CLASSIFICATION REVIEW PROCEDURE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (FGI)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001000240154-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2002
• Sequence Number: 154
• Publication Date: November 28, 1980
• Content Type: REQ

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28 November 1980
Classification Review Procedure
Reference: .79-3
Rescinds: 79-21
Systematic Review of Foreign Government Information (FGI)
1. Attached are the "Guidelines for Systematic Review of Foreign Govern-
ment Information Thirty Years and Older" issued by the Information Security
Oversight Office (ISOO) on 5 March 1980. Since systematic classification review
will be conducted in accordance with these I.SOO Guidelines, all reviewers must
become familiar with them. As they apply to the CIA program of systematic 2 5X1
classification review, special attention should be paid to the following:
25X1
d the broad range
a. The definition of FGI in part B of the Guidelines an of information associated with, as well as resulting from, foreign liaison
relationships that is considered FGI.
b. Individual agency responsibility for the handling of FGI, in part D.
c. The effect of publication in unclassified form of any FGI, in part E.
d. Categories of FGI which require item-by-item review, in part F.
e. Referral and decision provisions which identify the government agencies
having primary jurisdiction in the handling of different substantive cate-
gories of information found in UGI, discussed in part G.
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Scope of the Guidelines
2. Reviewers should be particularly sensitive to our past and present day
intelligence and security service liaison relationships. All such relationships
are sensitive, although the degree of sensitivity will vary from country to
country. Information that reveals cooperation between the U.S. and a specific
government component in an allied country is normally classified as SECRET and
the fact of intelligence cooperation between the U.S. and specifically named
foreign countries and governmental components thereof with which the U.S. is
not allied is normally classified not. less than SECRET. (See DCID No. 1/10
attached for details of "Security Policy Guidance on Liaison Relationships with
Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security Services.") The ISOO
_.._. a ion of FGI withrthe permission of the fore12
Guidelines ,permit the declassification scat
service or se ices involvedi T ce at this time CIA oes no see suc permission
as parr of our wys ematicc revLow program, FGI, whether documents or information, 25X1
will not be declassified. Also FGI documents, obtained officially through
normal liaison and falling within the ISOO Guidelines for FGI, will not be
25X1
Attachment:
DCID No. 1/1.0
"Guidelines for Systematic Review of
Foreign Government Information
Thirty Years and Older" issued by IS00
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 SI'EC11"1C WNILIV GUIDE
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1. FGI as defined in the ISUO Guidelines
A. FGI documents
Review Decision
? Do not declassify or downgrade.
DARE Input:
? Use "21" for retention justification.
? Use "888" for originating component.
---------- ? -Use-113011-for-next-review-date .
B. FGI information which is contained in CIA documents
Review Decision:
o Do not declassify.
o May be downgraded under certain conditions (see
paragraph 2 above and DCID No. 1/10).
DARE Input :
? Use "21" for retention justification.
? Use "10" or "30" for next review date.
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In all cases, no reference to the origin of the information should be made in the
"Review Coordination" field.
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~'~ ((_)E ' .!
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DCID No. 1 In
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE NO. 1/10'
SECURITY POLICY GUIDANCE ON LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS AND FOREIGN
SECURITY SERVICES
(Effective IS May 1976)
Pursuant to Section 102 of the Nat,on;l Security Act of 1947, Fxecutive Order 119R5
and National Security (:o incil Intelligence Directives, the following is established as
security guidance to represi'ntatives of US departments, agencies and military
comtu,u-ds who conduct, supervise or coordinate liaison with 1urc?it;n intelligence and
seciirily services.
E. The fact of broad, general intelligence cooperation with countries or groups of
countries with which they I 'sited States maintains formal military alliances or
.tgreenacnts (e.g., NATO) is unclassified
2. The fact of intelligence cooperation between the United States and a specific
governmental component in an Allied country (see I altosc!, or description of the
nature of intelligence cooperation between the United Slates and any Allied country is
classified Secret unless a different classification is specified.
3. 1 he fact of intelligem r. cooperation between the United States and specifically
named foreign countries and governmental components thereof ww ith which the United
States is not allied is u.rtrnatly classified not less than Secret.
4. Details of or specific's ('41 ncertring any intelligence exchange agreement will be
classified according to content.
5. The identities of foreign governmental or military personnel who provide
intelligence pursuant to such agreements or liaison relationships Mill be piotected at
the same level of classificatIi i ss bleb applies to the fact of the intelligence cooperation,
car it such different I vel is may he required by their gmcrnrnents or individual
circunnstauces.
6. Information classified ;r, accordance with paragraphs 2. 3. 4 and 5 chose shall
not he released to iny turtle;,, county or its representatives except by the mutual
agreement of the t'uited States and the foreign county %% hose intelligence cooperation
is involved.'
7. Information classified in accordance with this guidance shall be exetr)lrt from the
provisions (if the Gel-id I)rcfassifi(.,-tion Schedule of Executive Order 11652 under
esennta( i(ills 51ti1) or 3BIA1, or both. Information about the nature of a -?Lttionship
may lie declassified onl) in accord,on?i with the rnntual desires of the United States
and the foreign govennnenit
h. This directive d..e, not apply to any liaison relationship that is concern-d with
L S. internal secunt% fruritiuns, or with criminal or disciplinary matters that are not
directly related to foreign iaat(?ffig(-r,ct
'This ,Ice( 1451 Su1n?n. ( h . , I ) ( : I I ) I ; l u , I t ? 1 1 , 4 . 19 N,neml,er 1975
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eorge lies
Director ut (:wvtnd Intelligence
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GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC REVIEW OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
THIRTY YEARS OLD OR OLDER
A. PURPOSE.
These Guidelines for the systematic review and declassification of foreign
government information have been developed in accorc.ance with the provisions of
Section 3-404 of Executive Order 12065, "National Security Information," and
Section III.C of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1. All
foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records of the
United States Government, for which a prior declassification date has not been
established, shall be systematically reviewed for declassification as it becomes
thirty years old. Foreign government information found to be within one of the
specific categories of information listed in Part F below shall be reviewed
item-by-item by authorized personnel of the agency or agencies concerned to
determine whether continued protection beyond thirty years is needed. All foreign
government information not identified in these Guidelines as requiring item-by-item
review and for which a prior declassification date has not been established shall
be declassified at the end of thirty years from the date of original classification.
B. DEFINITION.
"Foreign government information" as used in these Guidelines consists of:
1. Documents or material provided by a foreign government or governments,
.international organization of governments, or any element thereof in the expectation,
expressed or implied, that the document, material, or the information contained
therein is to be held in confidence;
2. Documents originated by the United States that contain classified informa-
tion provided, in any manner, to the United States by foreign governments,
international organizations of governments, or elements thereof, with the
expectation, express or implied, that the information will be held in confidence;
3. Classified information or material produced by the United States pursuant
to or as a result of a joint arrangement, evidenced by an exchange of letters,
memorandum of understanding, or other written record, with a foreign government or
organization of governments requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both
be kept in confidence.
C. SCOPE.
1. These Guidelines apply to 30-year old foreign government information
which has been received or classified by the United States Government or its agents. 25X1
Atomic energy information (including that originated prior to 1947 and
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is outside the scope o these ul a Ines an is not
subject to systematic review and may not be automatically downgraded or declassified.
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Any document containing information within the definition of Restricted Data or
Formerly Restricted Data that is not so marked will be referred to the Department
of Energy Office of Classification for review and appropriate marking, except for
licensing and related regulatory matters which shall be referred to the Division of
Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
D. AGENCY RESPONSIBILITIES.
1. Foreign government information transferred to the General Services
Administration for accession into the National Archives of the United States shall
be reviewed for declassification by the Archivist of the United States in accordance
with Executive Order 12065, the directives of the Information Security Oversight
Office, these Guidelines, any applicable terms of accession, and any supplemental
guidelines provided by the agency with classification jurisdiction over the
information.
2. Foreign government information constituting permanently valuable records
of the Government (as defined in 44 U.S.C. 2103) that is 30 years old and undergoing
systematic review for declassification while in the custody of an agency shall,
except as provided in Part C above, be reviewed for declassification and downgrading
by that agency in accordance with Executive Order 12065, the directives of the
Information Security Oversight Office, these Guidelines, and any supplemental
internal agency guidelines.
3. Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed
in Part F of these Guidelines shall be declassified or downgraded only upon specific
authorization of the agencies to which the information was furnished by the foreign
government or international organization of governments concerned and/or which have
classification jurisdiction over it. When such information is in the custody of an
agency but was furnished to or classified by, or is otherwise under the classification
jurisdiction of another agency or agencies the information shall be referred thereto
for review. Information so referred shall remain classified until all reviewing
agencies have authorized its declassification. If the custodial agency cannot readily
identify the agency or agencies having classification jurisdiction, the information
shall be referred in accordance with Part G of these Guidelines for review or
further referral.
4. Consultations with foreign governments concerning the proposed declassi-
fication of foreign government information shall be the responsibility of the agency
having classification jurisdiction over the information affected.
S. Foreign government information falling within any of the categories listed
in Part F of these Guidelines appearing in White House documents, which is either
identifiable as having been furnished or appears to have been furnished by a foreign
government shall be reviewed by designated White House personnel and further referred
for review to any other agencies whose classification interest is indicated by the
nature or content of the documents.
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E. EFFECT OF PUBLICATION.
1. Foreign government information shall he considered declassified when
published in an unclassified United States Government executive branch publication
(e.g., the Foreign Relations of the United States series) or when cleared for such
publication by United States Government executive branch officials authorized to
declassify the information; or if officially published as unclassified by the
foreign government(s) or international organization(s) of governments that furnished
the information unless the fact of the U.S. Government's possession of the infor-
mation requires continued protection.
2. The unofficial publication, in the United States or abroad, of foreign
government information contained in United States or foreign documents, or of
substantially similar information, does not in or of itself constitute or permit
the declassification of such documents. Although prior unofficial publication is
a factor to be considered-in the systematic review process and may affect determin-
ations as to continuation of classification, there nay be valid reasons for continued
protection of the information which could preclude :.ts declassification. In
particular, the classification status of foreign government information which
concerns or derives from intelligence activities, sources or methods shall not be
affected by any unofficial publication of identical or similar information. The
final determination as to the declassification of foreign government information
similar to or identical with unofficially published information shall be made by
the agency or agencies having classification jurisdiction bver it.
F. CATEGORIES REQUIRING ITEM-BY-ITEM REVIEW.
Foreign government information falling into the specific categories listed
below shall be reviewed for declassification in accordance with Part A above:
1. Information exempted from declassification under any joint arrangement
evidenced by an exchange of letters, memorandum of understanding, or other written
record, with the foreign government or international organization of governments, or
element(s) thereof, that furnished the information. Questions concerning the
existence or applicability of such arrangements shall be referred to the agency or
agencies holding classification jurisdiction over the records under review.
2. Information related to the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities,
foreign and domestic, including but not necessarily limited to vulnerabilities and
vulnerability assessments of nuclear facilities and Special Nuclear Material.
3. Nuclear arms control information (see also #11 below).
4. Information regarding foreign nuclear programs (other than Restricted Data
and Formerly Restricted Data), such as:
a. Nuclear weapons testing.
b. Nuclear weapons storage and stockpile.
c. Nuclear weapons effects, hardness, and vulnerability.
d. Nuclear weapons safety.
e. Cooperation in nuclear programs including, but not limited to,
peaceful and military applications of nuclear energy.
f. Exploration, production and import of uranium and thorium from
foreign countries.
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S. Information concerning intelligence or counterintelligence sources,
methods or activities including but not limited to intelligence, counterintelligence
and covert action programs, plans, policies, operations, or assessments; or which
would reveal or identify:
a. Any present, past or prospective undercover personnel,
installation, unit, or clandestine human agent, of the
United States or a foreign government;
b. Any present, past or prospective method, procedure, mode,
technique or requirement used or being developed by the
United States or by foreign governments, individually or
in combination, to produce, acquire, transmit, analyze,
correlate, assess, evaluate or process intelligence or
counterintelligence, or to support an intelligence or
counterintelligence source, operation, or activity;
c. The present, past or proposed existence of any joint
United States and foreign government intelligence,
counterintelligence, or covert action activity or facility,
or the nature thereof.
6. Information that could result in or lead to actions which would place an
individual in jeopardy attributable to disclosure of the information, including but
not limited to:
a. Information identifying any individual or organization as a
confidential source of intelligence or counterintelligence.
b. Information revealing the identity of an intelligence,
counterintelligence or covert action agent or agents.
7. Information about foreign individuals, organizations or events which, if
disclosed, could be expected to:
a. Adversely affect a foreign country's or international
organization's present or future relations with the
United States.
b. Adversely affect present or future confidential exchanges
between the United States and any foreign government or
international organization of governments.
8. Information related to plans (whether executed or not, whether presented
in whole or in part), programs, operations, negotiations, and assessments shared by
one or several foreign governments with the United States, including but not limited
to those involving the territory, political regime or government of another country,
and which if disclosed could be expected to adversely affect the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy or the conduct of another country's foreign policy with respect to a
third country or countries. This item would include contingency plans, plans for
covert political, military or paramilitary activities or operations by a foreign
government acting along or jointly with the United States Government, and positions
or actions taken by a foreign government alone or jointly with the United States
concerning border disputes or other territorial issues.
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9. Information concerning arrangements with respect to foreign basing of
cryptologic operations and/or foreign policy considerations relating thereto.
10. Scientific information such as that concerning space, energy, Climatology,
communications, maritime, undersea, and polar projects, that could be expected to
adversely affect current and/or future exchanges of such information between the
United States and any foreign governments or international organizations of
governments.
11. Information on foreign policy aspects of nuclear matters, the disclosure
of which could be expected to adversely affect cooperation between one or more
foreign governments and the United States Government.
12. Nuclear propulsion information.
13. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of
nuclear detection systems.
14. Information concerning or revealing military or paramilitary escape,
evasion, cover or deception plans, procedures, and techniques whether executed or
not.
1S. Information which could adversely affect the current or future usefulness
of military of defense policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans.
16. Information concerning research, development, testing and evaluation of
chemical and biological weapons and defense systems; specific identification of
chemical and biological agents and munitions; and chemical and biological warfare
plans.
17. Technical information concerning weapons systems and military equipment
that reveals the capabilities, limitations, or vulnerabilities of such systems or
equipment and that could be exploited to destroy, counter, render ineffective or
neutralize such weapons or equipment.
18. Cryptologic information, including cryptologic sources and methods,
currently in use. This includes information concerning or revealing the processes,
techniques, operations, and scope of signal intelligence comprising communications
intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence, the crypto-
security and emission security components of communications security, and the
communications portion of cover and deception plans.
19. Information concerning electronic warfare (electronic warfare support
measures, electronic counter-countermeasures) or related activities, including but
not necessarily limited to:
a. Nomenclature, functions, technical characteristics or descriptions
of communications and electronic equipment, its employment/develop-
ment, and its association with weapon systems or military
operations.
b. The processes, techniques, operations or scope of activities
involved in the acquisition, analysis and evaluation of such
information, and the degree of success achieved by the above
processes, techniques, operations or activities.
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20. Present, past or proposed protective intelligence information relating to
the sources, plans, techniques, equipment and methods in carrying out assigned duties
of protecting United States Government officials or other protectees abroad and
foreign officials while in the United States or United States possessions. This
includes information concerning the identification of witnesses, informants and
persons suspected of being dangerous to persons under protection.
23. Information described in subparts 1 through 22 of this Part contained in
correspondence, transcripts, memoranda of conversation, or minutes of meetings between
the President of the United States or the Vice President of the United States and
foreign government officials.
24. Information described in subparts 1 through 22 of this Part contained in
documents originated by or sent to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, his Deputy, members of the National Security Council staff, or any
other person on the White House or the Executive Office of the President staffs
performing national security functions.
2S. Federal agency originated documents bearing Presidential, National Security
Council, or White House or Executive Office of the President staffs comments relating
to categories of information described in subparts I through 22 of this Part.
26. Information as described in subparts 1 through 22 of this Part contained in
correspondence to or from the President or the Vice President, including background
briefing memoranda and talking points for meetings between the Presidbnt or the Vice
President and foreign government officials, and discussions of the timing and purposes
of such meetings.
27. Information as described in subparts 1 through 22 of this Part contained in
agency message traffic originated by White House or Executive Office of the President
staffs members but sent through agency communication networks.
G. REFERRAL AND DECISION.
1. When the identity of agencies having classification jurisdiction over
foreign government information is not apparent to the agency holding the information,
or when reviewing officials do not possess the requisite expertise, classification
jurisdiction for systematic review shall be transferred as follows:
Categories
2 through
4,
Department of Energy or Nuclear
ulatory Commission (as appropriate)
Re
5
through
6,
g
Central Intelligence Agency
7
through
11,
Department of State
12
through
19,
Department of Defense
20
through
22,
Department of the Treasury
23
through
27,
National Security Council
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2. Agencies shall declassify information when it is determined after any
necessary consultation with other United States agencies and, as appropriate, with.
foreign governments and international organization of governments that the infor-
mation no longer requires classification protection. If it is determined-that
classification must be extended beyond 30 years,,the provisions of Section.1X1,C,2(b)
of Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1 apply.
H. DOWNGRADING.
Foreign government information classified Top Secret may be downgraded,to.
Secret after 30 years unless an agency with classification jurisdiction over it.'
determines on its own authority, or after consultation, as appropriate, with'the,
foreign government or international organization of governments which furnished':
the information, that it requires continued protection at the Top Secret level.
ISSUED: `March 5, 1980
Acting rec or
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Information Security Oversight Office
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