LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING DECEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 22, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
R
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/07/16 : CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
STAT
TOP SECRET
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
FROM:
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
22 December 1987
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Acting National Intelligence Officer for
Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
December 1987
1. The following items were discussed at the Latin America Warning
and Forecast Meeting on 16 December 1987.
2. Nicaragua
The insurgents continue to maintain the tactical initiative and
have sustained relatively high levels of combat activity, despite the
threat of a cut-off in US military assistance. Morale reportedly remains
high and recruitments are up. We believe that without further US
military assistance the rebels could sustain their current level of
operations for three to six months, depending on the aerial resupply
system and how much materiel is cached inside Nicaragua.
With the dry season Sandinista activity along the Honduran
border has increased, but we do not believe a large-scale incursion is
likely during the next month or so.
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478-k66660020002-3
STAT
STAT
1
25X1
25X1
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
TOP IZCRET STAT
WARNING ISSUE: While the rebels have materiel sufficient to continue
fighting for 3 to 6 months, their ability to remain in the field will
hinge on their fragile aerial resupply system, which will become
increasingly vulnerable to improving Sandinista air defense
capabilities.
3. Brazil
We see little likelihood of any diminution in economic and
political tensions in Brazil in the short term. The next six months will
probably be marked by continued policy drift and erosion in popular
support for President Sarney. Inflation will likely top 1000 percent
this year and economic growth could slip again in 1988, from 2 percent to
perhaps zero or worse. As a result, there are growing indications that
Brazilian elites are becoming uncharacteristically pessimistic about the
future of the country, at least as long as President Sarney remains in
office. The President, however, is unlikely to resign any time soon,
despite recent reports of health and emotional problems. Congress will
examine the new constitution in March, and we expect the newly formed
centrist coalition to eliminate or modify many of the leftist and
anti-military provisions, including a parliamentary system and excessive
state controls over the economy.
Despite mounting pressures, we judge that the military is
unlikely to intervene directly anytime soon and will be content to remain
a behind-the scenes--albeit important--player. The posture of the armed
forces could change, in our view, if there is a dramatic increase in
social unrest or if the congress becomes deadlocked over the new
constitution, which would paralyze decisionmaking.
The malaise in Brazil will probably block significant progress
on outstanding bilateral issues with the United States. The centrists
will not be able to eliminate all the nationalistic economic provisions
in the new constitution and problems, such as imports of computer
equipment into Brazil, will likely persist.
TOP SECRET
2
22 Dec 87.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/07/16 : CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
TOP WRET
WARNING ISSUE: Although the transition process probably will remain
on track, the problems posed by Sarney's health, continued economic
decline, and ongoing consitutional debates could encourage the military
to assume a more active role in governing the country.
4. El Salvador
President Duarte, whose domestic political fortunes had declined
in the wake of the regional peace talks, is working to regain momentum as
his administration heads into legislative elections in March. Duarte had
lost support among senior military officers and conservatives because of
his decisions to declare a unilateral ceasefire, back a broad amnesty,
and allow two rebel political leaders to return from exile, as well as
his reluctance to replace an Interior Ministry official who was
advocating human rights investigations. Military promotions and
reassignments in coming months may cause further discontent. Duarte is
also trying to contend with widening rifts within his own Christian
Democratic Party (PDC). Unless party leaders and factions soon reunite
and mount a vigorous campaign, the Christian Democrats will probably lose
their majority in congress. Duarte's political opponents believe that
elements of the PDC may try to rig the elections, and if the March 1988
voting is marred by credible allegations of fraud or other irregular-
ities, the legitimacy of the Duarte government and of El Salvador's
fledgling democracy would be damaged--perhaps seriously--both at home and
internationally.
On the militar front the fi htin
The insurgents
may soon try another spectacular attack, perhaps in
conjunction'with the mid-January Central American presidents' meeting.
Recent reporting also suggests that the FMLN has received training in the
use of surface-to-air missiles. There is no indication that the
insurgents have such weapons in their inventories, but if they do acquire
them, it would sharply diminish the effectivness of the government's air
force, which has been critical in maintaining troop mobility.
WARNING ISSUE: The military and right-wing political elements will
remain complacent in the near term, but will again become restive if they
believe the Christian Democrats rig the elections to keep them from
increasing their influence. Elections tarnished by fraud or credible
allegations of irregularities would undermine the credibility of the
government and the democratic system as it has evolved since 1982.
TOP SECRET
3
22 Dec 87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
TOP StRET STAT
5. Haiti
The ruling National Governing Council (CNG), which thwarted the
29 November national elections, appears determined to adhere to its new
electoral schedule regardless of domestic public opinion and
international criticism. Moreover, the CNG is determined to control who
runs in the election and the outcome. There are no provisions in the new
timetable for a presidential run-off, suggesting that military leaders
appear united behind a plan to assure a victory for a candidate
acceptable to them. Meanwhile, the political opposition remains
fractured and the unity of the newly formed coalition of the four
centrist presidential candidates is fragile.
The weakness of the political center will allow extremists free
hand and polarization will increase in coming weeks. More violence is
almost certain--much of it spontaneous and isolated. A more general
upheaval could occur, however, if a major opposition figure is killed or
extreme leftists undertake terrorist acts which escalate into large-scale
fighting. Fragmentation on the right could also prompt fighting between
the CNG and Duvalierists. In any case, the next government will resort
to Duvalierist tactics to remain in power, and the uncertainty will
create new opportunities for Cuban involvement.
WARNING ISSUE: The potential for violence will remain high as the
CNG moves Haiti closer toward controlled elections that will have little
legitimacy either in Haiti or abroad.
TOP SECRET
22 Dec 87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
STAT
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/07/16 : CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3 CI-AT
TOk....:ECRET STAT
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning Report
December 1987
DISTRIBUTION:
COPY NO.
1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - EXDIR
4 - ER
5 - D/OPS/WHSSS/NSC (J. Koehler)
6 - C/EPDS/DO
7 - C/PCS/DO
8 - NWS
9/10 - NIO/W
11- AC/NIC
12- NIO/AF
13- NIO/EA
14- NIO/GPF
15- NIO/NESA
16- NIO/AL (Einsel)
17- NIO/FDIA
18- NIO/USSR
19- Nb/Europe
20- NIO/SP
21- NIO/ECON
22- NIO/S&T
23- NIO/CT
24- NIO/NARC
25- SRP
26- IPC/DDI
27- D/CPAS (Room 7F17, HQS)
28- D/OIR (Room 2E60 HQS)
29- D/LDA (Room 1H19 IHQS)
30- D/SOVA (Room 4E58 HQS)
31- D/OIA (Room 3N100 BLDG 213)
32- D/NESA (Room 6G00, HQS)
33- D/OEA (Room 4F18, HQS)
34- D/OSWR (Room 5F46, HQS)
35- D/NPIC (Room 6N100 BLDG 213)
36- NPIC/PEG
37- NPIC/IEG/CSAB
38- NPIC/IEG/CAB
39- NPIC/IEG/AAD
40- FBIS/C/LRB,
41- FBIS/ELAAD,
'Room 3C525 Bldg 213)
Room 3C525 Bldg 213)
f Room 3S236, Bldg 213)
42- C/DDO/LAD, Room 3C2016, Hqs
43- DDO/LA
44- DDO/LA
45- DDO/PCS
46- DDO/EPS
Room 3C3203, Hqs
Room 3C24 Hqs
(Room 2D55 Hqs)
'Room 2D24 Hqs)
TOP SECRET
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
22 Dec 87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
T0Pz1CRET STAT
STAT
SUBJECT: Latin American Warning Report
December 1987
DISTRIBUTION:
COPY NO.
84- Department of State (Abrams)
85- Department of State (Fouche)
86- Department of State/INR/IC/RD
(Taylor Clear, Room 6845)
87- NSC (Sorzano)
88- NSC (Tillman)
89- NSC (Flower)
90- NSA
91- NSA
92- Treasury (Long)
93- DIA
94- DIA
95- DIA
96- DIA ,
97- DIA/D/C-4
98- DIA AT-5
99- DIA/DB-5
100-DIA/JSI-41
101-DIA/CAJIT
102-DIA/CAJIT
103-DIA/CAJIT
104-USMC (O'Hara)
105-HQ USMC/INTP (Bullen)
106-ONI (LaBauve)
107-USArmy/DCSINT (Spraecher)
108-USA/SOUTHCOM (Col. Stewart)
109-USA/CINCLANT (c/o CPAS/ILS)
110-USAF (Silva)
111-Vice President's Office (Watson)
111-Commerce (Karcich)
112-AIA/IT/AL (USITAC) (Lane/Sexton)
TOP SECRET
22 Dec 87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/07/16 : CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
TOP ACRET STAT
Participating in the NIO/Latin America Warning Meeting of
16 December 1987 were representatives of the following agencies:
DIA: DIO/DIA
DIA/DE3
DIA/DB3C2
DIA/DB3C1
DIA/0A-5
JSI-4B
DIA/CAJIT
National Security Agency
Department of State/INR
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
CIA Participants:
ALA
OGI
DIA
LDA
OIR
DO/LA
DO/CATF
DO/EPS
NIO/W
NPIC
FBIS
NIC/AG
TOP SECRET
22 Dec 87
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020002-3
STAT
STAT
STAT