LETTER TO MR. ARTHUR E. FAJANS FROM JOHN H. WRIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R001000040004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2014
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: October 4, 1989
• Content Type: LETTER

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\u?
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
01T-89-0145
4 October 1989
Mr. Arthur E. Fajans
Director
Security Plans and Programs
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20301-2000
Dear Mr. Fajans:
This is in response to your letter of 4 August 1989
concerning DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic
Declassification Review of Classified Information in
Permanently Valuable DoD Records." A copy of your letter and
the Directive is enclosed as Tab A.
Specifically, you requested that CIA review enclosure 6 of
the Directive. We have reviewed that enclosure for currency
and completeness and commend DoD for its thoroughness and
understanding of intelligence related matters. We have made a
few additions, as you will note, but mainly we have consolidated
and re-ordered the 1983 list, hopefully to increase its
usefulness to DoD reviewers. A revised enclosure 6 is enclosed
as Tab B.
We have also given some scrutiny to the remaining sections
of the Directive and have identified a few other areas which
might affect CIA interests as well. Enclosed at Tab C are some
suggested changes which we believe would further safeguard
information having to dD with intelligence matters.
Thank you for affording us this opportunity to comment on
and to clarify CIA interests in this Directive. If we can be
of further assistance or if there are any questions, my point
of contact in this matter is telephone
Enclosures
Sincerely,
John H. Wrig
Inf ation and Pr ordinator
cc: Director, Information Security Oversight Office
Director, Records Declassification Division, National
Archives and Records Administration
STAT
STAT
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4
OIT/MSG/ISD/CRB/HRP/JSC/taj/29 Aug 89
(updated and enlarged 19 Sep 89)
Distribution:
Orig ? Adse (w/encls)
1 ? Director, 1500 (w/encls B, C)
1 ? Chief, RDD/NARA (w/encls B, C)
1 ? ISD Chrono (w/encls B, C)
1 ? ISD/CRB Chrono (w/encls B, C)
1 ? EME (w/encls B, C)
1 ? JSC (w/encls B, C)
1 L.-,HRP Guidance Folder (w/encls)
.40e= CRB Subject file: Liaison with Defense (w/encls)
CRB #135
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POLICY
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000
4 August 1989
Mr. Jack Wright
Information Privacy Coordinator
ATTN:
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.0 20505
Dear Mr. Wright:
Reference is made to the telephone conversation today
between of your staff and Mr. Fred Cook of
this office.
We have asked Department of Defense Components and the
Information Security Oversight Office (IS00) to review the
enclosed DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic
Declassification Review of Classified Information in Permanently
Valuable DoD Records," for currency and completeness.
Because enclosure 6 of the Directive deals with guidelines
for systematic declassification review of areas of interest to
the Central Intelligence Agency, it is requested that this
enclosure be reviewed. Please advise us of the results of your
review at your earliest convenience.
My point of contaqt is Mr. Fred Cook, telephone 695-
2289/2686.
Enclosure
As stated
Sincer.ely,
Arthur E. Fajans
Director
Security Plans and Programs
cc: (w/o end)
Director, 'SOO
Chief, Records Declassification Division
National Archives and Records Administration
STAT
STAT
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19 September 1989
5200.30 (End l 6)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY--SUBJECTS OF SPECIAL CONCERN
1. Information that identifies CIA operational organizations,
installations, agents, sources, or methods.
2. Information that could identify CIA personnel under
official or nonofficial cover, or could reveal a cover
arrangement.
3. Intelligence reports that could have come from covert
sources, or information derived from them, which could divulge
intelligence sources or methods.
4. Information the release of which could place an individual
in jeopardy.
5. Information that could divulge intelligence interests,
intelligence requirements, the value of intelligence
information, or the extent of Intelligence Community knowledge
on a subject.
6. Names of CIA staff personnel or agents.
7. Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and
assessment capabilities.
8. Information on technical systems for the collection or
production of intelligence.
9. Methods or procedures used to acquire or produce
intelligence or support intelligence activities.
10. Information on the structure, size, budget, foreign and
domestic installations, security, or objectives of CIA.
11. Training provided to or by CIA personnel that would
indicate CIA's capabilities or identify its personnel or agents.
12. CIA's personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment,
and/or evaluation policies.
13. Any reports or publications by CIA, particularly NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, other finished intelligence analysis,
raw (field) intelligence reports, and related documents.*
14. Special access programs used by CIA.
15. Information on CIA's counterintelligence policies,
practices, and capabilities.
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_______ inui ualny, e.g., specific
chemicals, reagents, developers, and microdots.
17. Contractual relationships entered into by CIA, especially
those which reveal specific interests and expertise.
18. Any CIA information or publication including or derived
from SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT, etc.). [Material in this category
should also be referred to NSA.]
19. Any CIA information or publication including or derived
from overhead imagery.
20. Information on foreign nuclear programs, facilities,
capabilities, or intentions.
21. Diplomatic or economic activities affecting the national
security or international security negotiations.
22. Information related to political or economic instabilities
in a foreign country, the divulgence of which could endanger
American lives or installations in that country.
23. Covert activities conducted abroad in support of U.S.
foreign policy.
24. Information on the surreptitious collection of information
in a foreign nation by U.S. intelligence, especially when its
disclosure could affect relations with that country.
25. Covert relationships with international organizations or
foreign governments, especially liaison arrangements with
foreign intelligence services and information derived from that
liaison.
26. Information on the defense plans and capabilities of the
U.S. or its allies, exposure of which could enable an adversary
to develop countermeasures. [This is also of interest to the
DoD.]
27. Information tending to disclose U.S. systems and weapons
capabilities or deployment. [This is also of interest to the
DoD.]
28. Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic
contingencies affecting the national security. [This is also
of interest to the DoS.]
29. Information the disclosure of which could lead to foreign
political, economic, or military action against the United
States or its allies.
30. Information on U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.
[This is,also of interest to the DoD and DOE.]
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31. Information on research, development, and engineering that
enables the United States to maintain an advantage of value to
, national security. [This is also of interest to a number of
other U.S. Government departments.]
*[Item 13 in this revised list is designed to replace Items
30-34 in the 1983 list and to refocus attention to broader and
higher-priority categories of reporting.]
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EANk...4_,uouAL
Alternate wording which the Central Intelligence Agency
would prefer in non-CIA segments of DoD's guideline package
In DoD Directive 5200.30, page 1, ?84, we would like to amend
...shall be in accordance with special procedures issued by
the Director of Central Intelligence." to read "...shall ensure
that all such records also be referred to CIA for its
determination, as the Director of Central Intelligence is the
sole statutory authority enjoined to protect intelligence
sources and methods."
Ibid., page 2, ?El: Please add the sentence: "Any review of
files concerning intelligence activities, sources, or methods
shall include referral to the Central Intelligence Agency."
Loc. cit., 11E3: Please delete:
methods created after 1945,..."
..., intelligence sources or
In End l 4, ?2e, please change the first line to read: "The
information pertains to a diplomatic..."
We would also like to ask that End l 4, ?2f be amended as
follows:
"Declassification of information which reveals the fact of
or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or
capability, even when such source, method, or capability is no
longer employed and even when disclosure of such source,
method, or capability might appear not to cause damage to the
national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy,
shall be carried out only by the Central Intelligence Agency.
All such material shall be referred to CIA for its
determination. The Director of Central Intelligence is the
sole statutory authority enjoined to protect intelligence
sources and methods."
We would also like to amend Encl 4, ?3, to read as follows:
"Declassification of information that may reveal the
identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished
only through referral of said information to the CIA for its
determination."
End l 5, ?7: In regard to the sentence: "Reports documenting
conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign
government information," while we do not dispute that this is a
primary interest of the Department of State, we would prefer a
broader definition of the term "foreign government information,"
to include all information provided to the U.S. Government by a
foreign nation or international body of nations, with the
expectation that the U.S. Government will protect its
confidentiality.
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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000
POLICY
Mr. Jack Wright
Information Privacy C7rdinator
ATTN:
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.0 20505
Dear Mr. Wright:
Reference is made to
between
this of ice.
4 August 1989
the telephone conversation today
of your staff and Mr. Fred Cook of
We have asked Department of Defense Components and the
Information Security Oversight Office (IS00) to review the
enclosed DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic
Declassification Review of Classified Information in Permanently
Valuable DoD Records," for currency and completeness.
Because enclosure 6 of the Directive deals with guidelines
for systematic declassification review of areas of interest to
the Central Intelligence Agency, it is requested that this
enclosure be reviewed. Please advise us of the results of your
review at your earliest convenience.
My point of contaqt is Mr. Fred Cook, telephone 695-
2289/2686.
Enclosure
As stated
Sincerely,
Arthur E. Fajans
Director
Security Plans and Programs
cc: (w/o end)
Director, ISM
Chief, Records Declassification Division
National Archives and Records Administration
STAT
STAT
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..;
March 21, 1983
NUMBER 5200.30
Department of Defense Directive USD(P)
SUBJECT: Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review of
Classified Information in Permanently Valuable DoD
Records
References: (a) DoD Directive 5200.30, "Guidelines for Systematic
Review of 20-Year-Old Classified Information in
Permanently Valuable DoD Records," September 9,
1981 (hereby canceled)
(b) Executive Order 12356, "National Security Informa-
tion," April 2, 1982
(c) Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1
Concerning National Security Information, June 23,
1982
(d) through (g), see enclosure 1
A. REISSUANCE AND PURPOSE
This Directive reissues reference (a); establishes procedures
and assigns responsibilities for the systematic declassification
review of information classified under references (b) and (c), DoD
Directive 5200.1 and DoD 5200.1-R (references (d) and (e)), and prior
orders, directives, and regulations governing security classification;
and implements section 3.3 of reference (b).
B. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
1. This Directive applies to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD) and to activities assigned to the OSD for administra-
tive support, the Military Departments, the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the
Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD
Components").
2. This Directive applies to the systematic review of per-
manently valuable classified information, developed by or for the
Department of Defense and its Components, or its predecessor com-
ponents and activities, that is under the exclusive or final
original classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
3. Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly
Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (reference (0)
or information in nonpermanent records.
4. Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to
intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelli-
gence sources or methods shall be in accordance with special pro-
cedures issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.
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C., DEFINITIONS
1. Cryptologic Information. Information pertaining to or resulting from
the activities and operations involved in the production of signals intelligence
(SIGINT) or to the maintenance of communications security (COMSEC).
2. Foreign Government Information. Information that is provided to the
United States by a foreign government or governments, an international organi-
zation of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed
or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both are
to be held in confidence; or produced by the United States pursuant to or as
a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments,
an international organization of governments, or any element thereof requiring
that the information, the arrangement, or both are to be held in confidence.
3. Intelligence Method. Any process, mode of analysis, means of gathering
data, or processing system or equipment used to produce intelligence.
4. Intelligence Source. A person or technical means that provides intel-
ligence.
D. POLICY
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information
that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified
and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information
about DoD operations to the public.
E. PROCEDURES
1. DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined
by 44 U.S.C. 2103 (reference (g)), that has been accessioned into the National
Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically for declassifi-
cation by the Archivist of the United States, with the assistance of the DoD
personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes 30 years old; however,
file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities)
created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and
cryptology records created afVer 1945 will be reviewed as they become 50
years old.
2. All other DoD classified information and foreign government information
that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components,
including that held in federal records centers or other storage areas, may be
reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising
control of such information.
3. DoD classified information and foreign government information in the
possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they become
30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence activities
(including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or
methods created after 1945, or cryptology created after 1945, if they are not
within one of the categories specified in enclosure 2 or 3.
2
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Mar 21, 83
5200.30
4. Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with
procedures contained in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (e)). Information that falls
within any of the categories in enclosures 2 and 3 shall be declassified if the
designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of the declassification consider-
ations contained in enclosure 4, that classification no longer is required.
In the absence of such a declassification determination, the classification of
the information shall continue as long as required by national security con-
siderations.
5. Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information
under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on subjects
cited in enclosure 5, and with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on subjects
cited in enclosure 6.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES
1. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
a. Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation
of this Directive.
b. Request DoD Components to review enclosures 2 and 4 of this
Directive every 5 years.
c. Revise enclosures 2 and 4 to ensure they meet DoD needs.
d. Authorize, when appropriate, other federal agencies to apply
this Directive to DoD information in their possession.
2. The Head of each DoD Component shall:
a Recommend changes to the enclosures of this Directive.
b. Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems
under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to enclosures 2 and
4 of this Directive. ,
c. Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide
timely assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic
review of records under this Directive.
3. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service
(NSA/CSS), shall develop, for approval by the Secretary of Defense, special
procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic
information.
4. The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this Directive
when reviewing DoD classified information that has been accessioned into the
Archives of the United States.
3
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G. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.
PAUL T YER r
Deputy SecreLyry of Defense
Enclosures - 6
1. References
2. Categories of Information That Require Review Before
Declassification
3. General Guidelines for Systematic Declassification Review
of Foreign Government Information
4. Declassification Considerations
5. Department of State Areas of Interest
6. Central Intelligence Agency Areas of Interest
4
Enclosures
VCc: Director, Information Security Oversight Office
Director, Records Declassification Division, National
Archives and Records Administration
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5200.30 (End l 1)
REFERENCES, continued
(d) DoD Directive 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program," June 7, 1982
(e) DoD 5200.1-R, "Information Security Program Regulation," August 1982,
authorized by DoD Directive 5200.1, June 7, 1982
(f) Public Law 83-703, Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(g) Title 44, United States Code, Section 2103
1-1
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5200.30 (End l 2)
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically for
declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Directive:
1. Nuclear propulsion information.
2. Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the
U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.
3. Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities.
4. Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S. for-
eign relations. (Also see enclosure 5.)
5. Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness of
policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such information
would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used
in current operations plans.
6. Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and biolog-
ical weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of chemical and
biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S.
vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare attack.
7. Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research, develop-
ment, testing and evaluation, plans, operations, procedures, techniques, organi-
zation, training, sensitive liaison and relationships, and equipment concerning
psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue and recovery, insertion, and
infiltration and exfiltration; cover and support; deception; unconventional
warfare and special operations; and the personnel assigned to or engaged in
these activities.
8. Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or counter-
intelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities, identities of
clandestine human agents, methods of special operations, analytical techniques
for the interpretation of intelligence data, and foreign intelligence reporting.
This includes information that reveals the overall scope, processing rates, time-
liness, and accuracy of intelligence systems and networks, including the means of
interconnecting such systems and networks and their vulnerabilities.
9. Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly by
the Department of Defense with other federal agencies or to intelligence
activities conducted by other federal agencies in which the Department of
Defense has provided support. (Also see enclosure 6.)
10. Airborne radar and infrared imagery.
11. Information that reveals space system:
a. Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam charac-
teristics, physical survivability features, command and control design details,
design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).
2-1
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' b. Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support meth-
ods, network configurations, deployments, ground support facility locations,
and force structure.
12. Information that reveals operational communications equipment and systems:
a. Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) design features or performance
capabilities.
b. Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic warfare.
13. Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and
electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic counter-
measures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities, including:
a. Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technical
characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and 'electronic
equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon systems
or military operations.
b. Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, opera-
tions, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating
the above information, and the degree of success obtained.
14. Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in attachment 1.
15. Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in attachment 2.
16. Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in attach-
ment 3.
17. Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods). This
includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, opera-
tions, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications intelligence, electronics
intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the cryptosecurity and emission
security components of COMSEC, including the communications portion of cover
and deception plans.
a. Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task.
There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:
(1) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide
COMSEC guidance or information. Many COMSEC documents and materials are
accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System. Examples
are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying
material for use in enciphering communications and other COMSEC documentation
such as National COMSEC Instructions, National COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC)
Information Memoranda, National COMSEC Committee Policies, COMSEC Resources
Program documents, COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment
System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.
2-2
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5200.30 (End l 2)
(2) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various
formats that bear security classifications, sometimes followed by five-letter
codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying warning caveats
such as "This document contains codewotd material" and "Utmost secrecy is neces-
sary..." Formats may appear as messages having addressees, "from" and "to"
sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of
intelligence and comment.
(3) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
b. Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic
documents and materials are "cipher," "code," "codeword," "communications in-
telligence" or "COMINT," "communications security" or "COMSEC," "cryptanalysis,"
"crypto," "cryptography," "cryptosystem," "decipher," "decode," "decrypt,"
"direction finding," "electronic intelligence" or "ELINT," "electronic security,"
"encipher," "encode," "encrypt," "intercept," "key book," "signals intelligence"
or "SIGINT," "signal security," and "TEMPEST."
Attachments - 3
1.
Department
of
the
Army Systems
2.
Department
of
the
Navy Systems
3.
Department
of
the
Air Force Systems
2-3
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5200.30 (Att 1 to End l 2)
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SYSTEMS
The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed systematically
for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this Direc-
tive.
1. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the princi-
ple of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, firing, and destruct operations);
quality or reliability requirements; threat data; vulnerability; ECM and ECCM;
details of design, assembly, and construction; and principle of operations.
2. BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles, threat
definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative technical
system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses that are exploit-
able; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing vulnerability or capabil-
ity; discrimination technology; and details of operational concepts.
3. BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of U.S.
and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.
4. Shaped-charge technology.
5. Fleshettes.
6. M380 Beehive round.
7. Electromagnetic propulsion technology.
8. Space weapons concepts.
9. Radar-fuzing programs.
10. Guided projectiles technology.
11. ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.
12. Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.
13. 2.75-inch Rocket System.
14. Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).
15. Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.
16. Chaparral Missile System.
17. Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.
18. Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.
2-4
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19; Ground laser designators.
20. Hawk Guided Missile System.
21. Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided
Missile System (HELLFIRE).
22. Honest John Missile System.
23. Lance Field Artillery Missile System.
24. Land Combat Support System (LCSS).
25. M22 (SS-11 ATGM) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.
26. Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved Capabili-
ties with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).
27. Patriot Air Defense Missile System.
28. Pershing IA Guided Missile System.
29. Pershing II Guided Missile System.
30. Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial M41 (REDEYE) and Associated Equip-
ment.
31. U.S. Roland Missile System._
32. Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and
penetration aids only).
33. Shillelagh Missile System.
34. Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).
35. Terminally Guided Warllead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
36. TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.
37. Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.
2-5
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Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Att 2 to End l 2)
CATEGORIES OF INFORMATION THAT REQUIRE REVIEW BEFORE DECLASSIFICATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SYSTEMS
The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed systematically
for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this
Directive.
1. Naval nuclear propulsion information.
2. Conventional surface ship information:
a. Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:
(1) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and
underbottom protective systems.
(2) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear, bio-
logical, or chemical weapons.
(3) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans
(applicable to carriers only).
b. Ship-silencing information relative to:
(1) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including alter-
nating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential (UEP)).
(2) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an
individual ship's component.
(3) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.
c. Operational characteristics related to performance as follows:
(1) Endurance or tOtal fuel capacity.
(2) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maxi-
mum speed, and maximum to zero speed.
3. All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface
ships or submarines.
4. Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:
a. Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:
(1) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.
(2) Radiated noise and echo response.
(3) All vibration data.
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(4) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, and UEP signature data.
b. Details of operational assignments, that is, war plans, antisubmarine
warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.
c. General arrangements, drawings, and plans of SS563 class submarine
hulls.
5. Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
6. Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine counter-
measures.
7. ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.
8. Torpedo information as follows:
a. Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.
b. Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to counter-
measures.
9. Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles,
guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control
systems.
2-7
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Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (Ertcl 3)
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3-1
Monday
January 31, 1983
Part III
Information Security
Oversight Office
National Security Information; General
Guidelines for Systematic Declassification
Review of Foreign Government
Information; Final Rule
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4402 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT
OFFICE
32 CFR Part 2002
National Security Information; General
Guidelines for Systematic
Declassification Review of Foreign
Government Information
AGENCY: Information Security Oversight
Office (IS00).
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Information Security
Oversight Office is revising its guideline
which relate to the systematic
declassification review of foreign
government information. These
guidelines are issued pursuant to the
provisions of Section 3.3 of Executive
Order 12356, which superseded
Executive Order 12065. The Executive
Order prescribes a uniform information
security system: it also requires the
establishment of guidelines for the
systematic declassification review of
certain information. The purpose of
these guidelines is to assist in
Implementing Executive Order 12356.
EFFECTIVE DATE: January 31, 1983.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Steven Garfinkel, Director, IS00.
Telephone: [phone].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 2002
Archives and records, classified
information, Executive orders.
Information, Intelligence, National
defense, National security information,
Presidential documents, Security
information.
Title 32 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 2002, is revised as
follows:
PART 2002?GENERAL GUIDELINES
FOR SYSTEMATIC .
DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF
FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
Sec.
2002.1 Purpose.
2002.2 Definition.
2002.3 Scope.
2002.4 Responsibilities.
2002.5 Effect of publication.
2002.6 Categories requiring item-by-item
review.
2002.7 Referral and decision.
2002.8 Downgrading.
Authority: Sec. 3.3, E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874.
April 6, 1982.
? 2002.1 Purpose.
These general guidelines for the
systematic declassification review of
foreign government information have
been developed in accordance with the
provisions of Section 3.3 of Executive
Order 12356, "National Security
Information," and Section 2001.31 of
Information Security Oversight Office
Directive No. 1. All foreign government
Information that has been incorporated
Into the permanently valuable records of
the United States Government andlhat
has been accessioned into the National
Archives of the United States shallbe
systematically reviewed for
declassification by the Archivist of,the
United States. Declassification reviews
shall be conducted in accordance with
the provisions of these general
guidelines or. if available, in accordance
with specific systematic review
guidelines for foreign government
information provided by the agency
heads who have declassification
authority over that information. All
foreign government information (a) not
identified in ? 2002.6 of these general
guidelines or in specific agency
guidelines as requiring item-by-item
declassificatipon review and final
determination by an agency
declassification authority, and (V) for
which a prior declassification date has
not been established, shall be
declassified as that information
becomes thirty years old.
? 2002.2 Definition.
"Foreign government information" as
used in these guidelines means:
(a) Information provided by a foreign
government or governments. an
international organization of
.governments, or any element thereof
with the expectation, expressed or
implied, that the information, the:source
of the information, or both, are to be
held in confidence; Or
(b) Information produced by the
United States pursuant to or as a result
?of a joint arrangement with a foreign
government or governments or an
international organization of
governments, or any element thereof,
requiring that the information, the
arrangement. or both, are to be held in
confidence.
? 2002.3 Scope.
(a) These guidelines apply to foreign
government information that has been
received or classified by the United
States Government or its agents, and
has been incorporated into records
determined by the Archivist of the
United States to have permanent value.
(b) Atomic energy information
(including information originated prior
to 1947 and not marked as such;
information received from the United
Kingdom or Canada marked "Atomic."
or information received from NATO
3-2
marked "Atomal") that is defined and
identified as "Restricted Data" or
"Formerly Restricted Data" in Sections
Ily and 142d of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, is outside the
scope of these guidelines. Such
Information is not subject to systematic
review and may not be automatically
downgraded or declassified. Any
document containing information within
the definition of "Restricted Data" or
"Formerly Restricted Data" that is not
so marked shall be referred to the
Department of Energy Office of
Classification for review and
appropriate marking. except for
licensing and related regulatory matters
which shall be referred to the Division
of Security, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
? 2002.4 Responsibilities.
(a) Foreign goveenment information
transferred to the General Services
Administration for accession into the
National Archives of the United States
shall be reviewed by the Archivist of the
United States for declassification in
accordance with Executive Order 12356,
the directives of the Information
Security Oversight Office, these general
guidelines, and any specific systematic
declassification guidelines provided by
the agency with declassification
authority over the information.
(b) Accessioned foreign government
information in file series concerning
intelligence activities (including special
activities), or intelligence sources or
methods created after 1945, and
cryptology records created after 1945.
shell be subject to review by the
Archivist for declassification as it
becomes 50 years old. All other
accessioned foreign government
information shall be subject to review
by the Archivist for declassification as it
becomes 30 years old.
(c) Agency heads who have
declassification jurisidiction over
permanently valuable foreign
government information in agency
records not yet accessioned into the
National Archives of the United States
are encouraged to conduct systematic
declassification reviews of it in
accordance with the time limits
specified in paragraph (b) of this
section. These reviews shall comply
with the provisions of Executive Order
12356, the directives of the Information
Security Oversight Office, these general
guidelines, and specific agency
systematic review guidelines that have
been issued-in consultation with the
Archivist of the United States and the
ISOO Director.
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5200.30 (End l 3)
Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations 4403
(d) Foreign government information
falling within any of the categories listed
in ? 2002.6 of these guidelines shall be
declassified or downgraded only upon
specific authorization of the agency that
has declassification authority over it.
Such information shall be referred to the
responsible agency(ies) for review.
Information so referred shall remain
classified until the responsible
agency(ies) has declassified it. If the
responsible agency cannot be readily
identified from the document or
material, referral shall be made in
accordance with ? 2002.7 of these
guidelines.
(e) When required, the agency having
declassification authority over the
information shall consult with foreign
governments concerning its proposed
declassification.
? 2002.5 Effect of publication.
(a) Foreign government information
shall be considered declassified when
published in an unclassified United
States Government executive branch
publication (e.g., the Foreign Relations
of the United States series) or when
cleared for publication by United States
Government executive branch officials
authorized to declassify the information;
or if officially published as unclassified
by the foreign government(s) or
international organization(s) of
governments that furnished the
information unless the fact of the U.S.
Government's possession of the
information requires continued
protection.
(b) The unofficial publication, in the
United States or abroad, of foreign s
government information contained in
classified United States or foreign
documentS does not in or of itself
constitute or permit the declassification
of such information. Although prior
unofficial publication is a factor to be
considered in the systematic review
process, there may be valid reasons for
continued protection of the information
which could preclude its
declassification. In particular, the
classification status of foreign
government information which concerns
or derives from intelligence activities
(including special activities), intelligence
sources or methods shall not be affected
by any unofficial publication of identical
or related information. The final
declassification determination shall be
made by the agency or agencies having
declassification authority over it.
? 2002.6 Categories requiring item-by-Item
review.
Foreign government information
falling into the following categories
require item-by-item review for
declassification by agencies having
declassification authority over it.
(a) Information exempted from
declassification under any joint
arrangement evidenced by an exchange
of letters, memorandum of
understanding, or other written record,
with the foreign government or
international organization of
governments, or element(s) thereof, that
furnished the information. Questions
concerning the existence or applicability
of such arrangements shall be referred
.to the agency or agencies having
declassification authority over the
records under review.
(b) Information related to the
safeguarding of nuclear materials or
facilities, foreign and domestic,
including but not necessarily limited to
vulnerabilities and vulnerability
assessments of nuclear facilities and
Special Nuclear Material.
(c) Nuclear arms control information
(see also paragraph (k) of this section).
(d) Information regarding foreign
nuclear programs (other than
"Restricted Data" and "Formerly
Restricted Data"), such as:
(1) Nuclear weapons testing.
(2) Nuclear weapons storage and
stockpile.
(3) Nuclear weapons effects, hardness,
and vulnerability.
(4) Nuclear weapons safety.
(5) Cooperation in nuclear programs
including, but not limited to, peaceful
and military applications of nuclear
energy.
(6) Exploration, production and import
of uranium and thorium from foreign
countries.
(e) Information concerning
intelligence activities (including special
activities) or intelligence or
counterintelligence sources or methods
including but not limited to intelligence,
counterintelligence and covest action
programs, plans, policies, operations, or
assessments; or which would reveal or
identify:
(1) Any present, past or prospective
undercover personnel, installation, unit,
or clandestine human agent, of the
United States or a foreign government;
(2) Any present, past or prospective
method, procedure, mode, technique or
requirement used or being developed by
the United States or by foreign
governments, individually or in
combination to produce, acquire,
transmit, analyze, correlate, assess,
evaluate or process intelligence or
counterintelligence, or to support an
intelligence or counterintelligence
source, operation, or activity;
(3) The present, past or proposed
existence of any joint United States and
foreign government intelligence,
3-3
counterintelligence, or covert action
activity or facility, or the nature thereof.
(For guidance on protecting United
States foreign intelligence liaison
relationships, see Director of Central
Intelligence Directive "Security
Classification Guidance and Foreign
Security Services," effective January 18,
1982.)
(f) Information that could result in or
lead to actions which would place an
individual in jeopardy attributable to
disclosure of the information, including
but not limited to:
(1) Information identifying any
individual or organization as a
confidential source of intelligence or
counterintelligence.
(2) Information revealing the identity
of an intelligence or covert action agent
or agents.
(3) Information identifying any
individual or organization used to
develop or support intelligence,
counterintelligence, or covert action
agents, sources or activities.
(g) Information about foreign
individuals, organizations or events
which if disclosed, could be expected to:
(1) Adversely affect a foreign
country's or international organization's
present or future relations with the
United States.
(2) Adversely affect present or future
confidential exchanges beween the
United States and any foreign
government or international
organization of governments.
(h) Information related to plans
(whether executed or not, whether
presented in whole or in part), programs,
operations, negotiations, and
assessments shared by one or several
foreign governments with the United
States, including but not limited to those
involving the territory, political regime
or government of another country, and
which if disclosed could be expected to
adversely affect the conduct of U.S.
foreign policy or the conduct of another
country's foreign policy with respect to a
third country or countries. This item
would include contigency plans, plans
for covert political, military or
paramilitary activities or operations by
a foreign government acting alone or
jointly with the United States
Government, and positions or actions
taken by a foreign government alone or
jointly with the United States
concerning border disputes or other
territorial issues.
(i) Information concerning
arrangements with respect to foreign
basing of cryptologic operations and/or
foreign policy considerations relating
thereto.
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44(14 federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 21 / Monday, January 31, 1983 / Rules and Regulations
(jrScientific information such as that
concerning space, energy, climatology,
communications, maritime, undersea.
and polar projects, the disclosure of
which could be expected to adversely
affect current and/or future exchanges
of such information between the United
States and any foreign governments or
international organizations of
governments.
(k) Information on foreign policy
aspects of nuclear matters, the
disclosure of Which could be expected to
adversely affect cooperation between
one or more foreign governments and
the United States Government.
(I) Information concerning physical
security arrangements, plans or
equipment for safeguarding United
States Government embassies, missions
or facilities abroad, the disclosure of
which could reasonably be expected to
increase the vulnerability of such
facilities to penetration, attack, take-
over, and the like.
(m) Nuclear propulsion information.
(n) Information concerning the
establishment, operation, and support of
nuclear detection systems.
(o) Information concerning or
revealing military or paramilitary
escape, evasion, cover or deception
plans, procedures, and techniques,
whether executed or not.
(p) Information which could adversely
affect the current or future usefullness of
military defense policies, programs,
weapons systems, operations, or plans.
(q) Information concerning research,
development, testing and evaluation of
chemical and biological weapons and
defense systems; specific identification
of chemical and biological agents and
munitions; and chemical and biological
warfare plans.
(r) Technical information concerning
weapons systems and military
equipment that reveals the capabilities,
limitations, or vulnerabilities of such
systems, or equipment that could be
exploited to destroy, counter, render
ineffective or neutralize such weapons
or equipment.
(s) Cryptologic information, including
cryptologic sources and methods,
currently in use. This includes
information concerning or revealing the
processes, techniques, operations, and
scope of signals intelligence comprising
communications intelligence, electronics
intelligence, and telemetry intelligence.
the crytosecurity and emission security
components of communications security,
and the communications portion of
cover and deception plans.
(t) Information concerning electronic
warfare (electronic warfare iipport
measures, electronic counter-
countermeasures) or related activities,
including but not necessarily limited to:
(1) Nomenclature, functions, technical
characteristics or descriptions of
communications and electronic
equipment, its employment/
development, and its association with
weapoins systems or military
operations.
(2) The processes, techniques,
operations or scope of activities
involved in the acquisition, analysis and
evaluation of such information, and the
degree of success achieved by the above
processes, techniques, operations or
activities.
(u) Present, past or proposed ?
protective intelligence information
relating to the sources, plans,
techniques, equipment and methods
used in carrying out assigned duties of
protecting United States Government
officials or other protectees abroad and
foreign officials while in the United
States or United States possessions.
This includes information concerning
the identification of witnesses,
informants and persons suspected of
being dangerous to persons under
protection.
(v) Information on deposits of foreign
official institutions in United States
banks and on foreign official
institutions' holdings, purchases and
sales of long-term marketable securities
in the United States.
(w) Information concerning economic
and policy studies and sensitive
assessments or analyses of economic
conditions, policies or activities of
foreign countries or international
organizations of governments received
through the Multilateral Development
Banks and Funds or through the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD).
(x) Information described in ? 2002.6
(a) through (w) contained in
correspondence, transcripts, memoranda
of conversation, or minutes of meetings
between the President of the United
States or the Vice President of the
United States and foreign government
officials.
(y) Information described in ? 2002.6
(a) through (w) contained in documents
originated by or sent to tthe Assistant to
the President for National Security
Affairs, his Deputy, members of the
National Security Council staff, or any
other person on the White House or the
Executive Office of the President staffs
3-4
performing national security functions.
(z) Federal agency originated
documents bearing Presidential,
National Security Council, or White
House or Executive Office of the
President staffs comments relating to
categories of information described in
? 2002.6 (a) through (w).
(aa) Information as described in
? 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in
correspondence to or from the President
or the Vice President, including
background briefing memoranda and
talking points for meetings between the
President or the Vice President and
foreign government officials, and
discussions of the timing and purposes
of such meetings.
(bb) Information as described in
? 2002.6 (a) through (w) contained in
agency message traffic originated by
White House or Executive Office of the
President staff Members but sent
through agency communication
networks.
? 2002.7 Referral and decision.
(a) When the identity of the agencies
having declassification authority over
foreign government information is not
apparent to the agencY holding the
information, or when reviewing officials
do not possess the requisite expertise,
the information shall be referred for
review and a declassification
determination as follows:
(1) Categories 2002.6 (b) through (d),
Department of Energy or Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (as
appropriate).
(2) Categories 2002.6 (e) and (f),
Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) Categories 2002.6 (g) through (l).
Department of State.
" (4) Categories 2002.6 (m) through (t).
Department of Defense.
(5) Categories 2002.6 (u) and (w),
Department of the Treasury.
(6) Categories 2002.6 (x) through (bb),
National Security Council.
(b) Referrals to agencies shall include
copies of the documents containing the
foreign government information.
Agencies shall review the referred
documents and promptly notify the
Archivist of the United States of the
declassification determination.
Forwarded copies of the documents
shall be marked to reflect any
downgrading or declassification action
and shall be returned to the National
Archives.
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4405
? 2002.8 Downgrading.
Foreign government information
classified "Top Secret" may be
downgraded to "Secret" after 30 years
unless the agency with declassification
authority over it determines on its own,
or after consultation, as appropriate,
with the foreign government or ?
international organization of
governments which furnished the
information, that it requires continued
protection at the "Top Secret" level.
Dated: January 27, 1983.
Steven Garfinkel,
Director. Information Security Oversis;ht
Office.
InR Dix 53-2614 Flied I-211-83. 64S al,
BILLING CODE 61320-AF-M
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?
Mar 21, 83
5200.30 (End l 4)
DECLASSIFICATION CONSIDERATIONS
I. Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject
matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment; changes
in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar
events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declas-
sified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circum-
stances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would
result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.
2. The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in
deciding whether information in the categories listed in enclosure 2 may be
declassified when it is reviewed:
a. The information no longer provides the United States,a scientific,
engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical
advantage over other nations.
b. The operational military capability of the United States revealed by
the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the
Armed Forces.
c. The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or
relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does not
disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational systems.
d. The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current
weakness or vulnerability.
e. The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic
initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the
foreign relations of the United States.
f. The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence
source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to
no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause
damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.
g. The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure
can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to
the detriment of the national security of the United States.
3. Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine
human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures estab-
lished by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.
4. The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of
classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS
to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic in-
formation are:
4-1
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a. COMSEC Documents and Materials
(1) If records or materials in this category are found in agency
files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC
authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following
address:
Director
National Security Agency.
ATTN: Director of Policy (Q4)
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755
(2) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other
documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary
before declassification.
b. SIGINT Information
(1) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record
originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in
the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified
if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If
the material must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic
review for declassification.
(2) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving
agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before
any declassification.
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1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AREAS OF INTEREST
1. Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas,
or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.
2. Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies
identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.
3. Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security
organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
Organization of American States (OAS)).
4. Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military
facilities.
5. Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of
foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons.
6. Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in
contingencies.
7. Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign
government information.
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