Soviet threat appears to recede they feel freer to confront
each other. In this sense the Greek-Turkish problem, emerging as
it does from altered perceptions of the Soviet threat, is not much
different from .problems afflicting the alliance in other areas.
The resoluteness and skill with which NATO seeks to restore the
shattered political concensus between Greece and Turkey will say
much about its ability to restore the political consensus of the
alliance itself.
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