GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION DURING DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF RECORDS FROM THE PERIOD 1946-1954

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Content Type: REGULATION

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GUIDELINES FOR IDENTIFYING AND HANDLING CIA INFORMATION
DURING DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW RECORDS THE PERIOD 1946-54
INTRODUCTION
This guideline will serve as the basis for identifying and handling
information which was originated between 1946 and 1954 by the CIA or one of
its predecessor organizations, or is information from that period which falls
under CIA jurisdiction. This guideline provides no authority to declassify
information. Its purpose is to provide background and general descriptions
intended to aid declassification review personnel to identify CIA material
that may be found in the records of other agencies. When such material is
found it must be reviewed for declassification by CIA personnel. This is
necessary because an intelligence agency has special security problems.
All components of an intelligence agency are either directly involved in
clandestine work, provide support to elements that are engaged in clandestine
work, or are involved in processing clandestinely acquired information into a
finished intelligence product. Whatever their role, there is an interrela-
tionship among these elements which makes them all sensitive to one degree
or another and an exposure in one can lead to an exposure in another. It
requires a thorough understanding of these components and their interrela-
tionships to assess the degree of sensitivity of information relating to
intelligence matters and pass credible judgment on its classification status. (U)
The inherent sensitivity of intelligence organizations is attested to by
the fact that no other nation allows, let alone requires, its intelligence
organization to make its records public except after a minimum of 30 years
and then sources and methods are still completely protected. This point is
important from another aspect: the intelligence services of nations friendly
to the U.S. are keenly aware of the situation created by the Freedom of
Information Act, the Privacy Act, mandatory review, and systematic declassifi-
cation review, and are very sensitive to the possibility that information
that they pass to the U.S. government may be exposed. For this reason, we do
not declassify or even downgrade information from other intelligence services
without their concurrence. (C)
BACKGROUND
During the years 1946 to 1954, U.S. intelligence was passing through a
transitional period. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which played
the major U.S. intelligence role during WWII, was disbanded on 1 October 1945.
It was succeeded by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) which existed for one
year. The records of the OSS and the SSU reflect a wartime context, being
staffed with military personnel and putting emphasis on "hot war" activities
related to the achievement of military objectives. On 22 January 1946 the
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was created and began to take in more
civilians while it succeeded in absorbing the SSU by the end of October 1946.
The CIG in turn was replaced by the CIA on 18 September 1947. The CIA was 25X1
created as a civilian organization and remains one today. (U)
WARNING NOTICE
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The world environment also was in transition: from wartime, to peacetime,
then very quickly into a "cold war," followed after a few years with hostilities
in Korea, 1950-54. Intelligence activities during the period 1946-54 were not
of wartime nature but they continued to have a strong paramilitary cast.
Considerable resources were devoted to special activities aimed at strengthen-
ing the West and weakening the East through various kinds of direct action
operations. Measures were undertaken to prepare for a "hot war" situation.
Refugee and especially defector debriefings were an important source of
intelligence information although classical intelligence collection operations
were not ignored. Throughout this period the "iron curtain" between the West
and East proved very difficult for our relatively young intelligence agencies
to penetrate, and it restricted the flow of even overt information to the
West. That forced collection efforts into many unlikely areas which normally
would be considered overt. (U)
During this period, CIA and the other U.S. national security agencies
were learning to coordinate their intelligence activities and were developing
channels among themselves and with other U.S. government agencies to get
administrative and operational support. Because intelligence agencies must
establish themselves and operate abroad under some legitimate form, i.e. cover,
Metes . C
The identification of intelligence related documents and information can
be very difficult, and one purpose of this guideline is to assist the records
reviewer in identifying records that relate to intelligence and, more
specifically, to CIA. When files are encountered that relate to CIA, or
relate to intelligence matters, but the specific organization cannot be
determined, they should be given to CIA for declassification review.. (U)
GENERAL GUIDELINE
For the purpose of identifying information relating to CIA we may break
down its activities into four major areas: Plans and Policies; Collection;
Processing and Analysis; and Production and Dissemination. Following is a
brief general description of each of these areas intended to serve as a
framework within which to identify CIA intelligence related information. (U)
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Plans and Policies - Overall guidance to the intelligence
community comes from the National Security Council (NSC). Many
intelligence activities, particularly special activities, are
initiated by the NSC or by presidential commissions such as the
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) or the Operations Coordinating
Board (0CB). Several agencies may be involved in discussing and
eventually adopting and formulating such guidance and the record
of such collective activities may be held by all the participating
agencies. The implementation of such plans must be coordinated at
all levels and with the many types of units. This broad involvement
will be documented and that record will be found somewhere in the
files of the participating agencies. At the NSC level planning
papers often do not indicate the source of the specific information
used. In such a document if an intelligence matter is involved and
it is not possible to identify the specific agency or department
responsible for the information, CIA would like to have the
opportunity to review that material. Classified planning and
policy records relating to intelligence activities normally will
require protection for long periods of time because (1) they
officially confirm U.S. involvement and preclude the use of plausible
denial and, (2) might provide details which could compromise
intelligence sources and methods. (C)
Collection - The acquisition of intelligence information by
all methods of human and technical. This involves the
development, placement, and exploitation of sources that can
obtain the intelligence information that our government needs.
The protection of these intelligence sources is paramount to
preserve the flow of intelligence information, to prevent disruption
in our foreign relations, to protect those persons and organizations
who risk themselves on our behalf, to protect our national
investment in costly projects and technical devices, and to prevent
the targeted persons and countries from becoming aware of our
intelligence efforts and degree of success so they will not take
actions to nullify the results obtained or take aggressive
countermeasures detrimental to our national security. (U)
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While it is generally known, and therefore unclassified, that
CIA conducts intelligence operations around the world, the details
and specifics remain classified. The CIA's covert presence abroad
is made possible by the use of cover, and to maintain that cover
the U.S. government cannot acknowledge that a specific CIA
presence exists abroad. It is also important to protect friends
and allies and to avoid frictions in our foreign relations by not
disclosing details of our presence in specific countries or of our
liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and security
services. Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID)
Security Classification Guidance on Liaison Relationships With
Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security Services,
effective 18 January 1982, (Attachment A), states that the fact of
intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and a specific governmental
component in an allied country, or general description of the nature
of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and one of these
components is classified CONFIDENTIAL unless a higher classification
or no classification has been specified by mutual agreement with the
government or organization concerned. Finally, intelligence agency
elements are stationed abroad to obtain and report information.
Collections of their raw field reports can reveal a great deal about
the organization that produced them. Therefore, all raw, unevaluated,
field intelligence reports dated 1 January 1946 or later are
withheld from automatic declassification under the authority of a
letter from the DCI to the Archivist of the U.S. dated 16 October 1978
which was approved by the Archivist. (U)
Technical Collection - CIA is responsibile for the clandestine
technical collection for the intelligence community - as distinct
from overt technical collection, which is the responsibility n-F the
Department of Defense.
Processin and Analysis - Processing is the conversion of
technical a into in ormation useful to the intelligence analyst.
An example would be the development of film from overhead
reconnaissance, and its examination and reporting by photo interpreters.
Since most of this conversion falls under the heading of
"intelligence methods", the process and technical parameters are
always classified, with the most highly classified information
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being about the degree of success of the system and data which, if
divulged, would aid in the development of countermeasures to
negate collection. (U)
Much of the processing of technical data (such as in the
field of overhead photography) is a joint effort by CIA and other
U.S. government agencies, particularly elements of the Department
of Defense. The research and development of advanced methods of
technical collection is often a joint effort, with CIA sharing
contracting, appropriations, testing, etc. with other agencies.
Consequently, many documents concerning such joint efforts will be
found in the files of all participating agencies. The review of
classified documents arising from such joint activities must be
coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Analysis is generally known and understood as the collation
and processing of raw data from many different sources to find the
solution to some question confronting our policy makers. There are
many specific techniques that will be classified. The weighing and
establishing of priorities for collection data and its use in
estimating foreign capabilities and intentions is an intellectual
process used by all analysts. But the fact that the Agency employs
unique intelligence methodologies, for example, to estimate the
costs of foreign defense activities, is classified. So are
analytical techniques used in assessing the impact of natural
resources, science and technology development, and food and
population factors on foreign military, political, and economic
responses to the U.S. The substantive intelligence produced by
such analysis is often unavailable any other way. (C)
As in the case of processing, CIA has often shared analysis
duties with other government agencies, with many of the private
"think tanks," and with analytical institutions sponsored by
various American universities. CIA often has shared in contracts
other U.S. government agencies have had with such institutions.
Once again, this will result in documents of interest to CIA being
found in many files within and outside the intelligence community,
and review of these classified records from joint activities must
be coordinated with all the agencies involved. (C)
Production and Dissemination - The basic informational end
product o an rote ligence service is the finished intelligence
report. It results from the collation, analysis, and evaluation
of information available on a particular subject from all sources
both overt and covert. (Attachment B is a list of many of the
finished intelligence products that were published and disseminated
by CIA during the period 1946-54.) Most finished intelligence
reports are classified. Many of them include information from
other U.S. government agencies or from foreign governments. This
Means that classification review must be coordinated with other
interested elements before the information can be downgraded or
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declassified. In some cases the titles of intelligence reports
may be sensitive and require careful handling. Also, these
publications receive very wide distribution throughout the U.S.
government and therefore will be found in considerable numbers and
in a variety of files not only in the records of intelligence and
national security agencies but other U.S. government agencies as
well. (U)
The processing and analysis of raw intelligence information
serves to some degree to protect the source of the information.
Nevertheless, the source may be identifiable through the content,
subject matter, nature of the information, peculiar details, and
timing. In a few cases of exceptional importance to U.S.
policymakers the identify of the source may be given to aid in
assessing the value of the intelligence. Information from a
foreign liaison service may be distinguished through its style,
content, subject matter, the conclusions drawn or comments added,
and sometimes by outright identification. Intelligence methods
might also be inferable, particularly where technical means are
used to acquire information because of the nature, content, and
quality of the.data provided. Also, some sensitivity might accrue
to information which concerns the handling and distribution of
intelligence reporting, such as dissemination blocks, cover sheets,
buck slips, and even handwritten margin notes. Such informational
tidbits could indicate what information has been made available to
certain organizations, thus revealing the division of effort in
the intelligence community. It could reveal the names of covert
personnel, identify components whose existence is classified, or
reveal the existence and details of collaboration with a specific
foreign liaison service. (C)
As noted above, information that CIA is responsible for may appear in
documents which are not clearly discernible as CIA-originated, or in documents
originated by other agencies. This makes the identification of CIA involvement
very difficult. As a bottom line, we request reviewers to coordinate with CIA
any information in any document bearing on, or suspected of bearing on, any of
the topics discussed in this paper. Queries should be directed to the
Classification Review Division, Office of Information Services, Directorate for
Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505, or telephone [phone]. (U)
Attachments:
A. DCID
B. CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED
DURING THE PERIOD 1946-54
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE i
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS
WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN
SECURITY SERVICES
(Effective 18 January 1982)
Pursuant to Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, Executive Order
12333, and Executive Order 12065, the following is established as security
classification guidance to representatives of U.S. departments, agencies and military
commands who conduct, supervise or coordinate intelligence liaison with foreign
intelligence and security services and international organization.
1. The fact of broad, general intelligence cooperation with a country or group of
countries with which the United States maintains formal military alliances or
agreements (e.g., NATO) is unclassified.
2. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific
governmental component in an allied country (see I above), or general description of
the nature of intelligence cooperation between the United States and one of the
foregoing parties is classified Confidential unless a- higher classification or no
classification is specified by mutual agreement with the government or organization
concerned.
3. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and specifically
named foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the
United States is not allied is classified Secret unless a different classification is
mutually agreed upon.
4. Details of or specifics concerning any intelligence liaison or exchange agreement
will be classified according to content.
5. The identities (including name or title) of foreign governmental or military
personnel who provide intelligence pursuant to such agreements or liaison
relationships will be protected at the same level of classification which applies to the
fact of the intelligence cooperation, or at such different level as may be mutually
agreed upon.
6. Information classified in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 above shall
not be released to any component of either a foreign government or an international
organization without the mutual agreement of the originating parties.
7. Information classified in accordance with this guidance shall be protected as
specified in applicable Executive Orders and may be declassified only in accordance
with the mutual desires of the United States and the foreign government or
international organization whose interests are involved.
8. This directive does not apply to any liaison relationship that is concerned with
U.S. internal security functions, or with criminal or disciplinary matters that are not
directly related to foreign intelligence.
This directive sur)erscdes DCID 1/10 effective 18 May 1976. Nothing it, this directive shall supersede
the guidance provided in DCID 6/3.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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CIA INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED
DURING THE PERIOD 1946-54
ALL CLASSIFIED SSU, CIG, AND CIA INTELLIGENCE REPORTS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.
ALL UNIDENTIFIED CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE PUBLICATIONS SHOULD BE REFERRED TO CIA.
The following is a list of CIA finished intelligence publications that
were produced and disseminated throughout the government during the period
1946-54. Copies may be found in the records holdings of any government
agency that had need of, or use for, foreign intelligence. The titles of the
publications often changed through the years, as did the designations of many
of the CIA components which produced them. Most of these items had cover
sheets with a CIA letterhead, logo, and document number. In certain cases,
however, a plain cover containing only the document title was substituted, or
the CIA cover sheet was removed, for security or other reasons. This listing
is as complete as current institutional memory can make it but there may be
other series found in government files. As experience reveals additional
publications that are, or could be attributable to CIA, they should be
forwarded to the Classification Review Division, Office of Information
Services, Directorate of Administration, CIA, Washington, D.C. 20505.
National Intelligence Surveys (NIS) - Encyclopedic compendium
of facts a out a specific-
peci is country, published by section, with
contributions from all members of the intelligence community; e.g.,
USSR: Agriculture, Bolivia: Naval Forces, etc. The sections were
published as completed, and some sections were updated several
times before the program ended. The NIS's succeeded the JANIS
reports, a similar series published during World War II by a Joint
Army-Navy team.
National Intelli ence Estimate (NIE) - Produced and
coordinate uring t is perio y t e Office of National Estimates,
CIA, on behalf of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) (later
the United States Intelligence Board (USIB)), with contributions
from all members of the intelligence community. NIE's cover long
term problems or situations, and project policy analysis into the
future.
Steal National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE) - originally
called SE's, later called I'E s. Originated the same way as the
NIE's, except that they are spot reports covering immediate
problems or crises.
Current Intelligence Bulletin (CIB) - Brief reports alerting
the intelligence community and senior policy officials to world
events of particular interest. Published daily by the Office of
Current Intelligence and given wide distribution.
Current Intelligence Digest (CID) - a briefer, less formal
version o t e CIB.
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Current Intelligence Summa (CIS), and its codeword version,
the Current Tntelligence Weekly Review (CIWR) - longer, more
complete documents anarticles on current problem areas - published
weekly. Often had one or more annexes which gave a fuller treatment
to one specific problem. The annexes were sometimes published
separately.
Current Support Memos and Current Support Briefs - low level
monographs on economic subjects-of current interest. Published
periodically by the Current Support Staff of the Office of Research
and Reports. Some items were codeword.
ESAU Paers, CAESAR Papers, and POLO Papers - were Staff
Studies produced by the Senior Researc Staff on International
Communism. SRS studies were detailed, scholarly reports on various
aspects of international communism; e.g., the Sino-Soviet dispute
on Party doctrine. These studies were published in series, by
subject matter. Sometimes they were called projects.
Studies in Intelligence - articles and book reviews of lasting
interest in intelligence history, published (during this period) by
the CIA, Office of Training, on a quarterly basis. Classified, but
sometimes appeared with an unclassified annex attached.
Foreign Document Division (FDD) - Translations of foreign
language articles from boo s, magazines, and periodicals of
intelligence interest. These were classified to protect the method
of acquisition and/or the intelligence interest. During most of
this period, the Foreign Document Division was part of the CIA,
Office of Operations. Hence, many FDD translations appeared as
Office of Operations (00) reports.
Consolidated Translation Surve - Longer reports by FDD which
exploite numerous oreign language articles of intelligence interest
for the latest information (often scientific, technical, or economic)
on a single subject, e.g., Soviet electronics, Chinese Medicine, etc.
These were all classified.
Foreign Broadcast Information Division Daily Re ort (FBID) -
publis e in five volumes daily except Saturday and Sunday) by area
of the world, in both classified and unclassified versions. At
that time, FBID was subordinated to the Office of Operations.
Radio Propaganda Reports - produced by FBID's Radio Propaganda
Brancn. Ihese reports analyzed Communist policies, and especially
policy changes, as evidence by their radio propaganda broadcasts.
These were classified.
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Vulnerability Series, Spot Reports, Radio Reaction Series,
Current Development Series - Other FBID reporting of information
ob-t-ainee from the exploitation of foreign radio broadcasts. For
example, because of the popularity of radio stations as a primary
target for coup plotters, first word of upheavals in foreign
countries often came from these reports. Published as necessary.
These were classified.
Biographic Intelligence Bulletin - a short biography of a
foreign personality appearing in the news. If the person was in
the field of science, technology, or economics the bulletin would
be produced by the Biographic Register in the CIA. At this time
biographies of political personalities were produced by the
Biographic Information Division/INR/State Department. However, this
responsibility was transferred to CIA in 1961. Therefore political
biographies, even those with a BID/State cover sheet, must be sent
to CIA for classification review. Biographies of strictly military
personalities were produced by the individual U.S. services and are
now the responsibility of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Biographic Reference Aids - biographies of foreign personalities
grouped by a common interest, e.g. Soviet doctors attending a conference
in Italy, Chinese aircraft designers, etc. All these were classified.
OCR Reference Aids - The Graphics Register, Industrial Register,
and Special Register of the Office of Central Reference also
produced reference aids in the fields of film and still photography,
plant intelligence, and other non-biographic fields.
Intelligence Publications Index (IPI) - a bibliographic aid
which indexed classi ie articles o intelligence interest from all
U.S. government sources (including contractors) and was disseminated
throughout the intelligence community. These were classified.
Published monthly and cumulated semi-annually.
Domestic Contact Reports - sometimes informally called OOB's
from the first three characters of their document number series.
Intelligence reports on all subjects gleaned from interviews with
Americans returned from overseas. These were classified. Published
by the Domestic Contacts Division of the Office of Operations, CIA.
Intelligence Reorts - title usually preceded by the subject
matter, hence, Economic Tntelligence Reports, Scientific Intelligence
Re orts, Geograp is Intelligence Reports, Photographic Intelligence
Reorts, Factory Markings Intelligence Reports, etc."- monographs
produced by t e Intelligence Directorate, CIA, or one of its
constituent offices periodically. Classified and disseminated
according to subject matter, but usually single subjects.
Intelligence Memoranda - also preceded by the subject in the title,
as Scientific Intelligence Memorandum - shorter than reports, and usually
with less research ancoordination. Classified and published as the
occasion warranted.
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