DCI SPEECH TO CSIS COUNCILLORS, 16 MAY 1986 ASSESSING GORBACHEV'S USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000100120005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: May 16, 1986
• Content Type: MISC

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DRAFT
DCI SPEECH TO CSIS COUNCILLORS, 16 May 1986
"ASSESSING GORBACHEV's USSR"
Those who deal with the USSR need a hardheaded appreciation of the system,
its policies, and its regime. Providing that to the US Government is one of
the foremost tasks of the US intelligence community.
We peer through a veil of secrecy which has gotten only slightly more
transparent over the last thirty years, largely because of costly,
persistent efforts on our part. And we can't be distracted by elaborate
propaganda and public relations efforts by Moscow, which have become more
energetic under the new Gorbachev regime.
In the last couple of months we have had two prominent episodes that have
helped our highly trained specialists on the USSR and the world at large to
assess what has changed and what has not changed about the new Soviet regime.
One was a carefully stage-managed political extravaganza: the 27th
Congress of the CPSU, the first of what could be three or four under
Gorbachev.
The second was the Chernobyl' (cher-NO-bil) nuclear power plant disaster.
Taken together, these episodes convey a vivid message. It is not
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comforting, but we cannot ignore it. Despite its professed aim to seek
social and economic progress at home and amity with the surrounding world,
this system is the most powerful autocracy-in the world and its leaders are
preoccupied, above all, with the projection of their power over their own
people and their neighbors. The political processes occurring in the USSR
under the new Gorbachev regime appear very unlikely to change this anytime
soon. And we have to deal with it as it is, not on the basis of our hopes
or of the images projected by Soviet propaganda.
Of course, Gorbachev and his team want to, project an image of change to the
outside world and the Soviet people. They want the Soviet people to believe
that the corruption and stagnation that increasingly beset the system in the
1970s and early 1980s will be replaced by new leadership dynamism, economic
growth, technological progress, and social welfare. They want the outside
world to believe that Moscow is ready for fair and truly peaceful relations
with its neighbors on this globe...if only the latter will accept Soviet
status as a superpower and recognize the generosity of Soviet proposals.
Of course, there are some things the new Gorbachev regime is trying to
change. It does want to provide more effective leadership from Moscow. It
does want to reinvigorate economic growth and technological progress. It
does want to reinstill some degree of optimism about the future in the
Soviet people. And it does want to conduct a more effective, successful
foreign policy. Previous leaderships performed badly on all these fronts in
recent years, and Gorbachev wants to do better.
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In a way, although he came to. power by Kremlin intrigue and not any
broad-based political process, Gorbachev has a kind of mandate from his
constituency -- the party-state ruling apparatus, the Nomenklatura -- to get
the country moving again along these lines. At the same time, he has an
equally powerful mandate from that same constituency to preserve and
strengthen all the essential features of the Soviet power structure, at home
and abroad. He did not become General Secretary to jeopardize, much less
dismantle, the system inaugurated by Lenin, constructed by Stalin, and
nurtured by their successors.
It is fair to say that, in the Soviet context, Gorbachev is a
neo-conservative figure, not a liberalizer. There is a lot of old-time
Leninist religion in his outlook. His speeches are full of talk about "back
to Leninism." He is clearly determined to reinvigorate the mobilizing role
of the party apparatus and the Communist ideology, both of which had gone
somewhat slack in recent years. Everytime he talks about institutional
reforms to straighten out the economy, he or his lieutenants sternly remind
everyone that "socialist principles" will not be abandoned. Which means
highly centralized planning and the political power of the Kremlin oligarchy
are to be safeguarded.
Gorbachev, with all his new looks and improved speech, is in many ways the
archetypical product of his system: He is an apparatchik. He chose and
started his political career in the Young Communist League under Stalin. He
advanced with the patronage of such figures as Suslov,.the ideological
watchdog of the system for decades, and Andropov, its most successful secret
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policeman since the Dzherzhinskiy, the founder of the KBG. He is not an
economic technocrat, having run no farms or factories except from his party
office.
Gorbachev is, in short, a political operator within the Soviet power
structure. He is obviously skilled at political maneuver and struggle. He
is confident of his skills. He is tactically cynical and ruthless. His
public pronouncements, the testimony of insiders, and the impressions of
Westerners who have met him all say he is also a true believer in his
ideology. Both of these qualities -- maneuvering skill and ideological
commitment -- go with another quality we should not overlook, a certain
naivete, ignorance, and inexperience with respect to the outside world. He
thinks he can exploit Western public opinion with better propaganda, and he
may prove right. But he shows little understanding of what makes democratic
politics and capitalist economics really work. This naivete, incidentally,
could lead him into dangerous miscalculations in foreign policy.
Underneath the rhetoric about change, the policy agenda of the new Soviet
leadership is very much like that of its predecessors.
Gorbachev seeks economic growth through technological modernization, to
attain a stronger base for further economic growth, for military power,
and for some degree of welfare improvements. As did Brezhnev...but not
effectively.
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Gorbachev wants to maintain reliable control of East Europe and to
integrate it more fully with the Soviet political and economic system.
As did Brezhnev.
Gorbachev wants to organize Soviet relations with his neighbors in
Europe, in Asia, and to the south on the basis of their respect for
Soviet power and security interests. As did Brezhnev.
Gorbachev sees the management of Soviet relations with the US as his
central foreign policy problem, and wants to use detente and arms
control as political tools to slacken US actions and defense programs
that challenge Soviet power objectives. As did Brezhnev.
Gorbachev sees continued expansion of Soviet influence in the Third
World as one of the pillars of Soviet superpower status, especially
through the backing of radical Leninist elites employing military
tools. As did Brezhnev.
In foreign policy, some of the tactics have changed. And the role of what
we currently call "public diplomacy" has clearly expanded. But the basic
objectives appear to have remained remarkably constant.
The new Soviet regime has the outlines and some of the elements of a
strategy for economic revitalization, although it is not yet complete.
First comes the so-called human factors campaign. This involves the
placement of better managers, penalizing the most flagrant corruption,
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reducing alcohol abuse, and a lot of exhortation. Quite simply,
Gorbachev wants managers to manage and the workers to work. These
measures have boosted economic performance somewhat. But there are
doubts about its sustainability. We have no doubts that these measures
fail to address the root causes of Soviet problems: technological
backwardness, and the lack of incentives to work, to risk, and to
innovate.
The second element of the economic strategy is concentrate of investment
resources in the machinery and hi-tech industrial sectors to provide the
wherewithal for a modernization of the economy as a whole in the years
ahead. These efforts will produce an upsurge in modern machinery output
in the near term.
But the sustained acceleration of techological modernization throughout
the economy depends on the third element of the strategy which is much
talked about, but not in place, and evidently, not even agreed upon
within the political leadership: Reform of the management and
decisionmaking structure.
Here we have from Gorbachev two largely contradictory admonitions -- both
.to strengthen central planning at the top and to enhance enterprise
automony at the bottom -- and some vague hints about policies yet to be
implemented, such as price reform, encourging wholesale trade in capital
goods, and freeing the farmers to market more of their own product.
Where we have seen specifics on these measures since the party congress,
they are very conservative. Most analysts believe the benefits will be
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ol_II I 1111 1i.ea.
The problem is, of course, that the Soviets cannot contemplate real
economic reform without simultaneously contemplating an erosion of the
power of the party and the central oligarchy, and with it the material
privileges that make power in the USSR worthwhile. The nearest thing to
spontaneous debate they had at the recent party congress makes it clear
how sensitive this issue is.
Now we come to a question of the highest importance to the Soviet
leadership and to us: Will the economic needs and plans of the new
leadership undermine the military programs that are the real foundation
of Soviet superpower status and upon which Soviet hopes to expand that
status rest?
Soviet propagandists say that they want to restrain defense spending in
the interest of economic growth...and there is some truth in this.
Soviet military leaders say that economic growth and technological
modernization throughout the society are needed for the USSR to sustain
the long-range competition in high-technology weapons. There is much
truth in this.
What is the net assessment, so to speak? Our analysis leads to the view
that, over the course of the current five year plan out to 1990, there is
less of a conflict between Soviet economic plans and Soviet military
programs than meets the eye.
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Soviet economic growth and investment objectives will augur for a
relatively flat rate of growth in Soviet military hardware procurement
over the next five years, as they have seen for the,past eight years or
so. They will be able to continue to buy a very large volume of weapons
and equipment despite their other priorities because they have already
put into place the production lines which will sustain impressive rates
of weapons production and force modernization over this period.
During the past five years, the Soviets procured something like
800 long-range ballistic missiles
40 new missile and attack submarines
2,400 new tactical fighter,aircraft of modern design
12,500 new tanks
Tnus, so far as its plans have been laid down, the new Soviet regime
appears intent upon and capable of sustaining the structure and the
modernization of its basic strategic architecture. This will involve
four major components:
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First, active and civil defense programs for the defense of the
homeland in a major war with the West, including nuclear war. We
shall see modernization of Soviet air defenses. We shall also see
the continuation of long-standing programs for the development of ABM
defenses of the conventional sort, using ground based missiles and
radar, and equally long-standing programs for development of the more
exotic technologies for missile defense such as embraced by our SDI
program.
Second, the maintenance and modernization of massive continental land
and air forces, both conventional and nuclear, for the dominance of
the Eurasian theaters around the Soviet periphery, in Europe,
Northeast Asia, and the Middle-East/South Asia.
Third, the modernization of long-range nuclear strike forces against
NATO Europe, the Far East, and the Continental US. These are, in
Soviet doctrine, the long-range nuclear artillery which is intended
to back up the missions of homeland defense through destruction of
enemy nuclear targets, and also to back up the missions of dominating
the Eurasian periphery -- either by deterring nuclear attacks on
Soviet forces or by destroying the sources of such attacks.
Finally, the fourth element -- of growing importance in Soviet force
structure -- the capability to project military power at a distance,
through a blue-water navy, long range air and sea lift, and growing
resources for the supply of arms and military assistance to distant
clients. These capabilities will be increasingly supported by Soviet
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access to distant bases, such as Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. They
mayfor many years be outweighed by comparable US naval and air
capabilities for power projection. But we must remember that these
US and Soviet power projection capabilities are quite unlikely to
come into head-to-head conflict. Rather these Soviet capabilities
are intended for military-political support of distant clients in
low-intensity conflict situations. The US problem of dealing with
these is largely a political one, mustering the political will to
bring military, paramilitary, and other resources to bear.
All these military goals the Soviets can continue to sustain at a more or
less level defense procurement effort -- for that matter, even with a
slightly declining one. Steadiness and continuity are the hallmarks of
their effort, not rapid ups and downs such as the US has witnessed in the
post-war years.
But there are problems which loom in the distance for Moscow. The Soviet
military are very conscious of them. Under the influence of such
innovative strategic thinkers as Marshal Ogarkov, Soviet military
doctrine appears to be evolving in the direction of more emphasis on
hi-technology conventional forces and somewhat less emphasis on nuclear
forces. The aim is a better mix of forces that are useful in peacetime
power politics and for the conduct of real wars, which the Soviet
marshals would increasingly prefer to wage without nuclear weapons even
though they want to be fully prepared for nuclear combat. Soviet arms
control proposals for reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons appear to
be in part designed to promote these doctrinal aims, by their political
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and psychological effects, even if formal agreements are never reached.
There are two problems for the Soviet marshals here:
First, the emphasis on hi-tech and costly conventional weapons in the
future requires that the Soviet technology base across the economy,
not just in the military industries, must be ready to take the
burden. But there are reasons to question whether Gorbachev's
conservative economic measures will modernize the Soviet economy fast
enough.
Second, the US and its allies are conducting -- and, one hopes, will
be able to sustain in the future -- military modernization programs
and technology initiatives which will tend to oblige the dispersal of
Soviet military technological resources across a broad range of
nuclear and conventional, offensive and defense programs, precisely
when the Soviet military would like to concentrate them on hi-tech
conventional forces for offensive operations in the theater.
These US and NATO challenges are our strategic force modernization
programs, our conventional force modernization programs -- especially the
so-called emerging technologies for combatting Soviet tank armies -- and,
of course, the Strategic Defense Initiative. Emerging NATO technologies
on the conventional front and the SDI are exceptionally disturbing
challenges to the Soviets because they attack the weapons on which the
entire structure of Soviet strategic doctrine most depends: the tank and
the long-range ballistic missile.
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The Soviet marshals want General Secretary Gorbachev to solve both of
these problems for them. They want him to fix up the economic and
technology base to be ready for a demanding new round of weapons
competition, especially in the conventional area. And they want him to
use whatever diplomatic, propaganda, and arms control initiatives he can
come up with to talk the US and its allies out of their challenging new
military initiatives before they bear their unwelcome fruit for the
Soviet military.
Achieving the latter is the main purpose of Gorbachev's foreign policy
toward the US and Europe now. He wants to create a political environment
which is most congenial to the slackening of Western defense efforts, and
especially to a new sag in the level of US defense spending. He wants to
achieve this without any basic revision of the structure of Soviet
strategic power or the direction of Soviet foreign policy aims. This is
what his arms control initiatives are basically all about. They are, on
one hand, grandiose, but, on the other, not supported by any detailed
explanation of how they would be implemented, nor even by any readiness
of Soviet delegates at the bargaining table to even discuss them in
practical terms.
To call Soviet arms control proposals propaganda somewhat understates
their political importance. They are designed, not for negotiation, but
for political effect in the very important cause of slackening Western
defense efforts without Soviet concessions or even real negotiations.
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Meanwhile, the Gorbachev regime continues the expansionist program in the
Third World which saw such a "great leap forward" under the leadership of
Brezhnev.
In Nicaragua, the Soviets hope to see the consolidation of an
authentic Marxist-Leninist regime, supplying economic aid, military
equipment, and political advice and support to that end. This will
provide a base for further application of the Leninist formula for
revolutionary progress in Central and Latin America.
In southern Africa, they seek to consolidate the Angolan Marxist
regime and to reestablish their hold on Mozambique after some
wavering by it leader. This will provide bases for more of the same
in this troubled region.
The same holds true in Ethiopia, where consolidation of a Leninist
autocracy takes precedence over any humanitarian concern in a land of
starvation.
When their own machinations stimulated murderous factional strife in
South Yemen this spring, the Soviets sought cynically to ascertain
the winning side and then backed it decisively.
In Afghanistan, we see a multifaceted intensification of Soviet
efforts: Intensification of counterinsurgency operations,
intensification of pressures on Pakistan, intensification of internal
.political measures to consolidate the Kabul regime, and
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intensification of diplomatic efforts to split the resistance from
its sources of support, especially Pakistan. So far as we can see,
none of this is authentically directed at a peaceful settlement
acceptable to anyone but Moscow. Rather it is aimed at stimulating a
.-political process which leads others eventually to accept Soviet
domination of Afghanistan, and the Soviet military presence needed to
preserve it.
There are, of course, many other aspects of Soviet policy toward the
Third World, from more or less normal diplomacy with countries such as
India and Peru, to covert political action in all countries. We can
expect the Soviets to seek political inroads with the new government in
the Philippines. They will work both their established clients, Syria
and the PLO, and moderate Arabs to enhance their influence in the Middle
East. All in all, notwithstanding the muting of Soviet revolutionary
rhetoric recently which has made certain clients such as Castro a bit
nervous, we do not see any significant retrenchment of Soviet interest
and involvement in Third World affairs.
Recent Soviet behavior toward Libya is a revealing case in point.
Qadhafi's adventurism and terrorism have, of course, long rested on a
foundation of Soviet supplied military power. The Soviets have multiple
interests to serve: hard currency earnings, but especially troublemaking
for the West. They have never regarded Qadhafi as a stable and reliable
ally, but rather as a volatile, speculative investment worthy of support,
and yet no risky commitment. This policy has continued under Gorbachev
who received Qadhafi on a state visit last fall,
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accelerated Soviet SA-5 SAM deliveries this winter, and sent him a
"dear comrade" letter in the wake of our air strikes. .
Thirty years of activity have given the USSR a diversified portfolio
of investments in Third World revolution. They are a vital part of
Soviet status as a global superpower and the Kremlin's image of
itself. Gorbachev shows no sign at present of retrenchment.
This is admittedly a grim assessment of the current Soviet regime, rather
starkly in contrast to many hopes and expectations at its onset. You may
ask whether there is any good news for the Free World. Yes, indeed,
there is!
While the USSR is avaricious and very powerful, it is not all powerful.
It can be effectively resisted by determined diplomacy, by sustained
defense programs, and by support to those who oppose its avarice directly.
If the foreign aggrandizements of the USSR are effectively resisted,
there is a fair chance that lack of foreign policy success could combine
with failures to fulfill domestic economic plans. Together they might
bring Gorbachev or perhaps another successor to reevaluate basic Soviet
policy priorities. This could come out in favor of a real emphasis on
domestic welfare and a deemphasis on foreign and military power, rather
than the sham or superficial shifts we are now seeing. This is just a
possibility. It should not be excluded. But it would be even worse to
assume it is now a reality, when it is not.
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Finally, there is a possibility -- again just a possibility -- that the
Gorbachev regime -- even though it is neither liberal nor really
reformist -- could encourage by its exaggerated rhetoric and conservative
measures increased pressures on it from below, from the society itself.
This brings us back to our starting point. At the party congress,
Gorbachev promised openness, in Russian "glasnost". At Chernobyl the
people got cavalier disregard for the public good, secrecy, evasions, and
the familiar priority: protect the power and the image of the ruling
establishment no matter what the cost to the people. The peoples of the
USSR have put up with this patiently for decades, indeed centuries.
Perhaps their patience will some day wear thin. The Free World cannot
assume that this will happen now, soon, or ever. But for this at least
we should never cease hoping and, and by our own actions and example,
encouraging.
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