THE SIXTH ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: MILITARY LESSONS FOR AMERICAN DEFENSE PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000300040006-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/28 : CIA-RD-P9313-014781i0003000400-06
The Sixth Arab-Israeli Conffict:
Military Lessons for American Defense Planning
by Anthony H. Cordesman
IT IS ALWAYS DANGEROUS to draw war in Europe. and over a small and corn-
large lessons from little wars. Israel's in- paratively unique terrain. The total area
vasion of Lebanon has so far been a lim- of Israel is only 20.720 sq. kms. The re-
ited conflict fought under unique circum- cent air battles have been fought over an
stances. The Israelis have had seven area of less than 10.000 sq. kms. and most
years to develop plans and tactics tailored have been concentrated over an area the
to a given threat. It has also been a size of Luxembourg. These conditions
uniquely unequal struggle. are not similar to what the US is likely to
Israel launched its invasion against face in the future.
PLO forces who were desperately trying ,,-The Three .Major Lessons of the War.:
to avoid such a conflict. Israel's ground Such wars do not "prove" anything
troops won their initial victories against about US or Western military needs in
less than 8,000 PLO guerrillas whose ar- NATO, in the Persian Gulf, or. in Asia.
mament?while poor in quality?was far
better than their training, tactics, and
leadership. To put this in perspective, the
battle for Beaufort Castle involved some
of the most bitter initial fighting in the
invasion. Its PLO defenders, however,
numbered only about 200 men, and only
30-40 proved to be in the castle when it
was captured.
The Syrian army has only fought se- ability of some armies to learn them: ',strategic opportunities to make that inno-
riously when it felt that Israel threatened First, the war has shown the importancei vation effective. The Israelis had trulY
its ability to defend Damascus. Even tor readiness and training., The Israeli professional leadership, and it gave them
then, Syrian armor retreated up Ore 'forces that invaded Lebanon were not far more of an edge th2n their weapons or
Bekaa the moment it began to take signifi- waiting for some mythical "get well" peri- technology.
cant casualties. and Israel experienced od during which Israel finally funded the (Third, the..war has shown the value of
more problems from the terrain than in required cpare parts. munitions. equip- [superior organization. This superiority
dealing with the Syrian army. The fighting ment, and training. Since 1973, they had "had badly declined.;in '1973. Isra?e.
between Israel and Syria for control of the been given the most realistic tiaining of [say' ists'then were 'Poorly organized: its
Damascus toad was relatively pro forma any forces in the world and they had beerq mobilization plan was carelessly struc-
and more a Syrian test of the seriousness kept ready to fight at-any moment. `t,turecl: its logistic system was badly man-
of Israel's intention to capture the road Ironically, many of the Israeli reserve,..aged; itscombined armsorganization was
than a battle. All rhetoric aside, the Arabs units used in the invasien had more realis-,:weak; and its intelligence and tigher cotn-'
have known all too well that they face an tic and more advanced training than the ,.rnand organization .was capable only of
enemy that can defeat them virtually at best active US divisions in West Ger, attackingan enemy,. not of responding to
will, and that they have no military option many. It is also striking thatt1t0e1:,-,fiasi?5:.ri invasion or unexpected enemy court::
to help the Palestinians. ? . / flown' welroverl.200 high .streis`cornbat termove. The Israeli air fo- rce had no ded
Even the invasion's major air battles, sorties with advanced jet fighters and has icated command unit for planning and
must be kept in careful perspective. The evidently not lost more than one or two controlling air attack missions and had to
present duel between Israeli fighters and aircraft to poor maintenance, pilot error, improvise one on the spot. Its air recon-
Syrian fighters has gone on since 1973, or poor armament and turnaround sup- naissance efforts did not keep pace with
and Israel and Syria have employed"
port: Given the average readiness of Arab maneuver and resupply activities.
roughly the same weapons and technolo- USAF units in Europe, the US would and Israel had no command function ded-
gy for the last two years. The duel be- probably lose 10 times as many aircraftt cated to helping its pilots counter Arab
tween Israeli fighters and Arab land- per sortie flown because of readiness 'ground-based air defenses.
based air defenses has.gone on even long- problems?even if the Warsaw Pact failed ,Since then the Israelis have worked to
er. The Israelis won the first round in this to shoot back: /correct these weaknesses, and they have
duel during the Suez Canal war of the(Second, the:war has-shown the impoi:Ptested every "fix.- In the process, they
early 1970s. They nearly lost the next (tame of leadership, innovation, and fle.T.i-`-'-have made technology the servant of mili-
round during the October war in 1973, but II:laity. Admittedly, the Israelis have 1 tary organization and not its master.
only because their contempt for their unique advantage. They had seven years Where technology can help to meet a mili-
Arab opponents had made their training to learn how to attack a hopelessly in- tary need, Israel obtains technology tai-
lax, and they failed to properly employ ferior enemy, and eight months to refine bored to that purpose. Israel has a unique
the countermeasures the US had pre- their attack and contingency planning advantage in this regard because it can
viously provided. down to the level of analyzing how to at- fight predictable enemies who have lirn-
The air war is ako being fought largely tack every bridge in Lebanon. The US ited tactical options in a fixed terrain.
under fair weather and daytime condi- will never be able to afford such single- Nevertheless. Israel's integration of tech-
tions of a kind with little relevance to a minded concentration. nology into its forces is uniquely efficient.
Yet, Israel's performance has stilt been
far more impressive than in 1973 or 1978.
Israel made brilliant use. of helicopter
forces. independent armored units, small
amphibious landings, special forces and
commandos, and paratroops in combina-
tion with its repair combat arms. It has
shown great flexibility not only in execut-
ing its initial attack, but in dealing with
the unexpected problems and oppor-
tunities that have arisen since.
It is true that the Israelis made far bet-
ter use of combined arms than in 1973 or
Like the Falklands conflict, they can pro- 1978. but this ,was only part of the story..
vide only limited lessons, and most of liThelsraelistave again proven that their'
these lessons have nothing to do with thetofficers and NCOs have the training.and
debate over whether the West needsiess the freedom to innovate on the spot at the
or more sophisticated technology, or the',. squad to battalion level, and that this al
"reformist" debate over attrition vs. ma-'f: lows them to dominate their more rigid
neuver. The three most important lessons: enemies. They have shown that their
are, in fact, so old that the only thing: more senior officers have recovered the
striking about them is the incredible in-; ability to create the broader tactical and
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ualus IIIVVIVCU tne wnere Israel had the initiative in choosing
technology effort directly itt.wapport of conflict. Second, the Soviet weapormniow its points of attack on Syrian missiles and
each of our unified and specified corn- furnished to Syria are nothing like the mix other land targets.
mands. of weapons that will exist in Soviet forces (-This war is not an indication of NATO
In short, these three lessons show that by the mid-1980s. superiority over the Warsaw Pact, or of
modern armed forces can achieve great Helicopters and Special Forces future trends. The Soviet Union's new
advantages from a rigorous, if not ruth- As was the. case in the Iran-Iraq War, AA-9, and follow-on types, will bring it
less, attention to military fundamentals. and to a lesser extent in the Falklands. the far closer to parity in air-to-air missiles.
They show that the present invasion is not helicopter has again emerged as able to Its Candid 2 AWACS should be deployed
an argument for some particular technol- bypass defensive strong points and to sur- by the mid-1980s. The advanced models
ogy. tactic, or innovation, but rather a vive encounters with armor. The present of its MiG-2 I s and 23s deployed with Pact
case for choosing a given approach to war argues that attack helicopters, heli- forces already have far better avionics
war, for funding it to the point where it can borne troops, and special forces cn en- than the export versions in. Syrian in-
work, and for then tempering it through able armor to rapidly overcome barrier ventory. New variants of the MiG-25 have
exercises and training until it becomes and other defenses, particularly if artil- look-down/shoot down radars and the
fully effective. lery and airpower are properly used to AA-9 missile. The SU-25 (an A-10-like
Technology, Tactics, and Trivia isolate the defender and suppress anti- attack aircraft) is already operational in
At the same time, there are some les- tank weapons. Afghanistan.
sons that can be drawn about technology While it is dangerous to generalize.4the The Soviet SU-27 will be operational
and tactics, and some important caution- p. war is another data point which argues by the mid-1980s with radar and missile
ary remarks that need to be made about that modern armies can maneuver effec- capabilities roughly equivalent to those of
the invasion's implications for US force tively in spite of improvements in the de- the F-15. The new MiG-29, which will
planning. fense, and that light forces equipped with become operational in 1985. will roughly
Armor "force multipliers" like anti-tank guided equal the newest US fighter, the F-18, in
While it is mildly interesting to confirm - missiles do not give the defender new ad- avionics, armament, speed, and turning
that the T-72 is vulnerable to the US, vantages. It also argues that the Soviet rate. Its radar will have a 60 nautical mile
105mm tank gun, that the T-72 has not advantage in procuring large numbers of (nm) search range. and 45 nm track range,
solved the problems past Soviet tanks ad vanced attack helicopters like the which could cover most of Israel.
have had with inadequate range finders Mi-24 Hind D and E is an important one. In short, the West has no massive tech-
and gun sights. that Israeli improvements and that there are major risks in the dec. nical superiority that can give it the 80:1
to US 105mm APDS rounds are effective. ade-long delay in procuring truly ad- kill ratios Israel has achieved over Syria.
and that the T-72's gun has problems with vanced US attack and scout helicopters. Israel's advantage comes from superior
the advanced armor on the Merkava. The Air War ? ,ctics and training, and from the ruthless
these developments provide no surprises. There is no doubt that lsra ;1 has made and consistent Soviet denial of the ad-
NATO has known the details of Soviet brilliant use of the Aim-9L multi-aspect, vanced military technology the Arabs
a..d export versions of the T-72 for at least air-to-air missile; the superior maneuver need to compete. This denial has n- Kle
three years. capabilities of its US supplied F- I5s and the Soviets indirectly responsible for kill-
The T-72 is "new" only in the sense it is F-16s; and the radars on its F- I5s and ing as many Syrian pilots as Israel.
now being employed in battle where the E-2Cs. Israel's innovation in using the Air Defenses
West can see the results. The Soviets radar on its four E-2Cs to track Syrian Equal caution mist be shown about the
have alred4 deployed a new tank?the fighters from the moment of takeoff?and reports of Israeli kills of Syrian SA-6
T-80--with far more advanced armor, fire in using an F-15 in the rear to act as a mini- sites. First(theisraelis'havelexaggerated
contiol. and human engineering. Soviet AWACS and battle manager for the F- I5s (Their damage claims. Second. they have
tanks seem certain to be further upgraded and F-; as that engage Syrian fighters?is conducted a eliberate disinformation
in terms of armor, fire control, and fire- a brilliant innovation. It solves Israel's /campaign about their tactics, and obfus-
power by the mid-1980s, and will then critical problem of dealing with mass,?, cated the existence of still-secret. Israeli-
pose a serious challenge even to the M-1 fighter attacks. It has deprived the Arabs ;designed electronic warfare equipment.
or Leopard II. The USSR is already de- of the ability to "overload" Israeli combat; Third, and most important, the Israelis
ploying better artillery, AFVs, army anti- formations with so many enemy fighters have long been able to break the synthe-
air weapons, and anti-tank weapons than that they break up the formation and sizers which change frequencies on the
those yet furnished to Syria. create firing opportunities: the one Arab SA-6.'s continuous wave radar. Finally.
The only real news that could emerge tactic Israeli commanders feared after the the Israelis were able to precisely target
from the current fignting would be the October War. _ known SA-6 sites in a limited geographic
discovery that Israel has developed self- (The-war has-also validated the need for area where the SA-6 lacked overlapping
homing minelets that can be, launched by .advanced "look down/shoot down" coverage from modern longer range. sur-
artillery shells or cluster bombs. This t radars on modern fighters; the need for face-to-air missiles and short range air
could prove the value of a new form of f,hIgh performance multi-aspect, air-to-air defense weapons.
anti-armor area munition which virtually( missiles; and the value of an AWACS. It This does not mean that Israel's perfor-
every NATO country now has under de- confirms the results of nearly 10 years of mance does not comman,,
velopment. At this point, however, the US exercises which have reached the Israel destroyed most of the i- ? -?
reports of such a "secret weapon" could ,same conclusions. in Lebanon and in Syria near
just as easily be reports of the use of con- But, it must be stressed that the Sy- Lebanese border in its initial attack, a,
ventional US cluster bombs?which nans?who showed far more courage and also shot down 29 Syrian MiGs without
seem to have had the same lethality and aggressiveness than in 1973?were flying single loss. This performance unques-
reliability problems they had in Vietnam. stripped-down export versions of the tionably surprised the USSR. which sent
The US and its allies cannot afford to MiG-21 and MiG-23, and at best had Sovi- the deputy commander of Soviet air de- ,
assume that Israel's invasion of Lebanon et AA-8 air-to-air missiles. They lacked fense. Col. Gen. Yevgeny S. Yurasov. to
indicates that Western arms have overall top-ranking Soviet fighters and air-to-air Syria the day after the attack. It is also
superiority to Soviet weapons. First, a missiles. The Syrians also flew against an clear from the success of Israeli attacks
substantial percentage of NATO's main Israeli enemy with absolute superiority in during the first week of July on the new
battle tanks are inferior to both the Soviet air sensors and into a small "killing zone- SA-6 units that Syria deployed that the
30 rmori fnrreve in!DKIAI:.?----?:---1/August 1987
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USSR either did not have.L.:xould not
provide, a "fix" to the vulnerability of the
electronic warfare equipment available to
Syria.
Nevertheless, Israel's basic tactics are
familiar from Vietnam. It seems to have
used modified Ryan Firebee drones to
obtain the data it needed to program the
electronic countermeasure pods on its
fighters to jam the semi-active radar
homing on the missiles, and to reduce the
effectiveness of their guidance radars. At
the same time. Israel used its standard
recce capabilities and E-2Cs to character-
ize the emissions of Syria's missiles and
radars and to pinpoint the missile sites.
On the day of the attack it sent in a force
that eventually amounted to some 90 air-
craft, and flew a mix of attack sorties with
some fighters equipped with Shrike anti-
radiation missiles (ARM) and some
equipped with a mix of Maverick. laser-
guided bombs, and regular bombs and
rockets.
Israeli-modified Shrikes were used
against any Syrian radars that became ac-
tive, while the regular ordnance was used
to destroy the SA-6 sites. F-16s seem to
have performed the major attack mis-
sions, which required critical timing and
high accuracy due to two known prob-
lems: that the SA-6 can also be fired op-
tically, and the presence of AA guns and
SA-7s in the area. The F-15s provided
corward radar warning and air defense
cover, and the E-2C, advanced electronic
warfare analysis.
In shorttIsrael built on tactics the US,
first introduced in the late 1960s to attack
a type of--nissile that Israel first captured
and examin?d in October 1973. Israel was.
countermeasures like flares and bns
to counter less sophisticated systems like
the PLO's SA-7s.
The US is developing countermeasures
to cope with these developments. It has
new individual airborne jammers. the
AN/ALQ-I65. going into production to
replace its obsolescent ALQ-100/126s.
These jammers can be fitted to virtually
any US or allied aircraft and can. up to a
limited degree, adapt to changes in the
threat. The US is updating the special
Wild Weasel F-4G fighters configured to
kill surface-to-air missile sites, and it has
new or improved air-to-surface missiles to
kill enemy surface-to-air missiles and
radars. These missiles include the
AGM-88A high-speed anti-radiation mis-
sile (HARM): the improved Maverick.
which can home on the heat of power
generators once radars are shut down;
improved Shrike anti-radiation missiles:
and a possible variant of the AIM-9C for
"point-and-shoot" attacks.
It is far too soon, however, to judge the
outcome of this contest in advanced tech-
nology, especially since the Soviets have
similar weapons of their own. The Soviet
AS-10 anti-radiation missile is already de-
ployed in Europe ip large numbers, and
its more advanced fighters have racks for
a more advanced missile?the AS-14?
which can home on NATO's Hawk and
other radar-guided, surface-to-air missile
sites at ranges up to 150 nm.
There are many other passing lessons
that have emerged from the fighting. The
invasion has agai4 shown the importance
of cities and built-up areas as critical de-
fensive strong points and the need to train
and equip for urban warfar4Itfrasshown
also able to use its drones and electroniccifieicute?Probleliiiinherent in relying on
warfare capability against a missilel,Aechn;cal intelligence instead of HU-
whose operation leaves a massive electr!:MINT. For example, the Israelis esti-
tronic -fingerprint" every time it is's:. mated that the PLO had only 80 tanks
',switched on, 'I. before the invasion but now claim to have
These advantages do not apply to lound nearly 500 ,and they Lave been
NATO now, and will not apply to Israel in/amazed by the overall levels of arms
the future. The SA-8 surface-to-air mis- "!tached in unknoWn sites:'which they
sues now deployed in Warsaw Pact forces. rclaim are more than 10 times the size of
and soon to be deployed to Jordan. use a their prewar estimates. Israeli night at-
monopulse radar that is far harder to jam, tacks have again shown the advantage
that night warfare can provide against
even an alert enemy. These, however, are
lessons largely for professional military
planners.
The Implications for
American Defense Planning
Like the Iran-Iraq War, and the Falklands
conflict, the military side of the Israeli
invasion is most important in indicating
the value of military professionalism. If
we take this lesson to heart, we will have
learned most of what is necessary.
We should also, of course. do our best
to learn from other aspects of the inva-
sion. We have the same national interest
in examining its key details that the Soviet
Union showed in rushing its deputy air
missile may soon be in service and end defense commander, Gen. Yurasov, to
Israel's current ability to use the simple Syria to learn from the Israeli strike on
and the SA-8's missile, radar, and anten-
nas are mounted on BDRM-2 vehicles
which give them far greater mobility. The
SA-8 can be deployed in greater numbers
of fire units than the SA-6, and uses data
links to remote radars so that it only has
to be switched on briefly when it fires.
Another new Soviet surface-to-air mis-
sile, the SA-10, provides advanced cover-
age below 300 ft. and can even shoot
down cruise missiles. The new SA-13
short range missile system combines a
range-only radar with four missiles using
advance infrared homing. It can kill en-
emy fighters at 2 nm ranges and 30 ft.
altitudes with negligible warning and tar-
getability. Man-portable versions of this
Syria's SA-6s. Yet like other recent "little
wars," the invasion is a misleading indica-
tion of the rate of change that is taking
place in the military war profession's
tools. We already face far more serious
threats, and our military future will be far
more demanding. ? -:z?
Anthony H. Cordesman is a defense
consultant and former official in
NATO and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense.
MEMOS
OVERHAUL OF FAST FRIGATE USS
ROBERT E. PEARY, awarded to Todd
Shipyards, will begin in September. Work
on the 438-ft. 3.877-ton ship will consist
of repairs and alterations of the 1200 PSI
propulsion plant: auxiliary support, fire-
control, and weapons systems; and hab-
itability items. The 320 officers and en-
listed men of the Peary will be housed at
Todd's Seattle shipyard during overhaul.
Fixed price contract is S20-million for the
regular baseline overhaul.
CH-53E PRODUCTION CONTRACT has
been awarded to United Technologies
. Sikorsky Aircraft division totalling $87.1-
million for 12 Super Stallion helicopters.
This addition to a previous $43-million
at; ard for long-lead advance material pro-
curement brings total contract value to
$130-million. Under firm contract to pro-
duce 61 CH-53Es for the Navy and Ma-
rines?plus suppost and training, totalling
$797-million?Sikorsky has to date deliv-
ered 27 Super Stallions. The CH-53E can
accommodate 55 fully equipped troops,
palletized cargo and wheeled vehicles, or
can lift 16 tons of external payload over a
50 nautical mile radius.
PREMIER KC-135R ROLLOUT oc-
curred recently at Boeing's facility in
Wichita. The KC-135R's new engine?the
CFM56-2B-1?was developed by CFM
International, jointly owned by General
Electric and France's SNECMA. It is a
dual-rotor, variable stator, high-bypa-s
ratio turbofan engine. At 22,000-l.
thrust, the CFM56 provides a 60% in-
crease in power over the J-57 engine it
replaces, while consuming 25% less fuel.
This represents a five-year savings of
over $715-million in fuel costs for a fleet
of KC-135 tankers. Other aircraft im-
provements include: a new generator, an
auxiliary power unit, strengthened main
landing gear, improved nose wheel steer-
ing, anti-skid brakes, a larger horizontal
stabilizer, and related modifications to the
cockpit controls. The engineering devel-
opment and integration program of the
KC-I35R was a shared US-French effort.
Current USAF plans are to re-engine
over 300 KC-I35 aircraft through 1984 to
1988 at a cost of over S6-billion. ? *
1Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/28: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300040006-7 al/August 1982