INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN THE 1990S: STUDY GROUP REPORT TO THE DCI (29 MAY 1991)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93M00781R000700890001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1991
• Content Type: MEMO

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ICS-4632/91
14 a.., q
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director, Intelligence Community Staff
SUBJECT: Intelligence Community in the 1990s: Study
Group Report to the DCI (29 May 1991)
1. In March 1991, then DCI Webster commissioned a
senior-level group under Danny Childs to examine the missions,
functions, and organizational structure of the Intelligence
Community and identify ways to strengthen its capabilities to
meet the challenges of the 1990s. The group also was directed
to review existing DCI authorities and responsibilities and, if
needed, recommend alternatives for enhancing his management and
direction of the Intelligence Community.
2. The study was completed and sent to Judge Webster in
May 1991. It "focused on identifying and understanding the
major substantive national security issues that will challenge
the Intelligence Community in the future and, from that,
developing alternatives--both functional and structural--that
would enhance the Community's ability to meet these
challenges." The study contains 34 conclusions, four under the
category of "General Observations," 15 under "DCI Authorities
and Responsibilities," and 15 under "Functional Intelligence
Issues."
3. In September 1991 I directed select senior members of
the Intelligence Community Staff to review the report and its
conclusions, and based on their collective experience prepare
comments--and where-appropriate actions--for your
consideration. Their comments and recommendations have not
been coordinated with other organizations in the Intelligence
Community. Comments were not prepared regarding the "General
Observations" because they are just that--general
observations. The ICS group concurs in the negative
recommendation regarding the Director of National Intelligence
conclusion. And, the group did not address the conclusion
2"
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C. Norman Wood
Lieutenant General, USAF
SUBJECT: Intelligence Community in the 1990s: Study Group
Report to the DCI (29 May 1991) 25X1
addressed--related to the National Intelligence Council because
it did not believe it was within its purview. 25X1
4. During the conduct of the review, the Special Task
Team found that for many of the conclusions some actions
currently are under way. The team also found that for many of
the conclusions either additional or new action is required,
either by you as DCI or by some elements in the Community. 25X1
5. In an attempt to make the Task Team report most useful
to you, it contains a short discussion of each conclusion,
describes actions under way for each, and identifies what
additional actions are required. The conclusions are organized
into two groups. The first group (Tab A) contains those which
the team believes require quick action. Tab B contains the
rest of the conclusions which are judged by the team to be less
perishable. They may or may not require action. 25X1
6. After you have reviewed the attached document, I would
like to talk to you regarding how the Intelligence Community
Staff can assist in implementing necessary changes in the
Intelligence Community. Please let me know when you are ready
to discuss how we can help. 25X1
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SUBJECT: Special Task Team Response to the Childs Report
DISTRIBUTION: (ICS-4633/91& ICS-4632/91
DCI (wo/ICS-4633/91) Copy 1
ER (wo/ICS-4633/91) Copy 2
DDCI Copy 3
D/1-CS, DD/ICS Copy 4
C/COMIREX Copy 5
D/CCISCMO Copy 6
D/PPEO Copy 7
D/PBO Copy 8
CMX Subject Copy 9
CMX Chrono Copy 10
ICS Registry Copy 11
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The conclusions in this TAB are those we believe
require quick action. There are ten that we have placed
in this category--five related to DCI Authorities and
Responsibilities and five related to Functional
Intelligence Issues. They are arranged according to the
order found in the Childs Report.
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Conclusion: "A second DDCI position should be established to
manage Community affairs, and one of the three senior positions
should normally be filled by a four-star- military officer."
Discussion: The DDCI for Intelligence Community Affairs
(DDCI/ICA) would look outward to coordinate, on your behalf,
cross-jurisdictional interests and responsibilities such as
programs and budgets, collection requirements and
counterintelligence. The DDCI/ICA also should be given charge
of designated DCI Centers which have operated as Community
organizations under the control of the DDCI (e.g., DCI/CSE,
DCI/CIC, DCI/CTC) and the DDCI/ICA should be given supervision
and budgetary authority over all centers and activities that
provide services of common concern to'Community agencies such
as the Interagency Training Center, which provides technical
surveillance countermeasure training for the Community, and the
Community-wide Computer-assisted Compartmentation Control (4C)
System.
In order for the DDCI/ICA to he effective, he and his
Intelligence Community Staff must have a clearly articulated
Community mission and authority from you. In addition, the
DDCI/ICA should be physically located at Langley. The current
DDCI position should be designated DDCI/CIA with similarly
defined missions within the CIA organization.
Action(s) in Place: None of which we are aware.
Action(s) Required: That you establish the position of
DDCI/ICA with a clearly articulated Community mission separate
from that of the DDCI/CIA, and nominate a senior military
officer to'fill the DDCI/ICA position.
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Conclusion: "The Intelligence Community Staff should be
strengthened and colocated with the DCI at Langley."
Discussion: Strengthening the Staff requires a focus on those
key areas where you look to us for support. In the past, those
functions have been budget, requirements, and policy.
There are pros and cons to colocating the ICS at Langley. The
key advantage would be greater accessibility to you. The key
disadvantage is that colocation would generally be perceived
within the Community as evidence that the Staff is a captive
of, and therefore biased towards, the CIA.
Action(s) in Place: The Inspector General Report on the ICS
recommended steps to strengthen the ICS, and those that were
within the purview of the -D/ICS have been taken, including:
o Elimination of the Deputy Director for Requirements
and Evaluation and the Requirements and Evaluation
Office.
o Elimination of nine positions to make the staff
smaller and more focused.
o Restructuring to add more assessment capabilities in
the Program and Budget Office.
In the case of colocation at CIA, the space at CIA that was
recently vacated by the Comptroller has been tentatively
earmarked for ICS use. This would accommodate about 30
positions.
Action (s) Required: That you articulate how you will use the
ICS, and that you decide what parts, if any, of the ICS should
move to Langley.
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Conclusion: "The NFIC needs to place greater emphasis on
program evaluation to ensure that scarce resources are invested
wisely and that operational systems-remain cost effective."
Discussion: The NFIC is an advisory body to the DCI on
resource issues. In this capacity, it addresses and recommends
positions for the DCI relative to resource decisions affecting
NFIP programs. It is beneficial not only to the DCI but
Community members as well, providing advice and counsel to
senior Community leadership. The NFIC has been directly
involved, and will continue to be involved, in almost all of
the tough budget issues that the DCI has faced over recent
years F____]HUMINT in the 90s, etc).
The benefits of evaluating our capabilities are obvious,
especially when we must ensure the "biggest bang for the buck"
during a period of declining resources and vastly changing
requirements. There are, however, major difficulties in
establishing a structured series of routine assessments. They
include:
o Getting, and keeping, full Community support in order to
do effective and objective assessments.
o Enforcing implementation of recommendations at odds with a
Program Manager's views.
Action(s) in Place: A number of initiatives have been put in
place over the past two years that have strengthened the
capability to perform program evaluation. These initiatives
include:
The creation of a Program Guidance and Evaluation Division
in the ICS Program and Budget Office (PBO). The PBO, in
support of the DCI, prepares NFIC issue papers at relevant
times during the programming and budgeting cycle.on topics
or programs of significant Community concern and conducts,
as appropriate, assessments and evaluations in support of
those issues.
o The Program and Analysis Office (P&A), relatively new
within the NRO structure, conducts end-to-end,
cross-program, and cross-discipline analysis on NRO
collection assets and programs, and provides an integrated
strategic planning function for the D/NRO.
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o The Intelligence Program Support Group (IPSG) was recently
established to support OASD/C3I. It creates a major
staff with DoD intelligence to conduct program and
cross-program reviews as well as special program
assessments, identifying issues to be considered by the
resource advisory groups that support both the DCI and the
SECDEF.
In addition, the DCI's collection committees also provide
Community fora for assessing the utility of various systems and
projects within their purview. For example, last fall the
SIGINT and MASINT comitt 5; ~nint-ly iinriprt-nok an extensive
evaluation on h utm
These types o assessments
play heavily in the program an budget decisions made by the
DCI.
Action(s) Required: That you encourage the Community to
support PBO's efforts to conduct evaluations of existing and
new initiatives on a more routine basis than annually, when
these issues tend to surface during budget preparation. In
addition, support PBO's efforts to become more aggressive in
providing general resource strategies, especially important
over the next several years as the Community responds to the
evolving international political, social, economic, and
military order. The current study of evaluating the impact of
changing requirements on the future of our collection
architecture is a good example of this kind of work.
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Conclusion: "There are a number of areas where the
relationship between the Intelligence Community and DoD needs
to be clarified or strengthened, -including developing more
effective means to define and integrate planning and
decisionmaking for national/tactical intelligence requirements;
updating and executing the command relationship agreements for
transferring authority over intelligence assets in time of
crisis; and examining options for institutionalizing or
consolidating the myriad "quick reaction support teams" that
provide intelligence support to military commanders during
times of crisis."
Discussion: Lessons-learned reports from a number of crises in
the past ten years (Grenada, Panama, DESERT SHIELD and STORM)
identify similar problems in the relationship between the
Community and the Defense Department. Some of these problems
could be alleviated by strengthening the Community-Defense
relationship.
The main benefit of doing this would be better intelligence
support for military operations, premised on a better
understanding--in both the Intelligence and Defense
Communities--of missions, requirements, capabilities, and
limitations.
for military operations.
Action(s) in Place: Driven by DESERT SHIELD and STORM, a
number of actions are under way that directly address the main
issues raised in the Childs Report.
o DIA has prepared a joint doctrine for intelligence support
to military operations and recently took organizational
steps to enhance support through the JCS/J2.
o CIA has initiated a broad effort to improve its support
A cross-directorate task force is working to identify
actions that the Agency should take in this area,
including an initiative to increase the military
presence within the Agency.
o Two Intelligence Community studies--both ongoing--are
particularly germane. One of these is a broad study of
the Persian Gulf crisis conducted by the IC Staff; its
recommendations cover the main concerns in the Childs
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Report--and others as well. The second is an interagency study
being conducted at the DDCI's request to identify ways to
improve support to military operations. This study, which is
led by Dan Childs and Charlie Allen, also engages the concerns
of the earlier Childs Report and complements the IC Staff
study. Its recommendations, if accepted and implemented, would
meet the Childs Report's objectives. Further action beyond
implementation of key recommendations in these two studies is
not necessary at this time.
Actions) Requiired: Convene an NFIC meeting to discuss and
implement key recommendations for the Community's review of
support to DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.
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Qnclusion: "The Community should come to some agreement on
its highest priority area studies/foreign language needs and
focus its attention on these areas, including implementing an
aggressive monetary awards program and seeking legislation to
establish a rotational foreign language and area studies
scholarship program for promising high school graduates."
Discussion: Focusing on those languages/areas deemed most
important would enable the Community to plan a cohesive
training program, and develop a body of linguists able to serve
the entire Community in times of crisis. It also would ensure
a more steady flow in the linguist pipeline. The DCI Foreign
Language Committee (FLC) could serve well as the central point
in focusing the Community's attention on foreign language
issues. In mid-1989 the Foreign Language Committee completed a
study (An Assessment of Foreign Language Resources in the
Intelligence Community) which considered most of the
Community's language concerns--including those cited in the
Childs Report. While this assessment points out problems and
deficiencies, it also underscores the fact, that although
resolution of many of the problems requires funding, many could
be greatly alleviated though creative non-traditional
approaches and Community-wide commitment and cooperation.
Action(s) in Place: Several steps are currently under way to
increase emphasis on foreign language and area studies training:
o The National Security-Education Act, which is scheduled to
be discussed at the SSCI-HPSCI Budget Conference, will
provide funding out of Intelligence Appropriations for
scholarships for undergraduate language and area studies,
grants to educational institutions to improve or develop
training courses, and fellowships for graduate study
abroad. The Intelligence Community will have a voice in
determining the critical languages and areas and will
provide positions in the various agencies for many of the
graduating students.
o Other plans under way include the establishment of a
National Language Training Center (possibly in 1994 and as
part of the Foreign Service Institute) and the development
of standardized qualifying language. proficiency levels
among the intelligence agencies and military elements.
The National Training Center will eliminate some
duplication and certainly could assist in the development
of standardized language proficiency levels. Further, the
standardization of proficiency levels would contribute
greatly to the flexibility and mobility of linguists
within the Community.
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o Monetary awards are currently given to linguists in the
Intelligence Community for achieving and maintaining
language proficiency. However, each agency has its own
program and they vary greatly from agency to agency. If
there is to be greater Community coordination in
recruitment, training and pooling of linguists then there
must be a more uniform Community-wide monetary awards
system.
o The ongoing revitalization of the DCI FLC is key to
energizing the Community in placing increased emphasis on
foreign language and area studies training. The FLC does
not have a full-time chairperson. Steps are being taken
to ensure funding and full staffing, including the
appointment of a full-time chairperson, for the DCI FLC.
ction(s) Required: The DCI should endorse the full funding
and staffing of the FLC-and ensure appointment of a full-time
chairperson.
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Conclusion: "A comprehensive plan for collecting and
exploiting open source information needs to be developed;
additional resources will need to be devoted to this effort in
the future."
Discussion: We concur with this conclusion. Over the past
decade, virtually every study undertaken by the Community to
address substantive gaps and shortfalls has called for
improving open source collection and exploitation. And, other
than individual efforts (in particular CIA's), the Community
has done very little. So, the need for a" comprehensive plan"
is probably greater today than ever before.
Action(s) in Place: In the individual NFIP programs, CIA
appears to have the only significant initiative for enhancing
open source capabilities, and even it is only modestly funded.
In the Community arena, the ICS has conducted a number of open
source related studies, from the comprehensive 1984 report by
an Executive Steering Group, to the 1990 ICS relook at the
status of open source.
Action(s) Required: You need to discuss this issue with NFIC
principals and agree on a Community approach and investment
strategy for improving the collection and use of open source
material within the Community.
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Conclusion: "Clandestine support to military operations needs
to be strengthened and a dedicated focal point structure within
CIA/DO should be established for this purpose."
Discussion: It is clear that DO support to military operations
must be improved. In the past ten years, virtually all reviews
of military operations cite shortcomings in HUMINT as a
principal deficiency in intelligence support. As a result, CIA
has commissioned a task force, led by a senior DO officer, to
identify ways to improve its support. A focal point within the
DO for support to military operations will be established.
(Congressional interest in the assignment of a senior military
officer to CIA/DO also has been expressed.)
Action(s) in Place:
Action(s) Required: That the DCI act on the recommendations in
the above-mentioned reports.
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Conclusion: "The current imagery structure is working well for
the most part and major restructuring is not needed."
Discussion: In spite of the finding of the Childs group
regarding this issue, the structure of the imagery community
continues to be of concern to Congress. In our view, the focus
of Congress' attention is on DoD, based on language in the FY
1992 budget passback, but does include to a degree non-DoD
parts of the imagery community.
The most recent DCI response to a Congress inquiry regarding
the imagery structure issue was in February 1989. In essence,
Judge Webster's response stated that "a new imagery management
structure would not provide greater efficiencies but, on the
contrary, would impose another bureaucratic tier that would
create more problems than it would solve." No follow-up
questioning from Congress occurred in response to the DCI's
letter.
Th issue was raised again by Congress in the FY 1992 budget
passback language. In September 1991 ADCI Kerr's response to
Congress regarding the FY 1992 budget language stated that a
study is required to assess where changes in the Community are
needed, and that any Congressional decision regarding imagery
management issues should await results of our own assessment of
the need for change. It is clear that some response regarding
the imagery management issue must be provided back to Congress
this next year.
Action(s) in Place: In October of this year COMIREX sent to
ADCI Kerr a Terms of Reference (TOR) for an end-to-end study of
the imagery community. The study is designed to be conducted
by a blue ribbon panel under SECDEF and your direction. A
central theme of the TOR is the type of management structure
the imagery community will require to respond to the needs of
the mid-to-late 1990s.
Action(s) Required: That you and the SECDEF commission a blue
ribbon panel to review the issues identified in the TOR.
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Conclusion: "A review of imagery exploitation activities
should be undertaken to identify and eliminate unnecessary
duplication and redundancy."
Discussion: As stated in the text of the Childs Report, this
issue may be more perceived than real. Nevertheless, the
Childs group recommends that a thorough review of this issue be
conducted.
A report was sent to Congress under DCI and SECDEF signature in
the summer of 1990 regarding this specific issue. In a
nutshell, it stated that unwarranted duplication does exist
but, as measured against the totality of imagery exploitation,
it is about 5 percent. We have not heard any comments back
from Congress regarding the report, but it is likely that the
report was read with an appreciable degree of skepticism. The
findings in the 1990 report are about the same as studies done
in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Action(s) in Place: In October 1991 COMIREX sent to ADCI Kerr
a Terms of Reference (TOR) for an end-to-end study of the
imagery community. The study is designed to be conducted by a
blue ribbon panel under SECDEF and your direction. The TOR was
drafted in response to a number of statements received in the
1992 budget passback concerning management of imagery. COMIREX
included the issue of duplicative exploitation in the TOR.
Action(s) Required: Commission a blue ribbon panel to conduct
the imagery review.
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Conclusion: "The DCI Counterintelligence Center should adopt a
stronger Community focus, especially in the analytic area, and
consideration should be given to having it headed by a senior
FBI officer."
Discussion: If you approve the creation of a DDCI for
Intelligence Community Affairs (DDCI/ICA), the DCI
Counterintelligence Center (CIC) should be placed under this
position. Stronger Community focus would be achieved because
it would be looked upon as a true Community entity. This would
also blunt any perceived need to head it with an FBI officer,
although choosing such leadership would further substantiate
its interagency nature. Under the DDCI/ICA concept, there
would be less' reluctance and more enthusiastic endorsement for
making the CIC more broadly representational and, at a minimum,
ensure staffing with FBI personnel. (There currently are-no-
FBI detailees assigned to the CIC.) Broader Community
representation on the CIC, in both numbers and agencies, would
unquestionably enhance-the Community focus of analysis by
providing a wider level of expertise in CI matters than is
currently the case.
Action(s) in Place: None.
Action(s) Required: That you place the DCI CIC under the
DDCI/ICA, if the DDCI/ICA position is created.
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The conclusions in this TAB are those that either do
not require urgent action or do not require any action at
all. There are 18 that we have placed in this
category--nine related to DCI Authorities and
Responsibilities and nine related to Functional
Intelligence Issues. They are presented in order of
priority, those requiring action first and those not
requiring action last.
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Conclusion:
"The NFIP budget should remain classified
Dizcuon: Keeping the amount of the total NFIP budget
classified has been the subject of Congressional debate within
the Senate this year, and the Senate authorization report on
the FY 1992 NFIP request contains language that would make the
NFIP (and the TIARA) totals unclassified. The administration
has appealed this Senate provision, noting that the overall
total, in and of itself, provides little information. For that
very reason, it will inevitably lead to further, successively
more detailed inquiries on the size and purpose of component
programs. The more details of the budget that are revealed,
the more our adversaries would gain insight into our
capabilities based on the amount requested by each program. By
following this year after year, adversaries could see trends
and peaks which would be indicative of large system
procurements or shifts in intelligence priorities.
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Conclusion: "The DCI's budgetary authority should be
strengthened by giving him final authority for formulating and
executing the NFIP budget, including authority to reprogram
funds."
Discussion: We agree that DCI budgetary authority could be
strengthened; however, to get execution authority for the
entire NFIP will require a significant concession from Defense.
One step toward strengthening DCI budgetary authority would be
to allow you to transfer funds-from one NFIP component to
another. Currently, even this small power is caught up in the
appropriation rules governing each Department or Agency.
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Giving the DCI execution authority over the whole NFIP would
potentially solve some current problems (i.e., difficult-ies in
reprogrammings), but a whole new set would be created. For
example, giving you execution authority over Defense elements
would require a complete restructuring of the existing
Community and, most likely, the stripping of very large and
integral pieces of the Defense program from Defense.
Action(s) in Place: For two years we have tried to gain
Administration and Congressional approval to incorporate
language in the Defense Appropriation and Authorization bills
and the Intelligence Authorization bill that would give the DCI
authority to transfer funds within the NFIP across program
lines, say from DoD accounts to FBI, or from CIA to DEA. The
first year it did not make it through the Administration. The
second year it made it to Congress too late for them to include
it. Defense is uneasy that the Secretary of Defense will lose
something if the transfer authority comes to pass, but DoD
finally agreed. _
Acion(s) Required: We should continue to press for passage of
legislation to provide the DCI with the authority to transfer
funds within the NFIP.
If you should decide to seek full execution authority, it would
require:
o Defense agreement, or acquiescence to White House
decision. Since DoD would be a big loser in this
arrangement, this will be politically difficult.
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o Creating an NFIP appropriation (which will require
strong support in Congress).
o Establishing an NFIP or DCI Comptroller--giving the
ICS/PBO or some new DCI/Community body the
responsibility for programming, budgeting, and
executing the NFIP funds.
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CQnclusion: "The resource decisionmaking process should be
strengthened by creating an NFIC "executive committee" composed
of three-or four key NFIC members; or by replacing the NFIC
with a senior decisionmaking body, chaired by the DCI and
composed of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs."
Discussion: There is a major liability to replacing the NFIC
with a smaller, more senior group. This is the dilution of
your decisionmaking power. Under the current arrangement, you
use the NFIC as an advisory body, with you making the final
decision after hearing the Program Managers' views. Use of a
more formal, senior group would force power sharing at the
table.' In addition, elimination of the NFIC would be perceived
by the Program Managers as a decrease in their influence on
final resource decisions.
Mr. Kerr as the ADCI, initiated the use of an ad hoc group led
by the DD/ICS during the budget deliberations for FY 1992.
This group of senior representatives from the four major NFIP
programs developed a strategy and made budget reduction
recommendations to the NFIC. The original group gave way to
what is now called the Senior Budget Review Group (SBRG). The
DDCI continues to refer NFIC-level resource decisions to the
SBRG before presenting them to the full NFIC. While this group
has no official charter and ostensibly only provides
recommendations to you, it acts as a decisionmaking body by
working through all the alternatives it is presented and
arrives at a recommendation for the NFIC.
Action(s) in Place: The creation of the SBRG.
Action(s) Required: There might be value in more formally
chartering the SBRG, via a DCID, as an official "working group"
for NFIP resource decisions.
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CgnclusiQn: "The DCI should seek statutory approval for a
contingency fund to provide a Community-wide source of funds to
accommodate unique collection, research and development, and
other opportunities."
Discussion: This is a valid recommendation, and there is
precedent for such a fund. Benefits would include enhancement
of the DCI's resource management role, allowing more
flexibility in solving a perennial problem of how to fix things
that get broken, being able to allocate funds to program
managers in times of emergency, and being able to fund
something "smart" outside the normal lengthy budget cycle.
Accomplishing statutory approval, however, only can be?done
through legislative action. Current laws and authorities
-preclude Executive Branch unilateral action and year-by-year
authorization and appropriation are subject to Congressional
whim.
In addition, contingency funds usually are the first target of
budget cutters--OMB as well-as Congress--a particularly dicey
proposition in the current stark budget environment. And, if a
contingency fund were established, it would require a
substantial resource and people investment to administer.
Action(s) in Place: None
Action(s) Required: The Program and Budget Office (PBO) of the
ICS should be tasked to develop an implementation strategy for
a contingency and draft a legislative proposal in coordination
with the OGC. The PBO also should formulate an implementation
plan and develop resource requirements. The proposal then
should be coordinated with OMB and Congressional staffs by ICS
and OCA.
A key decision regards the question of which appropriation to
have the Congress place the yearly funds, and secondarily, who
should administer the fund. We recommend selecting the ICS
appropriation, thereby avoiding the DoD budget arena and its
attendant problems of reprogrammings. The ICS should
administer allocation and disbursement of the funding under
your direction.
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Conclusion: "The use of technology throughout the Intelligence
Community should be strengthened by the creation of a DCI
Science Advisory Board composed of senior scientists from the
private sector, some of whom should be "cross over" members
from the existing Defense Science Board."
Di_scussiQn: We agree with the report's desire to improve the
Community's use of technology. We do not believe, however,
that its specific recommendation is necessary. A scientific
advisory group already exists. The problem resides in the use
made of the group.
The DCI established a Science and Technology Advisory Panel
(S1AP) in 1976 and it has been in continuous existence since
then. Its makeup and mission coincide with the Board
recommended in the Childs Report. STAP consists of ten
members, all distinguished scientists and engineers from the
private sector (with some overlapping membership on the Defense
Science Board), and has a broad charter to provide scientific
and technical advice to the DCI.
In our view, senior management should make much more use of the
Panel. In recent years, senior managers have placed almost no
demands on the Panel beyond a general request to "tell us what
we should be worrying about." This is a valid request, but it
does not begin to tap the resources available in the Panel.
Individual members of STAP do make significant contributions by
applying special expertise on a few narrow problems, where help
is given to an individual or office. The Childs Report,
however, has broader concerns. If an outside board is to help
with those broader concerns, what is needed is greater
willingness by senior managers to use it.
In its discussion of ways to improve technological advice, the
Childs Report also mentions a possible revitalization of the
Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC); in its
conclusion, however, it drops this idea, opting instead for a
newly constituted Science Advisory Board. We believe that
there is merit in reviewing the charter and role of the IR&DC.
In its present form the IR&DC is a group of R&D advisors from
within the government (as opposed to the "outside" group
recommended in the Childs Report). A useful purpose is served
by such an internal group, mainly in its ability to serve as a
clearinghouse for information. We believe that there is much
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room for improvement in its effectiveness, however, especially
with respect to the larger issue of how best to coordinate and
conduct R&D within the Community--including coordination with
DoD to capitalize on Defense's much larger technology base
investment. The IR&DC Executive Secretary has recently begun
an effort to rethink the Council "from the ground up." That
effort could lead to an IR&DC that would contribute to a
resolution of the concerns expressed in the Childs Report. The
Executive Secretary's effort should culminate in a report for
consideration by the Community's senior management.
Informal IR&DC effort to review the
Council's structure and mission.
Action(s) in Place:
Action(s) Required:
1. For Science Advisory Board, none, but DCI should
reevaluate his expectations for STAP.
2. Formal report on alternative IR&DC options should be
prepared for senior management.
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(Qnclusion: "A comprehensive review of the Intelligence
Community security practices should be initiated promptly. Of
-particular concern are the wasteful and unnecessary duplication
and overlap in conducting security background investigations
and questions about the continued utility of or need for the
lifestyle polygraph."
Discussion: Although listed as a reference, the Childs panel
apparently did not grasp the meaning and intent of both
National Security Review (NSR) 18 (Strategy for
Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures in the 1990s)
and National Security Directive (NSD) 47 (Counterintelligence
and Security Countermeasures). NSR 18 was a review of CI and
SCM policy across the government. Review and refinement are
continuously performed under the NSD 47 reporting
requirements. With regard to "wasteful and unnecessary
duplication... in conducting security background investigation,"
a Single Scope Background Investigation was just approved by
the President as NSD 63. In addition, NSD 25 (National
Industrial Security Program (NISPI) was not referenced in the
Childs Report, and the NISP process will ensure standardized
and streamlined security procedures for the private sector.
With respect to interagency transferees, the current policy
authorizes the recipient agency to set the standard as to the
nature and scope of any polygraph. With respect to the
polygraph, we stand behind the President's direction expressed
in NSD 47:
We believe the-continued utility and need for the "lifestyle"
polygraph has been demonstrated repeatedly by those agencies
and departments that use it. For those agencies and
departments, in which it is policy to employ "lifestyle"
polygraph, the polygraph results obtained by a competent and
skilled examiner are considered another important investigative
tool when used by an experienced adjudicator.
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With respect to a comprehensive review of the Intelligence
Community security practices, the Intelligence Community
Security Managers, through the DCI Security Forum and with
input from industry provided by NISP Working Groups, has
comprehensive reviews of all security DCI Direct-ives under
way. What is more, the executive branch, through the AG/SCM
and with input from NISP Working Groups, is examining a
standardized PSQ and standardized access to
SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL, and will shortly begin examining a
standardized "administrative review" for National Security
Information.
Action s) in Place: Impleme on of NSR 18 recommendations
and actions required by NSDs25, and 63.
Action(s) Required: Encourage, endorse, and support the work
of the DCI Security Forum, the AG/CI, and the AG/SCM.
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Conclusion: "A vigorous, Community-wide, career enhancing
rotational program for mid- and senior-_evel officers should be
established to develop a cadre which not only understands the
unique requirements and capabilities of its own organization
but also those of the Community at large."
Discussion: The Childs Report notes the major benefits to be
obtained from a rotational program are enhanced awareness and
appreciation of cross-Community capabilities, which would help
the Community to function more effectively and efficiently.
The fragmented nature of the Community and the absence of
strong central management authority make this approach
particularly appealing: better cooperation and awareness cannot
be achieved by fiat; only prolonged exposure to the Community's
differing cultures will provide the common understanding that
the report seeks.
One potential difficulty in advocating a rotational program is
the lifestyle polygraph. The Childs Report views it as the
single most important factor inhibiting the establishment of a
vigorous rotational policy. It is very unlikely, however, that
the agencies that rely on it would agree to its elimination; it
is seen as a valuable tool and agencies would be reluctant to
grant the staff-like access that a rotational assignment
entails to officers unwilling to accede to the requirement. An
examination of the issue could be conducted, but it is
difficult to see how any other conclusion could be reached, and
it thus seems a waste of time to begin such an inquiry.
Moreover, the Childs Report does not attach a quantitative
factor to its call for a "vigorous" rotational program. The
numbers involved are likely to be relatively small, on the
order of two hundred or so officers at any given time; it seems
at least possible that this small number of officers (not all
of whom would be assigned to agencies requiring the lifestyle
polygraph) could be accommodated within existing security
policies.
Another reason why a rotational program does not exist is the
absence of central personnel management authority within the
Community. There is no permanent office charged with setting
or monitoring personnel policies across the Community. There
is, however, a Community Personnel Coordinating Committee
(CPCC) chartered by a DCID. Through a working group, this
Committee could develop the mechanics of a broad rotational
program for endorsement by the NFIC.
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Successful implementation of any meaningful rotation program,
with assurances that assignments to other agencies--including
the IC Staff--will be career enhancing, will not be possible
without strong and aggressive leadership from the DCI. Without
that leadership the bureaucratic obstacles would be significant.
Action(s) in Place: None.
Action(s) Required: You should charge the CPCC to establish a
rotational program.
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conclusion: "Policymakers continue to favor competitive
intelligence analysis, but in light of future resource
constraints, the Community should reassess its competitive
analysis program to determine how much is needed, in what
areas, and at what cost."
Discussion: Executive Order 12333, dated December 1981,
specifically states that "maximum emphasis should be given to
fostering analytic competition among appropriate elements of
the Intelligence Community". This order remains in effect to
this day. Indeed, the Childs Report notes that policymakers
continue to favor competitive intelligence analysis, and all
formal and informal surveys conducted under the auspices of the
Intelligence Producers Council (IPC) indicate that this is
still the case. There have nonetheless been periodic
assertions, both in and outside of the Intelligence Community
(IC), that there is significant, unnecessary duplication in US
intelligence production and that potential savings are to be
had by eliminating it. For example, the views expressed by
Admiral Crowe, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in his September 1989 farewell report to the Secretary of
Defense are quite specific in this regard.
In light of such charges, then DCI Webster chartered an
in-depth study of IC production in 1989 to investigate whether
there was any substance to them. The study was completed by
the ICS in early 1990 and subsequently a related one was done
by the IPC. While the bottom-line conclusions were that there
clearly appeared to be some (and perhaps considerable)
duplication in current and ad hoc intelligence production
(e.g., daily briefs, typescript memos, and current intel pubs)
this was the direct result of intelligence agencies serving
their formal or perceived agency and departmental production
responsibilities. The IPC found little "duplication" in
finished, scheduled, hard-copy, all-source products of the
Community or in external contracts based on the titles
reviewed. Clearly such a title-only search fails to tell the
total story--and personal experience demonstrates that some
duplication did and continues to exist (e.g., on every major
piece of hardware in the Soviet strategic arsenal). But such
duplication has been long judged by both the intelligence and
policy communities to be necessary.
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Furthermore, the Defense Intelligence Community, where 75
percent of the overall IC's intelligence production resources
reside, has been in the process of streamlining, consolidating,
and eliminating its product lines for over a year. The
disintegration of the the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union over
the same timeframe has provided increased incentive in this
regard. Similar top-down reviews and adjustments in the
intelligence production efforts of other Community producers
have taken a similar track. In any event, while the NFIP
resources devoted to multidisciplinary, finished intelligence
production increased substantially over the decade of the 1980s
the rate of increase in these resources was less than that of
the NFIP as a whole and constituted only a relatively small
nart- of the US intelligence budget over that period.
Further, the 1990 ICS study concluded it was ou u tnat more
than relatively small amounts of "noteworthy" savings (less
than $50 million) co-uld-be further squeezed out of key
production elements in US intelligence, and then only with some
degree of damage to the Community's overall core of competitive
analysis.
The basic validity of the above conclusion probably has not
changed appreciably over the past 18 months, even in light of
the radical changes in the world situation. Nonetheless, the
continuing--and deepening--US budget squeeze and the
increasingly diverse and demanding requirements being levied
against the IC argue that the Childs Report recommendation is
valid.
Action(s) in Place: The DoD organizations are undergoing major
downsizing and reorganization efforts, and all production
organizations are realigning their analytic resources in
response to the changing world situation.
Action(s) Required: The overall direction of the Community's
reorganization and realignment of analytic resources should be
monitored to ensure that, in the final analysis, we
collectively have a rational delegation of production
responsibilities. We believe that the proper organization to
monitor this change is the IPC.
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Conclusion: "Steps should be taken to clarify the role and
responsibilities of CIA and DoD in satisfying military
intelligence requirements and to strengthen DIA management and
coordination of DoD clandestine HUMINT activities."
Discussion: This is a valid recommendation and can be
accomplished without significant dedication of additional
resources. It will, however, require increased recognition by
some DoD and CIA components that heretofore one-dimensional,
one-agency planning and direction will benefit from broader
Community participation.
Action(s) in Place:
There are studies under way to address these issues. Much of
the following is drawn from or based on drafts produced by the
DDCI Study Group led by Danny Childs and Charlie Allen on
improving support to military operations.
o Collection requirements will be addressed by existing
military intelligence mechanisms at various levels, i.e.,
DIA, NSA, and field echelon commands. Those remaining
collection requirements will be assigned as appropriate to
other elements of the Community, i.e., CIA, State, DOE,
etc. There is, thus, limited value in further reference to
requirements as either tactical or national, except insofar
as budget considerations dictate an NFIP/TIARA
distinction. Requirements will be described instead in
terms of the appropriate Community element responsible for
collection.
o The basic or first tier statement of military intelligence
requirements should not be country- or region-specific, but
generic in nature so that Community-wide collection can
take place prior to the. designation of a specific country
or region as a possible target of US military
applications. Such base level generic requirements could
include host country/regional military capabilities and
vulnerabilities, command and control systems, logistical
infrastructure, geography and terrain features, internal
transportation systems, etc. There needs to be a joint
Community mechanism to decide for the Community as a whole
when a country or region merits inclusion in the
contingency/target category. Such an agreed list then
enables Community collection resources to be brought to
bear on a priority basis, in an efficient, coordinated
nonduplicative effort, collecting against country- or
region-specific requirements.
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Action(s) Required:
o Task a policy-level mechanism (NIC, IPC, NSC) to develop an
interagency-approved list of countries or regions with the
highest potential, near to midterm, for crises possibly
requiring US military applications. The list, which will
drive the entire collection community, will require
periodic updates and should reflect input from the policy
community and be issued by the DCI.
o Task the Director of DIA, in coordination with the
Director, ICS and the DCI's Collection Committees (ICS), to
develop a comprehensive set of military intelligence
collection requirements applicable worldwide, i.e., generic
in nature, not country- or region-specific.
o In coordination with the DoD/JCS, develop procedures for
greater participation by the national Intelligence
Community in military operational planning at all levels.
As part of this action, and to ensure a coordinated
internal support effort from all its components, CIA should
establish a mechanism dedicated to the support of military
operations.
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Conclusion: "The Community's HUMINT collection strategy needs
to be reassessed to ensure that our clandestine resources are
deployed where the substantive contribution is the highest."
Discussion: The statement is always valid. The Community must
continuously prioritize its collection needs, evaluate
capabilities and performance against those needs, and assign
tasking in accordance with the difficulty of the target, using
clandestine resources only when priority needs cannot be
satisfied by any other means.
Action(s) in Place: The DCI's National HUMINT Collection Plans
(NHCPs) are the closest approximation of a national-level
HUMINT collection "strategy" on any given topic. Through the
NHCP process, the Intelligence and.Foreign Affairs Communities:
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the Community has and
continues to update collection priorities and reassess
collection responsibilities and assignments. For example,
during CY 1990-1991, the Community:
Action(s) Required: The following actions would help assure
that clandestine resources are appropriately used:
o Develop
and subsequent use of
ensure the most efficient
allocation of all HUMINT resources through_a coordinated
approach to tasking.
o Push for implementation within DoD/DIA of the Duane Andrews
recommendation giving DIA collection tasking authority of
all DoD HUMINT collection resources.
0 Encourage more systematic integration of information
available to non-intelligence elements (e.g., Treasury,
Energy, Commerce, USAID, USIA, and military assistance
groups) in order to reduce reliance on clandestine
resources.
matic involvement of all Community
managerial tools to
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Conclusion: "The DCI and DIRNSA should undertake a review of
existing and planned SIGINT programs to ensure that scarce
resources are applied to the most critical, sensitive
priorities and that they are fully responsive to user needs."
Discussion: The DCI SIGINT Committee has conducted several
Concise reviews of the major SIGINT subelements noted above
would have numerous benefits. They include:
o Use of a consistent base of future substantive
intelligence problems and technical issues against which
to program SIGINT initiatives.
o A composite view of opportunities and problems facing each
element of the SIGINT discipline.
o Arraying in one place of the broad outlines of the
approaches to the future for various kinds of SIGINT.
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o A SIGINT-wide perspective for senior managers and others
to view plans for the.future.
Action(s) in Place: As noted above, the DCI SIGINT Committee
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studying other elements o the INT System.
Action s) Required: You should support the SIGINT Committee
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particular:
collection mode, planned
program objectives, and a prognosis of the future. In
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o A principal drafter for each topic should be selected and
coached under SIGINT staff cognizance.
o Inputs to the papers would be prepared by teams consisting
of representatives of interested product users, NSA, the
Chairman of SIRVES or designee, and the Vice Chairman; and
in consultation with the PBO/ICS.
0 All papers will be presented to the SIGINT Committee for
review and endorsement and then on to you for your
consideration.
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Conclusion: "The DCI should encourage the National Advisory
Group (NAG) to adopt a more active and decisive role in guiding
and directing the US counterintelligence effort."
Discussion: The NAG is an advisory group in the strictest
sense. Its lack of stature and visibility vis-a-vis the old
SIG-I is the result of its NSC-approved mission to serve as an
advisory structure for the DCI to use in addressing CI and SCM
issues outside of the NSC structure. Therefore, any DCI
encouragement to adopt a more active and decisive role in
guiding and directing the US CI effort must derive from his
statutory authorities or, if not, must come from the NSC
structure. The NAG principals have never met because issues
that have had governmentwide application such as the single
Scope Background Investigation have been resolved at the
Advisory Group level, were coordinated with the DCI, and
received final coordination at the NSC Deputies Committee level
before being provided to the President for approval.
At an NSC Deputies Committee meeting held on 27 June 1990 on
the subject of NSR 18, you as Chairman, asked why the NAG had
not met. DDCI Kerr replied that the NAG operated through its
subordinate elements, the Advisory Group/Counterintelligence
(AS/CI) and the Advisory Group/Security Countermeasures
(AG/SCM), and that they were active, met regularly, and carried
out the business of the NAG.
The AG/CI and AG/SCM of the NAG have accomplished much in terms
of policy recommendations, CI threat analysis, policy
directives, security advisories, and interagency studies of CI
and SCM issues. The current success record of the NAG is
proportional to the interest in and participation level of its
membership.
Action(s) in Place: None
Action(s) Required: In your position as DCI, you should ensure
that the NAG continues to provide relevant support to the NSC
regarding counterintelligence issues.
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Conclusion: "The DCI should seek multiyear statutory
authorization and appropriation for selected NFIP programs to
facilitate long-range program planning and implementation."
Discussion: From an idealistic perspective the proposal
appears attractive. It would provide less programmatic
turbulence for large, complex development programs and
facilitate long-range program planning and implementation.
However, it ignores the reality and politics of both the
Executive and Congressional budget process.
Multiyear programming is an inherent part of the current NFIP
program and budget process. The Executive Branch, and DoD in
particular, requires and uses it for both annual and biennial
budget formulation. Congress uses multiyear programming data
in consideration of the President's budget request and, in some
cases, authorizes for two years. However, Congress adamantly
refuses to appropriate funds for more than one year at a time,
and it would be highly unlikely to approve statutory
legislation to do otherwise. In addition, we question whether
OMB or even the SECDEF would favor such authority because it
could undermine fiscal flexibility of their overall budget
responsibilities.
Action(s) in Place: None.
Action(s) Required: None.
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Conclusion: "The DCI and the Secretary of Defense should
ensure that, plans to centralize and streamline
counterintelligence activities in the Department are
implemented promptly and that the results of this initiative
are as intended."
Discussion: The new Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (CI
and SCM) Nina J. Stewart, is taking very positive and
aggressive action to centralize and streamline CI and SCM
activities in OSD.
Action(s) in Place: The two principal CI and SCM DCI advisory
bodies, the AG/CI (chaired by the Director, FBI) and the AG/SCM
(chaired by a representative of the SECDEF), should be well
positioned to monitor and ensure full implementation to their
mutual satisfaction.
Action(s) Required: None.
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