STATE DEPARTMENT AUTORIZATION BILL AMENDMENT

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• Publication Date: July 25, 1989
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
25 July 1989
OCA 2604-89
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/Security Evaluation Organization
FROM:
Legislative Division
Office of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: State Department Authorization Bill Amendment
1. On 20 July, the Senate passed an amendment to the State
Department Authorization Bill that deletes section 133 and
reinstates current law as it pertains to the US Embassy in Moscow
and the Soviet Embassy at Mount Alto. Section 133, which was
deleted from the bill, would have authorized the President to permit
the United States to move into the embassy in Moscow and the Soviets
to move into Mount Alto even if the President finds such facilities
are not secure.
2. The amendment, which reinstated current law, directs the
President to withdraw from the Soviet-American Embassy Agreement
unless he can certify that it is vital to the national security of
the United States not to withdraw from the agreement; that steps
have been taken or will be taken which will ensure that the new
embassy in Moscow can be safely and securely used; and that steps
have been or will be taken to eliminate damage to the national
security of the United States due to electronic surveillance from
Soviet facilities on Mount Alto.
3. I have attached for your attention, a copy of relevant
portions of the Congressional Record for July 20, 1989, which
discuss the amendment in greater detail.
STAT
Attachment
STAT
OCA/LEGI
(25 July
89)
Distribution:
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1 -
OCA Records (w/att)
1 -
D/OCA (w/att)
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File:
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att)
STAT
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OCARead Library
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S 8148 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE July 20, 1989
(1) Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica is
'AO be commended for his proposal and for
his commitment to the war on drugs; and
'...(2) the United States should work if posed-
hie through multilateral organizations to
.determine the feasibility of such force and
assist-in the establishment of this force, if it
Is found to be feasible and consistent with
the United States Constitution.
? (c)* AIITHORIZATION Or FUNDING.?Funds
, authorised to be appropriated under this
'bill for any United Nations program, may be
realloctted for a program to establish an
international strike force for international
'narcotics control under multilateral auspic-
. es. Such reallocation may occur only if the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Com-
mittee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on For-
eign :Relations and the Committee on Ap-
propriations of the Senate, are notified at
least 15 days in advance of the obligation of
tundlin accordance with the procedures sp-
. .plicable to reprogramming notifications
under section 834A of the Foreign Assist-
ance Act of 1961. .
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President., I sug-
gest the absence of a quorum.
?? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
? .,The legislative clerk proceeded to
Call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
13313NDIONIS NO. 355
?.4,Pitrpose: To strike the provision of the bill
,.ioneern1ng Moscow Embassy, thereby
Tilimantalning current law)
r1IELMS. Mr. President, I call up
-amendment No. 355, which is at the
desk.
The 'PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk Will-report.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North. Carolina IMr.
Mums] proposed amendment No. 355.
? On page 31, strike line 10 through line 24
on page 32. .
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina.
? Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
This amendment strikes section 133
of S. 1160. It is still a pressing need for
the United States to have a secure.
safe Embassy in the capital of the
Soviet Union. The United States does
not have a safe and secure Embassy.
The fact remains that most of the ex-
perts believe that the new Moscow
Chancery is riddled with Soviet bug-
ging technology and ought to be bull-
dozed.
Unfortunately, an opposition opin-
ion is held by the State Department.
Mr. President, as I understand it. the
State Department is not contending
that the new U.S. Embassy complex in
Moscow is safe and secure.
What the State Department is con-
tending is that it does not matter
whether it is or not. The pending
amendment returns us to current law,
which was approved by the Senate in
an amendment offered by Senator
SYMMS during consideration of the
State Department authorization bill
back in 1987. The overwhelming will
of Congress at that time was not to
open or occupy the new but insecure
embassy. I believe that was also the
will of the overwhelming majority of
the American people.
Mr. President, there is no convincing
evidence that the situation has im-
proved in the past 2 years. In fact, ac-
cording to the New York Times on
July 16, 1989, a report of the Senate
Intelligence Committee strongly sup-
ports the concept of current law.
Namely. the Intelligence Committee
report says there is no hope to fix or
otherwise make the new embassy com-
plex in Moscow safe and secure.
The amendment strikes section 133
of the bill before us today. It calls for
the United States not to move into the
heavily bugged Moscow Embassy com-
pound. It also provides that the Sovi-
ets cannot use the extraordinarily de-
sirable facilities granted them by the
State Department on Mount Alto in
Washington. DC, until the United
States has a new and secure facility to
use in Moscow.
The situation has not improved to
allow us to rethink the 1987 position.
earlier this year the State Department
merely recommended another study of
the Embassy?bugs and all.
In the committee bill, section 133
provides new language on the Moscow
Embassy that some Senators might
think is an improvement over just an-
other study. Unfortunately, the provi-
sions of S. 1160 do nothing that makes
? this Senator believe it will solve the
Moscow Embassy-Mount Alto mess. -
Section 133, as reported, claims to
keep the Soviets from occupying
Mount Alto until the President, certi-
fies that there is a safe, secure Embas-
sy in Moscow. The certification also
requires that all feasible steps be
taken, now and in the future, to elimi-
nate damage to national security due
to electronic spying from Mount Alto.
Mr. President, the fact is that the
Soviets are already occupying Mount
Alto, and microwaves are bombarding
all of us at this very moment.
A second part of section 133 before
us today conditions the embassy agree-
ment between America and the Soviets
on whether Mount Alto poses a signifi-
cantly greater threat to United States
national security than the potential or
actual threat from the Soviets at their
old Embassy on 16th Street. It seems
to me that you would need a smart
lawyer or an astrologer to make such a
determination.
One final and puzzling element that
troubles this Senator is the provision
of section 133 that the President can
waive any of his findings about an in-
secure embassy or the Mount Alto
KGB headquarters if he determines it
Is in the vital national security inter-
est of the United States to do so.
Let's consider that a moment, Mr.
President. Suppose President Bush
makes such a determination?agreeing
with the report sent to him by the
Senate's own Intelligence Committee?
that the Moscow Embassy is hopeless-
ly insecure.
He can still make a finding to permit
the United States to move Into a
bugged embassy in Moscow and if he
determines that Mount Alto is an ex-
eellent Soviet listening post.. he can
still permit the Soviets to move into
Mount Alto.
Now I ask all Senators to consider
that provision of the law?which is
also in current law. The .:Congress
must give the President the ability to
be prudently responsible. Conditions
may change?although in this matter
It is hard to imagine how they would
change that would make a bugged em-
bassy or a new. Soviet spy headquar-
ters acceptable.
Perhaps some Americans who are
swept up in the euphoria of Mr. Gor-
bachev's international propaganda
campaign believe that assuring a
secure Embassy in Moscow or limiting
Soviet spying in this country might
offend the Soviet President and his as-
sociates.
Decisions in the Senate?and
throughout representative govern-
ment?often involve hard choices. Mr.
President, I ask Senators whether?in
the short and the long run, the United
States is better off holding its anger
and doing nOthing? I think not.
I think Senators will see the wisdom
of the amendment to strike section 133
and return to current law. ?
The language in section 133, as re-
ported, is practically as permeable as
the walls and ceilings of the new Em-
bassy compound in Moscow.. It is
maybe slightly better than another
study, but it has the same result:
America might be stuck with an
unsafe, insecure embassy while Soviet
moving vans are permitted to roll into
Mount Alto.
Let's live in the real world. The
Senate was right to approve the cur-
rent law language in 1987. and the
Senate must act again to make sure
that a international security scandal is
stopped.
Mr. President, for reasons that are
not especially clear to this Senator,
the State Depatment is prepared to
move into the new Embassy site in
Moscow in spite of the bugs that are
crammed into every corner of the
building.
An article in the New York Times of
July 16, 1989, page 11, entitled. "Bush
is Warned on Bugged Moscow Embas-
sy" should be enough to make all Sen-
ators share my worry about the State
Department's position.
The articles refers to "unusually
blunt language" in a report of the
Senate Intelligence Committee to
President Bush that "any decision
against tearing down the new Ameri-
can Embassy building in Moscow in-
vites 'security disaster* for which
President Bush would be responsible."
As all Senators know, S. 1160, the
State Department authorization bill,
contains language so vague and con-
fused that it would make it very diffi-
cult for President Bush to continue in
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July 20, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S8449
the tradition set bY President Reagan,
who ordered the Embassy building `to
be torn down.
? It is for this reason that the best
course of action is to return to current
law, enacted in 1987 but suspended by
the Appropriations Committee at the
request of the State Department
before it could come into effect.
Returning briefly to the Intelli-
gence's Committee report, as cited in
the New York Times, it is quoted as
saying that to permit the United
States to move into the new Embassy
complex would "confirm signs that the
executive branch is incapable of effec-
tive action in this field."
Not.surPrisingly, Mr. President, the
Intelligence Committee report lashes
out at the State Department for its
failure to cooperate with the newly
created Security Evaluation Organiza-
tion to examine eavesdropping tech-
niques and correct them. The Times
article quotes an unnamed State De-
partment official as saying they are
not cooperating because it would cut
into their turf.
In other words, Mr. President, the
State Department is still playing
games on diplomatic security ques-
tions?most especially regarding the
Embassy complex in Moscow.
The Senate can choose one of two
courses of action: Either we go along
with the vague and contradictory lan-
guage in S. 1160?which is described
clearly and well in the Additional
Views filed with this bill?or we return
to current law enacted in 1987.
WHAT CURRENT LAW PROVIDES
Section 151 of the State Department
authorization bill, enacted 2 years ago,
has eight findings which I think the
Senate must consider today. Have con-
ditions improved? Here are the find-
' ings, in a brief form, and I ask Sena-
tars to consider this question for
themselves.
I ..,..-P". First, that the Soviet regime "has in-
tentionally and substantially violated
.---M-- - international agreements ' ? ? con-
cerning the establishment and oper-
ation of a new United States Embas-
= 7-.-.. sy." Mr. President, that situation re-
i?,.?... mains the same.
EL'AN,?, - Second, Mr. President, "the Soviet
f- : Government's actions constitute a ma-
s"'--terial violation of international law
--. -F-- and a substantial default in perform-
7.,t;....
: ance under the contract for construe-
; .=-. tion" for the new Embassy, and that
the United States "is entitled to claim
... 'appropriate compensation." This is
",,the same too.
-1" Third, that because of Soviet ac-
Alms, United States personnel "cannot
ursue their official duties in confi-
-;'.dence." And this is certainly the mean-
g of the Intelligence Committee's
eport to President Bush.
ourth, that the Soviet regime has
en steps to impair the full and
roper use of the present United
States Embassy in Moscow."
n Fifth, that because of Soviet viola.
"the United States is entitled to
ate, in whole or in part," the
? 1-1
United States-Soviet Embassy Agree-
ment. I believe this is still the case.
Sixth, that termination of these
agreements may affect "rights and
privileges (regarding) ? ? ? a new,
Soviet Embassy" in Washington.
Seventh, that the new Soviet Embas-
sy complex on Mount Alto In Wash-
ington, DC, "creates serious concerns
with respect to electronic surveillance
and potential damage to the damage
to the national security of the United
States." Mr. President, I am sure that
few Senators would deny this.
And lastly, the current law found
that it was essential to protect vital
national security interests by termi-
nating "Embassy agreements in view
of substantial and international Soviet
breaches thereof, unless the threat to
the national security posed by adher-
ence to those agreements can be over-
come."
Mr. President, let me put it clearly,
the American people, based on its
track record on this topic, cannot trust
the State Department on this score?
and that is the message of the Intelli-
gence Committee report.
And so, Mr. President. current law
directs the President to withdraw from
the Soviet-American Embassy Agree-
ment unless he can certify to the fol-
lowing conditions.
Once again, let me tick off the condi-
tions that the President must certify
in order to waive current law.
No. 1 is that the President must de-
termine that "it is vital to the national
security of the United States not to
withdraw from the agreement."
Next, that "steps have been or will
be taken that will ensure that the new
chancery building ? ? ? in Moscow can
be safely and securely used *."
Finally, that steps "have been or will
be taken to eliminate" within 2 years
after enactment?in other words,
now?"damage to the national security
of the United States due to electronic
surveillance from Soviet facilities on
Mount Alto."
Mr. President, the issue could not be
clearer. In the light of our experience
regarding the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, and in light of the Intelligence
Committee report, I ask all Senators
to look carefully at section 133 of S.
1160, found on pages 31 and 32 of the
legislation before us.
I would be tempted to say this word-
ing is silly, except that the topic of the
Moscow Embassy and Mount Alto is
deadly serious.
As we did with current law, Mr.
President, let us examine what S. 1160
would have us do unless it is stricken.
First, it says the Soviets cannot
move into Mount Alto unless and until
the President certifies to two things:
That there is a safe and secure chan-
cery in Moscow and that all feasible
steps have been or will be taken to
eliminate the damage to the national
security of the United States due to
spying from Mount Alto.
This is pretty neutral language, Mr.
President, not nearly as tough as cur-
rent law. But then part (b) of section
133 adds that the President may
permit the Soviets to use Mount Alto
that, "Soviet use of the facility on
Mount Alto does not pose a signifi-
cantly greater threat to the national
security of the United States than the
actual or potential threat from Soviet
use for espionage of existing Soviet fa-
cilities in Washington, DC."
I have tried anti tried to figure out
what this qualification means, Mr.
President. For the life of me, it looks
as if this provision of S. 1160 is saying
that unless there is a hugh difference
in the spying the Soviets can 'conduct
from Mount Alto, the President may
permit them to move in.,.-,
How do you measure this capacity
and how would the President deter-
mine this? It is confusing and vague?
and current law is much more solid.
Then we get to the most bizarre pro-
vision of section 133, at the bottom of
page 32, Mr. President.
It states, as this Senator reads it,
that even if the President finds the
Moscow Embassy complex is insecure
and even if Mount Alto's spying is ex-
tremely dangerous, he can determine
that it is in the "vital national security
interests of the United States" to
move in anyway, or to let the Soviets
use Mount Alto.
Mr. President, there is no sensible al-
ternative to current law. Section 133
of S. 1160 must be striken from this
legislation so that we can turn back to
it. We may not be able to control what
the Appropriations? Committee wants
to do on the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, but the Senate must be clear and
firm?Moscow is not secure, Mount
Alto is a threat and the time for action
was 2 years ago, not now.
Think what benefits there would
have been if current law had been car-
ried out. But thanks to the State De-
partment's evasion and a weak posi-
tion by some members of the Appro-
priations Committee, there is no alter-
native.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the article from the New
York Times of July 16, 1989, be print-
ed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
[Prom The Ncw York Times, July 16, 1989]
Busn Is WARNED ON BUGGED Moscow
EMBASSY
(By Stephen Engelberg)
WASHINGTON, July 15.?In unusually blunt
language, the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee has warned the Bush Administration
that any decision against tearing down the
new American Embassy building in Moscow
invites a "security disaster" for which Presi-
dent Bush would be responsible.
President Reagan ordered the demolition
of the building last year after concluding
that American intelligence could not be cer-
tain of neutralizing the eavesdropping
system implanted during its construction.
Secretary of States James A. Baker 3d has
told Congress that the Bush Administration
is reassessing the issue. State Department
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S 8450 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
.officials have said that options under study
:include rebuilding the top stories of the
building or limiting the nearly completed
'structure to unclassified activities.
?-?? ? ?
IMPACT ON BUSH DELIBERATIONS
?Tile Intelligence Committee's views, in a
report accompanying the 1990 intelligence
budget authorization, add a significant ele-
ment to the Administration's deliberations.
? ?
1- Under a law enacted last year. no money
can be spent on Moscow embassy construe.
tion without permission from House and
Senate appropriations committees. While
the Senate intelligence panel is adamant
that the building be torn down, Representa-
tive Neal Smith, the Iowa Democrat who is
:chairman of the House appropriations sub-
committee. opposes demolition.
, State Department officials said they could
not comment on the report because they
bad not read it.
?. The committee's report said a reversal of
President Reagan's decision would "confirm
'signs that the executive branch is incapable
of effective action in this field.
? "The President and the National Security
?Count:LI; as well as the Secretary of State,
would share responsibility."
3in..a. separate issue, the committee's
"report 'Includes legislation requiring that
:the Federal Bureau of Investigation handle
espionage Investigations involving American
officials assigned to embassies abroad. The
Provision appears in part to be a reaction to
. the widely assailed Inquiry by the Naval In-
. yestigative Service into espionage by Marine
? guards in Moscow.
?? CONCERN ON =BASSI SECURITY
The committees report is also sharply
critical of the State Department's efforts to
improve embassy security, disclosing that
the department has failed to implement any
.of the measures proposed by the Reagan
Administration in 1987.
* A panel headed by former Defense Secre-
tary James R. Schlesinger issued a report on
the new Moscow embassy that said the lis-
tening devices could be combatted if the top
floors were destroyed and a six-story annex
was constructed at a cost of $35 million.
The Senate Intelligence Committee's
report says these reviews produced a con-
sensus within the Reagan Administration in
1987 for reforms, none of which have yet
been implemented.
, The report was most critical of the State
Department's response to the newly created
Security Evaluation Organization, which re-
ports directly to the Director of Central In-
telligence on embassy matters.
The organization was to be a place where
a select group of State Department officials
with the highest security clearances would
be given full access to American techniques
for eavesdropping and other black arts.
The report says the State Department has
refused to assign the necessary personnel to
the office or to coordinate its own security
work with it.
DISTRIBUTING THE BLAME
According to the report, the failure of the
office to achieve its objectives can also be
attributed to intelligence officals, who have
refused to meet "legitimate State Depart-
ment concerns on certain matters." A Gov-
ernment official said this included the State
Department officials' refusal to undergo the
C.I.A.'s polygraph, or lie detector, exam on
so-called life style questions.
State Department officials have said they
are not fully cooperating with the new
office because they think it encroaches on
the Secretary of State's authority to handle
embassy security.
- Mr. SYMMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Idaho.
Mr. SYMMS. I wish to praise the dis-
tinguished ranking Republican on the
committee, Senator HieLms, for this
amendment, I concur with what he is
trying to accomplish in the amend-
ment.
I might just say to my colleagues
that the Intelligence Committee, ac-
cording to the New York Times on
July 16, has urged that the bugged
Embassy in Moscow not be occupied,
and I do believe that all Senators here
are aware of what the security' risks at
the Moscow Embassy are to this coun-
try.
It seems that the prudent careful
course of action to take tonight would
be to accept the amendment of the
Senator from North Carolina and see
where aie are next year.
The articles refers to "unusually
blunt language" in a report of the
Senate intelligence Committee to
President Bush that "any decision
against tearing down the new Ameri-
can Embassy building in Moscow in-
vites 'security disaster' for which
President Bush would be responsible."
As all Senators know, S. 1160, the
State Department authorization bill,
contains language so vague and con-
fused that it would make it very diffi-
cult for President Bush to continue in
the tradition set by President Reagan,
who ordered the embassy building to
be torn down.
It is for this reason that the best
course of action is to return to current
law, enacted in 1987 but suspended by
the Appropriations Committee at the
request of the State Department
before it could come into effect.
Returning briefly to the Intelli-
gence's Committee report, RS cited in
the New York Times, it is quoted as
saying that to permit the United
States to move into the new embassy
complex would "confirm signs that the
executive branch is incapable of effec-
tive action in this field."
Not surprisingly, Mr. President, the
Intelligence Committee report lashes
out at the State Department for its
failure to cooperate with the newly
created Security Evaluation Organiza-
tion to examine eavesdropping tech-
niques and correct them. The Times
article quotes an unnamed State De-
partment official as saying they are
not cooperating because it would cut
Into their turf.
In other words, Mr. President, the
State Department is still playing
games on diplomatic security ques-
tions?most especially regarding the
Embassy complex in Moscow.
The Senate can choose one or two
courses of action: Either we go along
with the vague and contradictory lan-
guage in S. 1160?which is described
clearly and well in the additional views
filed with this bill?or we return to
current law enacted in 1987.
WHAT CURRENT LAW PROVIDES
Section 151 of the State Department
authorization bill, enacted 2 years ago,
July 20, .1989
has eight findings which I think the
Senate must consider today. Have con-
ditions improved? Here are the find-
ings, in a brief form, and I ask Sena-
tors to consider this question for
themselves.
First, that the Soviet regime "has in-
tentionally and substantially violated
international agreements ? ? ? con-
cerning the establishthent and oper-
ation of a new United States Embas-
sy." Mr. President, that situation re-
mains the same.
Second, Mr. President. "the Soviet
Government's actions constitute a ma-
terial violation of international law
and a substantial default in perform-
ance under contract for construction'?
for the new Embassy. and that the
United States is entitled to claim ap-
propriate compensation." This is the
same too.
Third, that because of Soviet ac-
tions, United States personnel "cannot
pursue their official duties in confi-
dence." And this is certainly the mean-
ing of the Intelligence Committee's
report to President Bush. .
Fourth, that the Soviet regime has
"taken steps to impair the full and
proper use of the present United
States Embassy in Moscow." This con-
tinues to be the case, so far as this
Senator can determine.
Fifth, that because of Soviet viola-
tions, "the United States is entitled to
terminate, in whole or in part," the
United States-Soviet Embassy Agree-
ment. I believe this is still the case.
Sixth, that termination of these
agreements may affect "rights and
privileges [regarding] ? ? ? a new
Soviet Embassy" in Washington.
Seventh, that the new Soviet Embas-
sy complex on Mount Alto in Wash-
ington, DC "creates serious concerns
with respect to electronic surveillance
and potential damage to the national
security of the United States," Mr,.
President, I am sure that few Senators
would deny this.
And lastly, the current law found
that it was essential to protect vital
national security interests by termi-
nating "embassy agreements in view of
substantial and intentional Soviet
breaches thereof, unless the threat to
the national security posed by adher-
ence to those agreements can be over-
come."
Mr. President, let me put it clearly,
the American people, based on its
track record on this topic, cannot trust
the State Department on this score?
and that is the message of the Intelli-
gence Committee report,
And so, Mr. President, current law
directs the President to withdraw from
the Soviet-American Embassy Agree-
ment unless he can certify to the fol-
lowing conditions.
Once again, let me tick off the condi-
tions that the President must certify
in order to waive current law.
No. 1 is that the President must de-
termine that "it is.vital to the national
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July 20, 1989
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 8451
security of the United States not to
withdraw from the agreement."
Next. that "steps have been or will
be taken that will ensure that the new
chancery building ? ? ? in Moscow can
be safely and securely used ? ? ?".
Finally, that steps "have been or will
be taken to eliminate" within 2 years
after enactment?in other words,
now?"damage to the national security
of the United States due to electronic
surveillance from Soviet facilities on
Mount Alto."
Mr. President, the issue could not be
clearer. In the light of our experience
regarding the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, and in light of the Intelligence
Committee report, I ask all Senators
to look carefully at section 133 of S.
1160, found on pages 31 and 32 of the
legislation before us.
I would be tempted to say this word-
ing is silly, except that the topic of the
?Moscow Embassy and Mount Alto is
deadly serious.
As we did with current law, Mr.
President, let us examine what S. 1160
would have us do unless it is stricken.
First, it says the Soviets cannot
move into Mount Alto unless and until
the President certifies to two things:
That there is a safe and secure chan-
cery in Moscow and that-all feasible
steps have been or will be taken to
eliminate the damage to the national
security of the United States due to
spying from Mount Alto.
This is pretty neutral language, Mr.
President, not nearly as tough as cur-
rent law. But then part (b) of section
133 adds that the President may
permit the Soviets to use Mount Alto
that. "Soviet use of the facility on
Mount Alto does not pose a signifi-
cantly greater threat to the national
security of the United States than the
actual or potential threat from Soviet
use for espionage of existing Soviet fa-
cilities in Washington, DC."
I have tried and tried to figure out
what this qualification means, Mr.
President. For the life of me, it looks
as if this provision of S. 1160 is saying
that unless there is a huge difference
In the spying the Soviets can conduct
from Mount Alto, the President may
permit them to move in.
How do you measure this capacity
and how would the President deter-
mine this? It is confusing and vague?
and current law is much more solid.
Then we get to the most bizarre pro-
vision of section 133, at the bottom of
page 32, Mr. President.
It states, as this Senator reads it,
that even if the President finds the
Moscow Embassy complex is insecure
and even if Mount Alto's spying is ex-
tremely dangerous, he can determine
that it is in the "vital national security
interests of the United States" to
move in anyway, or to let the Soviets
use Mount Alto.
Mr. President, there is no sensible al-
ternative to current law. Section 133
of S. 1160 must be stricken from this
legislation so that we can turn back to
it. We may not be able to control what
the Appropriations Committee wants
to do on the Moscow Embassy ques-
tion, but the Senate must be clear and
firm?Moscow is not secure, Mount
Alto is a threat and the time for action
was 2 years ago, not now.
Think what benefits there would
have been if current law had been car-
ried out. But thanks to the State De-
partment's evasion and a weak posi-
tion by some members of the Appro-
priations Committee, there is no alter-
native.
Mr. President., the Senate must
strike section 133.
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield
a moment? There is a time limitation
on this amendment. Would the Chair
state it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Sixty
minutes equally divided.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELT. Mr. President, bear in
mind that this administration very
strongly opposes the Helms amend-
ment. I think the administration,
while opposing the Helms amendment
vigorously, considers the committee
position too tough but preferable still
to the Helms position.
The committee bill imposes tough
conditions that must be met before
the Soviets may use their facility on
Mount Alto. First, the United States
must have a secure chancery in
Moscow. Second, the President must
take all feasible steps to eliminate the
Soviet espionage threat from Mount
Alto. Third, the committee bill re-
quires the President to remove the So-
viets from Mount Alto unless the
President certifies their presence does
not pose a significantly greater espio-
nage threat- than that which exists
from their current facilities.
The Helms amendment would repeal
these tough conditions.
The Helms amendment would force'
the Soviets off Mount Alto. Because of
the principles of reciprocity the
United States would have to give up
Its new facility in Moscow. While our
chancery is not usable, the new facili-
ty houses several hundred U.S. fami-
lies.
Given the housing situation in
Moscow, these diplomatic families
would either be forced into substand-
ard, KGB-accessible Soviet housing or.
more likely, forced to come home. The
result would be a major reduction in
our ability to do business in Moscow.
With all that is going on in the
Soviet Union, there is a desperate need
for more, not fewer. American person-
nel. To cite one example, most Sena-
tors believe we should take advantage
of loosened Soviet emigration require-
ments to facilitate the exit of Soviet
Jews, dissidents, and evangelical Chris-
tians.
Adoption of this amendment would
make it impossible for the United
States to process visas and thus bring
the emigration to a halt just at the
time we have succeeded in changing
Soviet policy on emigration. It would
be a grotesque tragedy for those who
have suffered so much for the oppor-
tunity to move to a free country.
The administration shares those
thoughts and strongly opposes this
Helms amendment.
The Moscow Embassy mess was cre-
ated by sloppily-crafted agreements by
the Nixon administration and the lax
attitude toward security by the State
Department. President Bush is now
working to resolve this mess. He de-
serves our support.
I yield the floor.
the PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. -The
Senator from North Carolina is recog-
nized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, if no
other Senator wishes to speak I am
willing to yield back the remainder of
my time, if the distinguished chairman
is willing to yield back his.
Mr. PELT- Looking around I am
trying to see if there is anyone. The
Senator from Indiana I would like to
recognize.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, how
much time does the Senator from
Rhode Island have?
The PRESIDING OFFICER.
Twenty-seven minutes and sixteen sec-
onds.
Mr. LUGAR. Will the Senator yield
10 minutes.
Mr. PFJJ. I am glad to yield 10 min-
utes to the Senator from Indiana and
also 3 minutes to the Senator from 11-
linois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Indiana is recognized.
Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as Sen-
tors know, the problems with regard
to our Embassy in Moscow and prob-
lems with the Soviet Embassy at
Mount Alto present a huge number of
difficulties for all of us. That point is
very clear.
' No one here would praise the way in
which our Government went about
the construction of the chancery
building in Moscow. It was obviously
bugged. That problem has been with
us now for several years. The State
Department and the administration
tried to deal with it.
Let me just say as opposed to re-
hashing those mistakes, we really
ought not to make another one and, in
my judgment, the striking of section
133 of the act this year would be a
very bad mistake.
The administration has been very
clear on this point The -President of
the United States, the Secretary of
State, and the Under Secretary of
State have all indicated that in the
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8452 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 'July 20, 1989
_event the Senate tonight strikes sec-
. tion 133 and we go back to the existing
:law of 1987, that there will be no flexi-
? ;bang left to the administration with
regard to this.
? ; The House bill does not mention this
subject. Therefore, it is not conferen-
? .ceable and in the event that section
.133 is struck, we are back to a certifi-
cation that no President of the United
States will find it easy to make, and in
-my judgment this President might
find it impossible to make; namely, no
building is of necessary vital security
to the United States of America and
no building can be secured with regard
to bugging or interference completely
with absolute assurance.
The President of the United States
does not want to be in the position of
having to make a statement which is
either manifestly false or very likely
to be interpreted that way.
But, Mr. president, if the President
-.of the United States did not make
such a dubious statement, it is very
. probable that the agreement with the
Soviets would be abrogated, which
means we would not be able to build
our Embassy in Moscow, to be relegat-
ed to the ancient Embassy that we
. have with all of its faults and difficul-
ties for Americans who have to serve
In that situation. Other buildings that
are now being utilized in Moscow by
our people could no longer be utilized.
Mr. President, I have no doubt, and I
think Senators make judgments for
themselves, that our relationships
? with the Soviet Union would be rather
severely damaged by this situation.
Senators may not realize the impli-
cations of the simple striking of sec-
tion 133, but I hope my colleagues
even at this late hour will understand
the very grave problem of American
foreign policy that is at stake at this
point.
The President of the United States.
the Secretary of State, and others are
not ambiguous about the fact that
they need latitude to deal with this
problem. The current bill that came
out of the Foreign Relations Conunit-
tee gives that kind of latitude. It is a
verytough section in my judgment.
The Senator from North Carolina
has sought to strike that, to move to
what I believe is inflexible language
that the President really cannot deal
with satisfactorily.
So, Mr. President. I am hopeful this
amendment will not be adopted. It is a
serious item. There is really no more
that can be said, it seems to me, that
will lead to any other conclusion than
that the adoption of this amendment
will be a very severe setback for the
foreign policy of our country.
I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
The Senator from Rhode Island is
recognized.
Mr. PELL. I yield 3 minutes to the
Senator from Illinois.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Illinois, Mr. SIMON, is
recognized.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President. I say to ,
my colleagues here in the Senate, back'-
when I was in the State legislature in
Illinois I observed the. closer we got to
midnight, the more foolish we became
in what passed that legislative body,
and what was true of the State legisla-
ture in Illinois, I have observed is also
too frequently true in the United
States Senate.
Here we are talking about something
that could have all kinds of conse-
quences, and I do not know that we
are ready to move in this direction.
I would simply underscore what Sen-
ator P.ELL and Senator LUGAR have
said. The administration strongly op-
poses this amendment.
In all of human history there are
only two nations who have the ability
to destory the world, and that is the
Soviet Union and the United States.
When we deal with relations be-
tween these two countries, let us deal
with a scalpel, not with a meat ax.
With all due respect to my friend from
North Carolina, this is a meat ax ap-
proach. This is not wise.
Now, it you take a look at the bill
Itself, and it is on page 31, you will see
that the Foreign Relations Committee
came out with a bill that really is
tough.
The Soviets are doing things that we
applaud, having elections, though
they are not like ours, but they are
having elections, people are getting up
in their Congress and denouncing the
KGB. They are printing things in the
Soviet Union that we used to have to
sneak in. They are permitting more
emigration of Jews, of Germans, Pen-
tecostals. They- are doing the things
that we have said you ought to do.
For us now to pass this. kind of an
amendment, I say to my friends, just
does not make sense.
Let?us not do something imprudent-
ly at 11:50 at night here on the floor
that can cause major problems for this
administration, major problems be-
tween our two countries.
I hope we will use common sense an4
not hold ? our finger to the wind and
say what might be most popular back
home immediately. Let us reject this
amendment. Let us support the Presi-
dent of the United States in this par-
ticular amendment and defeat the
amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. HELMS. Let me tell you, Mr.
President, what is really at stake here.
The Soviet Embassy is still bugged.
Everybody agrees that nothing has im-
proved and only this pending amend-
ment can protect the national security
of the United States.
The Senate has spoken time and
time again on this issue. It has ap-
proved an amendment even tougher
than current law by an overwhelming
vote of 71 to 26. That was in July of
1987, a couple years ago.
The commitee language vihich: I pro-
pose to strike does, nothing- to solve
the problem because ICI:nisi force the
United States to occupy an unsafe, in-
secure Embassy in the Soviet Union.
If that is playing to the folks back
home, so be it.
I do not mind disagreement ? when
you start talking about stupidity and
cynicism at some time.
Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Can we
have order?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senate will come to order. ?
The Senator may proceed.
Mr. HELMS. Let us be sure we know
what the facts are. This Senate has
passed judgment several times on this.
The Foreign Relations Committee was
wrong in its provision and it ought to
be struck, and that is what the amend-
ment does.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield me 1 minute?
Mr. HELMS. Any time the Senator
wants.
The PRESIDING OFFICkat. The
Senator from Idaho is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, rappre-
elate the Senator yielding. I would like
to just share with my colleagues an ar-
ticle and then I will ask unanimous
consent that it be printed in the
RECORD.
The article was published by one of
our distinguished colleagues who car-
ries the rank of Ambassador. He was
Ambassador to the United Nations and
Ambassador to India. He has worked
in several administrations. He is the
distinguished senior Senator from New
York.
The article was about how the Sovi-
ets are bugging America, and I just
give you the punchline of what our
distinguished colleague said. He said:
My solution: Throw the bastards out if
they are listening to our microwave signals.
Nothing technical about it. On three occa-
sions I have introduced legislation requiring
the President to do Just that, unless in
doing so, he might compromise an intelli-
gence source.
Nothing has changed, as the Senator
has said.
I ask unanimous consent that the ar-
ticle printed in the April 1987 Popular
Mechanics, by Senator DANIEL PAT-
RICK MOYNIHAN which I just quoted
from be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
How THE SOVIETS ARZ BUGGING AMERICA
(By Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan)
Soviet agents may be listening to your
personal telephone conversations. If you're
involved in the government, in the defense
industry or in sensitive scientific activity.
there is a good chance they are.
In fact, a recent unclassified Senate Intel-
ligence Committee report on counterintelli-
gence indicates more than half of all tele-
phone calls in the United States made over
Pt
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July 20, 1.989
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
any &stem* are vulnerable to interception.
Every American has a right to know this.
You should also know that the Regan ad-
ministration has recognized this threat for a
long time now, but so far, the bureaucratic
response has been piecemeal, and at times
reluctant
Consider this as background: In 1975,
when I was named permanent U.S. repre-
sentative to the United Nations, Vice Presi-
dent Nelson Rockefeller summoned me to
his office in the Old Executive Office Build-
ing. There was something urgent he had to
tell me. The first thing I must know about
the United Nations, he said, is that the Sovi-
ets would be listening to every telephone
call r made from our mission and from the
ambassador's suite in the Waldorf Towers. I
thought this a very deep secret, and treated
It as such. Only later did I learn that Rocke-
feller had publicly reported this intelligence
breach to the president in June 1975. The
Rockefeller "Report to the President on CIA
Activities Within the United States" notes:
We believe these countries (communist
bloc) can monitor and record thousands of
private telephone conversations. Americans
have a right to be uneasy if not seriously
disturbed at the real possibility that their
personal and business activities, which they
discuss freely over the telephone, could be
recorded and analyzed by agents of foreign
powers." ? - ?
The Soviets conduct this eavesdropping
from ? their "diplotnatic"- facilities lb New
York City: Glen Cove, Long Island; San
Francisco; and Washington. By some esti-
mates, they have been doing so since 1958.
President Reagan knows this well. Be sat on
the Rockefeller Commission ind signed its
final report concluding that such covert ac-
tivities existed.
If we had any doubts about this eaves-
dropping, effort. Arkady Schevchenko dis-
pelled them when he came over in 1975 and
subsequently defected in 1978. As you will
Schevcheiako was, at the time, the
second-ranking Soviet at the United Nations
and an up-and-corner in the Soviet hierar-
chy. He describes the listening operation in
New York City in his book "Breaking With
Moscow": "The rooftops at Glen Cove, the
aPartmeni, building in Riverdale. and the
Mission all bristled with antennas for listen-
ing to American conversations."
But we have to worry about more than
just parabolic dish antennas tucked behind
the curtains in the Soviet "apartment"
building in Riverdale, New York.
There are also those Russian trawlers
that travel up and down our coast. They are
fishing, but fishing for what? Communici-
tions. And now the Soviets have taken their
eavesdropping a step further and have built
two new classes of AGI, or Auxiliary Gath-
ering Intelligence vessels. From the hull up,
these new vessels are floating antennas, I
suppose.
Most dangerous of all, perhaps, is the
Soviet listening complex in Lourdes, Cuba,
Just outside Havana. This facility is the
largest such Soviet listening facility outside
its national territory. According to the
president, it "has grown by more than 60
percent in size and capability during the
past decade?'
Lourdes allows instant communication
with Moscow, and is manned by 2100 Soviet
technicians. 21001
By comparison, our Department of State
numbers some 4400 Foreign Service Offi-
cers?total.
Again, to cite the recent Senate Intelli-
gence Committee report: 'The massive
Soviet surveillance efforts from Cuba and
elsewhere demonstrate ? ? ? that the Soviet
intelligence payoff from interception of un-
secured communications is immense." Intel-
ligence specialists are not prone to exag-
geration, they do not last long that way.
You can be assured that "massive' and "im-
mense" are not subtle words as used in this
context.
There are, however, two things you should
know.
. First, our most secret government mes-
sages are now protected from Interception
or are scrainbled, and all classified message
and data communications are secure. In ad-
dition, protected communications zones are
being established in Washington, San Fran-
cisco and New York by rerouting most gov-
ernment circuits and by encrypting micro-
wave links which continue to be vulnerable
to intercept. But there are still communica-
tions links which carry unclassified, but sen-
sitive, information that we need to protect.
Second, it is a truism in the intelligence
field that while bits of information may be
unclassified, in aggregate they can present a
rlassified whole. The Senate Intelligence
Committee informs us, "Due to inherent
human weakness, government and contrac-
tor officials, at all levels, inevitably fall to
follow strict security rules. ? ? ? Security
briefings and penalties were simply not ade-
quate to prevent discussion of classified in-
formation on open lines." If the Soviets can
piece it together, you must assume that
they will, given the resources they invest
toward this effort.
But the intelligence community needs no
reminder that we are up against a deter-
mined and crafty opponent. In 1983, for ex-
ample, a delegation of Soviet scientists were
Invited to tour a Grumman plant on Long
Island. No cameras. No notes. All secure,
right? Wrong. The delegation had attached
adhesive tape to the soles of their shoes to
gather metal fragments from the plant floor
for further study at home. The Soviets are
pretty good at metallurgy?probably the
best in the world?and we don't need to help
them any further.
But concern is not always translated into
budgetary action, at least not in the realm
of communications security. Let us take a
look at the technical problem confronting
us,
As you know, there are two basic ways
voice can be transmitted over telephone
media: digital and analog. Analog refers to
voice waves which are modulated (ampli-
fied) up to a very high frequency (HF).
That is, they are increased in speed from
hundreds of cycles per second to thousands
of cycles per second. This facilitates their
passage over distance.
Nevertheless, because analog radio waves
diminish rapidly over distance; it's necessary
to periodically amplify, or boost, the signal
either at a microwave relay tower repeater
or satellite transponder. (Actually, the sig-
nals are diminished in frequency to voice
quality and then brought back up to high
frequency.)
Digital transmissions are voice or data vi-
bration signals which are converted into a
series of on-and-off pulses, zeros and ones.
as in a computer. Like analog telephone
calls. digital calls go through a process of
modulation and demodulation.
For the purposes of this discussion, we
need only remember two things about
analog and digital telephony.
First, analog telephony is fast being re-
placed by digital telephony because IL better
translates computer language. But, more
importantly, after a high initial overhaul
cost, it's possible to send thousands of digi-
tal calls (bundles) over a single conduit.
Therefore, as we expand our digital capac-
ity, we must ensure that both our analog
and digital communications are protected
from Soviet eavesdropping.
S 8453
Second, sending bundles over a single con-
dint is the base block at which we introduce
the encryption I am talking about.
When you place a long-distance telephone
call from point A to point B, there are three
communications paths, or circuits, over
which your call might travel: microwave,
satellite or cable.
Cable is the most secure. However, it is
the least practical and enconomical method
for bulk transmission over long distances.
As a result, 90 percent of our long-distance
telephone traffic is sent by microwave or
satellite, and that which is in the air can be
readily intercepted.
As your signal travels along the cable
from your home to the local switching sta-
tion and then on to a long-haul switching
station, itis combined (stacked and bundled
might better describe the process) with as
many as 1200 other signals trying to get to
the same region of the country.
This system of stacking and bundling sig-
nals Is called multiplexing and it's how the
telecommunications industry gets around
the problem of 7 million New Yorkers all
trying to call their senator at the same time
on the same copper wire or radio frequency.
If you use a common carrier, that is, if
you have not rented a dedicated channel
from a telecommunications company, a com-
puter at the long-haul switching station will
select the first available route to establish a
circuit over which your call signals may
travel.
Therefore, calls that the caller believes to
be on less vulnerable circuits may be auto-
matically switched to more vulnerable ones.
All this takes place in 1 to 3 seconds.
So let's 'follow your call as it. goes by
either microwave or satellite.
If your call goes via microwave, it will be
relayed across the country as a radio wave
In about 25-mile intervals from tower to
tower (watch for the towers the next time
you drive on an interstate route.) until it
eventually reaches a distant switching sta-
tion where it is unlinked from the other sig-
nals, passed over cable to your, friend's tele-
phone, and converted back into voice,: .
The problem with this system: ?Along
these microwave paths there Is what we call
"spilL" This measures about 12.5 meters in
width and the full 25 miles between towers.
This is where the microwave signal is most
at risk. Using a well-aimed parabolic dish
antenna (located, let's say, on the top of
Mount Alto, one of the highest hills in the
District of Columbia, and site of the -new
Soviet embassy) you can intereept this
signal and pull it in. And that is just what
the Soviets are doing.
(My solution: Throw the bastards out if
they are listening to our microwave signals.
Nothing technical about it. On three occa-
sions I have introduced legislation requiring
the president to do just that, unless in doing
so, he might compromise an intelligence
source. On June 7, 1985, this measure was
adopted by the Senate as Title VII to the
Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, but it
was dropped in conference with the House
of Representatives at the urging of the ad-
ministration.
Nevertheless, I think the administration
accepted the simple logic behind the propos-
al when at the end of October. 55 Soviet
diplomats were ordered to leave the coun-
try, including, The New York Times tells us;
"operatives for intercepting communica-
tions." Now, let's not let the Soviets Just re-
place one agent with another.
The process is much the same for a satel-
lite telephone call. Today, approximately,
eight telecommunications carriers offer sat-
ellite service using something like 25 satel-
lites. Let's suppose your signal has traveled
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8,454 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE
a? long-haul switching station and all
- -.microwave paths are filled. The carrier's,-
. computer searches for an alternative path
, to send the signal and picks out a satellite
connection. At the ground station, your call
Is sent by a transponder up to a satellite and
? then down again to a distant ground station.
Using an array of satellite dishes at
Lourdes, the Soviets can seize these signals
from the sky just as a backyard satellite
dish can pull in television (and telephone)
High-speed computers then sort
through the calls and identify topics and
numbers of particular interest. And if the
information provided is real time intelli-
gence, the Soviets have the ability to trans-
mit it instantaneously to Moscow. And yes,
the Soviets have the range at Lourdes to
grasp our satellite transmissions as they
travel from New York to Los Angeles or
?'Washington to Omaha.
'Here, too, there is a solution: Develop and
Procure cryptographic hardware for use at
the common-carrier long-haul switching sta-
tions. This hardware will encrypt the multi-
plexed telephonic signals (that is. approxi-
mately 1209 calls at a time) before they are
transmitted as radio waves from ground sta-
tion to ground station, a technique analo-
gous to the cable networks scrambling their
signals. This canlre done for under $1 bil-
lion. If we start by encrypting just those un-
classified signals we categorize as sensitive,
those having greatest impact on the nation-
al defense or foreign relations of the U.S.
government, it would cost us about half as
much. It would cost us so much more not to
do so.
'1Communicat1ons security has no constitu-
ency. There is no tangible product and the
public can never really be sure that we have
done anything. But National Security Deci-
"lion Directive 145 says It is a national policy
and national responsibility to offer assist-
ance to the private sector in protecting COM-
' munications. It's time to make communica-
tions security (ComSec is the lingo) a true
national security priority supported with re-
- sources as well as rhetoric. This was certain-
ly the conclusion of the comprehensive In-
telligence Committee report.
I agree, and have suggested a way to get
on with it. If someone has a better idea?if
you have another idea?I would be happy to
know it. The important thing is that we
stop this massive leak of sensitive informa-
tion and protect your privacy.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina is recog-
nized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I would
like to yield as much time as the dis-
tinguished Senator from Oklahoma
(Mr. Boar] may desire. Mr. BOREN, as
all Senators know, is chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Subcommittee.
Mr. BOREN. Mr. President, I thank
the Senator from North Carolina for
yielding to me. I am in support of the
amendment of the Senator from
North Carolina, as I understand it, be-
cause I think that the language adopt-
ed by the Foreign Relations Commit-
tee would allow Presidential certifica-
tion which would make it possible for
the Soviets to occupy the Mount Alto
site prior to us having a satisfactory
conclusion of a new site or a new loca-
tion, new facilities provided for us in
Moscow.
We all know this is a matter that
has been thoroughly gone into by
many Members of the Senate, certain-
ly by the members of the Intelligence
Committee, that the site that we now
have, the Moscow Embassy facility,
the new facility which has been built,
creates a grave security risk. The In-
telligence Committee has publicly
stated that we should never occupy
that facility.
For us to allow the possibility of the
Soviets to occupying the Mount Alto
site prior to a satisfactory conclusion
or decision about a new site for us in
Moscow would, in my opinion, be a
grave security risk for the United
States.
I will not go into all the details, but
let me say administrations of both par-
ties over the last 20 or 30 years bear
joint responsibility for a series of seri-
ous mistakes that have been made
which allowed the Soviets to, in es-
sence, build, under their own terms,
facilities here in which they inspected
everything as small as a grain of sand
which was brought on location here
when they constructed the Mount
Alto site, while, at the same time, we
foolishly allowed them to bring large
prefabricated sections of the building
for us in Moscow on to location, con-
structed where we had no opportunity
to observe what kind of construction
techniques or let me say what kind of
eavesdropping techniques would have
been applied during the time that the
Embassy was being constructed.
So I think it would be wrong for us
to open the door to the possibility, as
this language would do, that would
allow the President to certify that he
was now satisfied with the Moscow
Embassy location, without a decision
for a new location and a new facility
there and which would allow them,
the Soviets, the advantage of moving
into the Mount Alto site. I simply do
not think we should open the door to
the possibility and I am afraid that
the language that is now in the com-
mittee bill would open the door to that
possibility.
Mr. SIMON. Will my colleague
yield? --
Mr. BOREN. I am happy to yield.
Mr. SIMON. Let me just say I have
great respect for my colleague from
Oklahoma who is doing a superb job
as the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee. But the language in the
bill right now says: "The Soviet Union
shall not be permitted to occupy the
new chancery building on Mount Alto
in Washington, District of Columbia,
unless and until the President certifies
in writing to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the chairman
of the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate that, No. 1"?and I
will just go over the first step here?
"that there is completed a new chan-
cery building for use by the United
States Embassy in Moscow which can
be safely and securely used for its in-
tended purpose."
I think that does precisely what the
Senator from Oklahoma wants.
Mr. BOREN. Well, I would answer
my good friend. I understand how he
is interpreting that. I am simply fear-
July 20, 1989
ful?and I do not aim this comment at
this President as an individual: There
have been those who avoided_ a? deci-
sion about tearing down the current
facility in Moscow, which I clearly be-
lieve should be torn down. We must
start all over again to try? to come up
with some kind of plan to say that
that facility could sonlehow be made
secure. ?
I am fearful this language would
open the door to a President in the
future to say that he is now satisfied
that we could occupy that facility,
which we have built there under less
than rigorous conditions as far as pro-
tecting our own security, and then
allow the Soviets the right to go ahead
and move into Mount Alto.
Mr. SIMON. If my colleague will
yield again, the language in the bill is
that "there is 'completed a new chan-
cery building," not the present one. ?
I think the bill itself is very, very
clear. I. think it does what the Senatar
from Oklahoma intends 'Without caus-
ing harm to the ability fo the .Presi-
dent of the United States to do what
he should do for our country.
Mr. BOREN. I think, unfortunately.
Presidents have avoided a decision on
this matter, Presidents of both parties,
because they have not wanted to
admit the serious security mistakes
that have been made by their adminis-
trations. I am simply fearful that they
would decide to add a few stories on to
the existing building and attempt to
seal it off and say it could be made
secure when many of us are convinced
it could not be made secure and de-
clare that sufficiently a new chancery
building that would allow the Soviets
to move into Mount Alto. .
I think I understand what the Sena-
tor is saying. If I felt the language had
the import of saying exactly what he.
Is interpreting it to Mean, I would not
be alarmed. Perhaps we are being
alarmed at a possibility that would
never arise. I find it difficult to believe
that this President would ever make
such a certification, but I do not think
we ought to open the door to that pos-
sibility.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who
yields time?
Mr. PELL. I yield the Senator from
Massachusetts 5 minutes.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, how
much time remains?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
time for Senator HELMS is 21 minutes
and 31 seconds and for Senator PELL,
19 minutes and 16 seconds.
The Senator from Massachusetts is
recognized.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am
struck by the inconsistency of the po-
sition of the. distinguished Senator
from Oklahoma who this afternoon at-
tached an amendment to this bill,
along with Senator DANFORTH, in
which he criticized the micromanage-
ment of the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee and indeed the Senate in its ef-
forts to dictate to a President what he
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July 20, 1989 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE
ought to and ought not. to do with, re-
spect to foreign policy. In fact, he
spoke eloquently about the need for
the Senate to step back from that mi-
cromanagement, requiring that the
Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, upon consultation with the sec-
retary of State on the appropriate re-
lationship between the legislative and
executive branches with respect to for-
eign policy.
Now, here is a situation where the
President of the United States and the
Secretary of State have clearly said
that, in the interest of this new rela-
tionship with the Soviet Union, they
feel this would be adverse to the for-
eign policy of our country.
What is more, the administration
does not like the language of the For-
eign Relations Committee. They think
it is too tough, but they find it far
preferable to the disruption which will
occur as a consequence of the lan-
guage which the Senator from North
Carolina Is proposing.
There is nothing discretionary in the
language that the Foreign Relations
Committee has inserted here. The dis-
tinguished chairman of ?the Intelli-
gence Committee is wrong on the facts
irith respect to what the President can
and cannot do.
The Soviet Union cannot, cannot, be
permitted to occupy the new chancery
building unless the President has cer-
tified to the Speaker and the chair-
man of the Committee on Foreign Re-
lations of the Senate that there is
completed, that is, finished and avail-
able to move into, a new chancery
building in Moscow which can safely
and securely be used for its intended
purpose. In other words, a condition
precedent to their proceeding to the
Mount Alto position is the completion
of a new chancery. And there is no
waiver as to that, Mr. President, none
whatsoever.
In addition, all feasible steps have to
be taken to eliminate damage to the
United States national security due to
electronic surveillance facilities on
Mount Alto.
If that does not require the Soviet
Union to adhere to a tough standard
and give the President the ability to
make the determination which he is
entrusted with, I really do not know
what does. There is no discretion
there. There is no waiver. There is no
ability to vary.
And the chairman of the Intelli-
gence Committee has adequate capac-
ity and he has often spoken of his
faith in the President to be able to
make these kinds of determinations.
So I would suggest that at this late
hour a Senate that has more often
than not supported the President of
the United States on those requests,
ought to do so once again.
Mr. BOREN. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. KERRY. The Senator will
gladly yield.
Mr. BOREN. Is my colleague aware
of the fact that the amendment of the
Senator from North Carolina does not
-
add any language, it does not place
any restrictive language in the bill? It
is striking language adopted by the
Committee on Foreign Relations?
Mr. KERRY. I am aware of that, but
what it does is have the effect thereby
to take us back to the old section 151.
Mr. BOREN. Which has been adopt-
ed by the Senate. Is my colleague fur-
ther aware that in spite of the fact
that the Senate has over and over
again expressed itself about Mount
Alto and the demolition of the exist-
ing embassy, that the State Depart-
ment which has been delaying a deci-
sion on this matter for years under
both administrations, is once again de-
laying a decision about what to do?
Mr. KERRY. The Senator is well
aware of the problem and in fact I
have voted along with both Senators, I
believe, to voice our concern about
what has happened in Mount Alto.
This is not the issue here.
The question is: Does what the For-
eign Relations Committee put in the
legislation, and does the President's
desire and the Secretary of State's
desire to have that. language in their
interests in the carrying out of our
foreign policy, supersede whatever
impact the changes that the Senator
from North Carolina seeks?
That is really the decision we have
to make. Is the Senate of the United
States, in the interests that we have
expressed with respect to security,
adequately protected by the language
of the Foreign Relations Committee?
And I would respectfully suggest that
the President having found yes, the
Secretary of State having found yes,
and I think the Foreign Relations
Committee in its judgment having
found yes, that there is no compelling
showing as to why we should vary
from that.
The final comment I would make is
that, No. 1, the Secretary of State and
the President find that if we revert to
the original language of section 515,
that will impose constraints on their
ability to further the relationship with
the Soviet Union at this point in time;
No. 2, it will require dislocation of
families that are currently housed in
the facilities in Moscow; and, No. 3, it
will greatly interrupt the processing of
visas and of the normal course of busi-
ness where they have already lost per-
sonnel.
I think we ought to lead the Presi-
dent on this as the distinguished
chairman so eloquently suggested we
ought to do this afternoon by amend-
ing this legislation.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from North Carolina (Mr.
HELMS) is recognized.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, we are
going to shut this off in just a minute
if Senators are willing.
Let me say that DAVE BOREN, in my
judgment, knows more about the
Moscow Embassy than, I think, prob-
ably any other Senator; certainly more
than I do. I thank him for his com-
ment.
S 8455
Of course, he cannot tell us on this
floor tonight all he knows because it is
classified. But I think Senators in
their heart of hearts know exactly
what is going on. I thank the Senator
again for his comments and contribu-
tion, and I yield 1 minute to the Sena-
tor from Wyoming."
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Wyoming is recognized.
Mr. WALLOP. I thank the Senator
from North Carolina and thank the
Senator from Oklahoma, and I will
not belabor this issue much farther
except to say that from the very be-
ginning, State Departments and Presi-
dents have opposed the responsibility
that this body has undertaken to bring
them to. Were it not for the actions of
previous Senates, we would not have
ever found the nature of the security
risks that exist in ths building that
has been constructed in Moscow today.
I would respectfully say to those
who think that the language on pages
31 and 32 is complete, that it rests
only on the opinion that can be stated,
that it can be safely and securely used
for its intended purpose; they would
have certified that a long time ago.
And, in fact did, and tried, continually,
to make us yield to that proposition.
Second, I suggest to my colleagues
that the end of it contains a waiver
proposition that, were it to be factual
that this was binding upon the Presi-
dent of the United States, he could
still waive it. And would. Because the
State Department views it as our re-
sponsibility to buy Soviet elections
with the lack of our security.
I do not think that is a wise position
for the Senate of the United States to
take, and I compliment the Senator
from North Carolina on his , amend-
ment which returns us to current law.
which this Senate has voted for in the
past with real good reason.
Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. I
am perfectly willing to yield back the
remainder of my time if the chairman
will yield his.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
offer has been tendered by the Sena-
tor from North Carolina to yield his
time back if the Senator will.
Senator PELL.
Mr. FELL. Mr. President, I yield
back the remainder of my time.
Mr. HELMS. I yield the remainder
of my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
majority leader is recognized.
ORDER OF PROCEDURE
Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. President, I am
about to propound a unanimous-con-
sent request regarding the disposition
of Senator Spsc-rza's death penalty
amendment.
After I complete the reading of the
request, and before I present it to the
Chair, I am going to ask Senator
Bum; to address the Senate and spe-
cifically Senator Tuusuaorrn on the
subject of Senator THURMOND'S death
penalty legislation.
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