CONTRASTS IN AMERICAN AND SOVIET STRATEGIC THOUGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000100130002-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MISC

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~'G are having trou-
ble with Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet thinking about strategy and nuclear wai
differs in sigificant ways from our own. To the extent one should care about th~s
and that extent is a matter of debate-we do not like the way the Soviets seem
to think. Before 1972, appreciation of differences between Soviet and American
Strategic thinking was limited to a small number of specialists.. Those who held
rt .a matter of high concern for policy were fewer still. Since that time, concern
~
abbut the nature, origins, and consequences of these differences is considerably
more widespread, in large measure as a result of worry about the Soviet strategic
arms buildup and the continued frustrations of achieving a real breakthrough in
SALT.
Heightened attention to the way the other side thinks about strategic nuclear
power is timely-and proper. The nature of the Soviet buildup and some of our own
previous choices have locked us out of pure "hardware solutions" to our emerging
strategic security problems that are independent of the other side's values and
perceptions. Whatever one thinks about the wisdom or folly of the manner in
which we have pursued SALT so far, it is desirable that management of the U.S.-
Soviet strategic relationship have a place for an explicit dialogue. That dialogue
should include more attention to strategic concepts than we have seen in past
SALT negotiations. Moreover, whatever the role of SALT in the future, the exis-
fence of "rough parity" or worse almost by definition means that we cannot limit
strategic policy to contending merely with the opponent's forces. In the cause
of deterrence, crisis management, and, if need be, war, we must thwart his
strategy. That requires understanding that opponent better.
s striving help d
strategic and fore:
characteriaatic
them are valid
over the last ten
in so awkwar
we were about pr.
atening form c
we did that the S j
ady tacitly accept i
'i if anything, eve
today. They are ~ ~
are only a star
tall, respective] ~
plicated, qua]
themselves. T.
them could
other, the tea.
The Need to Understand Strategic Doctrine
Let us define "strategic doctrine" as a set of operative beliefs,-values; and arse'!`
ions that in a significant way guide official behavior with respect to strategic
-_____L _->>----i__-_--lDa_T\ ...,...........,.t,;,:..e [.,r.b~ nnor~rinnalnlanS,afllfl
etc. The essence of U.S. "doctrine" is to deter central nuclear war at tew-
control
,
tively low levels of arms effort ("arms race stability") and strategic an>~;;
~
~
;
credible threat of catastrophic damage to the ets
("crisis stability") through the
discussion
U.S. and ~
to to the c
military do
Fritz W. Ermarth has been an analyst of Soviet and American shategic policies at the G
-
!n[ell[gC1{[e ngene~ unu .nc ~ursw ...v.yv.....v ... ........ ..........~ .._ ..__ __.-
Studies Program. Since submission of this article, Mr. Ermarth has become a membsr
National Security Council sta/f to work on U.S. strategic and arms conhol policy.
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d deterrence fail.
ty of U.S. power i
g the world foll
ited States is, at bes
et strategic forces
t that the Sovie
militarily meaning
e Shategic D~
es differ
lC thi
y have ,
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_ American and Soviet Strategic Thought ~ 139
strategy
:e should.
he way the
:n Sodiet
iince that
ferences is
;areal break
about stra
up and some of
urions" to our
folly of the m
Management of
dialogue. That
C in the future,
is forces. In the
r, we must thw
~liefs, values, and
vith respect to stra
operational plans,
~tral nuclear war at
)and strategic a
tic damage to the en
tegic policies at the C
as directed Rand's Str
rs become a member of
~, trol policy.
rho lu d deterrence fail-In that event, tlus doctrine says it should~be the aim and
ibiliry-of U.S. power to inflict maximum misery on the enemy in his homeland. ~
Making the world following `the outbiealc~of nuclear-war more tolerable for the
Uriiied'States is, at best, a lesser concern. Soviet strategic doctrine stipulates that
~.. ; :.,:
Soviet strategic forces and plans should strive in all available ways to enhance th~
~ther strategic and foreign policy goals.,f` ~" ~ - _ _ _
`These characterizations of U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine and the differences
between them are valid and important. Had U.S. strategic policy been more serisi= ~
hive over the last ten years to the asymmetry they express, we might not find
ourselves in so awkward a present situation. We would have been less sanguuine
than we were about prospects that the Soviets would settle for an easily defined,~=
non-threatening form of strategic parity. We would not have believed as uncritic-
ally as we did that the SALT process was progressing toward a common explication
of already tacitly accepted norms of strategic stability. _. f
i` _ V. ~_ ~ __ __ -_ _~. ---
It is, tf anything, even more important that these asymmetries be fully appre-
ciated today. They are a crucial starting point for strategic diagnosis and therapy.
But they are only a starting point. The constellarions of thought, value, and action
that we call, respectively, U.S. and Soviet strategic doctrine or policy are much
more complicated, qualified, and contradictory than the above characterizations
admit by themselves. To be aware of these other ramifications without fully un-
derstanding them could lead to dangerous discounting, on 'one hand, or distort-
ing, on the other, the real differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking.
Comparative Strategic Doctrine
The following discussion is intended only to suggest some of the contrasts that
exist between U.S. and Soviet strategic thinking. The issues raised are not treated
exhaustively, and the list itself is not exhaustive. Our appreciation of these matters
is not adequate to the critical times in the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship we
are facing. It would be highly desirable to develop the intellectual discipline of
comparative military doctrine, especially in the strategic sphere. Systematic com-
parative studies of strategic doctrine could serve to clarify what we think and
how we ourselves differ un these matters, as well as to organize what we know
about Soviet strategic thinking.
Although many have and express views on how both the United States and the
prospect that the Soviet Union could survive as a nation and, in some politically
and militarily meaningful way, defeat the main enemy should deterrence fail-and ?'
tby this striving help deter or prevent nuclear war, along with the attainment of ,
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International Security 1140
Soviet Union deal with strategic problems, there is in fact little systematic com-
parison of the conceptual and behavioral foundations of our respective strategic
activity. In this area, more than other comparative inquiries into communist and
non-communist politics, there are the obstacles of secrecy in the path of research.
Perhaps as vital, neither government nor academic institutions appear to have
cultivated many people with the necessary interdisciplinary skills and experience.
The most influential factor that has inhi iied~lucid comparisons ofyU.S. and
Soviet strategic thinking has been the uncritically held assumption that they had
be very similar, or at least converging with time. Many of us have been quite
insensitive to the possibility that two very different political systems could deal
very differently with what is, in some respects, a common problem. We under-
.,stood the problem of keeping the strategic peace on equitable and economical terms
~-or so we thought. As reasonable men the Soviets, too, would come to under-
~-
stand itour way.
~
"Ezplairiing tliis particular expression of our cultural self-centeredness is itself
a fascinaring field for speculation. I think it goes beyond the American habit of
value projection. It may result from the fact that post-war developments in U.S.
strategy were an institutional and intellectual offspring of the natural sciences that
spawned modern weapons. Scientific truth is transnational, not culturally deter-
mined. But, unfortunately, strategy is more like politics than like science.
The next five to ten years of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relarionship could well be
characterized by mounting U.S. anxieties about the adequacy of our deterrent
forces and our strategic doctrine. There seems to be little real prospect that the
SALT process, as we have been conducting it, will substantially alleviate these
anxieties. Even if a more promising state of affairs emerges, however, it is hard
to see us managing it with calm and confidence unless we develop a more
thorough appreciation of the differences between U.S. and Soviet strategic think-
ing. Things have progressed beyond the point where it is useful to have the three
familiar schools of thought on Soviet doctrine arguing past each other: one saying
"Whatever they say, they think as we do;" the second insisting, "Whatever they
say, it does not matter;" and the third contending, "They think what they say, and
are therefore out for suveriority over us."
Comparative strategic doctrine studies should address systematically a series o!
questions:
-What are the central decisions about strategy, force posture, and force em-
ployment or operations that doctrine is supposed to resolve for the sides examinedl' ,.
-What are the prevailing categories, concepts, beliefs, and assertions elu~ ~~
appear to constitute the body of strategic thought and doctrine in question?
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What are the hedg
fficial thinking?
What are the "n
ivate doctrinal prof
ction between what i
in the Soviet case) ?
In what actions, c
2 Where does it lie
dispute?
What perceptions
side? With what e:
Bring these que
y no easy mar
j;pamcipants have
e out with respec
,ta to do a good de:
tJ.S. strategic c
e Soviets pro
they are offic
authorities t
oyment in war
t useful thing
do not have
the most
iet strati
from o
'tam about
is in me
en.
serve
domestic
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American and Soviet Strategic Thought 1141
spe
path of
s and e
eons of U:
on that tk~
stems couli
elem. We
i come to
eredness is
merican ha
lopments in
ural sciences
culturally d
science.
iip could well'
of our deters
prospect that
y alleviate th
:vever, it is
develop a moth
t strategic think
to have the th
ether: one sa
"Whatever th
hat they say, and
3
tically a series of
e, and force em=
sides examined?
i assertions tha
question?
-What are the hedges and qualifications introduced to modify the main theses
of official thinking?
-What are the "non-strategic," e.g., propagandistic, purposes that might
motivate doctrinal pronouncements? Does the. doctrinal system recognize a dis-
tinction between what ideally ought to be, and what practically is (a serious prob-
lem inthe Soviet case) ?
-In what actions, e.g., force posture, does apparent doctrine have practical
effect? Where does it lie dormant?
-Tu what extent are doctrinal pronouncements the subject of or the guise for
policy- dispute?
-What perceptions does one side entertain as to the doctrinal system of the
ocher side? With what effect?
Answering these questions for both the United States and the Soviet Union is
adrr.ittedly no easy matter, especially in a highly politicized environment in which
ma-ry participants have already made up their minds how they want the answers
~o come out with respect to assumed impact on U.S. strategic policy. But we have
nc~ data to do a good deal better than we have to date.
1:.5. and Soviet Dochine Contrasted
What is U.S. strategic doctrine and policy? What is Soviet strategic doctrine and
policy? The Soviets provide definitions of doctrine (doktrina) and policy (politika)
that state they are official principles, guidance, and instructions from the highest
governing authorities to provide for the building of the armed forces and for
their employment in war.
The most useful thing about these definitions is that they remind us-or should
-that we do not have direct and literal access to Soviet strategic doctrine and
policy through the most commonly available sources, i.e., Soviet military literature
and various pronouncements of authoritative political and military figures. Our
insight into Soviet strategic policy is derived by.inference from such sources along
with inferences from observed R&D and force procurement behavior, what we
manage to learn about peacetime force operations and exercises, and occasional
direct statements in more privileged settings, such as SALT, by varyingly per-
suasive spokesmen.
The value of all these sources is constrained by the limitarions of our perceptive
apparatus, technical and intellectual, and the fact that Soviet communications on
strategic subjects serve many purposes other than conveying official policy, such
as foreign and domestic propaganda. For all that, we have gained over the years
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International Security 1142
a substantial degree of understanding of the content of Soviet strategic thinking,
of the values, standards, objectives, and calculations that underlie Soviet decisions.
It is this total body of thinking and its bearing on action that are of concern
here.
Where lack of access complicates understanding of Soviet strategic doctrine,
an overabundance of data confuses understanding of the American side, a point
that Soviets make with some justice when berated with the evils of Soviet secrecy.
If, in the case of the United States, one is concerned about the body 'of thinking
that underlies strategic action it is clearly insufficient to rely on official statements
or documents at any level of classification or authority. Such sources may, for one
reason or another, not tell the whole story or paper over serious differences of
purpose behind some action.
One of the difficulties in determining the concepts or beliefs that underlie U.S.
strategic action is that strategic policy is a composite of behavior taking place ir,
at least three distinguishable, but overlapping arenas. The smallest, most secre-
tive, and least significant over the long-term, assuming deterrence does not fail,
is the arena of operational or war planning. The second arena is that of system
and force acquisition; it is much larger and more complex than the first. The most
disorganized and largest, but most important for the longer-term course of U.S.
strategic behavior is the arena of largely public debate over basic strategic princi-
ples and objectives. Its participants range from the most highly placed executive
authorities to influential private elites, and occasionally the public at large.
Strategy-making is a relatively democratic process in the United States.
To be sure, may areas of public policymaking can be assessed in terms of these
overlapping circles of players and constituents. But the realm of U.S. strategic
policy may be.unusual in the degree to which different rules, data, concerns, and
participants dominate the different arenas. These differences make it difficult to
state with authority what U.S. strategic policy is on an issue that cuts across
the arenas. For example, public U.S. policy may state a clear desire to avoid
counter-silo capabilities on stability grounds. The weapons acquisition community
may, for a variety of reasons, simultaneously be seeking a weapons characteriedt
vital to counter-silo capability, improved ballistic missile accuracy. As best they
can with weapons available, meanwhile, force operators may be required by ~
logic of their task to target enemy missile silos as a high priority.
Despite these complexities, however, it is possible to generalize a body of policy
concepts and values that govern U.S. strategic behavior. There are strong tende~+-
cies that dominate U.S. strategic behavior in the azeas of declaratory policy,
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from the mid-19.
quisition, and arms cont
may be cited. Today
inst Soviet missile sil
definitely. This is in pai
small ICBMs and the c
ult of Soviet efforts to i
ability, because it thre
tes to possess.
tegic policymaking tak
is monopolized by th
gh elites external
t, they cannot seriou
force acquisition, a
this decision group '
fives, and paramete
considerations m
central to the st
Soviet strategic
central issues: (1
henomenon of det
tation.
ation, the rel ',
agreed that
ter of immer
:Union with ~
~ioatetimes suss
to Russians,
al, if cent
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American and Soviet Strategic Thought 1143
rlie S
't stra
nerican si
ils of Sovi
he body of
m official
trious diff~
fs that un
tvior taking
mallest, m
rrence does
na is that of~
term course:
asic strategic
41y placed
he public at
ed States.
ed in terms of
data, concerns;
make it diffi
sue that cuts a
Iuisition comm
?apons characte
uracy. As best
be required
~?
lize a body of
aratory policy,
acquisition, and arms control policy. Again, the case of U.S. counter-silo capabili-
ties may be cited. Today, the United States lacks high confidence capabilities
against Soviet missile silos; it may continue to lack them for some time or
indefinitely. This is in part the result of technological choice, the early selection
of small ICBMs and the deployment of low-yield MIRV weapons. It is also the
result of Soviet efforts to improve silo hardness. But the main reason for this lack
is that we have abided by a conscious judgment that a serious counter-silo
capability, because it threatens strategic stability, is a bad thing for the United
States to possess.
The situation seems more straightforward, if secretive, on the Soviet side. Soviet
strategic policymaking takes place in a far more vertical and closed system. Exper-
tise is monopolized by the military and a subset of the top political leadership.
P.lthough elites external to this group can bid for its scarce resources to some
extent, they cannot seriously challenge its values and judgments. Matters of doc-
d
trine, force acquisition, and war planning are much more intimately connecte
within this decision group than in the United States. Policy arguments are indeed
possible. Public evidence suggests a series of major Soviet debates on nuclear
strategy from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, although identification of issues,
alternatives, and parameters in these debates must be somewhat speculative.
These considerations make difficult, but not impossible, the comparative treat-
ment of U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems and concepts. One may describe
with some confidence how the two very different decision systems deal with certain
concerns central to the strategic nuclear predicament of both sides. Much about
U.S. and Soviet strategic belief systems can be captured by exploring how they
treat five central issues: (1) the consequences of an all-out strategic nuclear war,
(2) the phenomenon of deterrence, (3) stability, (4) distinctions and relationships
between intercontinental and regional strategic security concerns, and (5) strategic
CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR
For a generation, the relevant elites of both the United States and the Soviet
Union have agreed that an unlimited strategic nuclear war would be a socio-
political disaster of immense proportions. Knowing the experiences of the peoples
of the Soviet Union with warfare in this century and with nuclear inferiority since
1945, one sometimes suspects that the human dimensions of such a catastrophe
are more real to Russians, high and low, than to Americans, for whom the prospect
is vague and unreal, if certainly forbidding.
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International Security 1144
For many years the .prevailing=U.S. concept of nuclear war's consequences has~}~.
ibeen such as to preclude belief in any military`or politically meaningful form of!_
~ - r fr .t _ _ _! .t _ _._._ __ __L ____ .L_ _______. L.._ __~_~_1
survival seemed quixotic, even dangerous. Hence stems our relative disinterest
in air defenses and civil defenses over the last fifteen years, and our genuine
fear that ballistic missile defenses would be severely destabilizing. Growth of l
Soviet nuclear power has certainly clinched this view of nuclear conflict among ~
~ critical elements of the tJ.S. elite. But even when the United States enjoyed massive
superiority, when the Soviet Union could inflict much less societal damage on the
United States, and then only in a first strike (through the early 1960s), the awe- ~_
some destructiveness of nuclear weapons had deprived actual war with these
Lweapons of much of its strategic meaning for the United States. _ -
The Soviet system has, however, in the worst of times, clung tenaciously to the
belief that nuclear war cannot-indeed, must not-be deprived of strategic mean- ~
ing, i.e., some rational reia'tionship to the,.,interests;of:>the state:~~It has insisted
- - - --- - -
victory attainable.~As most-are aware, this issue was debated in various ways at
i,-- ---
the beginning and~end of the Khrushchev era, with Khrushchev on both sides of
the issue. But the system decided it hnd to believe in survival and victory of some
form. Not so to believe would mean that the most basic processes of history, on
which Soviet ideology and political legitimacy are founded, could be derailed by
the technological works of man and the caprice of an historically doomed oppo-
nent. Moreover, as the defenders of doctrinal rectitude continued to point out,
failure to believe in the "manageability" of nuclear disaster would lead to pacifi-
cism, defeatism, and lassitude in the Soviet military effort. This should not be read
as the triumph of ideological will over objective science and practical reason.
From the Soviet point of view, nuclear war with a powerful and hostile America
was a real danger. Could the state merely give up on its traditional responsi-
bilities to defend itself and survive in that event? Their negative answer hardly
strikes one as unreasonable. Their puzzlement, alternating between contemptuous
and suspicious, over U.S. insistence on a positive answer is not surprising.
~In recent years the changing strategic balan`~- ce'has had the effect of strengthening
Dubious when the United States enjoyed relative advantage, strategic victory and
`~ urvival in nuclear conflict have become the more incredible to the United Scarce
as the strategic power of the Russians has grown. For the Soviets, however, the
progress of arms and war-survival programs has transformed what was in large _ ;
measure an ideological imperative into a more plausible strategic potential. For
easons to be examined below, Soviet leaders possibly believe that, under favor
able operational conditions
today. Notwithstanding st;
:may also believe they could
DETERRENCE
FTlte concept of deterrence e
strategic belief systems. F~
ensions, and a good de:
ctional symmetry betwe
hostile action across a sI
etries of thinking h~
legit deterrence has tent
policy, and it has becotr
Soviets, deterrence-or
the last objective of stra
that had both offensi?
t the ultimate objecti?
has improved for tl
of war prevention a;
es that include the I
interests. Repetiric
power, among othe.
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'stability is a concept',
~.
~tritin~s. In U.S. t
~tivesinherentin
,'closely related, t.
nment doming
farces. Emph
unterforce, a.
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pr's co
r meanirtgf?~
prospect
~r relative
abilizing. G
iclear conflict
rates enjoyed m
~cietal damage
arly 1960s), the
:tual war with
s.
tag tenaciously t
'ed of strategic m
to kind of mea
'd in various ways
:hev on both sides
1 and victory of
~ ~cesses of history,
-ically doomed op
ttinued to point ou
would lead to pacifi
end practical reason:
and hostile America-
traditional responsi~,.
native answer hardly
~tween contemptuous
,ot surprising.
ffect of strengthening
strategic victory and
~~ to the United States
ioviets, however, the
:d what was in large
rategic potential. For
ve that, under favor-
able operational conditions, the S?`'iet Union _could win a central strategic war;~-
today:`Notwithstanding strategic pari
ty. or essential equivalence of force, they
~ay also believe they could lobe such a conflict under some conditions.
ot:~rrkxr.NCr,
1'he ?, Inept rrf deterrrnce early became. a central element of both U.S. and Sovie- ~-~ t - f5
strategic belief systems. For both sides the concept had extended or regional j
dimrnsinns, and a good deal of political content. There has, in short, been some `~
tunrtir,nal symmetry between the deterrence thinking of the two sides: restraint ~:
~of hr,stile actirm acrrns a spectrum of violence by the threat of punishing conse- ~
~ucn~rs in war. purr time and with shifts in the overall military balance, latent: ~
~'symmetrirs of thinking have lxcome more pronounced. For th_e United States, s
stratc~,ic deterrence has tended to became the only meaningful objective of strate- f ?
SicP',licy, and it has become pruyressively decoupled from regional security. For ~~.
the `~'jvirts, deterrence-or war preventir~n-was the first, but not the only and
n ,t the last abjective of strate beterrence also meant the protection of a foreign( ~
"1,~ ;~ that had lx,th rffensive and defensive goals. And it was never counterposed
a ;;,,n;r the ultimate abjective of being able to manage a nuclear war successfully
s~hr,uld dr?rcrrr-ace fail. The Soviet crmcept of deterrence has evolved as the strategic
hal'nre h.a imprrrved for the Smiet Union from primary emphasis on defensive
r~?rr~~a of war Prevention and prntcrrian of prior political gains to more emphasis ,;~
un tl,~Tnr9 that include the protection of dynamic processes favoring Soviet inter-~
'}'`'r``'I 'nt''ro,r>. krpetirirm r,f the refrain that detente is a product of Soviet
srr:,r~_p,rlx,wr?.r,amrmgr,therthin~,g,.d~Spla_ys_this-evolutions _- _-_____.__ -
S'tb.kl:.(rY
S,r ~ tic stahilir~ is a crmcept that ,s very difficult to treat in a comparative manner
~~~",?~"`~ 't 's ~'' v,tal rr, (J.S srra?r?
h
yu t
inkin ,but hardl identifiable in Soviet
srrarr.~'c wrir,n g y ~
~ ~ y~. !n L'.S. think,ny,, strategic stability has meant a condition in,
`f~h~' h tncrnr(vs?; inherent in the arms balance to initiate the use of strategic nuclear
!~'r`-`-s and, clr,atly related
u, ae
`
,
quue new or additional forces are weak or absent.
!r, -,n envirrmrna_nr drmrinated Fi-
r
f
l
~ p
nver
u
offensive ca abilities and com ara-1
- P --` ~-_- _P
Lv