FINLAND: LOOKING OUTWARD FOR FUTURE ECONOMIC GROWTH*
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP93T00643R000200920001-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 9, 2011
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Content Type:
MEMO
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For Data Entry Only
FINLAND: Looking Outward for Future Economic Growth*
SUMMARY
Finnish government and business leaders often link
their country's future economic growth prospects to the
ability of Finnish firms to expand internationally both
their operations and sales. Because of Finland's small
domestic economy and its reliance on trade to maintain
its relatively high standard of living, there is little
disagreement in Finland on the need to maintain and
improve international competitiveness and to expand
trade. Helsinki approaches these objectives at the
macroeconomic level by providing a stable economic
environment and at the microeconomic level by encouraging
greater development and application by industry of
advanced technology. We expect Helsinki to become
increasingly interested in expanding its Western economic
ties in order to strengthen domestic firms, maintain
export growth, and ensure long-run economic expansion.
The Finns would favor most forms of trade, investment, or
joint venture arrangements that would help improve
domestic firms' technological capabilities and provide
them with access to foreign markets. Helsinki will be
careful, however, not to permit expanded economic ties
with other Western countries--especially with the US--to
be portrayed as in any way downplaying Finnish-Soviet
relations. The Finns are particularly sensitive about
anything that puts Finland in the position of
jeopardizing its neutrality policy, which they rely on in
order to deny the Soviets any reasons for interference in
Finnish affairs.
*This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of European 25X1
Analysis at the request of G.T. Underwood, Director of
International Operations, Office of Productivity, Technology, and
Innovation, Department of Commerce. Questions and comments can be
directed to Chief, West Europe Division 25X1
E U R M 8^~-z$10 N
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GENERAL MACROECONOMIC CLIMATE
Finland has a healthy economy with no major long-term problems
that are likely to force the government to alter its domestic
economic policies. The economy has had positive growth every year
since at least 1960, and has shifted from a predominantly agrarian
base right after World War II to an industrial and service base
currently. Helsinki recognizes that sustaining economic growth in
future years will require increased trade with the West to acquire
the high-tech components necessary for continued industrial
innovation, as well as to provide markets for Finnish goods. The
government perceives the importance of a stable domestic
macroeconomic environment to this process. Consequently, economic
policies are aimed at maintaining confidence in the Finnmark,
controlling inflation, limiting the tax burden, deregulating
financial markets, and reducing foreign-exchange restrictions.
Short-Run Economic Outlook
While the long-term outlook for the Finnish economy remains
good, the Social Democratic/Center/Swedish People's/Rural coalition
government has adopted a mildly expansionary fiscal policy in the
1987 budget in the hopes of boosting sagging economic growth.
Estimated growth for 1986 was about 1.5 percent, in contrast with a
2.9 percent rate for 1985, and the coalition seeks to improve its
chances in the upcoming March parliamentary elections. The
$22-billion budget -- about 30 percent of GDP -- features
income-tax cuts and an overall 8-percent nominal spending hike that
Helsinki hopes will contribute at least 0.6 percentage points to
GDP growth and may help push the rate back over 2 percent. The
unemployment rate will probably exceed 7 percent in 1986 and 1987
following a 6.3 percent rate in 1985.
*Finland's public-sector expenditures as a percentage of GDP is one
of the lowest in West Europe. In 1984, total government outlays
equaled 39.9 percent of GDP, compared with an average for OECD
European countries of 50.6 percent and 49.3 percent for smaller
European countries. Current receipts as a percentage of GDP have
fluctuated between 35 and 40 percent for Finland over the last
decade, while the OECD Europe average has been between 40 and 45
percent, with the average for smaller European countries slightly
higher.
*Compared with Sweden and Norway, Finland is relatively tolerant of
unemployment. Polls indicate union members are most interested in
job creation and job security, but recognize that unemployment is
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The immediate factors behind the 1986 slowdown include several
major strikes in the spring that helped push first-half industrial
production 1.8 percent below the same period in 1985 and a sharp
decline in Soviet trade. On the other hand, several positive
factors helped temper slower growth. A decline in inflation from
5.9 percent to about 3.5 percent, a slight reduction in taxes, and
pay settlements that provided real income increases combined to
allow private consumption growth of over 3 percent, but this was
not enough to offset flagging growth elsewhere. The growth in
private consumption should continue in 1987, and, coupled with an
expected improvement in exports to other Western countries, should
help the economy remain steady. 25X1
MOVES TO IMPROVE LONG-RUN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Finnish government and business officials often link their
country's future economic growth prospects to the ability of
Finnish firms to expand internationally both their operations and
sales. The Finns generally recognize that they must keep their
economy open to trade and investment flows so that Finnish firms
can obtain access to important Western technology. They also
realize that maintaining an open economy will facilitate continued
access to Western markets. Helsinki has been deregulating domestic
financial markets and foreign exchange laws in the past few years,
reflecting the government's view that increased exposure of the
economy to foreign capital flows and business activity will provide
opportunities for linkages with other Western economies.
An increasingly internationalized economy
Substantial changes have taken place in the structure of
Finnish industry during the postwar years. Although the forest
products industry is still of prime importance to Finland,
diversification into other manufacturing sectors has reduced forest
products to only 35 percent of total exports, down from 85 percent
in 1960. Nonetheless, Finland's industrial firms -- even the
larger multinational ones -- are hampered by their relatively late
entry into international markets and by the small size of the
domestic economy. Finnish firms typically rely on exports for most
of their sales, and Helsinki recognizes that they would benefit
substantially from expanded linkages with foreign firms.
often unavoidable because of the structural adjustments sometimes
needed within industries to keep pace with structural changes in
both domestic and foreign markets.
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Finland increasingly linked its economy to the West during
this time by joining the IMF (1948) and the GATT (1950). Finland
also either joined or became associated with the OECD, the EC, and
EFTA (European Free Trade Association) in the 1960s and early
1970s, and did likewise with EUREKA (1985) and the ESA (European
Space Agency -- 1986). Helsinki actively supports international
efforts to expand free trade in goods and services, and would be
highly unlikely to jeopardize its economic relations with other
countries by reversing its commercial policies -- particularly
since trade is equivalent to almost 60 percent of GDP. Because of
strong support for an open, private-enterprise economy, the Finnish
government is unlikey to restrict repatriation of assets, profits,
or technology by foreign firms. In addition, any change in laws
that would alter protection of property rights for either Finnish
citizens or foreign investors would, under the 1919 constitution,
require a five-sixths majority for passage. The only support for
such tampering would come from the Communists, who currently hold
only 27 of 200 parliamentary seats and whose popularity is on the
Competitiveness
Despite Finland's efforts to adjust to changing international
economic conditions over the past few decades, Helsinki is
concerned that the Finnish economy will face difficulties in the
future because of sagging competitiveness. Wage costs are rising
faster than in most competitor countries, and the spring 1986
settlements may boost 1987 labor costs by 7 percent. To combat an
expected deterioration in competitiveness, the government will
continue to fight inflation --which is about twice the rate of its
main OECD trading partners at a 3.5-percent annual rate through
October -- and promote increased competition in domestic markets.
For example, the Finance Ministry has proposed expanding the access
of foreign suppliers to bidding for public sector contracts as one
way to tackle this problem. The government reasons this would not
only expose domestic firms to more rigorous competition and improve
the economy's efficiency, but could also provide goods at lower
prices and help dampen inflation, which is about twice the rate of
competitor countries at a 3.5 percent annual rate through October.
This proposal also reflects Helsinki's general recognition that it
must permit greater competition by foreign companies in the
domestic market if Finnish firms are to keep up with the
competition in foreign markets.
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Changing financial markets
Helsinki has expressed its commitment to the openness of its
economy by deregulating domestic capital markets and reducing
foreign exchange restrictions during the past few years, actions
which have improved the prospects for joint ventures and foreign
direct investment in Finland. The trend towards relaxation of
foreign exchange regulations also signifies that Finland's current
policies of permitting full repatriation of profits and assets are
not likely to be altered. This trend is likely to continue as
Finland manifests its desire to obtain more technology from
countries through trade and investment arrangements.
At the same time, the structure of the Finnish banking system
is often cited as one of the main hindrances to the job-creating
potential of smaller businesses. The seven commercial banks -- two
of which dominate the Finnish financial scene -- have close
connections with the larger Finnish firms, and new firms can have
difficulty obtaining finance. Financial market competition is also
limited because dissemination of information on interest rates and
other credit costs is relatively unsophisticated, and Finnish banks
do not publish reference rates similar to prime rates. The close
relationship of companies with their banks also lessens competition
because of firms' tendency to stick with one lender instead of
shopping around for potentially better financing packages.
The growing presence of foreign banks in Finland has helped to
increase competition in financial markets, however, and the
probable passage of a bill reducing the portion of another firms's
equity a bank may hold from 20 percent to 10 percent will help
promote greater competition for corporate customers by banks.
Furthermore, reforms in bank laws that cause savers to favor bank
deposits over equity purchases are planned, which will help to
capitalize firms and force banks to compete more intensively for
deposits. In the past, credit was usually rationed on non-market
criteria, but the increased ability of Finnish firms to engage in
"grey market" transactions that skirted these restricitons forced
the ientra1 bank to acknowledge the need to begin deregulating.
Increased capital flows
The deregulation of foreign exchange controls that has also
occurred in recent years reflects the government's desire that
Finnish capital markets adapt to the increasing globalization of
financial markets. Deregulation by Helsinki of firms' capital
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transactions and financing activities in the early 1980s
facilitated a surge in overseas investment, leading to a
quadrupling in the markaa value of Finnish foreign direct
investment and a 30-percent increase in the number of Finnish firms
operating overseas between 1981 and 1984. Foreign purchases of
Finnish firms have not been as extensive, primarily because of the
limited opportunities in Finland's small domestic market,
restrictions that prohibit investment in mining, forestry, and
insurance, and other, less-strict limits on investment in several
smaller industries. In addition, the 20-percent ceiling on foreign
ownership of a firm's outstanding shares of voting stock will soon
be raised to 40 percent, but voting power of foreign investors will
be limited to one-half that of Finnish shareholders. The
government had wanted to raise the limit to only 33 percent while
granting full voting power, but compromised with parliamentarians
who objected to full voting rights for foreigners. Finnish firms
should, nonetheless, be able to get larger infusions of outside
capital, and foreign investors will probably continue to prefer
investing in rather than managing Finnish firms. Raising the
ownership ceiling is consistent with OECD efforts to liberalize
international capital flows, but the restrictions on voting
probably are not.
Potential conflicts with monetary policy
Helsinki's efforts to internationalize the economy could come
into conflict with its monetary policy objectives. The central
bank has increasingly used interest rate instruments to control
credit expansion and inflation, and has sought to maintain a fixed
exchange rate to strengthen confidence in the currency.
Maintaining a strong markaa when domestic inflation exceeds that of
its trading partners could, however, hurt Finnish competitiveness
by preventing the necessary exchange rate relative depreciation.
In addition, Helsinki's deregulation of credit markets and foreign
exchange regulations has complicated the task of keeping the
exchange rate within its desired range. For example, increased
arbitrage activities that exploit interest rate differentials
between domestic and foreign bonds has made foreign exchange
reserves increasingly vulnerable to speculative pressures. There
is a risk that the central bank could use repeated speculative
attacks on the currency as a pretext for reversing the trend
towards deregulation.* We do not believe, however, that Helsinki is
*In mid-August 1986, a sudden flight from the Finnmark occurred
largely because of uncertainty about how Finland would adjust to
the sharp decline in Soviet trade that lower oil prices had
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likely to do so in the forseeable future, except in the extreme
case where the damage to the domestic economy -- such as a rapid
increase in inflation -- becomes so serious as to override the
benefits to Finland of deregulation.
FINLAND'S PURSUIT OF TECHNOLOGY
In the early 1970s Finland significantly improved its efforts
to encourage development of high technology when the Science Policy
Council proposed a target of 10-percent real annual growth in total
resources devoted to research and increasingly larger government
expenditures to support these activities.* At that time, the
government began to support the R & D activities of businesses by
granting loans, tax credits, and subsidies for product development.
In addition, the government-funded Technical Research Center of
Finland (VTT) -- originally founded during World War II -- was
reorganized and rapidly expanded. Today it employs 2,300 people
and conducts self-initiated applied technical research for
industries that do not have jointly-owned research institutes.
Another source of R & D financing is the special Bank of Finland
"Sitra" fund, which supports risk-bearing product development
projects for innovative enterprises. Moreover, there are 25 small
research institutes subordinate to the various government
ministries. In 1980, the Council reaffirmed Finland's technology
policy through the 1990s, and R & D spending has met its goals of
10-percent annual growth since then.
induced. The central bank quickly responded by pushing the call
money rate -- essentially a discount rate -- from about 11 percent
to 40 percent within a two-week period. This action prevented the
exchange rate from deviating from an intervention range that is
tied to an index of currencies. The financial markets quickly
perceived that the central bank was committed to maintaining its
stable exchange rate policy at great cost; the markets soon
stabilized; and the authorities lowered the call money rate back to
about 13 percent by the end of September. 25X1
*The Science Policy Council is a cabinet advisory body responsible
for the overall planning, direction, and coordination of research
in Finland. It includes the prime minister, the Ministers of
Education, Finance, Agriculture and Forestry, and Trade and
Industry, two other cabinet-selected ministers, the Chairmen of the
Central Board of Research Councils and the Council for Higher
Education, and five others chosen for their knowledge of Finnish
science and technology issues. 25X1
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The clearest indication of the changing perspective of Finnish
society on technological development is the erosion of the
long-standing multi-party consensus that Finnish agriculture merits
heavy subsidization and protection. Finns increasingly believe
they should shift more resources into industrial R & D instead.
Long-term trends in the Finnish economy have produced a migration
of population from rural to urban areas because declines in
agricultural employment have given way to industrial employment
growth. At the same time, the interests of the Conservatives and
the largely urban Social Democrats are converging because
supporters of both movements are increasingly likely to be urban,
white-collar workers. Although Social Democrats fought
Conservatives in the 1917 Civil War, the former's identification
with "proletarian" interests has declined, while association of the
Conservatives with "big business" has become weaker. Still, the
left wing of the SDP has recently unsuccessfully opposed government
proposals that are seen as supporting business at the expense of
workers, but we do not expect such efforts will have much influence
on the generally positive government and public attitudes towards
private industry.
Promoting Technological and R & D Cooperation
Helsinki hopes that more joint venture opportunities with
Western firms will afford Finnish business greater access to
advanced technology. The small scale of most Finnish companies
forces them to spend a higher percentage of their earnings on
research and development than similar firms in larger countries.
Helsinki would also like to raise the technology intensity of
Finnish industry. Finland ranks only in the bottom third of OECD
countries in the proportion of exports with high research and
development efforts (i.e., technology-oriented industries) to
general manufacturing. In addition, Finland is in the middle third
of OECD countries in the proportion of manufacturing value added to
One possible hindrance to Finland's R & D efforts is the
shortage of engineers. Finnish firms have attempted to address
this by establishing engineering development operations and
recruiting engineers for them outside Finland. For example, Nokia
has established a mobile telephone development group at the Oxford
Science Park in the UK, and a pulp and paper engineering group in
According to the US Embassy, most US-Finnish R & D and science
and technology cooperation occurs within the private sector through
licensing arrangements and other production and research
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arrangements. The private sector finances and conducts about 58
percent of all research, the government finances about 40 percent,
and nonprofit organizations and foreign sources provide the rest.
The government finances only about 10 percent of all R & D done by
business -- which is low compared with most other OECD countries --
and Helsinki would welcome greater joint-venture cooperation to
provide needed R & D funds. In early 1986 Helsinki signaled its
commitment to supporting the linkage between technological
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when it ignored strong domestic opposition to the acquisition of 70
percent of Valmet's elevator division by a US firm and approved the
merger because of the technology Valmet would have access to.
Helsinki also encourages Finnish participation in
international R & D cooperative efforts. One example is the
government's Technology Development Center (TEKES) -- established
in 1983 to coordinate R & D efforts and boost overall spending on R
& D from 1.4 percent of GDP in 1985 to 2 percent by
1990 -- which has helped several firms gain participation in EUREKA
projects. Helsinki has also sought participation in Common Market
cooperative programs and increased cooperation with other Nordic
countries, which is where Finnish firms often have their greatest
success. For example, the Nordic Council of Ministers established
the Nordic Council for Research Policy after recognizing that
opportunities for Nordic research cooperation are only modestly
exploited. This strategy seeks to ca italize on the advantages
Nordic firms have within that region.
Despite its close political and economic reltionship with the
USSR, Finland recognizes that it must further its Western economic
ties in order to obtain advanced technology. Finland relied on its
balanced-trade clearing account arrangement with the Soviets to
maintain economic growth in the early 1980s at a time when other
Western economies were in recession. The decline in Finnish-Soviet
trade in recent years -- especially in 1986 -- has impressed in
Finland the need to rely less on the short-run stimulus that
arrangement provided, and to emphasize long-run industrial strength
instead. The Finns see limited opportunities to gain technological
capabilities from cooperation with the Soviets. They appear
skeptical that the Gorbachev economic reforms will significantly
improve the quality of Soviet goods and technology. Nonetheless,
they probably hope that increased trading opportunities will emerge
from these reforms, and they want to maintain and improve their
economic relations with the Soviets. Despite its skepticism of the
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potential of Moscow's proposed joint venture program, Helsinki will
encourage some Finnish companies to participate. The two countries
recently reached agreement on two joint ventures involving
Finnair and OY Sadolin, a Finnish subsidiary of a Danish paint
manufacturer. We expect that, despite the extensive efforts
Helsinki puts into maintaining its economic relationship with
Moscow, the Finns will be increasingly interested in new
initiatives with Western economies, especially the US, that will
help Finland boost its competitiveness maintain port growth, and
ensure long-run economic expansion. 25X1
POTENTIAL CONSTRAINTS ON INCREASED ECONOMIC TIES TO US
Finland would welcome expanded economic ties to the US, but
there are factors that could complicate such efforts. The nature
of Fenno-Soviet relations could potentially dampen the Finns'
enthusiasm for such ties at some point in the future.
Consequently, the Finns will avoid giving Moscow the impression
that widely expanded economic ties with the West in any way imply a
downplaying of bilateral relations. Finland might blame the US for
jeopardizing Finland's postwar security policy if closer economic
cooperation led to sharp criticism by Moscow. 25X1
No amount of Finnish-US economic cooperation over the
foreseeable future will affect Finnish attitudes so sharply as to
convince them to significantly alter their security policy. Polls
show that, despite their wariness of the Soviets, the Finns
perceive the US as a greater threat to world peace than the USSR.
Finland may, therefore, be susceptible to portraying the US as the
aggressor in the north -- which now features the Soviet submarine
fleet on one side counterveiled by the US Forward Maritime Strategy
on the other -- in an effort to quell Soviet criticism of expanded
US-Finnish economic cooperation. 25X1
The Finns' delicate balancing of their Eastern and Western
interests complicates efforts to control technology transfers.
Finnish government and business officials are sensitive to US
concerns about reexporting US technology, and in general do not
want to jeopardize their access to it. Although Helsinki does not
ostensibly control exports of indigenously developed technology, it
will continue to require licenses for exports to the USSR under the
clearing account arrangement and will quietly seek to control
reexport of third-country technology. Nonetheless, the Finns would
probably perceive any restrictions they felt were unilaterally and
arbitrarily imposed by the US after a joint-venture arrangement
commenced as an attack on Finland's security interests and on its
status as a Western democracy.
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IGUIZE A:
Energy
Dept.
PARLIAMENT
GOVERNMENT
Council of
the sciences
of the state
FINLAND: -SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY BUREAUCRACY..
Ministry of Trade
and Industry
Ministry of
Education
r
Technology
Development
Center
Regional
Development
Fund
Technological
Research Center
of Finland
Geological
Research Center
of Finland
Marine Research
---f Institute
Other research
institutes
Enterprises
Academy of
Finland
LIUniversities
Parliamentary
Trustees of the
Bank of Finland
Other ministries
Sitra
Research
institutes
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SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
20,
15-a
-5
1974 1976 two 1860 1952 1984 1966
Am ow ORO=
@-I
01
Legend
-3
1074 186. 19O 1960 192 1964 1968 1866 1987-Forecast
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FINI a DISTRI?IITION Or TREE (1985 data)
EXPORTS
UNITED KINGDOM
10.?%
k? USSR
21?6%
IMPORTS
UNITED KINGDOM
7?2X
USSR
21?OX
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rn& mHIFIfIe cwtomm r ii, 73
1976
INDUSTRY
.9_41
TRANSPORTATION I
COMMUNICATIONS
7.6%
224l1 ~TR%
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1985
25X1
I
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SUBJECT: FINLAND: Looking Outward For Future
Economic Growth
Distribution External:
1. Mr. Ford Cooper, Director, EUR/NE State Dept. rm 4513
2. Mr. Dick Christensen, Desk Officer for Finland,
EUR/NE, State Dept. rm 4513
3. Mr. F. Herb Capps, Deputy Director, INR/WEA, State Dept.
Room 4742
Orignal - 1 - DCI
1 - Executive Registry
3 - DCI-DDCI Executive Staff
25X1
25X1
1 - DDI
1 - D/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - IMC/CB
1 - EURA/DIV
1 - EURA/DIV/BR Production File
1 - EURA/DIV/BR Analyst
DDI/EURA/DIV/BR/
21 Jan.87 25X1
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