AN ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR REVIEWING MANUSCRIPTS WRITTEN BY PRESENT AND FORMER AGENCY EMPLOYEES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001200100003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 18, 1981
• Content Type: MF

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STAT
1 8 NOV 31
MEMORANDUM EOR: l-Tuty Director for Administration
PROM:
Director of. lnlormation Services
An Alternative Procedure for Reviewing Manuscripts
Written by Present and Rmier Agency Employees
FOIAb2
FOIAb3x
OGC Has
Denied Release
1. Attached IF, a paper that proposes an alternative procedure for
reviewing manuscripts written by present and former Agency employees. It was
prompted by the Director's concern For the number of people involved in this
type or review, and responds to that concern by proposing the designation of
a centralized reviewing unit that would process the manuscripts. The unit
would conduct its omi review for clearance and coordinate, as appropriate,
S upplementary reviews with specific components. In some cases, such as with
novels, poems, and TV scripts that do not reveal actual sensitive intelligence
matters, review by the centralized unit may be all that is necessary. Where
further review is indicated, the manuscript would be reviewed only by those
Agency components directly involved with the substantive matter. Considerable
savings in the manpower directed to this effort could thus be realized.
2. A major objection to this proposal may he concern by a directorate
that its equities may not be identified or properly asse.,sed by the centraii7ed
unit. One means to alleviate this concern would be to ask the four directorates
to assign personnel to the central reviewing unit on a rotational basis.
Attachment:
Paper entitled "An Alternative
Procedure for Reviewing Manuscripts
Written by Present and Former Agency
Employees
Distribution:
Oris - Addressee w/att
1 - OIS Subject. w/att
STAT
- CPD Publication kevicv, Ploeedures w/att
(1
- CRD Chrono w/0 ati
STAT I( c, ?: ?55 I
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AN ALTI;RNATIVE PROCEDURE, EOR REVIEWING MANUSCRT PTS
*MIEN BY PRESENT AND EOINER AGENCY EMPLOYEES
1. This paper examines one method of increasing efficiency- in reviewing
manuscripts written by present and former Agency. employees. It is a procedure
designed to provide reviews equally reliable to those accomplished under the
current procedures but using less manpower by: (1) focusing the review effort
proportionately to the seriousness and sensitivity of the material; and
(2) involving only those Agency components that have equities to protect. This
would be accomplished by creating a centralized review unit consisting of officers
experienced in all four directorates. This group would complete review- of the
less sensitive manuscripts and coordinate, when necessary, with the appropriate
directorates or independent offices on the more sensitive and complicated ones.
The following paragraphs look at this proposition in terms of the way in which
it might work, the advantages and disadvantages, and who might undertake it.
2. Briefly, the procedure might work as follows. Manuscripts from
former Agency employees would be received in the Office of General Counsel
(OCC) which would acknowledge receipt to the author. The manuscript then
would go directly to the central reviewing unit. That unit would establish
administrative controls and assign the manuscript to one or more reviewers
within the unit. A full Agency review would be conducted by the unit,
researching any points that were questionable. If no questions arose or if
the questions that did arise could be resolved satisfactorily within the
unit, the results of the review would be forwarded to OCC. The latter would
conduct their review and would notify the author of the results. If questions
arose that could not be resolved within the central review unit based either
on the cumulative expertise or research material available, the central review
unit would effect coordination with other Agency components that had equities
involved. When this coordination was completed and all questions were resolved
to the satisfaction or concensus of everyone involved, the central review unit
would notify OGC of the results. OGC would review the final results and notify
the author. The procedure currently in force that permits manuscripts written
by current employees to be reviewed and passed upon by the directorate concerned
would be continued.
3. in brief, centralized review of manuscripts would have the following
advantages:
a. Greater consistency in reviewing actions resulting irrOM:
(1) involvement of fewer people; (2) materials being available to
the reviewers to research questions; and (3) review experience
developing at a faster rate because of the concentrated experience.
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//' mor
b. Greater efficiency resulting from: (1) involvement of fewer
persons and the directorates having to review only those materials
which involve their equities; (2) less coordination required;
(3) the reviewers, as specialists, wasting less time; ahd. (4) the
availability. of research materials and access to the DECAL data
base, providing ready answers and saving time.
c. Better supported review decisions resulting from: (1) fuller
knowledge and understanding of the review requirements and.
procedures; (2) greater expertise and professionalism developing
from concentrated. experience; and (3) researched.. decisions being
more typical.
d. Improved capability to develop a data base of released information
through: (I) concentration of expertise and experience; and.
(2) narrow responsibility allowing a. focus of effort OP 11-W problems
faced.
e. Improved recording of review actions, particularly if the record of
these actions is to be computerized_
IT. Continual improvement and enhancement of review procedures and
techniques based on the concentrated and. focused experience.
Provision of greater expertise to help the Agency find an answer to
the problem of the constant flow of inside information to the public
domain.
I). Elimination of confusion caused by the multiple reviews and sometimes
overlapping equities of the four directorates.
g ?
4. Centralized review would have the ioliowing disadvantages:
a. Breadth of expertise within the central unit would be limited to
the experience and background of its staff.
h. The possibility of error could potentially be greater because fewer
people would review each manuscript, and the background that would
be brought directly to bear on substantive matters could be limited.
c. The interests of the directorates could be overlooked if coordination
is not properly effected and certain areas of 'Knowledge are limited
or lacking in the central unit.
S. The Office of Information Services, DDA, already has such a unit: its
Classification Review Division (CRD). GRD consists of officers from all four
directorates who review documents under the Agency's systematic review program.
In addition, they review documents selected for the Department of State's
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Nor
Foreign Relations of the United States series, support the systematic review
programs at other agencies that surface materials affecting Agency equities,
and review nantipts for DDA equities. CRD already is established and has
the expertise in reviewing and coordinating procedures and techniques that are
required by the centralized unit in our proposal. The channels and lines of
communication with other directorates and components of the Agency are already
well established_ it would he an easy matter for CRD to a...sume the additional
responsibility of reviewing from the Agency's standpoint the manuscripts of
current and former Agency employees.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Publications Review Board
FROM:
SUBJECT:
REFERENCE:
Director of Information Services
A Proposal That Could Help
CIA Protect Information (U)
Publications Review Board Minutes,
for Tuesday, 15 June 1982
1. In reference, Mr. Charles E. Wilson asked PRB members
4441 ,04,1414;71,d)-6/44ra A,J2,42,44,pat
in trying
l'2Sill."-4/1"1-"1"1-or'ifie4v04r
to protect classified information aL.4.?seurce-a under present F
reviewing guidelines..coolslatigg.e.s-t -sTri%44,44.11a.. The following
are in response to Mr. Wilson's suggestion:
a. One way to improve our ability to protect
information would be by developing a system to record
information that has been released, Cgr not released,'
by CIA. To the extent that such a system can be
successfully developed to record such information and
make it recallable in response to specific classification
questions, it would help us to become: (1) more consistent
in our review actions; (2) better able to support our
classification decisions with a "track record"; (3) less
vunlnerable to "surprises" from authors sourcing information
that we did not know had been released with CIA approval;
CONFIDENTIAL
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(4) more aware of how CIA may be adversely impacted by the
cumulative or "mosaic" effect; and (5) able to index
material of all types that has been released by CIA. A
system to do this has been proposed by CRD.
b. Consider publishing a more comprehensive and
detailed classification guide for Agency-wide use in
reviewing non-official publications. One such proposed
guideline is attached. (C)
CONFIDENTIAL
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CUIDELJNES FoR THE REVIEW or NON-OFFICIAL PUBLICAliONS
AND ORAL PRESENTATIONS BY EMPLOYEES AND FORMER EMPLOYEES
General Guidelines:
These guidelines are for use in the review of material related to
intelligence matters, produced for communication to the public in a. written
or oral presentation, by persons who are, or have been employed or associated
STAT with the Agency: ( Primarily, these persons will be current and
former employees, but will include persons on contract to CIA, or persons who
now have or previously have had official access to CIA material by reason of
association through employment with private firms or with other government
agencies. These may include, for example, employees of companies doing
consulting work for CIA, employees of the Department of Justice, members of a
congressional staff, etc. All such persons have held a position of trust with
the U.S. Government, and, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, they must
fulfill that trust and fiduciary responsibility to protect sensitive information
learned as a result of their association with the Agency.
The only information to be judged is that which was learned as a result
of employment or association with the CIA, the point being that these persons,
through this association, are seen by the public to be authoritative spokesmen
regarding the Agency's activities, to one degree or another. When a person has
spent a. significant period employed at CIA, it is:presumed that all information
relating to intelligence matters was learned as a. result of that employment_
unless it is sourced by the author otherwise. For those associated with CIA
in other capacities or for relatively short periods of time, a similiar presumption
must be made commensurate with the intimacy and length of their CIA association.
Where such information can be sourced outside CIA, the author is responsible for
supplying source identifications and for the clarity and completeness of that
sourcing._
The decision to delete information is based on a two-part judgment that
(1) the information falls within one of the categories for classified information
established by the executive order, and (2) that its release reasonably could
be expected to cause damage to the national security. The predominate categories
of information that apply to intelligence matters are those that relate to
intelligence activities, sources, or methods; foreign government information; and
U.S. foreign relations which includes Agency liaison relationships. In judging
whether release could cause damage, the reviewer must consider the "worst case"
possibility; i.e., that the individual or organization that could profit most
from the released information will have access to it and be in a position to
exploit it fully. It must be kept in mind that unauthorized disclosure of
foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source,
or intelligence sources and methods is presumed to cause damage to the national
security (Section 1.3(c) of E.O. 12356). When decisions are made to withhold,
fthey-slould be supportable under the "reasonable man" rule. These decisions may
be subjected to review from a legal standpoint but unless there is serious
potential for establishing a damaging legal precedent, they will not be changed.
P.T177
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Reviewers must alsd adhere to the policy, established by Section 1.6(a) of
E.O. 12356, that classification may not be used to conceal violations of law,
inefficiency, or administrative error; to prevent emt/Wssment to a person,
organization, or agency; to restrain competition; or to prevent or delay the
release of information that does not require protection in the interest of
national security.
Specific Guidelines:
The following specific guidelines are intended to regularize the Agency's
approach to manuscript review with the objective of improving our consistency
and fairness in making those reviews. In considering each judgment the proper
balance must be struck between protecting our national security and the public's
right to know; our decisions must be supported by sound reasons; and, although
the executive order provides a broad latitude for withholding information
relating to intelligence matters, a specific item should be withheld only when
it is determined that its release would materially confYibuto to The identification
of a clearly discernible aspect of intelligence matters which is by itself, or
in the aggregate, sensitive. The specific guidelines are:
1. These guidelines apply to information concerning the WWII
period up to the present day.
2. Manuscripts written by either a current or former employee
will be reviewed against identical criteria.
3. The attitude that the author holds towards the CIA is not
to be considered during the review process.
4. The views, opinions, or speculations of an author.are not
normally classified. When an expressed opinion however, cdncides
with the official CIA position and that fact can be drawn from the
context or implied by the acknowledged background of the author, it
may he withheld. For example, the discussion of Intelligence
Community policy, when it is known that the author had participated
in the formulation of that policy, may be withheld.
S. The information contained_ in factual or non-fictional writing
about secret intelligence work, by its very nature, falls squarely
within a. classification category. Such accounts may be so saturated
with classified material that it would be difficult if not impossible
to separate the classified material from the unclassified and leave
an account which would be coherent and meaningful. In such cases
the manuscript should be withheld in toto. Biographical and
autobiographical accounts by persons who have been involved in secret
intelligence work normally will fall within this category. When
factual accounts of secret intelligence work appear in fictional
writing, they may be withheld even if the names of persons and places
have been changed. Organizational titles, generic terms, and tradecraft
common to intelligence activity found. in extant literature in the
public domain may not be withheld. The question is whether there
is sufficient detail to identify actual events, persons, organizations,
or methods unique to this Agency, the Intelligence Community, and
their activities.
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reviewed separately because the limited context may create the
potential for damaging release stemdng from the "mosaic principle."
An exception may be the submission of an outline or first chapter
to "test the waters," but in such cases it must be made clear to the
author that the completed manuscript must be cleared before it can
be released. Reviews of outlines of intended publications and
speeches should include a response to the author that the clearance
applies to the outline only.
7. General statements on intelligence matters may be unclassified
when more specific statements may not be. A statement, for example,
that CIA operates abroad is not classified; however, a statement that
CIA has a station in a. specific foreign city is classified. As a
rule, when the information materially contributes to the identification
of a clearly discernible aspect of the U.S. Intelligence Community's
activities, that is, it provides a material piece of the puzzle, that
information should be withheld.
8. As noted above, the executive order prescribes the classification
of several categories of information concerning national security,
some of which are automatically presumed to cause damage. When
information falls within a category where damage is not automatically
presumed, say in the area of U.S. foreign relations, the reviewer
must determine whether release reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security. In making that determination the
reviewer must assess the credibility of the author in the intelligence
field. That credibility will be derived from the author's Agency
position(s), stature, experience, expertise, and notoriety. The
reviewer must judge what weight an informed person would place on
the author's words. A statement by a former director concerning a
foreign policy matter, for example, may have considerable potential
for damage to foreign relations, whereas the same statement by a
former low-level employee may not.
9. When a. sensitive item is identified for withholding from
a manuscript, care must be exercised to withhold all identifiable
references to it regardless of the phraseology used or the context.
The point is to be as consistent as possible.
10. When information is being deleted, we are not obligated to
suggest alternative language. Similarly, as a matter of discretion,
we will not identify known. errors or inaccuracies to the author.
An exception can be made if the author requests our suggestions or
is amenable to OUT noting inaccuracies.
11. Although damaging information may have been released
previously by oversight or for other reason, each case must be
considered within its own context. For example, we must consider
the credibility of the author or source, the nature and timeliness
of theiiateriai;yand. the possible effectsfirming or highlighting
the information as judged at the time of the review. The courses
of action open to the reviewer are: (1) to withold; (2) to request
specific and clear attribution to the information previously released;
and (3) to suggest that the author be asked to delete the information
voluntarily. It must be kept in mind that the repeated release of
information creates an additional impact by confirming and broadening
the extent of the exposure which conceivably coul d. outweigh the use
of attribution.
I.
r7P";_l. f;:iL ONLY
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DIVoIS
Charles
PUBLICATIONS REVIEW BOARD MINUTES
Tuesday; 15 June 1982, 1030 Hours
E. Wilson, Chairman
xecutive Secretary
Assistant Executive Secretary
DA
C), CCS Representative
DDO Representative
, DDG
DDI
S&T
, DDS&T
, Legal Advisor
RB Reference Center
PRB Reference Center
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STAT
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1. The Publications Review Board convened on Tuesday, 15 June 1982,
in 7B03, Headquarters. (U)
2. (Revised) - Final
Review. The manuscript
as submitted to the Board on 8 June was approved
with one classification
chanae on oage 331 which was an oversight in the
oriainal review.
should have been changed to
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(s)
The Board discussed at length the frustrations of reviewing
this and other autobiographical manuscripts which recount operational
activities and locations. Several members commented on the difficulty
of protecting classified information and sources under present review-
ing guidelines. Some members believed that the Agency should test in
the courts a more strict interpretation of the Executive Order or the
legality of the Summary of Agency Employment, or explore other legal
means of protecting information. It was noted that the Board might
approve information on the basis of previous disclosures only if the
language were precisely the same as that previously disclosed. Approv-
ing information that is merely generally the same opens wider doors
that lead to a persistent increase in the amount of information
disclosed. (U)
25X1 said that the new Executive Order on Classification,
effective in August, will present an opportunity to enforce security
objections on a broader scale. I said he would schedule
an Executive Order briefing for the Board by I in
the near future. (U)
Mr. Wilson asked those members who felt strongly about these
issues to express their feeling in a short paragraph and to suggest
solutions. He offered to summarize them for forwarding to the
Executive Committee in a consolidated PRB position paper. (U)
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SECPT'T
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2. David Atlee Phillips, Material to be Utilized in Litigation
David Atlee Phillips v. Donald Freed (644-821; deny letter of
1 December 1975 to Mr. Phillips from the Director of Security because
it identifies an in-place asset. (See 8 June Minutes for the PRB
decisions on the remainder of the submission.) (S)
3. The meeting adjourned at 1125 hours. (U)
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Assistant Executive Secretary, PRB
APPROVED:
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Charles E. Wilson, Chairman
SECRET
Da e
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lnno Rince
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gone rorwaru cluu
purpose in adding a comment./h the event
however that it has been sent back again and,
since you have reqoested a comment,I duly
submit the following for what its worth:
a) its a good,xmtia solid papaax paper with
several Imxtu trenchant points. Its a bit
long perhaps and covers a good deal of
territory which may not be palatable for
DCI or AD/CI swift perusal;
b) Your most salient point,and the item ,
that could stand a bit more elaboration,is
that max the CRD contingent has been in the
review business for 4 years now and,during
that time has been exposed to the widest
variety of review experience;far more than
any of the other reviewing elements in ekkexx
all W other Directorates.We have reviewed
ops Hills from Stations all over the world;
we have plumbed the ancient depths and
mysteries of Archives,WDC,private papers
gathered by leading figures within and out-
side the Agency; sensitive ops cases have
also be under out care;our people have also
dealt with kiWax Presidential Libearies
possessionsx etc.It struck me Stan that
although CRD appears to be ideally suited
and complemented to represent th single
review contingent that you argue for,the
4010k t
concept does not come through with
sufficient force to strike the reader
with the hoped for response from people
on the upper levels; a response that wo uld
iwad promt the reaction from Rimy Casey or
Stein " If this unit has that much experience
and agency kw awareness why can't we leave th
job to them in place of the plethora of
petit juries that are noew involved in ..the
task".
(Comment: The above is of little use
and I am quite sure your product will go'
forward as written,But just in case you
did wa nt a comment,tkix her is a brief
and somewhat lame reaction which your
labors deserve )
C.F.M.
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