NIE 14.2-87: NORTH KOREA: PROSPECTS FOR THE SUCCESSION AND STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000300050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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SteitE-T-
The Director of Central intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council NIC #04156-87/2
27 October 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT: NIE 14.2-87: North Korea: Prospects for the Succession
and Stability
1. Attached for your review are the proposed Concept Paper and Terms of
Reference (TOR) for NIE 14.2-87: North Korea: Prospects for the Succession
and Stability. The Estimate will be drafted by DI/OEA.
2. This will be the first Estimate that looks at the issue of succession
in North Korea. Earlier Estimates on the North addressed North Korean foreign
policy objectives; the North's proposals for reunification of the Peninsula;
and possible North Korean reactions to potential instability in the South
during the late 1970s. This Estimate is the third in a series on the Korean
peninsula initiated by the NIO/East Asia. It will examine the prospects of
the forthcoming succession in P'yongyang, establish some scenarios for
political change, and assess the implications of the scenarios for political
stability.
3. The Senior Review Panel did not have any substantive disagreements
with the Concept Paper and Terms of Reference. At the suggestion of the SRP,
however, we have dropped the word "Internal" from the title of the Estimate.
4. With your approval we will distribute the Concept Paper and TOR to the
Community representatives for a 12 November 1987 coordination meeting.
Attachments
S
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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SUBJECT: NIE 14.2-87: North Korea: Prospects for the Succession
and Stability
CONCUR:
Acting
irman, Nati
Intelligence Council
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
APPROVED:
Date
Director of Central Intelligence Date
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NIC #04156-87/2
27 October 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - D/ExStaff
1 - ER
1 - SA/DCI
1 - AC/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - NIC/PO
1 - SRP
1 - Harry Cochran
1 - NIC/AG
1 - NIO/ECON
1 - NIO/EUR
1 - NIC Registry
1 - NIO/EA Chron
1 - NIO/EA Dev
NIO/EA:CWFord,Jr./mm
Carl W. Ford, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
NIE 14.2-87: North Korea: Prospects for the Succession
and Stability
(c/o NIO/W)
STAT
270ct87 STAT
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27 October 1987
NIE 14.2-87: North Korea: Prospects for the Succession
and Stability*
PROBLEM
Kim Il-song hopes that by meticulously planning for his succession and by
early-on handing some authority over to his son, Kim Chong-il, the younger Kim
can avoid the internecine squabbles that have characterized transitions in
other Communist countries. The elder Kim's hopes, however, are complicated by
a number of uncertainties:
It will be the first transfer of power since the founding of North
Korea in 1948.
No formal mechanism for determining a successor exists.
It is the first instance in a Communist country in which a father will
attempt to pass power to a son.
The younger Kim's capability and temperament to rule remain a question
mark.
In addition to trying to consolidate his power, establish his legitimacy,
and firm up his credibility with Moscow and Beijing, Kim Chong-il inherits a
North Korea beset by serious internal and external challenges:
The reform movements in China and the Soviet Union, and postwar
generational change within North Korea are stimulating the desire among
the public and within the Party for significant political and economic
change.
The sluggish economy and serious shortfalls may force P'yongyang to
reassess its longstanding emphasis on military spending at the expense
of the civilian sector.
A strong and vibrant South Korea--its confidence buoyed by a booming
economy and its hosting of the Seoul Olympics--is establishing itself
as the senior player on the peninsula and in the region, with North
Korea relegated to a junior role.
* This will be the first Estimate that looks at the issue of succession in
North Korea. Earlier Estimates on the North addressed North Korean foreign
policy objectives; the North's proposals for reunification of the Peninsula;
and possible North Korean reactions to potential instability in the South
during the late 1970s.
1
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This Estimate is the third of a series on the Korean peninsula initiated
by the NIO for East Asia in support of policymakers at the Departments of
State and Defense. It will examine the prospects for the forthcoming
succession in P'yongyang, establish some scenarios for political change and
assess the implications of these scenarios for political stability. The Key
Questions are:
? What key domestic considerations--political, social, and economic--will
affect the succession?
How might the external environment affect the succession?
What are Kim Il?song's plans and timetable for succession?
How is the succession process likely to unfold?
What are the domestic and foreign policy implications for P'yongyang?
What opportunities and risks does the North Korean succession have for
the United States?
OUTLINE
I. What key domestic considerations--political, social, and economic--will
affect the succession?
A. What is the status and condition of the Communist Party?
B. Do pressures exist within the society for a loosening of totalitarian
controls?
C. How will the North's serious economic problems affect the leadership's,
succession strategy?
D. What role does the military have in internal party debates and decision
making? The intelligence and security services?
E. Are the recent developments in the Army, such as reduces levels of
training, the apparent increased use of the Army in civilian projects
and P'yongyang's announced unilateral reduction of its armed forces,
linked to the succession?
II. How might the external environment affect the succession?
i r1. A. South Korea
...----............
IVthe time being to give priority to the succession?
2. To what extent will the political situation in South Korea affect
1. Has North Korea put the reunification issue on the back burner for
the succession in the NoTrir------"'---1'
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3. To what extent will South Korea's rising international stature
influence the North Korean leadership's thinfffig-as-th'e?tramition
approaches?
4. Is P'yongyang using tension reduction on the peninsula as a means of
smoothing the way for the Kim Chong-il succession?
BI. The Soviet Union and China?
1. How are recent political changes and openness in the Soviet Union
and China influencing North Korean thinking and attitudes?
2. How does P'yongyang view its position vis-a-vis Moscow and Beijing?
C. Which other countries--Japan the_US or perhaps others--may affect the
transition and how?
D. How do the Olympics factor in to the North's thinking?
III. What are Kim Il-song's plans and timetable for the succession?
A. At what stage are we in the succession?
1. How has Kim Il-song been grooming Kim Chong-il?
2. How has the regime rationalized the father-son succession in terms
of North Korea's ideology?
3. How extensive is support for the proposed mode of succession among
the North Korean political elite?
4'. What additional steps, if any, must father and son take to
legitimize the transition?
B. How much political power does Kim Chong-ii wield?
1. Is he completely in control?
2. To what extent does (must) he have Kim Il-song's approval for his
decisions?
3. What is the present role of Kim Il-song?
C. What is the probable timetable for the succession?
1. Will it take place before Kim Il-song dies or after, and what are
the consequences of each alternative?
2. How is Kim Il-song's health and how many more years can he maintain
his fairly active role?
D. What do we believe are Kim Il-song's chief concerns concerning the
succession process?
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IV. How is the succession process likely to unfold?
A. A smooth succession in which Kim consolidates his power and exercises
co61771
1. What is the most likely timing?
2. What is the most likely process by which the elder Kim will transfer
power?
3 What elements are needed for a successful transfer of power to Kim
Chong-il?
a. What are the key constituencies in which Kim Chong-il needs
supporters?
(1) Has he succeeded in cultivating them?
(2) Can we identify his key supporters in the Party Central
Committee and the military?
b. What faction does Kim Chong-il represent and what policies and
outlook would be associated with them? Who would represent
competing or conflicting policy positions and what are those
positions?
c. What must Kim Chong-il do to demonstrate his political legitimacy
and consolidate his power?
d. What factors will facilitate the establishment of legitimacy and
the consolidation of power?
(For example, the NIE would examine in this context Kim
Chong-il's long apprenticeship, his control of the Korean
Workers Party, the Youth League, administrative organs and the
Three Revolutions Teams, effective and pervasive security
organs, a disciplined populace and a regimented system of
thought control and education, tight control of everyday life,
and the extent to which Kim Il-song's aura and authority can be
transferred to Kim Chong-il.)
e. Does Kim Chong-il have the necessary credentials to succeed his
father in terms of experience, revolutionary heritage, and
ideology?
(1) What do we know about Kim Chong-il (his personality,
leadership traits, strengths and weaknesses, and
political-economic philosophy)?
(a) How does he compare in these areas with his father?
(b) What leadership traits does he possess?
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(c) What are his strengths and weaknesses?
(d) What is his political-economic philosophy?
B. A contested succession but one in which Kim manages to overcome
opposition and win anyway?
1. What types of challenges might frustrate Kim Chong-il's quest for
legitimacy and consolidation of power?
a. Where might challenges to Kim Chong-il most logically come
from? Could they disrupt the succession?
b. Is popular discontent with the system growing and could it
derail the succession process?
c. Would challenges to Kim Chong-il be based primarily on
ideological grounds, such as the inappropriateness of hereditary
succession in a Communist political system?
d. Might disagreement over policy become grounds for opposing the
succession?
(1) Can we identify any potential factions or interest groups
that might oppose Kim Chong-il?
e. At what point in the transition process would challenges be most
likely?
(Before the death of Kim Il-song, soon after his death,
several months or years after his death)
C. ksuccRssion_that-goes awry with someone other than the younger Om
consolidating control?
1. What is the most likely, cause for things going wrong?
2. What other figures would be potential leaders should Kim Chong-il
fail to consolidate his power?
3. What types of power-holding or power-sharing arrangements might
emerge in lieu of one-man succession by Kim Chong-il?
4. Might jealousies and ambitions within the ruling family lead to an
attempt to displace Kim Chong-il with another of Kim Il-song's sons?
'7 D. Might the Soviets and Chinese attempt to intervene in the succession
process?
V. What are the domestic and foreign policy implications for P'yongyang and
the other key liTiFIFFP ,a0.??????01.16.00P.INNIMM*??????1?Mr????=0
A. If Kim Chong-il consolidates power with a minimum of difficulty?
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1. Would he continue to manage North Korea as a closed society or would
he try to open society and make significant changes?
2. How might this impact on relations with the Soviets, Chinese, and
Japanese?
3. How might Kim Chong-il deal with the problem of ideology an
continuing the Kim Il-song line?
4. What changes might Kim Chong-il make in his policy toward South
Korea and the United States?
B. If there is a turbulent succession?
1. What would be the consequences for dialogue and reunification?
2. Other foreign policies?
3. Would North Korea attempt provocations against the South to divert
attention from domestic problems or to strengthen his position?
4. What role might the Soviets and Chinese play?
C. What would be the consequences of a failed succession?
VI. What opportunities and risks does the North Korean succession have for the
United States?
A. How are US interests likely to be affected by our most likely scenario
and various alternatRfe ttebarios?
1. If the succession is smooth and Kim Chong-il inherits power, how
will the interests of theUS and its allies be affected?
a. Specifically, will North Korea constitute a greater challenge or
will the challenges to US interests diminish?
2. How would a period of prolonged instability ,in North Korea affect:
a. The US military presence in South Korea?
b. US relations with Moscow, Beijing, and Tokyo?
c. US security guarantees and economic ties with other states in
the region?
d. The prospects for war on the peninsula?
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-The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
- NIC-04228-87 -
22 OctOber_198-7
Senior Review Panel
'MEMORANDUM FOR: .Director of Central Intelligence ,
IDeputy Director:of-Central-Intelligence
Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
Concept Paper and Terms Ofjleferente(TOR)
for.NIE 14.2-87: North Korea: Prospects
for the Succession and Internal Stability,
internally dated 5 October 1987
SUBJECT:.
1. The Panel considers the drafts comprehensive, well-
elaborated, and appropriately addressed to the challenges,
problems, and _implications of the efforts of Kim Il-song to
secure succession to power by his son, Kim Chong-il. _
2. We flag two comparatively minor points: (a) .the
possibility of consolidating TOR-III land TOR-IV might be worth
considering in order to assist in holding the ultimate text to
desirable length; (b) the word "internal" might-perhaps be
dropped from the title in view of the extensive foreign policy
considerations adduced In-TOR-1, TOR-V, and TOR-IV.
3. We commend this initiative--the-first estimate that -
examines this unprecedented succession problem--and look forward
to the draft paper. -
William Leonhart
B. McPherson
Courtland D. Perkins James D. Theberge
cc: Acting C/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)
VC/NIC (Mr. Fuller)
NIO for East Asia
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Signers
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SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft Concept Paper and
? Terms of Reference (TOR) -for NIE 14.2-87: North
Korea: Prospects for the Succession and -Internal
Stability, internally dated 5 October 1987
? ODCl/SRP:thelma
Distribution: -
" Orig - DCI
? 1 - Acting C/NIC (Mr. Hutchinson)-
? 1 -VC/NIC (Mr: Fuller)
1 - NIO for East Asia -
1 - Nb O for Economics
1 - Nb/AL/AG (Kate Hall)
? 1 - PO/NIC
1 - Executive Registry
1 - SRP File
1 - SRP Chrono
1- SRP (Amb. Leonhart )
? 1 SRP (Gen.. McPherson)
2
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STAT:
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