LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING AUGUST 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020030-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 30
• Publication Date: August 29, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/07/16 : CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020030-2
SECRET SI-AT
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC.20505
NIC 04026-86
National Intelligence Council 29 August 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
August 1986
1. The following items were discussed at the Intelligence
Community's Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 27 August 1986.
Jamaica
2. Despite the severe defeat that Prime Minister Seaga's ruling
party suffered at the polls in recent local elections from the left
opposition party of Michael Manley, there is little prospect that Seaga
will be forced to call national elections soon.
Given Jamaica's serious economic problems, Manley appears
content to bide his time and let Seaga struggle with the IMF
over new loan commitments.
Seaga wants to promote economic growth to regain popular
support, and is resisting new IMF austerity measures,
particularly a currency devaluation.
WARNING ISSUE: Seaga appears unwilling to compromise with the IMF,
but he would face serious economic problems if an agreement on conditions
for new lending are not reached in the next few months.
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Chile
3. CIA and DIA disagree strongly on the degree of military support
for Pinochet.
CIA believes that Pinochet has become increasingly isolated, and
that unless he makes some basic compromises to speed up the
transition process, he risks efforts to remove him by other
officers, even within the Army.
DIA believes the armed forces basically support the
constitutional transition and will support Pinochet as long as
he abides by the constitution.
There is also disagreement over whether an escalation of
violence strengthens Pinochet or weakens him, but both agencies
agree that protests and violence tend to polarize opinion in the
military in support of or against a speeded up transition
process.
WARNING ISSUE: There is some danger that increased protests and
violence planned by the Communists and radical left may precipitate a
crisis in the next several months and exacerbate differences within the
ruling junta.
Mexico
4. The ruling party appears to have successfully contained
opposition protests against the recently-rigged elections in the north,
and is likely to be undeterred from manipulating results in additional
state elections over the next few months.
The opposition has little choice but to mount peaceful protests,
but these are likely to have little effect.
Over the longer run, however, the ruling party risks further
alienation of public opinion and disgust with the overall
political process.
WARNING ISSUE: There is little prospect of near term political
crisis in Mexico despite likely future protests of rigged local elections.
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Nicaragua
5. Despite concerns by Honduran military and Contra leaders that the
Sandinistas may launch a major cross-border offensive before 1 October,
DIA sees little evidence that such action is imminent.
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There has been no buildup of forces on the Nicaraguan side of
the border, and newly-conscripted troops have yet to be
adequately trained.
WARNING ISSUE: Despite the lack of indications that a major attack
is imminent, a sabotage raid could be launched on short notice.
/
Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
3
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Participating in the NIO/Latin America Warning Meeting of
27 August 1986 were representatives of the following agencies:
DIA: DIO/DIA
DIAC/DB3C3
DIA/DB3C2
DIA/DC4A
DIA/DB6D2
JSI-4B
DIA/AT-5
US SOUTHCOM
Department of the Navy
US Marine Corps
National Security Agency
National Security Council
Vice President's Office
CIA Participants:
ALA
OGI
OIA
CRES
LDA
OIR
OSWR
DO/LA
NIO/W
ICS/HC
NP IC
FBIS
JPRS
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