PROPOSED EXTENSION OF CLASSIFICATION OF IMAGERY AND IMAGERY-DERIVED INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01194R000700010011-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: March 31, 1981
• Content Type: MF

01S Registry
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OGC 81-02256
31 March 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, COMIREX
Associate General Counsel for
Intelligence Community Affairs
SUBJECT: Proposed Extension of Classification of Imagery
and Imagery-Derived Information
REFERENCE: Your Memorandum to DCI, dated 9 March 1981,
Subject: Declassification Review Policy for
Twenty-Year-Old Overhead Imagery
1. The issue raised by the reference, which proposes to
extend the classification of imagery for 30 additional years, is
whether classification can be extended without an initial
declassification review. The language of section 3-401 of Execu-
tive Order (EO) 12065 would seem to indicate that classification
cannot be so extended:
Classified information ... shall be reviewed
for declassification as it becomes twenty
years old .... When classification is
extended beyond twenty years, a date no more
than ten years later shall be set for
declassification or for the next review ....
(Emphasis added.)
2. Section 3-401 also states that:
The Director of the Information Security
Oversight Office [ISOO] may extend the period
between subsequent reviews for specific
categories of documents or information.
The Director, ISOO, has authorized extension of the period for
subsequent reviews for six categories of information set forth in
his memorandum of 20 October 1979. Imagery falls within the
category:
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[i]nformation involving or concerning intel-
ligence sources and methods and covered under
special access, distribution and protection
programs continued or established pursuant to
section 4-2 of Executive Order 12065.
The ISOO memorandum goes on to provide, however, that the
requirement in section 3-401 for a subsequent review in ten years
may be waived only for information that:
has been systematically reviewed following
its 20th anniversary, or its 30th anniversary
in the case of foreign government informa-
tion;
is identified through such review as
requiring continued classification for a
period in excess of 20 additional years;
cannot, when so reviewed, be assigned a
definitive date or event for declassifica-
tion, thus requiring at least one additional
review; and
has its classification extended beyond 20
years, or 30 years in the case of foreign
government information, by an agency head or
official designated by the President as
authorized to do so under Executive Order
12065.
The ISOO memorandum then provides that:
Information to which this waiver is applied
shall be rereviewed 30 years after its
initial systematic review, and thereafter at
10-year intervals if necessary. (Emphasis
added.)
Thus, the ISOO memorandum expressly requires an initial review
(and the fulfillment of additional conditions) before the ten-
year subsequent review requirement may be waived and classifica-
tion can be extended for a 30-year period. As I understand it,
no initial systematic review of imagery or imagery-derived infor-
mation has been accomplished or initiated.
3. One approach that has been suggested is to consider
imagery and imagery-derived documents for review in mass on the
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theory that factors common to the entire, class of documents would
clearly warrant continued classification of all such materials.
Unfortunately, such an approach does not find support in EO
12065, the ISOO memorandum of 20 October 1979, nor Agency regula-
tions. Indeed, section 3-402 of EO 12065, in directing
establishment of agency guidelines for systematic review of 20-
year old information, provides that:
[t]hese guidelines shall state specific,
limited categories of information which,
because of their national security
sensitivity, should not be declassified
automatically, but should be reviewed item-
by-item to determine whether continued
protection beyond twenty years is needed.
In addition, section 3-403 permits the Secretary of Defense and
the DCI, respectively, to establish special procedures, notwith-
standing sections 3-401 and 3-402, for the systematic review of
classified cryptologic information and classified information
concerning the identities of clandestine human agents. Conspic-
uously absent from this provision which permits special treatment
of two categories of information is imagery and imagery-derived
information.
4. Furthermore, paragraph 151 of dated 28 Novem- STAT
ber 1978, in requiring Agency guidelines for systematic review of
classified information under the Agency's jurisdiction, provides
that:
[s]uch guidelines shall specify limited
categories of information covered under
Agency classification criteria ... that
cannot, because of its national security
sensitivity, be declassified automatically,
but requires item-by-item review to determine
whether continued protection is needed.
Thus, I can find no support for the suggestion that the system-
atic review required by EO 12065 can be accomplished in the broad
categorical fashion that may be implicit in the referenced memo-
randum.
5. There are at least three alternative courses of action
that can be pursued in this matter:
a. Add imagery and imagery-derived information to
section 3-403 of EO 12065, thus allowing the DCI to estab-
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lish special procedures for systematic review of materials
containing such information. This could be proposed in the
course of the EO 12065 review now underway.
b. Seek a Presidential waiver from the requirement for
item-by-item review in the case of imagery and imagery-
derived information.
c. Promulgate DCI guidelines for the systematic review
of imagery and imagery-derived information and provide that
materials which warrant continued classification under such
guidelines will be forwarded to the DCI for approval of
extended classification under EO 12065 and the ISOO memo-
randum of 20 October 1979. In connection with this option,
consideration could be given to requesting that ISOO approve
a sampling technique for an initial review which, as I
understand it, has been used in some initial reviews that
have already been conducted.
6. This Office would be glad to assist you further in this
matter.
cc: C/DIS/DDA
Added distribution: (THW:ydc/6 Apr 81)
1 - C/CRD
1 - C/RMD
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 SECRET
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
DCI-CT-81-0770
9 March 1981
Executive Rrgiilzp
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Acting Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking 6 '
SUBJECT Declassification Review Policy for Twenty Year
Old Overhead Imagery (U)
C_.,~,@F tc...,c!
~1-Uao4
i
1. Action Requested: Approve and sign the attached memorandum to the
National Foreign Intelligence Board outlining declassification review policy
guidelines for classified overhead imagery materials that are twenty years old.
(U)
2. Background: Executive Order 12065 requires that classified materials
shall be reviewed for declassification as they become twenty years old (Tab A).
Thus all the U-2 photographic coverage for the 1956-60 period and the initial
satellite imagery materials for the 1960-61 period are now subject to
declassification review. (S)
3. The continuing importance of imaging systems as intelligence sources
and the large volumes of the imagery-derived sensitive intelligence of Communist
and other countries warrant special attention with respect to the
declassification review procedures concerning any overhead imagery-derived
materials. These materials have been widely used and disseminated in numerous
intelligence, military planning and targeting, mapping, and civil programs over
the years. (S)
4. It is therefore especially important to establish an overall DCI
policy that will preclude unilateral -- and potentially inconsistent --
declassification actions by recipient organizations without adequate
appreciation of all the aspects of sensitivity concerning these materials, and
of the basic DCI responsibility for the protection of such a sensitive
intelligence source. Even one such action could have a major negative impact
with reference to intelligence targeting methods, collection system technology
and foreign relations. Such an action would also run counter to our positions
taken in current FOIA litigation that no classified imagery can be publicly
released. (S)
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5. The attached policy guidelines briefly outline the intelligence
sensitivities and the potential adverse impact on US foreign relations that must
be considered in any declassification review of imagery-derived materials. They
also emphasize your responsibility for making decisions for the continued
protection of intelligence sources and methods in any such review procedure.
The general policy incorporated in the guidelines memorandum includes the
following points:
o Classification of all such materials will be generally
extended for an additional thirty years, in accordance with the
provisions of (1) Section 3-401 of Executive Order 12065 (Tab A) and
(2) the 20 October 1979 waiver by the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office that specifically includes information
involving such intelligence sources and methods (Tab B).
o This policy applies to: (a) the primary imagery
record; (b) the subsequent reproductions, in full or partial frame;
and (c) the textual, graphic, magnetic, and digitized information
derived from the imagery, constituting the hard-core detailed
information concerning the location and physical characteristics of
military and other intelligence targets in denied areas.
o Declassification of individual items or specifically
identified categories of materials is not precluded -- but such
action would take place only on the basis of your decisions, or
those of the Chairman, COMIREX, acting on your behalf.
(S)
6. The attached guidelines focus on the potential problems in protecting
major intelligence collection sources that would arise from an uncontrolled
declassification review process. By reserving decisions on declassifying
imagery-derived materials to yourself, the guidelines preclude the numerous
intelligence, military, and mapping organizations that have extensively used
these materials from taking unilateral declassification actions. Such actions
could prove detrimental to protecting the sensitive portions of these materials
from public disclosure, from FOIA and other requests for release, and could
create obstacles to the promotion of US foreign policy objectives. (S)
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7. Staff Position: These policy guidelines have been reviewed and
concurred in by COMIREX members on behalf of their respective NFIB
organizations and by the DCI Office of General Counsel. They were developed in
collaboration with the Classification Review Division of the Deputy Director for
Administration's Information Services Staff. That Staff is prepared to follow
through with information copies to the Information Security Oversight Office
after your approval. (C)
8. The guidelines also would be incorporated in the Consolidated Imagery
Policy Manual now being developed. Since this manual is not expected to be
available for distribution until spring 1981, the guidelines will be initially
disseminated through the COMIREX structure to all users of classified materials
derived from satellite imagery. (C)
9. Recommendation: I recommend that you approve and sign the attached
memorandum to NFIB conveying your policy guidelines on the declassification
review procedures for classified overhead imagery materials. (U)
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CON C UR/ N6N-e&teUR:
I- la /-tar. '/
Acting Deputy to the DCI f Collection Tasking Date
CONCUR/NON-CONCUR:
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Date
APPROVE/DISAPPROVE:
Director of Central Intelligence Date
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Distribution: (DCI-CT-81-0770)
Original - DCI
1 - D/DCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - D/DCI/CT
1 - D/DCI/RM
1 - OGC
1 - DDA
1 - DDS&T
1 D/NFAC
1 - ODE
1 - PTO/COMIREX Subject
1 - PTO/COMIREX Chrono
1 - RPAB, 2E29, Hq.,
1 - CTS Registry
1 - RMS Registry
DCI/CTS/PTO/COMIREX~
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 SECRET
The Director of Central Intelli cnce
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Washington. D C 20505
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board
SUBJECT Policy on Declassification Review of Overhead
Imagery Materials
1. Purpose. This memorandum provides the policy guidelines that will
govern the systematic declassification review of materials derived from the
national overhead imagery collection programs. (U)
2. Authority. These guidelines are issued pursuant to the statutory
authority and responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for
protection of intelligence sources and methods. The policy and guidelines
herein are in accordance with the provisions of Section 3-401, Executive Order
12065, and the 20 October 1979 waiver by the Director of the Information
Security Oversight Office concerning the subsequent 10-year declassification
review requirement specified in Executive Order 12065. That waiver applies to
"information involving or concerning intelligence sources and methods and
covered under special access, distribution and protection programs continued or
established pursuant to Section 4-2 of Executive Order 12065." This category of
information includes information concerning overhead reconnaissance imagery.
The waiver specifically stipulates that classification can be extended for an
additional 30 years beyond the initial systematic review provided for at the
20-year mark. (U)
3. Scope and Background. Section 3-4 of Executive Order 12065
established a declassification review procedure for classified materials as they
became twenty years old. Thus, the materials derived from the early platforms
of the national overhead imagery program, which include all the U-2 photographic
coverage for the 1956-1960 period, and the initial satellite imagery materials
now fall within the scope of the declassification review procedures. The
continuing critical importance of overhead reconnaissance imaging systems as
intelligence sources and methods, as well as the continued political sensitivity
of coverage of the USSR, China and other foreign countries, however, require
special attention and protection with respect to declassification review
procedures. Furthermore, the extensive use of these materials in intelligence,
military, and mapping programs requires the establishment of Community-wide
guidelines to preclude unilateral actions that might fail to consider all the
aspects of sensitivity concerning classified overhead imagery materials. (S)
ORIGINAL CL BY Signer
REVIEW ON March 2001
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4. In the absence of common Community criteria and coordinated review,
inappropriate declassification of such overhead imagery materials could result
in one or more of the following adverse effects pertaining to protecting
intelligence activities, sources, or methods and promoting the foreign policy
and relations of the US:
o indicate specific foreign intelligence targets, types of targets, or
collection strategies of the overhead imagery collection program;
o provide concrete evidence to support propaganda charges of US spying
on foreign countries;
o reveal aspects of sensitive collection system technological and
performance capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities that
still require classification;
o indicate that a specific overhead imaging system was operational at
a particular point in time and facilitate making estimates
concerning sensitive capabilities of current operational systems;
o assist hostile foreign countries to develop techniques to counter
the intelligence collecting capabilities of such systems;
reveal inputs, in some instances, of other sensitive intelligence
sources at specific points in time.
(S)
5. Considerations such as these require that imagery and derived
intelligence materials not yet declassified on the basis of specific DCI
authorizations shall remain classified. (U)
6. Policy. All declassification review judgments concerning currently
classified imagery and materials derived from the national program for the
collection of overhead imagery for intelligence purposes remain reserved to the
Director of Central Intelligence. The general policy is that the classification
of all such imagery materials will be extended for an additional thirty years
beyond the initial systematic review at the 20-year point, pursuant to the above
cited waiver by the Director, Information Security Oversight Office. This
policy does not preclude declassification of individual products or product
categories on a case-by-case basis. Such declassification, however, must
proceed from specific review and determination under authority from the DCI or
the Chairman of the DCI Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
(COMIREX), acting on behalf of the DCI. (C)
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7. Application. This general policy applies to the primary imagery
record, to all reproductions therefrom whether in full or partial frame, as well
as to other materials derived from the imagery collection programs in various
formats -- verbal (written and oral), graphic (line drawings and other types of
sketches), maps and charts, and digitized and magnetic products used in
automatic data processing or other computerized programs. The policy applies to
the various uses of these materials in intelligence, military, and other federal
government applications in memoranda, reports, and other publications, whether
prepared as briefings, target materials, maps, charts, or budget presentations.
In sum, regardless of the issuing agency or department and of the basic current
classification, the declassification of any documents, publications, or other
materials which contain overhead imagery derived information will be
accomplished only with the approval of the DCI. However, organizations that
declassify non-sensitive categories of imagery-derived materials on the basis of
DCI (Chairman, COMIREX) approved guidelines will continue such declassification
actions without reference to this general declassification review policy. (C)
8. Implementation. This policy can be readily implemented in those
instances where the imagery and the derived information were controlled within
special access programs and marked with distinctive compartmentation
designators, with attribution to the classified imagery collection source being
explicitly indicated. On the other hand, the actual source of an even larger
volume of materials derived from the classified imagery collection program may
not be immediately identifiable. To meet essential military, intelligence, and
mapping purposes, past DCI authorizations extended dissemination of the derived
data outside of the compartments -- with the stipulations that there would be no
attribution to the classified overhead imagery source and no use of photo
interpretation terminology. The DCI approval of these "sanitization
guidelines," as codified in the 1965 Manual for Sanitization, Decontrol, and
Downgrading*, permitted and facilitated the incorporation of literally millions
of bits of imagery-derived intelligence data -- without source attribution --
into various product formats such as were regularly listed in appropriate
appendices to the 1965 manual. For your reference, these listings are available
in the Office of the Chairman, COMIREX. (S)
*Manual for Sanitization, Decontrol and Down radin (of TALENT-Controlled
Materials): USIB-D-41.12/16; NPIC)
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9- In view of this background, therefore, it will be necessary to
exercise caution in any declassification review of such derivative materials.
As a rule, the inclusion of any source-unattributed descriptive data concerning
the exterior physical features (layout, dimensions, number of buildings,
equipment, etc.) at specific locations or installations in Communist or other
denied areas in these types of products produced after 1956 should be considered
as being derived from these imagery sources -- unless there is specific evidence
to the contrary. (S)
10. Questions concerning the interpretation and application of these
policy guidelines should be referred to the Chairman of the DCI Committee on
Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) for resolution. (U)
William J. Casey
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Distribution:
Original - NFIB Executive Secretary for
Dissemination to NFIB
1 - DCI
1 - D/DCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - D/DCI/CT
1 - D/DCI/RM
1 - OGC
1 - DDA/ISS
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DDS&T
1 - PTO/COMIREX Subject
1 - PTO/COMIREX Chrono
1 - RPAB, 2E29, Hq.,
1 - CTS Registry
1 - RMS Registry
DCI/CTS/PTO/COMIREX4
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