NIE 14.2-88: NORTH KOREA: PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESSION AND INTERNAL STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000300060006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 5, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC #00670-88/2
5 April 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT:
NIE 14.2-88: North Korea: Prospects for the Succession
and Internal Stability
1. Attached is a precoordination draft
Prospects for the Succession and Internal
of NIE 14.2-88: North Korea:
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Stability. It was prepared
under
and was
in
of power
for
and
to the Senior
the
drafted
North
from
political
looks
Review
auspices of the National Inteltigence
Officer for East Asia
)f the Office of East Asian Analysis.
that looks at the issue of succession
for a successful transfer
Chong-il; establishes some scenarios
effect on the political stability;
United States.
made to this draft in response
dropped.
by
2. This is the first Estimate
Korea. It examines the prospects
Kim Il-song to his son, Kim
change and assesses their
at the implications for the
3. Several changes have been
Panel's comments. Specifically:
The Executive Summary has been
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The box on Kim Il-song's health has been modified to reflect the degree of
uncertainty of his illnesses.
The title of BOX 4 has been changed to Policy Issues: Potential for
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Disagreement.
In
addition, we have added the phrase--as
of Policy Differences, paragraph 33
yet unidentitied--to the discussion
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Several thoughts have been added to the text regarding economic issues,
including:
"Nonetheless, even minor shifts to a more open economy would send
shock waves throughout the society and could put his political
controls at risk." added to paragraph 34.
"North Korea is seriously in arrears in payments on its $3 billion
foreign debt; its volume of trade has stagnated since 1980; and
shortfalls in energy are adding to already severe bottlenecks in its
industrial output." added to Box 2.
4. The Senior Review Panel's question on Tension Reduction has not been
addressed, however. The drafter points out, and I agree, that there is no
good evidence of serious problems at present with "older cadres, fractious
family members, and the military." Reference to these groups in the Estimate
is in the context of possible difficulties after Kim Il-song's death, not
before. We believe that resistance to the succession is unlikely while Kim
Il-song is alive.
5. Likewise, we take some exception to the Panel's comment on the North's
peace offensive. We mentioned the North's forward deployment of military
units in paragraph 15--actually this movement has been underway since about
1980. Anti-Team Spirit campaigns are becoming fairly routine,
nevertheless--in paragraph 15--we state the North has not abandoned its
objective of extending its hegemony of the entire peninsula. In addition,
there are several other factors--like generally lowered training levels--that
could have been explored in this Estimate. However I believe that these are
more appropriate for a future Warning of War Estimate.
6. Community representatives will meet to coordinate this paper on
22 April 1988, and we plan to complete the SNIE in time for presentation to
NFIB in early May.
Attachment
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//,///
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
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NIC #00670-88/2
5 April 1988
. -
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - DCl/SA
1 - ADDI
1 - NIO/ECON
1 - SRP
1 - AC/NIC (Hutchinson)
1 - VC/NIC (Gries)
1 - NIC/PO
1 - NIO/EA (Chron)
1 - NIO/EA (Dev)
ANIO/EA
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
NIE 14.2-88: North Korea:? Prospects for the Succession
and Internal Stability
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The Director of Central Intelligence_
Washington. D.C. 20505 -
Senior Review Panel
)NIC-00598-88
9 March .1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT:
Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
NIE 14.2-88: North Korea: Prospects
for the Succession and Internal Stability,
internally dated 22 February 1988
1. The Panel finds this draft both commendable and .
worrisome. The author is to be commended for organizing the
material in such a way as to make clear the strange character of
the socialist dynasty in North Korea and to explore the range of
succession problems. The draft is worrisome because it reveals
how
dangerous North Korean regime.
2. The draft Estimate is remarkably compact--sufficiently
so that we do not believe an "Executive Summary" is really
necessary. The four Box Texts provide useful elaboration. We do
have a few comments on them:
a. Kim Il-Song's Health. Are we sure that the ageing
despot suffers from all the illnesses listed, or is it that
*various reports have from time to time mentioned these
maladies?
c. Who Are the Players? Box 4 discusses groupings--
hawks vs. doves, technocrats vs. militarists, etc., yet not a
ey Signers
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single name is mentioned. Given the recent purge of Defense
Minister 0 Kuk-Yol, the activities of Foreign Minister Kim.
Yong-Nam, or the -records of who travels with Kim the elder
and Kim the younger, we believe it would be helpful to have a
listina of the key players immediately under them.
3. Economic Problems. In both the text and in Box 2 there
is general reference to North Korea's stumbring economy. It
would help the reader of this admirable NIS- to have a few
illustrations of current problems: the extent of debt default,
trends in production and foreign trade, and especially current
energy shortages. These would help to portray the magnitude of
the challenges Kim Chong-I1 will face. Even if the younger Kim
were to face up to his economic problems, what is the likelihood
he could do something about them without putting his political
controls at risk?
4. Tension Reduction. The draft argues (paragraph 14) that
Kim Il-Sona may opt for tension reduction in order to smooth the
transition. We wonder whether the opposite might also be the
case; he could feel that heightened tension would help bring the
older cadres, the fractious family-members, and the military into
line. The Panel also feels that the description of the DPRK
"peace offensive" since 1984 might be a bit overplayed. The
forward deployment of second and third echelon military units
(1984-85), the intensity of the anti-Team Spirit campaigns (1985,
1986, and 1987, and now especially strident in 1988), and other
activities are hardly reassuring.
Di
Courtland D. Perkins
cc: AC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
.YC/NIC (Mr. Gries)
NIO for East Asia
ODCl/SRP:tbelma
Distribution:
Orig - DCI
1 - AC/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
1 - VC/NIC (Mr. Cries)
1 - NIO for East Asia
1 - NIO for Economics
1 - Nb/AL/AG (Kate Hall)
1 - PO/NIC
1 - Executive Registry
1 - SR? File
1 - SR? Chrono
1 - SRP (Amb. Leonhart)
1 - SRP (Gen. McPherson)
B. McPherson
2
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Richard L. Walker
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