LETTER TO DR. ROBERT M. WARNER FROM(Sanitized)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
Dr. Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United. States
National Archives and. Records Service
Eighth Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408
.T V4 -rt Cou-ut3 OA Yet VeAOZ,,
Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United States, and
several members of the NABS staff met with Mr. Thomas White, Director of Infor-
mation Services, and several CIA staff members to discuss the problem of
identifying information concerning intelligence sources and methods that may
be found in unclassified records held at NABS. The concern was that NARS
personnel, when reviewing records which carry no classification markings,
might overlook information concerning intelligence sources and. methods that
requires protection. To aid NARS in overcoming this problem, it was agreed
that CIA would draw up guidelines designed to help NARS personnel identify this
type of information, which will then be set aside for review by CIA personnel.
Such information will be protected under the authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect information concerning intelligence sources and methods.
The problem becomes more acute as systematic classification review at NARS
progresses and involves documents of more recent years when CIA was becoming more
active. ~.^ may well exist in earlier records and may have gone
unnoticed during systematic review of those records ; however, to review
again that material in its entirety for this purpose would be a tremendous
undertaking and possibly not worth the effort. As we gain additional experience
we may be able to pinpoint where intelligence sources and methods information
may be found. We would like to keep open the option of screening again certain
categories of records at NARS that have undergone systematic review but may
have a high potential for containing information requiring protection as
determined by experience.
assified when
Approved For Release 9AO1194R0013000600 gl rated from
 Approved For Release 2005 08/16 QDP3B04R001300060005-7
The guidelines, which are attached, have been written with the following
objectives: (1) to describe the various types of activities in which CIA
engages; (2) to indicate the records which these activities would. generate; and
(3) to suggest where those records may be Found particularly if they are
unclassified. Since we do not have, a great deal of experience with unclassified
records of other U.S. Government agencies, the guidelines will be rather tentative.
We hope that with experience they can be expanded and made more useful.
We appreciated the opportunity to discuss this issue with your personnel.
They presented the problem very clearly and we found the frank and free exchange
of views most informative and helpful. If you or your staff should desire
further discussion of this issue, please do not hesitate to contact. us.
Sincerely,
25X1
Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
Attachment:
Guidelines to aid NARS personnel
identify unclassified information
concerning intelligence sources
and methods
CON I TI A L
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 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/08/16: CIA-RDP93B0l194R001300060005-7
GUIDELINE; TO AID NABS LDEN'1'1PY UNCLASSIFI.L-D INFORMATION
CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
Generally speaking, information that concerns intelligence activities,
sources, and methods is classified. Intelligence activities, by their nature,
must be carried out in secrecy and the records they generate must be protected
for many years. This latter point was reflected in the waiver approved by ISOO
which established a period of 30 years for the systematic re-review of such
information. Generally speaking, we believe that information concerning
intelligence activities, sources, and methods must be protected for a minimum
of 75 years. In spite of the general need and the longevity required for
protection of intelligence-related information, some of this material may carry
no classification markings and be found among unclassified records. This could
happen in records relating to cover, to the creation and maintenance of proprietary
organizations, to obtaining support from outside organizations, and to any dealings
that extend outside the service itself. Cover is an open and overt status that
provides a plausible explanation for the presence and activities of an intelligence
service. Cover is an open and legal device and when it is provided by another
government agency the records generated may well be Luiclassified.
Many of their activities are carried out overtly and correspondence relating to
such activities will not be classified. A proprietary organization is an overt
business entity owned or controlled by an =intelligence service that is used to
provide cover for conducting intelligence operations. Normally, a proprietary
operates openly and does not generate classified information. What is sensitive
and requires protection is the connection between the "proprietary" and the
intelligence service. Some "proprietaries," like Air America, may deal with
many U.S. Government agencies, and their correspondence could be found in the
records of these agencies. Finally, an intelligence service must get all manner
Approved For Release0 411194RO01300060005-7
1
25X1
 CONFIDENTIAL
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of support from other organizations both governmental. and pri.vatc. Ibis will
include all. the materials and services that are required to keep a large and
diverse organization functioning, help in the development and manufacture of
many items, some of which are very esoteric, and. consultations on Just about
every subject imaginable. The sensitivity of the records surrounding these
activities is twofold: it is necessary to protect the, intelligence service so
that its work is not compromised; and it is necessary to protect the business,
institute, private enterprise, or government agency which could be damaged by
revelations of involvement with an .intelligence service and result in denying
further support from that entity. Furthermore, as in all sensitive intelligence
service activities, confidentiality and discretion are promised or impi._ied. and
this trust cannot be abandoned lightly.
Administrative documents form one category of records where unclassified
documents of interest to CIA will be found.
Approved For Relea 5 8 I -
25X1
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 LUNl utIN I IAL
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documents that do not carry a classification marking still should
protected under the authority of this letter.
3. ~orein Liaison. The CIA has the U. S. Government responsibility to
maintain liaison with foreign intelligence and security services.
The U. S. Government policy for such liaison, as expressed by the
yyA5 ro~.Oaaa5:
National Security Council, isl~(a) the fact of broad general intelli-
gence cooperation with countries or groups of countries with which
the U. S. maintains formal military alliances or agreements is
unclassified; (b) the fact of intelligence cooperation between the
U. S. and a specific foreign service or governmental component in an
allied country or description of the nature of intelligence cooperation
between the U. S. and an allied country is classified; (c) the same is
true for specifically-named foreign countries and governmental com-
ponents thereof with which the U. S. is not allied.; (d) details of or
ARC
specifics concerning any intelligence exchange agreement 4-classified
as are the identities of foreign governmental or military personnel
who provide intelligence pursuant to a liaison relationship; and
(e) classified. information resulting from a foreign liaison relation-
ship may be declassified only in accordance with the mutual desire of
the U.S. and the foreign government. All documents relating to
foreign liaison with intelligence and security services will be
classified and generally will remain so. Should any documents
relating to liaison with foreign intelligence and security services
OIL
.e found that are not marked classified, they should be held for
25X1
Approved For Release 26 Q / 194R001300060005-7
S
 CONFIDENTIAL
Security Problems. When there is a threat to U.S. personnel, facilities,
or activities overseas, CIA will usually play a. role in investigating
and. neutralizing that threat. CIA performs all kinds of investigative
actions abroad including liaison with foreign security services who
could play a. role in this type of situation. CIA abroad also supports
other U.S. agencies by providing name traces for visas, or on local
hire employees, bidders for U.S. contracts, U.S. Government grantees,
the senders of "nut." letters, etc. Correspondence generated from
investigative work will normally be classified but care must be ta.keii
Approved For Release 1:1 I 194R001300060005-7
25X1
 CONFIDENTIAL
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since routine background investigative work related to local hires
and other common administrative matters could be unclassified.
6. U.S. MilitaIntelligence and Counterintelligence. CIA is responsible
for (a) coordinating all clandestine activities conducted outside the
U.S. or that involving foreign clandestine services (as noted above);
(b) coordinating clandestine activities with overt collection activities
A+40 conducted abroad;^(c) coordinating the arrangements for cover support
required by any other department or agency to carry out authorized
clandestine activities and. which cover will utilize the Facilities of,
or become identified with, other departments or agencies of the govern-
ment or nongovernmental organizations. CIA also has the primary
responsibility to: (a) conduct espionage and clandestine counterintelli-
gence outside the U.S. as a service of common concern; (b) conduct
ANO
liaison with foreign security and intelligence services ;A(c) maintain
central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information
for the benefit of the intelligence community and to which all departments
and agencies are to contribute. Other departments and agencies with
commands or installations located outside the U.S. may: (a.) conduct
supplementary espionage to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;
(b) conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the
security of their personnel, commands, activities, and installations;
and (c) conduct lia.ision with foreign clandestine services or, when
concerning the clandestine activities described in paragraphs a and b
immediately above, with foreign intelligence or security services.
Intelligence collection requirements, and assessments of the value of
the information collected, will be provided as guidance to CIA from
various departments and agencies and vice versa. In foreign areas,
the CIA will ensure that the senior U.S. representative is appropriately
advised of [J.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities
conducted in or affecting the area. In a foreign. area where major
Approved For Release 2005/ H TilAlk4R001300060005-7
7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/1 PlAq-9 9 J 'I 1 #RO01300060005-7
U.S. military commands are. stationed, the CIA represcntati.vc will
keep senior U.S. military commanders informed of the espionage and.
clandestine counter-intel7.igence activities and operations conducted
by the CIA in or from such areas, including the iiaistori between
CIA and. foreign military establishments. Records generated from
these activities normally will be classified.
KeG ~r~~~gsq~r~ f,witises, To /e. , Oe-erC~at~99o~S, aq+ola0
8 ?~+~ ~Bcoase ~~ -roo,4-r swAv ~.asa+PC~a7e CIA Z^ reAw r
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
Dr. Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408
Recently, Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United States, and
several members of the NABS staff met with Mr. Thomas White, Director of Infor-
mation Services, and several CIA staff members to discuss the problem of
identifying information concerning intelligence sources and methods that may
be found in unclassified records held at NARS. The concern was that NARS
personnel, when reviewing unclassified records, might overlook information
concerning intelligence sources and methods that requires protection but carries
no classification markings. To aid NARS in overcoming this problem, it was
agreed that CIA would draw up guidelines designed to help NARS personnel identify
this type of information which will then be set aside for review by CIA personnel.
Such information will be protected under the authority of the Director of Central
Intelligence to protect information concerning intelligence sources and methods.
The problem becomes more acute as systematic classification review at NARS
progresses into more recent years when CIA was becoming more active. Such infor-
mation may well exist in earlier records and went unnoticed during systematic
review of those records. To re-review that material for this purpose, however,
would be a tremendous undertaking and possibly not worth the effort. As we gain
additional experience we may be able to pinpoint where intelligence sources and
methods information may be found and we would like to keep open the option of
screening certain categories of records at NARS that have undergone systematic
review but may have a high potential for containing information requiring pro-
tection as determined by experience.
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
The proposed guidelines have been written with the objective of:
(1) describing the various types of activities CIA engages in; (2) indicating
what records these activities would generate; and (3) suggesting where those
records may be found particularly if they are unclassified. Since we do not
have a great deal of experience with unclassified records of other U.S. Govern-
ment agencies, the proposed guidelines will be rather tentative. We hope that
with experience they can be expanded upon and made more useful. A copy of the
guidelines is attached.
We appreciated the opportunity of discussing this issue with your
personnel. They presented the problem very clearly and we found the frank and
free exchange of views most informative and helpful. If you or your staff
should desire further discussion of this issue, please do no hesitate to contact
Sincerely,
D
Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration
Attachment:
Guidelines to aid NARS personnel
identify unclassified information
concerning intelligence sources
and methods
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 ::2CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
GUIDELINE TO AID NARS IDENTIFY UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
STAT
Generally speaking, information that concerns intelligence activities,
sources and methods is classified. Intelligence activities, by their nature,
must be carried out in secrecy and therefore the records they generate must be
protected and the protection must last for many years. This latter point was
reflected in the waiver approved by ISOO which established a period of 30 years
for the systematic re-review of such information. We believe that information
concerning intelligence activities, sources and methods must be protected for a
minimum of 75 years. In spite of the general need and the longevity required
for protection of intelligence-related information, some of this material may
carry no classification markings and be found among unclassified records. This
could happen in records relating to cover, to the creation and maintenance of
proprietary organizations, to obtaining support from outside organizations, and
to any dealings that extend outside the service itself. Cover is an open and
overt status that provides a plausible explanation for the presence and a.ctiv-
ities of an intelligence service. Cover is an open and legal device and when
it is provided by another government agency the records generated may well be
Many of their activities are carried out
overtly and correspondence relating to such activities will not be classified.
QRGtAm t'&ArsPoj
A proprietaryvs an overt business entity owned or controlled by an intelligence
tort eoLftDUGrIAJ5, ,.frrn.- eeasewo6MA
service that is used to provide cover Normally a'tproprietaryooperates openly
and does not generate classified information. What is seisitive and requires
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : Cki4-RDP93B011,94R001300060005-7
protection is the connection between the proprietary and the intelligence service.
Some proprietaries', like Air America, may deal with many U.S. Government agencies
and their correspondence could Wa"r in the records of these agencies. Finally,
an intelligence service must get all manner of support from other organizations
both governmental and private. This will include all the materials and services
that are required to keep a large and diverse organization functioning, help in
the development and manufacture of many items some of which are very esoteric,
and consultations on just about every subject imaginable. The sensitivity of
the records surrounding these activities is twofold: it is necessary to protect
the intelligence service so that its work is not compromised; and it is necessary
to protect the business, institute, private enterprise, or government agency
which could be damaged by revelations of involvement with an intelligence service
and result in denying further support from that entity. Furthermore, as in all
sensitive intelligence service activities, confidentiality and discretion are
promised or implied and this trust cannot be abandoned lightly.
Administrative documents form one category of records where unclassified
documents of interest to CIA will be found.
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
L
 STAT Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
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 Approved or Release - -
STAT
2. Intelligence Reporting. This includes CIA-originated reports
although CIA-obtained information may be found in the reporting of
other U.S. agencies. The latter is particularly true of State and
military reporting because of the strong similarity in, and the
common targets among, these agencies. Generally, almost all such
reports will be classified and if dated after 1 January 1946 are
automatically exempt from declassification by authority of the
letter from the Director of Central Intelligence to the Archivist
of the United States dated 16 October 1978. Any such reports that
are not classified will still be protected under this letter. A-4
3. Foreign Liaison. The CIA has the U. S. Government responsibility to
maintain liaison with foreign intelligence and security services.
The U. S. Government policy for such liaison, as expressed by the
National Security Council, is: (a) The fact of broad general intelli-
gence cooperation with countries or groups of countries with which
the U. S. maintains formal military alliances or agreements is
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7
4
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 k kDP93B01194R001300060005-7
unclassified; (b) The fact of Aintelligence cooperation between the
U. S. and a specli"ic foreign service or governmental component in an
a
allied country or,description of the nature of intelligence cooperation
between the U. S. and an allied country is classified; (c) The same is
true for specifically-namSforeign countries and governmental com-
ponents thereof with which the U. S. is not allied; (d) Details of or
specifics concerning any intelligence exchange agreement is classified
as are the identities of foreign governmental or military personnel
who provide intelligence pursuant to a liaison relationship; and
(e) Classified information resulting from a foreign liaison relation-
ship may be declassified only in accordance with the mutual desire of
the U.S. and the foreign government. All documents relating to
foreign liaison with intelligence and security services
classified and generally will remain so. ~kany documents
relating to liaison with foreign intelligence and security services
_5found that are not& ified, they should be held for CIA review.
4. Defectors and Refugees. The CIA plays a primary role in receiving,
debriefing and handling defectors. This is coordinated with other
U.S. Government agencies in terms both of sharing the product and
providing support. State and the military services are most often
involved and, the correspondence generated in coordinating this
activity classified. Reports obtained from the defector
sw~ e sent to interested U.S. Government agencies and%such reports
assified and exempt from declassification under the Director's
letter as cited above. The handling of refugees is a more integrated
U.S. Government activity. State is primarily responsible but CIA and
the military services play an important role including the joint manage-
ment of refugee reception centers. Some refugee processing facilities
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7
have been managed jointly by CIA and foreign liaison services. These
facilities process refugees from reception through debriefing after
which they normally are sent on to resettlement camps run by local
governments or international agencies. CIA's principal responsibility
is to see that all the intelligence information is obtained, and that
all counterintelligence questions are identified and resolved. Corre-
spondence generated incl.ude5that necessary to provide for the
support of the facility, that which provides a record of the activity ,-11
and the intelligence reports
ublisher1 Correspondence dealing with
administering and processing refugees may be unclassified, that
involved with defectors t~never be. Intelligence reports resulting
from the debriefings of refugees or defectors normally w4 4i
classified and exempt from declassification under the Director's
letter as cited above.
5. Security Problems. When there is a threat to U.S. personnel, facilities
or activities overseas, CIA will usually play a role in investigating
and, neutralizing that threat. CIA performs all kinds of investigative
actions abroad including liaison with foreign security services who
could play a role in this type of situation. CIA abroad also supports
other U.S. agencies by providing name traces for visas, local
hire employees, as bidders for U.S. contracts, ear U.S. Government
grantees, ea the senders of "nut" letters, etc. Correspondence generated
from investigative work will normally be classified but care must be
taken since routine background investigative work related to local
hires and other common administrative matters could be unclassified.
6. U.S. MilitarIntelligence and Counterintelligence. CIA is responsible
for (a) Coordinating all clandestine activities conducted outside the
U.S. or that involving foreign clandestine services (as noted above);
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7
(b) Coordinating clandestine activities with overt collection activities
conducted abroad; (c) Coordinating the arrangments for cover support
required by any other department or agency to carry out authorized
clandestine activities and which cover will utilize the facilities of,
or become identified with, other departments or agencies of the govern-
ment or nongovernmental organizations. CIA also has the primary
responsibility to: (a) Conduct espionage and clandestine counterintelli-
gence outside the U.S. as a service of common concern; (b) Conduct
liaison with foreign security and intelligence services; (c) Maintain
central indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information
for the benefit of the intelligence community and to which all departments
and agencies are to contribute. Other departments and agencies with
commands or installations located outside the U.S. may: (a) Conduct
supplementary espionage to satisfy departmental intelligence needs;
(b) Conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the
security of their personnel, commands, activities, and installations;
and.(c) Conduct liaision with foreign clandestine services or, when
concerning the clandestine activities described in paragraphs a and b
immediately above, with foreign intelligence or security services.
Intelligence collection requirements and assessments of the value of
the information collected will be provided as guidance to CIA from
various departments and agencies and vice versa. In foreign areas,
the CIA will ensure that the senior U.S. representative is appropriately
advised of U.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities
conducted in or affecting the area. In a foreign area where major
U.S. military commands are stationed, the CIA representative will
keep senior U.S. military commanders informed of the espionage and
clandestine counter-intelligence activities and operations conducted
Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B0l194R001300060005-7
 the ~ pro~ve~For lelease 2005/08/16r Ceas IA-RDP93B0119 RO 1300060005 7 between
CIA and foreign military establishments. Records generated from
these activities normally will be classified.
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 Approved For Rel
se 2005/08/16: CIA-RD
9x3
TRANSMITTAL SLIP
14 Oct 81
TO:
ROOM NO. BUILDING
REMARKS:
F. Y. I. AND
COMMENTS.
FROM:
ROOM NO.
BUILDING
EXTENSION
5-7
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 Approved For Re
ease 2005/08/16 : 01194R0~11300060
TRANSMITTAL 14 Uct
ro:
100M NO. BUILDH
R1
Chief, c
F. Y. I. AND COTM'IENTS.
-70
bb C V m C+JT i
SvcGrs-~r.o??r5, t~.~.,tA-s .igO0~r
'r'HC C4.A-53 ~iG~CA TlDrt ? TL/r5
REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
'P C S1F C- L, 6
CC,SI
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 Approvegk6VTMeMq 2t IttI P93B0119/4ff00
6887
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,
uilding, Agency/Post)
1.
Date
Date
2.
3.
4.
!3.
ion
File
Note and Return
roval
For Clearance
Per Conversation
Reque sted
I
For Correction
Prepare Reply
ulate
Irc
For Your Information
See Me
mment
Investigate
Signature
Coordination
Justi
REMARKS
P c 5 , Cv~ h-o-~` 2
DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions
FROM: (Name, org.
11
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206
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 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
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 Ell {ASSI FI,p INTERNAL 61BO' ~~x T ^ SECRET
UNCL roved~r ~@~eBiieY2005/08/16 : CIA-RDI ~'9F4R0'013%60005-7
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
CRD/OZS/)DA
T N I N
NO.
322 Ames
DATE
26 January 1982
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
PCS/PGLO
2E 14 Hd s
0- Per our discussion by
phone today. Appreciate your
2.
Attn:
help.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
FORM 61 O USE PREVIOUS SECRET CONFIDENTIAL INTERNAL UNCLASSIFIED
3-62 EDITIONS ^ ^ E] USE ONLY ^
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 STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
EXTENSION
NO.
OPS/cRD/OIS
DATE 10 November 19$1
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. C/IPG/INS/D0
ATTN: 0
.e0~
This is the guideline that was
requested by NARS at our June
meeting with them at NARS. Do
2.
you have any comments., suggestions,
etc.? We would like to get it
to NARS as soon as we can because
3.
it has been a while since our
meeting.
4. 02 C..D o rs
5.
6.
7.
10.
11.
R
12.
13.
~
tO f
(
14.
~t/ 1,
~G-VE1~a
15.
CAi
FOR
3-62A 61 O uSEDITIONSUs ^ SECRET ^ CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSI Fl nI~I INTERNAL n r(1 11pp ~uj1J ~~tt SECRET
A roved fey- R ea( '20005/08/16: CIA-RDFI~I B(AgYfQ6VJAA60005-7
^ INTERNAL
USE ONLY
^ UNCLASSIFIED
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 ~-o
$ru~- c r
Releas,? 2005/Q /,V6 : C{ P93BO1194ROCW3 600
;e4
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
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J-( a (f t," /.,?-
 STAT Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
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The Weekly Report of 18-24 June 1981 referred to a meeting held at NARS on 17 June,
durign which the NARS leadership described their review procedures and then proceeded to
levy a request for guidelines which could be used by their reviewers when they encounter
materials that bear no classification markings.The NARS people are understandably concerhed
because they will continue to be faced with the usual mass of paper but, in addition,the
reviewers will be further challenged by a plethora of unmarked documents,possibly often
devoid of the usual indicators,benchmarks or signals 11 lubpaa recognized acd stressed by
us that indicated to the NARS reviewer that the material under review was deserving of
Apm Agency attention
STAT
Solutions to the above dilemna do not readily come to mind but,in the interest bot0 of
protecting our classification equities as well as alleviating NARS's concerns there are
some duggestions we could offer that migght form a_basis for conducting ongoing xmu*mm CRD
reviews: a
A. If it has not already been done,we should have a "sit-down" with Allan T to find out
just how they go about surveying the material that has been accessioned.Are computer a
print-outs made of the material and could the titles and descriptions be made available so
that we might be able to nominate segments oraips b6napae portions/topics that might provide
clues of sensitivity and interest to us? We obviously do not war.t to get involved in the NARS
survey process JOPOW as =su such but it might be helpful if we. could review the print-outs
of the survey which might permit us to get the flavor of the materials which,in turn,might
help to flag ate certain areas or segments that might embrace of reflect matters or materials
STAT
that appear to hold a special interest for us.
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 STAT Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
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 ~ raaat t, ik1ls~ a.c w ? .
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.Juti I97
Dr. James B. Rhoads
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, I.C. 20408
Dear Dr. Rhoads :
Pursuant to Section 3-402 of Executive Order 12065, I hereby issue
and enclose for your use the required systematic review guidelines cover-
ing classified information of United States origin and more than twenty
years old over which the Central Intelligence Agency has classification
jurisdiction. These guidelines were prepared in consultation with your
designated representative Mr. Edwin A. Thoas son, Director of the Records
Declassification Division, National Archives and Records Service.
Copies of this letter and of the enclosed guidelines have been for-
warded to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISM)
for his review, as provided by the Order. Systematic review guidelines
for "foreign govern ttent infort ation" as defined in Section 6-103 of the
Order and in Section I/F of ISOO Directive No. I will be provided at a
later date, in compliance with the provisions of the Order and Directive
concerning such information.
S'IAN'SPIILI) 'I'URNLR
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CLNTkAL I aVIT"L1.I C11'YC! AGENCY
A. Authorization. 'I'1-1e foilowi.ang guidelines apply to information of United
States or in (dh ch is more than 20 years old and over which the Central
Intelligence Agency has classification jurisdiction. Under the provisions of
Section 3-402 of Executive Order 12065, the CIA authorizes the Archivist of
the United States to use these guidelines in the review of such information
upon its transfer to the General Services Administration and accession into
the National Archives.
B. Cate"or.ies of Information Lxcejted ,from Automatic Declassification.
Except for foreign government inTormation, which is exempt iom automatic
declassification under Section 3-404 of the Order, all classified informa-
tion over 20 years old which is tinder the classification jurisdiction of
this agency is automatically declassified unless it falls into one of the
categories described below. Infon;aation in these categories shall. not be
declassified until reviewed for declassification by designated CIA personnel,
and must he referred to CI_\ for such review by all other agencies having
custody thereof. Information in Categories I through 5 below is subject to
another systematic review on the dates specified in parentheses Lander each
of those five categories upon approval of Information Security Oversight
Office (15(.0) 10-year-revieww: requirement waivers as provided in Section
3-401 of the Order. Othen'i.se, information in all categories listed below
shall be so re-reviewed aat 10-year intervals, as necessary until it can be
declassified or assigned a date or event for automatic declassification.
Category 29 is as new category under Section 1-301(g) of the Order.
CA'ITGORY 1
InForiaution constituti.nc; or concerning cryptologic or cryptographic
inteli.igence, inclaadin infonnaation on the development and/or use of any
method, meaans, system, device, installation or activity for the acquisition
or transmission of such intelligence or for the protection of cryptograph- -.
ically processed data including cryptograaph c, coi unications and emanations
security procedures, techniques, materials and equipment.
(Next Review Date: 40 years following initial review.)
C 1T1;GOI- Y 2
Information constituting, or concerning counterintelligence, defined by
Executive Order 12036 of 24 January 1978 (Section 4-202) as ".-information
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 'Jpw~ 1014k
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gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, sabotage,
international terrorist activities or assassinations conducted for or on
behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not including
personnel, physical, document or ccynrnurnications security programs."
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CATEGORY 3
Information concerning or covered by special access, distribution and
protection programs continued or established pursuant to Section 4-2 of
Executive Order 12065, including but not limited to Sensitive Conrnpartmented.
Information (SCI).
(Next Review Date: 30 }ears following initial review,)
CATEGORY 4
Inforn-ation which identifies any undercover personnel or unit(s), or
clandestine human agent(s), of the Central Intelligence Agency or of a
predecessor agency; or which otherwise reveals sensitive intelligence
sources, methods or activities including intelligence plans, policies,
or operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, a predecessor agency,
or any element of either.
(Next Review Date: 30 years following initial review.)
CATEGORY 5
Information covertly acquired which is contained in intelligence reports
and other documents that bear the legend ""MIS IS UNEVALUATED INFOI MATION"
or, lacking this or an equivalent marking, are similar in format or content
to items so marked; and. in which the formats used, subject matter, source
descriptions or other content would, in collections or aggregates of such
reports and/or other documents, reveal the nature, scope or extent of United
States intelligence activities -in, or in relation to, particular foreign
countries or areas or would identify intelligence sources or methods.
(Next Review Date: 3Qyars following initial review.)
Information which reveals or identifies a present, past, or prospective
intelligence source, whether a person, organization, group, technical
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system, mechanism, device, or any other means or instrument that provides,
has provided, or is being developed to provide intelligence.
Information which reveals or identifies a present, past, or prospective
intelligence method, procedure, mode, technique, or requirement used or
being developed to acquire, transmit, analyze, correlate, evaluate, or
process intelligence or to support an. intelligence source, operation, or
activity.
Information that discloses the organizational structure of the Central
Intelligence Agency; the numbers and assignments of CIA personnel; the size
and composition of the CIA budget, including internal and external funding;
logistical and associated support activities and services; security procedures,
techniques, and activities including those applicable to the fields of
conmlmications and data processing; or other quantitative or qualitative
data revealing or indicating the nature, objectives, requirements, priorities,
scope or thrust of CIA activities, including the missions, functions, and
locations of certain CIA components or installations.
CATEGORY 9
Information pertaining to intelligence-related methodologies, techniques,
formulae, equipment, programs or models, including computer simulations,
ranging from initial requirements through planning, source acquisition,
contract initiation, research, design, and testing to production, personnel
training, and operational use.
Infona tion which identifies research, procedures, or data used by CIA
in the acquisition and processing of intelligence or the production of
finished intelligence, when such- identification could reveal the particular
intelligence interest of the CIA, the value of the intelligence, or the
extent of the CIA's knowledge of a particular subject of intelligence interest.
(\TI CORY 11
Information pertaining to training in intelligence sources, methods,
and activities provided under the auspices of CIA to individuals, organi-
zations, or groups that could reveal or identify equipment, materials,
training sites, methods and techniques of instruction, or the identities
of students and instructors.
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(M1 CORY __ 1 12.
Information that could disclose CIA policies and procedures used for
personnel recruitment, assessment, selection, training, assigiunent, and
evaluation.
CATEGORY 13
Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military
action against the United States or other friendly nations.
Information that could create, stimulate, or increase international
tensions in such manner as to impair the conduct of United States foreign
policies.
Information that could deprive the United States of a diplomatic or
economic advantage related to the national security, or that could weaken
the position of the United States or its allies in international negotia.-
tions, or adversely affect other activities pertinent to the resolution
or avoidance of international conflicts or differences having national
security significance.
CATEGORY 16
Information concerning plans prepared, under preparation, or contem-
plated by officials of the United States to meet diplomatic or other
contingencies affecting the national security.
CATEGORY 17
Information that identifies or otherwise reveals activities conducted
abroad. ill support of national foreign policy objectives, and planned and
executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent
or acknowledged publicly; or information that discloses support provided
to such activities.
Information revealing that the United States has obtained, or seeks to
obtain, certain data or materials from or concerning a foreign nation,
organization, or group; the disclosure of which information could adversely
affect United States relations with or activities in a foreign country.
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CATEGORY 19
Infonnation that could lead to political or economic instability, or
to civil disorder or unrest, in a foreign country or jeopardize the lives,
liberty, or property of United States persons in such a country or could
endanger United States Government personnel. or installations there.
Information concerning foreign intentions, capabilities, or activities
which could pose a potential threat to United States national security
interests or to those of allied or other friendly governments.
CATEGORY 21
Infornnation indicating the extent of, or degree of success achieved
by, United States collection of intelligence on and assessment of foreign
military plans, weapons, capabilities, or operations.
CATEGORY 2 2
Information revealing defense plans or posture of the United States,
its allies, or other friendly countries or enabling a foreign nation or
entity to develop countermeasures to such plans or posture.
CATEGORY 23
Information disclosing the capabilities, vulnerabilities, or deployment
of United States weapons or weapons systems.
Information that continues to provide the United States with a scientific,
technical, engineering, economic, or intelligence advantage of value?o the
national security.
CA`ITEGORY 2 S
Information concerning research of a scientific or technical nature
leading to the development of special techniques, procedures, equipment
and equipment configurations, systems, or devices for collection or
production of foreign intelligence; or the operational planning for,
deployment or use thereof in such collection or production, or for other
national security purposes.
CATEGORY 26
Information concerning United States' Government programs to safeguard
nuclear materials, techniques, capabilities, or facilities that could com-
promise, jeopardize or reduce the effectiveness of such programs.
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C:A`I EGORY 27
Information on foreign nuclear programs, activities, capabilities,
technologies, facilities, plans and intentions, weapons and their deployment
that could disclose the nature, scope, or effectiveness of United States
intelligence efforts to monitor nuclear developments abroad or could cause
such efforts to fail or be restricted in a manner detrimental to national
security.
CA'11"GORY 2 8
Infotlrration pertaining to contractual relationships or joint arrange-
ments with individuals, corrurmercial concerns or other entities when such a
relationship or arrangement involves a specific intelligence interest, or
reveals the extent or depth of knowledge or technical expertise possessed
by CIA, or when disclosure of the relationship or arrangements could
jeopardize the other party's willingness or ability to provide services
to CIA.
CATEGORY 29
Information that could result in or lead to action(s) placing an
individual in jeopardy.
C. ~4errcv iusistance to the National Archives. This agency has designated
experienced personnel to gu Ce and assist Nat anal Archives personnel in
identifying and separating documents and specific elements of information
within docuaents under these categories that are deemed to require continued
protection. These CIA-designated personnel are authorized to declassify
categories of information exempted from automatic declassification (listed
in the preceding section) if it is determined that they no longer require
protection. These CIA personnel will make recommendations for continued
classification of the documents or categories of information requiring
continued protection.
D. Continuing AA licat:ion of Earlier Guidelines. The systematic review
quid Ines ariI% a_nstruction: i cnt `i c~l~elow s~iall remain in effect until
canceled or superseded:
1. Downgrading instructions provided in the letter of 16 April 1973
from Lawrence R. Houston, Central Tntelligence Agency General Counsel, to
Dr. James B. P.hoacls, Archivist of the United States.
2 Instructions concerning information on Secret Writing (S/W), cited
in the letter of 8 June 1973 from Central Intelligence
Agency Archivist, to Mr. Edwin A. ompson, Director of the Records Declas-
sification Division, National Archives and Records Service.
STAT
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3. Guidelines concerning Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)
material, cited in the letter of 23 August 1977 to Mr. Edwin A. Thompson,
Director of the Records Declassification Service, National Archives and
Records Service, from Central Intelligence Agency Senior
Review Officer.
Central Intelligence Agency issuance dated 11 December 1978 and
entitled "GUIDFLINFS FOR CLASSIFICUION RL II W OI CIA PREDECESSOR RECORDS
AND INFODL\TION BLIWE N 1941-1946", signed by Chief of the
Classification Review Group, Information Systems Analysis Staff, Direc-
torate of Administration.
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3 June 1981
STAT
MEM)RANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Staff, DO
Chief, Classification Review Division
Chief, Information and Privacy Division
Office of General Counsel
FROM:
Chief, Records Management Division
SUBJECT: Meeting on 17 June 1981 at the National Archives
Attached is background information for the meeting we will be
attending at NARS on 17 June at 1 p.m. to discusss with Dr. Edward Weldon
Agency concerns about protection of unclassified U.S. intelligence
information in NNARS custody. This background 'infornation consists of
an exchange of letters between the DCI and the Acting Administrator of
GSA and minutes of a 4 March 198.1 meeting of Agency personnel of this
and other subjects. Before 17 June I. will inform all participants of
the room number for the meeting.
Attachment
a/s
cc: DIS
C/RSB
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 Approved For Release 26 / 8? f t FAU1 1 BOt194R001300060005-7
r) C 2050
27 APR 191
Mr. Ray Kline
Acting Administrator
General Services Administration
18th F, F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
Dear Mr. Kline:
I would appreciate your cooperation on a matter recently brought
to my attention. It concerns the need for formalized procedures within
the National Archives and Records Service to protect from disclosure
certain unclassified or unmarked United States intelligence information.
The information of concern is that which by law is rrr responsibility
as Director of Central Intelligence to protect, whether or not it is
national security classified.
This responsibility derives from section 102(d)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947, which requires that I protect intelligence sources
and methods information from unauthorized disclosure. In furtherance
of this requirement, section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 exempts CIA from any law which requires disclosure of the
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency.
To ensure my legal responsibilities under both Acts. are fulfilled,
I request that the National Archives and Records Service establish
procedures that will protect from disclosure all U.S. Government
information in its legal custody concerning intelligence sources and
methods, whether national security classified or not, unless previously
officially released or approved for release by the Director of Central
Intelligence or an official authorized by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Your agreement to this request will provide authority for personnel
of the National Archives, and Records Service to protect such information.
I have been advised of and appreciate their continuing efforts to
protect intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure.
Sincerely,
6A^,l?A?
,.
iI W~
William J. Casey
1 'O33rl/ /
,~,& -7X4Z?,,
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 OI S 81-179/1
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FOIA Exemptions (b) (3) and (b) (1) , OSS Records, and
E.O. 12065 Requests
4 March 1981.
1. Discussion of implications of use of FOIA (b) (3) (sources
and methods) exemption, without use of (b)(1) (classification)
exemption, and its impact upon NARS' ability to protect CIA's infor-
mation in NARS' custody. Included is discussion of NARS' claim of
inconsistency between applications under FOIA and E.O. 12065.
After extensive discussion on the use of the (b) (3)
(sources and methods) exemption without the use of the
(b) (1) (classification) exemption, several actions were
proposed as follows:
a. .A technical amendment should be proposed
to E.O. 12065 which would delegate from the DCI
to a lower senior level the authority to classify
a document after the fact when one is located .
under the FOIA process which merits classification.
Records Management Division, OIS has the action
on this particular item.
b. Amend E.O. 12065 to include a statement
that identifies sources and methods, organizational
titles, names of employees, etc., as constituting
identifiable damage if released. Action on this
item has been assigned to RMD/OIS.
c. A letter be prepared to the'Administrator
of General Services (or the Archivist of the U.S.,
as appropriate) signed by the DCI which establishes
an inter-agency agreement making intelligence infor-
mation which concerns sources and methods as an area
which automatically requires continued protection?to
the National Archives even though it is not marked
as classified information. RMD/OIS is to prepare a
draft of this letter and coordinate it with all G~Jta?~'"
appropriate Agency components and with appropriate tv o_
personnel at NARS. Upon completion of all
coordination, this letter will be sent from OIS
to the Director for signature with a copy to Director,
ISOO.
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STAT
d. IPD is to review all FOIA cases where
(b) (3) is claimed without claiming (b) (1) . In
these instances, IPD is to make contact with the
originating office to determine whether (b) (1)
can also be claimed. If neither a component nor
IPD can justify using the (b)(1) exemption, it is
to be referred to the Director of Information
Services, DDA (DIS/DDA) for a determination. These
efforts should avoid the confusion that now arises
at NARS when only (b)(3) is claimed. IPD should
circulate a note to all FOIA personnel establishing
the policy that is to be followed when only (b)(3)
i r~ 1 a marl _
3. Discussion of restrictions placed on Agency OSS records
in NARS' custody.
It was agreed that NARS is in the process of deciding
whether the records should be returned to the Agency.
Because the DO is prepared to service requests for the
OSS records rather than lift any restrictions now placed
on OSS records, it was agreed to wait for NARS to make its
determination and then for the Agency to accept custody
of the OSS records.
4. Discussion of E.O. 12065 mandatory review requests being
handled in same queue as FOIA and PA requests on a first-in,
first-out basis.
After having heard further expansion of the manner in
which the DO maintains its E.O. 12065 queue thus being
ensured that there was really a separate queue for E.O. 12065
requests, the Office of General Counsel representative felt
that we could defend their handling of the E.Q. 12065 requests
and still. not be in violation of IPD's practice that advises
that requests are processed on a first-in, first-out basis.
Thomas H. White
Director of Information Services, DDA
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 General
o\(ed' o - ease 2005/08/16 : C
U-S Registry
Honorable William J. Casey.
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
This is in response to your letter of April 27 regarding
intelligence records in the legal custody of the National
Archives and Records Service. I fully share your determi-
nation to protect from unwarranted disclosure sensitive
U.S. Government information concerning intelligence sources
and methods.
Officials at the National Archives are anxious to discuss
your concerns and explain current National Archives proce-
dures for protecting information about intelligence sources
and methods as well as information about the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. I
have asked Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United
States, to assume responsibility for clarifying and resolving
the concerns addressed in your letter. Please ask your repre-
sentative to contact him directly at the National Archives
and Records Service, Washington, DC 20408, 523-3132, to
arrange a meeting between your staff and his.
I have asked Dr. Weldon to keep me fully informed about this
matter. If I can help further, please let me know.
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 Ho nor 4?0 J E@Ie se $@1 0^8/16: CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Casey;
This is in response to your letter of April 27 regarding
intelligence records in the legal custody of the National
Archives and Records Service. I fully share your determi-
nation to protect from unwarranted disclosure sensitive
U.S. Government information concerning intelligence sources
and methods.
Officials at the National Archives are anxious to discuss
your concerns and explain current National Archives proce-
dures for protecting information about intelligence sources
and methods as well as information about the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Central Intelligence Agency. I
have asked Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United
States, to assume responsibility for clarifying and resolving
the concerns addressed in your letter. Please ask your repre-
sentative to contact him directly at the National Archives
and Records Service, Washington, DC 20405, 523-3132, to
arrange a meeting bet;ieen your staff and his.
I have asked Dr. Weldon to keep me fully informed about this
matter. If I can help further, please let me know.
Sincerely,
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 )IJTIMIG AND RECORD SHEET
1Su&JECT: (oi?tionai) Approve or Release 2005708716 : - -
Letter to GSA re Intelligence Information in NARS
FROM: EXTENSION NO.
! hx Hugel
Deputy Director for Administration DATE
7D18 Headquarters t 193;
TO. (Officer designation, room number, and DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
OGC NAR.S-management personnel recently.
7C36 Headquarters brought to our attention their--:
need for a
th
it
t
t
bli
h
DDCI
7E12 Headquarters
u
or
y
o es
a
s
procedures to protect unclassified
or unmarked intelligence sources
and methods information from
unauthorized disclosure. At the
present MARS can protect such
information only when it is
properly- classified and maiked:::`iri`
accordance with Executive
Order 1206S 'National-`Security
The Acting Administrator of General
Services agreement with your
request will provide.NARS with the
needed authority and help to
ensure that your responsibilities
tinder -- the National Security
Act of'1947 are fulfilled.
Note :y"We .: understand;:, that. some
Personnel within NABS may, take-=
exception-to enforcing DCI
authority on other than CIA
records.
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;
'
 tt tt~~ n~~ OIS Registry
A roved For Releas t2 Uokb?1g~n 1A-RI j~93B01194R0013000600 - ~~
pp
Washingti?i f) C 20505
17-.A, 8 )
Mr. Ray Kline
Acting Administrator
General Services Administration
18th & F Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20405
Dear Mr. Kline:
I would appreciate your cooperation on a matter recently brought
to my attention. It concerns the need for formalized procedures within
the National Archives and Records Service to protect from disclosure
certain unclassified or unmarked United States intelligence information.
The information of concern is that which by law is my responsibility
as Director of Central Intelligence to protect, whether or not it is
national security classified.
This responsibility derives from section 102(d)(3) of the National
Security Act of 1947, which requires that I protect intelligence sources
and methods information from unauthorized disclosure. In furtherance
of this requirement, section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 exempts CIA from any law which requires disclosure of the
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the Agency.
To ensure my legal responsibilities under both Acts are fulfilled,
I request that the National Archives and Records Service establish
procedures that will protect from disclosure all U.S. Government
information in its legal custody concerning intelligence sources and
methods, whether national security classified or not, unless previously
officially released or approved for release by the Director of Central
Intelligence or an official authorized by the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Your agreement to this request will provide authority for personnel
of the National Archives and Records Service to protect such information.
I have. been. advised of and appreciate their continuing efforts 1~o-
protect intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure._
Sincerely, -
'W. lu
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William J. Casey
 Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060005-7
STAT
STAT
STAT
?TAT
Meeting, June 17
Central Intelligence Agency
Tom White. Director of Information Services
Deputy Director of Information Services
Chief, Records Management Division
Chief, Records System Branch
Records Management Officer, Director of Operations
Freedom of Information Officer, Director of Operations
ffice of General Counsel
Records Declassification Division
Chief, Information and Privacy Division
Information Security Oversight Office
National Archives
Ed Weldon, Deputy Archivist
Gary Brooks, Office of General Counsel, GSA
Alan Thompson, Director, Records Declassification Division
Milt Gustafson, Chief, Diplomatic Records Branch
Bob Wolfe, Chief, Modern Military Records Branch
Janet Hargett, Chief, Reference Branch, General Archives Division
Jerry Tagge, Records Disposition Division
Mary Ann Wallace, Director, Program Coordination Staff
Bill Leary, Program Coordination Staff
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 Approved For Release 2005/Q8/16 : CIA-RDP93BO 194RO01300060005-7
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kll-~ (f /
oz~
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 o;e
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Iool~
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Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01194RO01300060005-7
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