CLASSIFICATION REVIEW PROCEDURE GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW OF RECORDS FOR THE PERIOD FROM THE END OF OSS TO THE BEGINNING OF CIA 1 OCTOBER 1945 - 20 SEPTEMBER 1947

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001000240038-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 28, 2002
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: July 2, 1979
• Content Type: REQ

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2 July 1979
Classification Review Procedure CRP 79-32 and
CRP 79-008/OSS
GUIDELINES FOR THE REVIEW OF RECORDS FOR THE; PERIOD
FROM THE END OF OSS TO THE BEGINNING OF CIA
1 October 1945-20 eptem er 1947
On 20 September 1945 President Harry Truman signed an Executive Order
breaking up the OSS as of 1 October 1945 and directing the Secretary of
State to take the lead in developing the program for a comprehensive and
coordinated foreign intelligence system. The Research and Analysis (R&A)
and Presentation Branches of the OSS went intact to the State Department.
The remaining activities of the OSS (mostly clandestine services) were
assigned to the War Department which was to keep them separate in the
Strategic Services Unit (SSU) established by the Executive Order for that
purpose and to keep those activities to serve as a nucleus for a possible
central intelligence service.
On 22 January 1946 President Truman issued a Presidential Directive
which established. the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) functioning directly
under the National Intelligence Authority (NIA). The NIA consisted of
representatives of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy and a personal
representative of the President. The Director of CIG was appointed by the
President. His duties included planning to coordinate departmental intel-
ligence activities; recommending policies and. objectives of the "national
intelligence mission;" correlating and evaluating intelligence for strategic
and national policy and disseminating it within the Government; performing
functions related to intelligence as the President and NIA might direct;
and performing services of conunon concern where those services could. be
performed more efficiently by a central organization. Significantly, the
Director of CIG was not given the duty of directly collecting intelligence.
The CIG was described as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity." Since
the SSU had been expected only to serve an interim function, the Executive
Order of 20 September 1945 directed the Secretary of War to discontinue the
SSU as soon as its functions and facilities could be: 1) placed in a new
central intelligence organization; 2) placed in the War Department; or 3)
dropped entirely. General Magruder, Chief of the SSU, was to superintend
the liquidation of those SSU activities to be dropped entirely during
peacetime. On 29 January 1946 the Secretary of War directed that the SSU
should be liquidated by 30 June 1916. The Director of CIG was to take what
records he wanted from SSU through the Secretary of War and retain operational
control over them. Title to the records was to be settled later. Magruder
felt that SSU plans, properties and personnel must be maintained because
they were indispensable for the procurement of intelligence in peacetime.
On 14 February 1946 he urged that the SSU be placed under the Director of CIG.
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As there was some dispute over whether the Director of CIG should get the
entire unit, an interdepartmental committee was organized under Colonel
Fortier to study this question. The conunittee found support for the opinion
that the SSU, as was, ought not go to the CIG. The committee had heard that
the bulk of intelligence information came from friendly governments; that
much material came from other sources than secret collection; that SSU
personnel had not been adequately screened; and that many clandestine personnel
had become exposed during WW II. The committee thought that the SSU should
be reorganized and the desired portion placed under the CIG as a "going
concern." The committee thought that CIG should closely coordinate clandestine
operations, concentrate on the USSR and the Satellites, penetrate key institu-
tions to aid possible U.S. military operations, develop liaison with foreign
intelligence agencies while
overt collection of intelligence information should remain with the other U.S.
Government agencies. The committee also recognized the interrelationship
between the SSU and the R&A Branch (still located in the State Department)
and urged that their activities be integrated because the R&A Branch was
"closely geared to the secret intelligence branches as their chief guide."
The committee also felt that the Director of CIG should take authority and
responsibility for liquidation of the SSU.
On 3 April 1946 the final liquidation of SSU was postponed from
30 June 1946 to 30 June 1947. Meanwhile, the Chief of SSU was directed to
obey the instructions from the Director of CIG. This made it possible for
Fortier, Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services of
CIG, to take over such SSU assets as the Director of CIG wanted while unwanted
assets would be absorbed into the War Department or abandoned. The arrange-
ments for the transfer of SSU to the CIG through the War Department were
complicated but it enabled the CIG to take legally what it wanted while
Magruder, Chief of the SSU, got rid of unwanted facilities through the War
Department. Although no specific legal action,was taken, the passage of time
and the inferential approval of the National Security Act of 1947 appears to
have vested title of SSU property to the CIG.
In June 1946 General Vandenberg became the Director of CIG (replacing
Admiral Souers). Vandenberg felt that the Director of CIG must be the NIA's
executive officer and he immediately struck out to obtain greater authority
and independence for the CIG. While his ideas met resistance from the member
agencies of NIA, Vandenberg did win some points. For example, Vandenberg
wanted the CIG to conduct all espionage and counter-espionage for the collec-
tion of foreign intelligence abroad. This proposal was modified. to allow the
Director of CIG to conduct only those "organized federal" operations which
were outside the U.S. and its possessions, but still left CIG with the
authority to collect intelligence information. The purpose of the revision
was to permit the military services to collect intelligence for departmental
purposes and it was meant to protect the FBI in performing its duties within
the U.S. Vandenberg then established the Office of Special Operations to
collect foreign intelligence. During the summer and fall of 1.946, the CIG
arranged to take over the personnel, tuidercover agents, and foreign stations
of the SSU. By mid-October 1946 the liquidation of SSU was complete. (SSU as
a bonafide organization never actually went out of business. The C/IMS/DDO
is tie current chief of SSU and is authorized to conduct certain business for
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and on behalf of SSU. Most SSU activities involve checking out special
requests from IiX-SSU or OSS personnel.) Field stations were notified that
effective 19 October 1946 "SSU discontinues all overseas activities and the
Office of Special- perations of CIG assumes responsibility for conducting
espionage and counterespionage in the field for collection of foreign intel-
ligence information required for national security."
As noted above, the CIG takeover of the SSU stretched over a period of.
several months in 1946. During this period the CIG took over many of the
personnel, installations, facilities rind cover arrangements and units as well
as administrative practices of the SSU. Thus you will find CIG, after
19 October 1946, using SSU cover unit designations and. letterhead stationery
from such units making it difficult to identify CIG documents from appearance
alone. It could be argued that if the letterhead is SSU then it is an SSU
document. Be that as it may, for general. purposes in classification review
consider all records created before 19 October 1946 as SSU and all records
created after that date as CIG.
GUIDELINES
For our general use in the classification review process, the date of
19 October 1946 will be considered the pivotal date marking the "end" of the
SSU an the ' eginning" of the CIG. Generally speaking, records dated prior
to 19 October 1946 will be considered SSU documents and those created after
that date will be considered CIG documents.
The methods of organization and operation used by the SSU were very
similar to those developed and used by the OSS. The SSU was essentially a
military unit, staffed mostly by military personnel and housed in the War
Department under military command. It is therefore pertinent for us to review
SSU documents under those guidelines developed for and used in the classifi-
cation review of OSS records. The CIG on the other hand, very soon after its
creation began to take on an independent life and although many CIG personnel
continued to be military it quickly attracted more civilians and it was not
under direct military command. We will, therefore, look at CIG documents as
relating closely to the beginnings of the CIA and will review CIG documents
under those guidelines developed for and used in the classification review of
CIA records. As a general rule, the OSS review team will be responsible for
reviewing documents originated before 19 October 1946 and the other CRD
reviewers will be responsible for those documents originated after 19 October
1946. This date is not intended to be an absolute rule; as in all review
work, individual judgement must be used. For example, a document originated
after 19 October 1946 might refer to the past and to activities or problems
of the SSU making it in essence a more or less typical SSU document containing
material relating to the SSU. Such a document should be reviewed as being
essentially a SSU document and using the OSS guidelines to judge the classifi-
cation action. On the other hand, a document originated before 19 October 1946
might refer to the future and to activities or problems relating to the CIG
making it in essence a more or less typical GIG document. This type document
should be reviewed as a CIG document using the CIA guidelines.
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All reviewers should be especially alert for these types of documents
and pay particular attention to their classification review. If there is
any question, coordination should be effected between the CRD Operations
Branch/OSS and the CRD Operations Branch/CIA through the Chief of the CRI)
Operations Branch.
The major categories of information which most likely will require
continued protection are: 1) information which identifies sources; 2)
foreign government information and details of intelligence agreements we
had with foreign governments; 3) information revealing unique intelligence
methods not generally known or used and not outdated; and 4) information
which could still cause negative reactions that could impact adversely on
current or future U.S. foreign relations. Some more specific guidelines
are as follows:
1. Protect all sources to avoid creation of a reputation that U.S.
intelligence services cannot protect their sources. A rare exception to
this rule might be possible where the contact was fleeting, incidental,
insignificant and overt.
2. Identification as an SSU staffer will be judged and handled the
same way as it is for an OSS staffer. Staffers generally will not be
protected merely because they later worked for the CIG or the CIA. If
however, the person engaged in sensitive work for CIG or the CIA, their
SSU (and OSS) employment may be exempted from declassification to protect
the later sensitive work or position in the CIG or the CIA.
3. Persons who served under non-official cover are protected at all
times as is their cover.
STATINTL
Classification Review Division
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