CAMBODIA: PROSPECTS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF A DIPLOMATIC BREAKTHROUGH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00306R000400070002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 1, 1988
• Content Type: SNIE

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LdelrnetCrialr OT %/Gtoi GI.
* Intelligence
Cambodia: Prospects for
and Implications of a
Diplomatic Breakthrough (c)
Special National Intelligence Estimate
This Special National Intelligence Estimate represents
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
-Secret-
SNIE 57-88
September 1988
Copy
564
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Warning Notice
National Security
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
STAT
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4t-Zor, LJI1Cl..LIJI LSI 3 ,
c' Central N r [INN C NTI7ACT
Intelligence
8NIE-57-138
Cambodia: Prospects for
and Implications of a
Diplomatic Breakthrough (c)
Information available as of 25 August 1988 was used
in the preparation of this Special National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
Department of the Air Force
This Estimate was approved for publication by the
National Foreign Intelligence Board.
Sccrct
So tom cr 190
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Secret
NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
Key Judgments
Momentum toward a diplomatic breakthrough in Cambodia has grown in
the past several months. While an agreement probably will not be achieved
this year, we believe that one is highly likely by 1990.
The major factors fueling the momentum for change include:
? Vietnam, beset by severe economic difficulties and other pressures,
recognizes that continued military occupation of Cambodia is not
feasible; Hanoi hopes that an agreement will usher in a new era of
international assistance, trade, and investment.'
? Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk, a key ingredient to any negotiated agree-
ment, appears to be developing an increased sense of urgency to reach a
settlement.
? Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are becoming
more amenable to a diplomatic settlement that takes into account
Hanoi's main interests.
? China has shown some flexibility in its position to avoid appearing
obstructionist. However, it continues to demand a full withdrawal of
Vietnamese troops and the dissolution of the People's Republic of
Kampuchea.
? The Soviet Union is encouraging a settlement both to improve relations
with China and to reduce the cost of its assistance to Vietnam. However,
there is no evidence that it has taken drastic steps such as reducing aid to
push Vietnam to be more flexible.
We think an agreement most likely will establish either an interim
coalition government comprising all four Cambodian factions and headed
' The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research believes the Estimate
overemphasizes the degree to which Hanoi's domestic economic problems and international
isolation have induced greater flexibility on Cambodian policy and understates the
importance of Vietnam's security concerns. Certainly Vietnam is eager to focus on its
economic difficulties and gain access to the Western world, but the Assistant Secretary
does not believe that Hanoi is operating primarily from weakness on the Cambodian front,
that it may be prepared to make substantial concessions toward the Khmer Rouge to reach
a political solution, or that its security interests in Indochina are no longer compelling. Its
present approach represents a calculated risk that Sihanouk can be enticed to join the
People's Republic of Kampuchea, that the PRK has a reasonable chance of dominating any
new government, that in such circumstances ASEAN support for a continuing resistance
will crumble, that regional and international attention can be focused on measures to
isolate the Khmer Rouge, and that Vietnam's troops can be withdrawn and its isdlation
ended. Barring unforeseen political change in Hanoi, the Assistant Secretary considers
remote at best the notion raised in the body of the Estimate that Vietnam might allow the
Khmer Rouge to dominate a future Cambodian government.
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
by Prince Sihanouk, or one in which Sihanouk and the People's Republic of
Kampuchea establish a provisional government without the Khmer Rouge.
Any coalition will be inherently unstable and only the first step in
returning peace and order to Cambodia.'
In any Cambodian agreement, Vietnam's principal concern will be.to put
into place a diplomatic, political, and security framework that minimizes
the Khmer Rouge's influence and precludes its return to power following
the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces:
? The Khmer Rouge poses the most serious obstacle to a settlement. We
believe that the Khmer Rouge leadership remains intent on regaining
sole power in Phnom Penh and that this determination also ensures that
it will break at some point with the other Khmer factions.
? From Hanoi's perspective, a settlement must be premised on agreement
by China, Thailand, and others to stop providing arms and safehaven to
Cambodian resistance forces?especially the Khmer Rouge?and to exile
a few of the top Khmer Rouge officials. Hanoi probably believes that, al-
though these measures alone would not end the Khmer Rouge threat,
they are critical to capping its growth potential and, over time, causing a
steady decline in its influence.
? As a further guarantee, Hanoi hopes to stack the internal political odds
against a resurgence of the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam wants to encourage a
collaborative arrangement between its client, the People's Republic of
Kampuchea, and Prince Sihanouk's resistance group that together would
constitute the dominant force in postoccupation Cambodian politics.
If negotiations fail, we believe that Vietnam would withdraw most of its
forces unilaterally by early 1990, banking on a moderately strengthened
PRK, possibly joined in a de facto alliance with the non-Communist
resistance against the Khmer Rouge. In any case, it is highly likely that
Vietnam will keep a clandestine residual force in Cambodia.'
The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research believes that the Khmer
Rouge is unlikely to participate in any quadripartite settlement acceptable to Vietnam and
the PRK. Thus, he believes that the formation of a quadripartite government is the least
probable outcome and that the more likely scenarios, including a Sihanouk-PRK deal, will
leave the Khmer Rouge in an active (though probably reduced) insurgency with continued
Chinese support. Such a "new" Cambodian government would be dominated by the PRK
and probably need Vietnamese assistance to remain viable.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research believes that Vietnam is
prepared to reduce the number of its forces in Cambodia, but would not withdraw
unconditionally by early 1990 if the Khmer Rouge remains a significant threat.
Secret iv
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
The limited capability of Sihanouk's troops and the fading fortunes of Son
Sann's Khmer People's National Liberation Front forces dim the military
prospects of the non-Communist resistance. This weakens Sihanouk's hand
in negotiations and could put the non-Communists at risk if an agreement
gets derailed. At present, they have no realistic prospect of competing with
either the Khmer Rouge or PRK forces on the battlefield.
We believe the outlook for Cambodia in the first few years following any
agreement will be highly uncertain. There will be a serious potential for
civil war, fragmentation of the country, renewed foreign involvement, and
a major resurgence by the Khmer Rouge.
The full international ramifications of any agreement cannot be known
with any certainty, but we can outline some of the more important
potential consequences. They include:
? Divisions within ASEAN could become more pronounced without the
unifying influence of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.
? Vietnam's international isolation is likely to be eased, and its prospects
for trade will be improved. However, a settlement will not be a panacea
for Vietnam's domestic ills.
? If China's actions encourage a resolution and if it helps to control the
Khmer Rouge, China's standing in the region is likely to be enhanced.
However, China's standing could suffer if it is isolated with the Khmer
Rouge or if it is perceived as blocking an agreement.'
? Moscow will try to capitalize on a settlement to improve its relations?
especially economic?with the ASEAN countries, and to weaken South-
east Asian support for a US military presence in the region.
? An agreement could pave the way for a normalization of Sino-Soviet
relations.
? An agreement could contribute to the resolution of the Cambodian
refugee issue.
More directly, we can point to a number of important potential implica-
tions for the United States. Among these are:
? Khmer Rouge participation in a Cambodian government would make US
support and assistance difficult to justify, while its exclusion from a
settlement could strain US relations with Thailand and China.
? If negotiations break down, and Vietnam withdraws unilaterally, a
number of US allies may accept Hanoi's client, the PRK, as a fait
accompli in Cambodia.
? The non-Communists could be the biggest losers in a settlement. They
will be militarily impotent and politically vulnerable after an agreement.
? A settlement could contribute to a reappraisal in the region of the
respective roles of the United States, China, the USSR, Japan, and
others, to the possible detriment of US interests.
? Thailand's relations with China have roots deep enough to outlive the
Cambodia problem.
T/jjirdiff matioa is Secret Nof en.
Reverse Blank
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
Contents
Page
Key Judgments iii
Discussion 1
? Hanoi Wants a Settlement 1
The Non-Communists: Ready or Not? 6
The Khmer Rouge: Strengths and Potential Weaknesses 9
The Roles of Thailand and ASEAN 10
Other Key Players: China and the Soviet Union 11
The Most Likely Outcomes 11
Less Likely Alternatives 1 2
Challenges and Uncertainties in a Postagreement Environment 1 3
International Ramifications 1 3
Implications for the United States 1 4
Annex: Who Are the Khmer Rouge? 17
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
Glossary
ANS
Armee Nationale Sihanouk-
ienne?the military arm of Prince
Sihanouk's anti-Vietnamese re-
sistance faction
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian
Nations?Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Indonesia, the Philip-
pines, and Brunei
CGDK Coalition Government of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, comprising
the ANS, DK, and KPNLF
DK Democratic Kampuchea?the
Khmer Rouge
KPNLF Khmer People's National Libera-
tion Front, led by Son Sann.
Along with the ANS, makes up
the non-Communist resistance.
PAVN People's Army of Vietnam
PRK
People's Republic of Kampuchea,
the Vietnamese-controlled regime
in Phnom Penh under the nomi-
nal direction of Heng Samrin
In this Estimate, "Khmer" and "Cambodian" are used interchangeably to refer to the people of
Cambodia.
Secret
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NOFORN-NOCONTRACT
Discussion
Momentum toward a diplomatic breakthrough in
Cambodia has grown in the past several months. The
informal talks on Cambodia that took place in Indo-
nesia in late July were another milestone in this
process. The meetings involved the four Cambodian
factions?the DK, PRK, KPNLF, and the ANS?
Vietnam, Laos, and representatives from the ASEAN
nations (see "Glossary"). Although there was little
substantive progress on any of the key issues, it was
agreed to form a committee to work toward another
informal meeting, probably sometime next year. Also,
Prince Sihanouk agreed to meet PRK Prime Minister
Hun Sen for the third time in Paris in October or
November (see figure 3 at the back of this paper,
which describes the key participants in a settlement).
These meetings will quite likely lead to other initia-
tives and discussions that could provide the frame-
work for a diplomatic agreement. The success of these
efforts, however, will depend largely on Vietnam's
willingness to withdraw its remaining forces and to
enter into substantive negotiations. (s NF)
Hanoi Wants a Settlement
Initial Designs. Hanoi's initial objectives in invading
Cambodia in December 1978 were to stop Khmer
Rouge attacks on its borders and to overthrow the Pol
Pot regime, which it had come to view as an instru-
ment of Chinese hostility. Having successfully done
so, it turned its attention toward:
? Mopping up the Khmer Rouge forces that had fled
to the Thai border.
? Creating a puppet regime modeled after the Viet-
namese party and Government that would, in time,
be able to administer the country on its own.
? Withdrawing the majority of its forces once a
situation has been stabilized.
In the months following Vietnam's successful 1984-85
dry-season offensive, it became apparent that, al-
though Hanoi could not destroy the resistance, it no
longer was a serious threat to Vietnam's strategic
control of Cambodia. In August 1985, Vietnam an-
nounced a deadline of 1990 for withdrawing its troops
from Cambodia (see inset "Cambodia Chronology").
(s NF)
1
Cambodia Chronology
March 1970
April 1975
December 1978
January 1979
Government of Prince Noro-
dom Sihanouk is over-
thrown by Gen. Lon No!.
Lon Nol government over-
thrown by Communist
Khmer Rouge.
Vietnam invades Cambodia;
Khmer Rouge Army dis-
perses.
People's Republic of Kam-
puchea established in
Phnom Penh by Vietnamese
forces; Heng Samrin named
president.
February 1979 China begins attacks along
Vietnam's northern border.
June 1982
December 1987?
January 1988
July 1988
Coalition Government of
Democratic Kampuchea
(CGDK) established with
ASEAN support. This re-
sistance coalition?a gov-
ernment in exile with very
little real power?included
Sihanouk (ANS) as presi-
dent, Son Sann (KPNLF) as
prime minister, and Khieu
Samphan (DK) as vice presi-
dent.
Sihanouk?Hun Sen talks.
Jakarta informal meeting
held.
Unclassified
Secret
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Table 1
People's Republic of Kampuchea Armed Forces
Nondivisional
Divisional
Provincial
Total
Total
14,130
21,140
11,400
46,670a
General Staff
5,160
'
5,160
Military Zone 1
1,020
4,600
1,200
6.820
Military Zone 2
1,900
7,200
9,100
Military Zone 3
2,120
3,800
2,000
7,920
Military Zone 4
2,130
12,740
1,000
15,870
Naval
1,000
1,000
Air
800
800
the overall figures used in
he Estimate are presented as a range.
The PRK: A Weak Reed. Hanoi's objective of estab-
lishing a viable puppet regime, however, has proved
elusive. Vietnam's client in Phnom Penh is politically
weak. It commands little loyalty from the Cambodian
population, and its military and civilian officials
frequently collaborate with the non-Communist resis-
tance, particularly Prince Sihanouk's.ANS. Vietnam
has also failed in its attempt to build the PRK
military into an effective fighting force; the PRK is
not capable of taking on its primary responsibility for
defense and internal security. The PRK's armed
forces number about 44,000 to 48,000, but these
troops are poorly led, are prone to desertion, and
would be hard pressed to contain intensive and sus-
tained attacks by the Khmer Rouge and other resis-
tance forces without Vietnamese or international as-
sistance. (See table 1 and figure 1 on PRK military
deployments.) We believe that the PRK will not be
ready to stand alone by 1990; Hanoi most likely
understands this. (s NF)
? The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
believes there is insufficient reliable information on conditions in
Cambodia to judge the strength of the PRK. It may be politically
weak and have difficulty now in dealing with a determined Khmer
Rouge campaign on the border, but it is the only Khmer faction
with an administrative structure and, with prodding and training
from the Vietnamese, its armed forces could improve. (s NF
Secret
Domestic and International Pressures. At home,
Vietnam's economy has been reduced to virtual paral-
ysis, spawning widespread deprivation and a deep-
seated malaise that has infected all levels of society
(see inset on page 4). General Secretary Nguyen Van
Linh has instituted a broad-based program of domes-
tic reforms not unlike Gorbachev's perestroyka and
glasnost policies?so far to little effect. The overall
situation has actually deteriorated over the past two
years. Linh and other senior officials concede that
reforms will not have any discernible impact for at
least four or five years. Although improvements in
some sectors are possible in the short term, we find
Linh's prognosis to be optimistic.\
(S
Hanoi's new leaders view the Cambodian conflict as a
costly and counterproductive venture that is distract-
ing attention and resources from urgent domestic
problems and blocks meaningful access to the West-
ern and Japanese aid, trade, investment, and technol-
ogy it needs to forge a viable economic recovery and
development strategy. Moreover, Hanoi is very aware
of Gorbachev's public statements, including his Feb-
ruary 1988 declaration, that the Afghan settlement
could serve as a precedent for resolving other regional
conflicts. (s NF)
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Figure 1
Disposition of Contending Forces in Cambodia, August 1988
3 (286I(
115
g 1179
309 16
ir1 (196)
V" 03,7704
f 4
1339
Prey Moen
Priem Thmel
?
Angkor Bal
(Site 8)
302
307
623,7705 ED5504
15
5
5503
5507a
7701 fa,_ e,7707
,9903 11
6B
9902
Q,7702
Phnom PenhI7708
9907 e?9901 62'99076
9905 et?"77
Q3)
?2b5502
9904
Northern (To Mak.
Netto lir
36(
450
of 15,:')
i
NortgL 1 t Northwest. 912
leng SuYi 25
g415 0(
I
1 1, 705
i,e----
Sou
Bore!
Te Loan'
I Pot)
ts
Southwest
4 f Phnom Penh
118
Eastern (Son Sen
980 m6/
V
Northern
616
78
18081
100
Eastern
417 (920
t
SuaY Takeo
Thmar Omen Khe Yen
Sentisokh
Ritthisen
Obey Chen
PAVN and PRK ETV'
Vietnam (PAVN),
People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK)
100,000-110,000
44,000- 48,000
Total 144,000-158,000
PAVN division
? PRK division
et, Joint Vietnamese-PRK group
Khmer Rouge ETS?
Communist Democratic Kampuchea 30,000-40,000
(DK) concentration
Total 30,000-40,000
I DK division
? DK staging area
di DK regional headquarters
? DK military boundary
Non-Communist Resistance ETS?
Armee National Sihanoukienne (ANS)
concentration
Khmer Pebple's National Liberation
Front (KPNLF) concentration
12,000
? ANS staging area
? KPNLF staging area
Total
17,000
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
100 200 Kilometers
100 200 Miles
'Estimated troop strength.
Secret NOFORN
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Cambodia: Economic Malaise
An absence of statistics makes it impossible to
measure Cambodia's economic performance,
but there are clear indications that nine years of
war have taken a severe toll. Poverty is wide-
spread?with most of the population at a sub-
sistence level?and will not be alleviated soon,
even with a settlement. The country lacks tech-
nological skills and its literacy rate has
dropped to one of the lowest in the region.
Diplomatic isolation from the West?outside
the Soviet Bloc only India recognizes the Ha-
noi-installed government?has blocked the flow
of aid and technology, further slowing Cambo-
dia's economic development. (c NF)
Despite a fertile and underpopulated country-
side, we estimate that Cambodia will experi-
ence a 150,000-metric-ton shortfall of rice this
year, in part because the Vietnamese are confis-
cating significant amounts of rice either to feed
occupying troops or to alleviate food shortages
in Vietnam. Because Cambodia's war-driven
economy is unable to meet consumer needs,
Phnom Penh permits the smuggling of an esti-
mated $1 million per month of Thai and West-
ern products into Cambodia, either through
Kaoh Kong, an offshore island in the Gulf of
Thailand, or through the port of Kampong
S QOM. (C
Cambodia has allowed significant private par-
ticipation in its domestic economy, encouraging
private households to provide consumer ser-
vices. Nevertheless, it continues to exercise di-
rect control over the industrial sector, and its
development strategy focuses on constructing
inappropriately large industrial projects. The
mix of private initiative alongside direct state
control will probably remain a central feature
of the economy regardless of the form taken by
a postsettlement coalition government. (c NF)
Secret
We believe that this mix of domestic and international
pressures has caused Hanoi to reconsider its goal of
imposing its own settlement on Cambodia. As a
result, it is now seeking a diplomatic solution.
Although Hanoi still believes that Cambodia and
Laos must not be hostile toward Vietnam, and that
Hanoi is entitled to some influence over their affairs,
it recognizes that continued military occupation of its
neighbors is not feasible. In any Cambodian agree-
ment, Vietnam's principal concern will be to put into
place a diplomatic, political, and security framework
that minimizes Khmer Rouge influence and precludes
its return to power following the withdrawal of Viet-
namese forces. (s NF)
From Hanoi's perspective, a settlement must be pre-
mised upon agreement by China, Thailand, and oth-
ers to stop providing arms and safehaven to Cambod-
ian resistance forces?especially the Khmer Rouge?
and to exile a few of the top Khmer Rouge officials
(see annex). Hanoi probably believes that, although
these measures alone would not end the Khmer Rouge
threat, they are critical to capping its growth potential
and, over time, causing a steady decline in its influ-
ence. Moreover, Hanoi also probably calculates that
no Cambodian government in the near future, includ-
ing one dominated by the Khmer Rouge, is likely to
pose a critical threat to its security interests. Even if
the Khmer Rouge strikes out at Vietnam as it did
between 1975 and 1978, Hanoi almost certainly feels
confident of its ability to deal with such a threat. We
believe once Vietnam completes its withdrawal, how-
ever, it would reintervene on a large scale in Cambo-
dia only in extreme circumstances. Hanoi's new em-
phasis on economic development is heavily premised
on international cooperation.' (s NF)
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
believes that the pressures cited may have increased Hanoi's
urgency in resolving the Cambodian problem, but that Vietnam
still holds the objective of maintaining PRK dominance, although
it will be prepared to accept some form of coalition with Sihanouk
and other non-Communists. (s NF)
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
doubts Hanoi would let a Khmer Rouge regime be reinstituted in
Phnom Penh, particularly one with continuing ties to Beijing.
Hanoi's security interests will outweigh its concerns about interna-
tional cooperation. (s NF)
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As a further guarantee, Hanoi hopes to stack the
internal political odds against a resurgence of the
Khmer Rouge. Vietnam wants to encourage a collabo-
rative arrangement between its client, the PRK, and
Prince Sihanouk's resistance group that together
would constitute the dominant force in postoccupation
Cambodian politics. Sihanouk, as well as Vietnamese
and PRK officials, has alluded to the common ground
among them that makes such an arrangement attrac-
tive and feasible. (s NF)
Despite discomfort with the Prince's egotism and
unpredictability, Hanoi sees Sihanouk as a Khmer
nationalist who?unlike the Khmer Rouge?harbors
no inherent anti-Vietnamese bias. Moreover, both the
PRK and Sihanouk view the Khmer Rouge?not
Vietnam?as the greatest threat to Cambodia's sur-
vival.
iBoth Vietnamese and Soviet
diplomats have spoken approvingly of the already
widespread collaboration between PRK and Sihan-
oukist troops?notwithstanding the negative impact it
exerts on PRK discipline?because it bodes well for
future cooperation. (s NF)
We believe Vietnam prefers to complete its withdraw-
al in the context of a broad political agreement that
entails international guarantees and stringent diplo-
matic and military restrictions on the Khmer
Rouge?a settlement that Hanoi believes would be
more durable. At the same time, however, we believe
Vietnam is prepared to withdraw its troops without an
agreement. The increasingly credible prospect that it
will do so has galvanized Prince Sihanouk, ASEAN,
and others into accelerating diplomatic efforts that
address, inter alia, Vietnam's concerns about the
Khmer Rouge. (s NF)
Vietnamese Troop Withdrawals. Vietnamese forces in
Cambodia, which numbered approximately 200,000
in early 1979, was reduced to about 120,000 to
130,000 by 1986. In late 1987, Vietnam withdrew up
to 20,000 of its soldiers, leaving approximately
100,000 to 110,000 troops in Cambodia. (See table 2
and figure 2.) Hanoi recently announced that half of
the 100,000 troops it claims are currently in country
5
would leave this year. We believe that a small lead
element of several hundred troops from Vietnamese
Headquarters in Phnom Penh pulled out in late June.
Hanoi also announced in July that the troops remain-
ing after this withdrawal-50,000 to 55,000 by our
count?would be withdrawn by the end of March
1990. In our view, Hanoi is serious about ending its
occupation of Cambodia, but at the same time it will
leave behind a covert contingent of several thousand
troops and intelligence operatives. We believe that
some of the 300,000 or more Vietnamese civilians in
Cambodia already have been integrated into PRK
local militia units. In short, we believe that Vietnam
will retain a residual presence sufficient to bolster
local defense capabilities and to monitor the overall
security situation, but not capable of mounting signifi-
cant counterinsurgency operations. An important con-
straint on the size and nature of Vietnam's residual
presence will be Hanoi's desire to avoid offering
China reasons to challenge Vietnam's assertions that
it has honored its withdrawal comniitments. (s NF)
Tracking Hanoi's troop withdrawals has been difficult
and monitoring future reductions is likely to be even
more complex. In the past, Vietnam's highly publi-
cized withdrawal ceremonies often involved troops
discharged after completing a normal tour of duty
who were then replaced surreptitiously by new re-
cruits. Hanoi has shuffled subordinate units among
commands and has used unit designations that com-
plicate our strength assessments. In addition, the
organization of Vietnamese infantry divisions is not
standardized; manpower and equipment vary within
and among units. About half of Vietnam's troops in
Cambodia are assigned to joint Vietnamese-PRK
groups. Information on the composition of these
groups is limited, and the size of these units varies by
region. The combination of infantry from both armies
adds to the accounting problem. (s NF)
' The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research does
not believe that Hanoi has changed its withdrawal timetable,
despite references to an earlier unilateral pullout. With one excep-
tion Hanoi has conditioned earlier withdrawal to an end to foreign
support for the resistance, promising unconditional withdrawal
only by the end of 1990. (s NF)
INR reserves judgment on the latest calculation of Vietnamese
troop strengths in Cambodia because they differ significantly from
previous Community estimates and should be analyzed further.
(s NF)
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Table 2 .
PAVN Forces in Cambodia
I
Nondivisional
Divisional
Group
Total
Total
39,010 '
51,570
10,210
100,790 a
Front 719
7,020
7,020
Front 479
'
8,080
21,400
240
29,720
Front 579
3,580
10,460
3,550
17,590
Front 779
7,300
3,900
3,300
. 14,500
Front 979
5,630
15,810
3,120
24,560 ,
Naval
4,700
4,700
Air
1,700
1,700
Marine
1,000
1,000
the overall figures used in the Estimate are presented as a range.
At present, Hanoi is scaling down the size of its units
by not replacing troops that are being discharged and,
in some cases, by withdrawing troops efore their tour
of duty is completed. Relatively few whole units are
withdrawn intact, which further complicates our
assessments. We will have a particularly hard time
confirming the location and size of any Vietnamese
contingents integrated into PRK units. (s NF)
The Non-Communists: Ready or Not?
The ANS: Growing, But a Long Way To Go. Prince
Sihanouk, who resigned in early July as president of
the CGDK, is acting independently of the coalition in
the search of a political solution. The Prince is
motivated primarily by concern that: ,
? Time is limited to achieve a settlement that is
acceptable to him.
? Thailand and China?the primary supporters of the
anti-Vietnamese resistance?are motivated by polit-
ical and security objectives that diverge in impor-
tant respects from what he believes are Cambodia's
best interests.
Secret
? The Khmer Rouge?now that Vietnamese troops
are moving out?constitutes the most serious threat
to Cambodia, and attention must be focused on
preventing its return to power. (s NF)
Sihanouk's personal force, the ANS, has an estimated
12,000 armed troops?of which no more than 50
percent are operating inside Cambodia. The prospects
are good that the ANS will grow to 15,000 before
1990. Recently, it has made some progress organizing
politically inside Cambodia based on Sihanouk's cha-
risma and his son Ranariddh's ability to keep faction-
al tensions under control (see figure 1). A major
constraint on the ANS's short-term growth pros-
pects?shortages of supplies and weapons?will be
eased this year by Singapore's decision to increase
support for the group. Even with improved logistic
support and modest growth, however, the ANS is
unlikely either to become a formidable military force
or to close the gap substantially in capabilities with
the Khmer Rouge. (s NF)
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Figure 2
Vietnamese Ground Forces in Indochina, August 1988
China
ang Ninh
icial Region
NHaiphong
Command
Gulf
of
Tonkin
Vuetnam
hailand
*Bangkok
Viet.
Front 479
Infantry division
Artillery division
6 Engineering division
^ Construction division
-di- Armored brigade
/f Marine brigade
Military region boundary
6
Ka6h K6nge
Viet.
Front 979
Phnom Penh
Kampang
Sabi
Gulf
of
Thailand
Vung Tau-Con Dao
Special Region
Ho Chi
Minh City
Command
on
South
China
Sea
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
Secret NOFORN
7
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The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Talks: Beginning of a
Settlement?
Sihanouk held two meetings with Hun Sen, the
Foreign Minister of the PRK, in late 1987 and
early 1988. The two agreed that the Cambodian
conflict should be settled politically by the Cam-
bodian people themselves through negotiations "by
all parties to the conflict." Specifically, the two
agreed on a future multiparty government, the
holding of elections under international supervi-
sion (not necessarily control), a neutral interna-
tional stance for Cambodia, and an international
conference to guarantee a settlement. (s NF)
The principal areas of disagreement included Si-
hanouk's demand for the dissolution of the PRK
and the formation of a coalition government before
holding elections, the establishment of an interna-
tional peacekeeping force, and an early withdrawal
timetable for Vietnamese troops. Hun Sen de-
manded the "dismantlement" of the Khmer
Rouge, which Sihanouk opposed as unrealistic
because China would not accept it. (s NF)
In July 1988, Sihanouk resigned as president of
the Cambodian resistance coalition, but arranged
to be present in Indonesia later in the month
during an informal meeting among representatives
of each of the four Khmer factions, Vietnam, Laos,
and ASEAN. In a meeting with the four Khmer
representatives held outside the framework of the
larger informal meeting, the Prince modified his
demand for dissolution of the PRK prior to elec-
tions. He proposed instead the creation of an
interim government by expanding PRK adminis-
trative structures to include equal representation
from all four factions. The new quadripartite
government would be responsible for organizing
elections. Citing both PRK and Khmer Rouge
opposition, Sihanouk also dropped mention of an
international peacekeeping force, but allowed for
an undefined security role for a proposed interna-
tional control commission that would be charged
primarily with supervising Vietnamese troop with-
drawals and Cambodian elections. Vietnam,
meanwhile, announced just before the Indonesia
meeting that it had moved up its final troop
withdrawal deadline from late 1990, to early 1990
provided that certain conditions are met. (s NF)
A statement approved by the participants in the
informal meeting noted agreement that the two
key issues in a diplomatic settlement, which are
interlinked, are the withdrawal of Vietnamese
forces and the prevention of the recurrence of
genocidal policies and practices. The only concrete
agreement emerging from the meeting was to es-
tablish a working group to discuss specific propos-
als and to report recommendations on a larger
meeting by December. (s NF)
Sihanouk did not participate in the Indonesia
meeting. His presence on the fringes, however,
along with attendance at the meeting by Vietnam-
ese, Khmer, and ASEAN representatives, marked
the first time most of the principal players in the
Cambodian conflict had addressed the key issues
in a single venue. (s NF)
Despite the modest tangible results of the meeting
and the reluctance of the Khmer Rouge to partici-
pate in the proceedings, the Indonesia meeting
provided new impetus to diplomatic efforts, in-
cluding a prospective third round of talks between
Sihanouk and Hun Sen. (s NF)
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Sihanouk's international reputation and acceptability
to all major players?despite the ANS's military
shortcomings?make him an essential ingredient of
any agreement. Hanoi and its PRK clients are willing
to accept a coalition government headed by Sihanouk;
so too are China, ASEAN, and the United States,
although there are differences over the role he should
play. His overall impact will depend on how much
power he actually, wields and the length of time he
remains in office. (s NF).
The KPNLF: Stumbling Into Insignificance. Sihan-
ouk's non-Communist coalition partner, Son Sann's
Khmer People's National Liberation Front, has for-
feited most of the leverage once available to it as a
result of debilitating factional strife over the past
three years. The persistent internal leadership prob-
lems paralyze KPNLF command and control, while
the organization continues to suffer from supply
shortages, steady erosion of morale and discipline, and
widespread corruption. (s NF)
General Sak Sutsakhan, military commander of the
KPNLF forces, has repeatedly attempted to reverse
the downward spiral without success. Since last
March, General Sak has attempted to implement
critically needed reforms, including a greater display
of personal leadership, reorganization of the Front,
and the removal of several officers with questionable
loyalty. The initiative is floundering?as have past
attempts at reform?and it has provoked another
round of infighting among senior officers whose loyal-
ties are split between General Sak and President Son
Sann. (s NF)
KPNLF military strength has dropped from a high of
15,000 in 1985 to fewer than 5,000 troops today (see
figure 1). Unless leadership problems are resolved, it
will not be a military factor, and its political signifi-
cance will be greatly reduced. (s NF)
The Khmer Rouge: Strengths and Potential
Weaknesses
The militarily most potent of the Cambodian factions,
the Khmer Rouge, has a strength of 30,000 to 40,000,
of which about half are inside Cambodia at any given
time (see figure 1). Though these forces are no match
for the Vietnamese, in the event of a Vietnamese
withdrawal they will be a destabilizing factor. (s NF)
9
Has the Khmer Rouge Changed Its Stripes?
Although the Khmer Rouge has tried to im-
prove its image in recent years by renouncing
Communism and by lowering the profile of its
most notorious leader, Pol Pot, we have no
reason to believe that the Khmer Rouge has
abandoned its quest for sole power in Cambodia
or its radical ideology that led to the deaths of
between 2 and 3 million Khmer in the late
1970s. The current leadership is virtually the
same group that founded the brutal Democratic
Kampuchea regime in 1975. Pol Pot, despite his
ostensible retirement in 1985, still plays an
integral role in Khmer Rouge military opera-
tions and his inner circle that includes Ta Mok,
Ieng Sary, Son Sen, Nuon Chea, and point man
Khieu Samphan is intact. While reporting from
Khmer Rouge?controlled areas is sketchy, the
bulk of evidence indicates that the Khmer
Rouge is both totalitarian and oppressive. It
has developed its support base inside Cambodia
somewhat in recent years, but memories of its
brutality are a major impediment to its ability
to attract popular support. (s
The Khmer Rouge is focusing most of its efforts on an
expanded political and psychological campaign to
dismantle systematically the PRK administrative
apparatus in rural areas and to replace it with one
under Khmer Rouge control. In addition, the Khmer
Rouge is stockpiling military equipment and supplies,
while bringing increasing military pressure against
PRK forces and non-Communist resistance factions.
Several PRK border garrisons fell to Khmer Rouge
attacks in June and July 1988, and their recent gains
astride non-Communist infiltration corridors give the
group the ability to cut off non-Communist supply
lines. Khmer Rouge attacks against the non-Commu-
nist resistance apparently have increased since
March. (s NF)
The recent Khmer Rouge attacks emphasize the
group's military prowess and probably are intended to
win political leverage as talks proceed toward finding
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a diplomatic settlement. However, the aggressive
policy also risks stiffening domestic and international
opposition to the organization. (s NF)
We believe that the Khmer Rouge leadership remains
intent on regaining sole power in Phnom Penh and
that this determination almost ensures that it will
break at some point with the other Khmer factions.
The group appears to have two basic options over the
near term:
? Participate in a formal agreement in order to
achieve some legal standing that would allow it
opportunities to undermine, from within, a post-
Vietnamese-withdrawal government. This option
probably would dictate relative military restraint on
the part of the Khmer Rouge, at least until the
Vietnamese completed their pullout.
? Attempt to sabotage the present negotiations or,
failing that, break off entirely its own participation
in them before a formal agreement. This would
entail an openly hostile Khmer Rouge stance from
the outset toward any government succeeding the
present PRK regime. (s NF)
Despite the apparent disparity in strength between the
Khmer Rouge and the other Khmer factions, its
prospects for returning to power in postsettlement
Cambodia are by no means ensured:
? It has been able to replace its combat losses in
recent years, but not expand its size.
? There are reported problems of morale and disci-
pline among some Khmer Rouge forces, and sub-
stantial numbers might desert if presented the
opportunity.
? Its forces depend on China for combat materiel and
other supplies and?despite vigorous stockpiling of
late?would be significantly weakened over the
longer term by a shutdown of this external support.
? Much of its domestic support derives from its
association with Sihanouk and its efforts to force a
Vietnamese withdrawal. It stands to lose the luxury
of this legitimacy and support if it undermines an
agreement or, in the extreme, if it engages in a
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protracted guerrilla war against the new
government.
Although there is no evidence of major power strug-
gles within the organization, present difficulties over
policy could prove divisive over the longer term. (s NF)
The Roles of Thailand and ASEAN
Thailand's role is crucial in any potential agreement
because it is the conduit for Chinese supplies to the
Khmer Rouge and is the provider of sanctuaries to the
resistance forces. The ASEAN countries have thus
far been united in their support for Thailand as the
frontline state, though Indonesia and Malaysia, who
are more concerned about China's regional influence
than Vietnam's, have pushed for a negotiated settle-
ment. Bangkok has thus far been adamant about
Vietnam's total withdrawal from Cambodia and, until
recently, has taken a highly skeptical view of Hanoi's
intentions. However, Thailand has hailed Vietnam's
announcement of troop withdrawals, and Foreign
Minister Sitthi?a hard liner regarding Vietnam?
held cordial talks with his Vietnamese counterpart,
and has spoken much more optimistically about the
prospects for progress on the Cambodia question. For
the first time Bangkok also has displayed willingness
to discuss ways of dealing with the Khmer Rouge
issue. (s NF)
The Thai are nervous about Vietnamese intentions,
however, and are unlikely to do anything regarding
the Khmer Rouge unless there is reciprocal movement
by Vietnam. Because the Khmer Rouge is the only
major source of military pressure on Vietnam, Thai
officials argue that Bangkok's ability to impose limi-
tations on the guerrillas is an important bargaining
chip that must not be played prematurely. Before
cutting off aid to the Khmer Rouge, Bangkok would
have to be convinced that the Vietnamese withdrawal
will be completed and that Vietnam would be discour-
aged from returning to Cambodia. Thailand also
wants to ensure that its role in an agreement does not
unduly compromise Chinese interests or damage
growing bilateral ties. (s NF)
ASEAN's overall influence will quite likely be rela-
tively limited. It will have an important say in struc-
turing the negotiations that lead to the shape of a new
Cambodian regime but?apart from Thailand?is in
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no position to take independent steps to meet either
Vietnamese or international concerns for preventing a
Khmer Rouge return to power. (s NF)
Other Key Players: China and the Soviet Union
China's major interest has been to contain Soviet and
Vietnamese influence in the region. Beijing's strategy
has been to maximize political and military pressure
on Vietnam through a number of means: materiel
supplies to the Khmer Rouge and the non-Communist
resistance, military operations along Vietnam's north-
ern frontier, strong support for Thailand's hardline
position demanding Vietnamese withdrawal, and con-
tinued insistence that Moscow use its influence with
Hanoi to effect a withdrawal of PAVN troops as a
precondition for normalization of Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. China has used international condemnation of
Vietnam's invasion to buttress its position but, as
Vietnam withdraws, Beijing can no longer claim the
moral high ground and risks being perceived as the
chief obstacle to a settlement because of its support
for the Khmer Rouge. Recognition of this danger
apparently inspired China's 1 July Foreign Ministry
statement that, though consistent with past positions,
contained new elements addressing the Khmer Rouge
problem. Chinese diplomats have indicated privately
that their policy is evolving toward a more flexible
stand. In spite of public denials, China has privately
shown some willingness to give top Khmer Rouge
leaders safehaven as part of a settlement and might be
induced to cut off its logistic support for those left
along the Thai-Cambodian border. While China will
attempt to place major limitations on Vietnam's role
in a postsettlement Cambodia, firm guarantees of a
Vietnamese withdrawal will probably be sufficient for
Beijing to sign on to a Cambodian accord. (s NF)
Gorbachev has stressed to the Vietnamese his interest
in resolving the Cambodian conflict, to improve rela-
tions with China, reduce the cost of Soviet military
assistance to Vietnam, and enhance Soviet prestige as
a peacemaker. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghani-
stan, in our view, has added some impetus to the
existing momentum toward a Cambodian agreement.
(s NF)
We have no evidence that the Soviets have taken
drastic steps, such as reducing aid, to try to force
Hanoi to seek a settlement, but residual nervousness
11
exists in Hanoi that Moscow could sell Hanoi's inter-
ests short for the sake of improved Sino-Soviet rela-
tions. Moscow should be able to pressure Hanoi up to
a point without risking its military stake in Vietnam.
Hanoi's dependence on Moscow goes far beyond just
Soviet support on Cambodia. We believe that Viet-
nam's moves toward an agreement in Cambodia
currently stem primarily from Hanoi's own interests,
but Soviet pressure may have been instrumental in
moving the process forward. Moscow's attempts to
play up Vietnamese and Soviet flexibility on Cambo-
dia?to deflect criticism of its economic and military
support for the Vietnamese occupation?have also put
pressure on Beijing to be more flexible to avoid
appearing as obstructionist. (s NF)
The increased flexibility shown by both Moscow and
Beijing produced a recent agreement to hold a round
of discussions in Beijing that, for the first time, would
focus exclusively on the Cambodia issue. While the
ability of both sides to influence their respective allies
has limitations, any joint approaches or reciprocal
actions the two might agree on could profoundly
affect the course of negotiations. (s NF)
The Most Likely Outcomes
The prospects for an agreement in Cambodia are
better now than at any time in the past decade, and
we believe one is highly likely by early 1990. We
envision as the most likely outcomes either a coalition
government comprised of all four Cambodian factions
and headed by Prince Sihanouk, or one in which
Sihanouk and the PRK establish a provisional govern-
ment without the Khmer Rouge. (s NF)
A Four-Party Coalition. In a four-party coalition, the
most important provisions?and ones most difficult to
predict?would be those regarding the Khmer Rouge.
At a minimum, we would expect Hanoi to demand
that the most objectionable Khmer Rouge leaders,
including Pol Pot and his inner circle, be exiled, and
that China and Thailand cut off supplies to the group.
Other guarantees that may apply range from disarm-
ing all Khmer Rouge forces, to establishing an inter-
national presence to lend stability to the coalition for
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the first few years. The advantages of such an out-
come include:
? Sihanouk has an opportunity to establish legitimate
authority.
? All parties get something: Vietnam gets out of
Cambodia in a face-saving manner; China and
Thailand get a political settlement that includes
Vietnamese withdrawal; the Cambodian resistance
factions get to participate in the government.
? International acceptance and support probably can
be achieved. (s NF)
Nevertheless, there are some potential liabilities in
such an outcome, including:
? The Khmer Rouge has a good chance of subverting
the coalition.
? Political instability will continue as the various
factions contend for power.
? As the situation in Cambodia remains unstable, it
will invite continuing external?Thai, Vietnamese,
and Chinese?meddling. (s NF)
Sihanouk and the PRK Come to Terms. If negotia-
tions aimed at reconciling all four Cambodian fac-
tions break down, we believe an agreement between
Sihanouk and the PRK is the most likely outcome.'
We believe that Son Sann probably would play a
supporting role in this scenario; Sihanouk probably
would retain the backing of Western and ASEAN
countries; and Vietnam would stay in the background
to prop up the PRK faction. If the agreement held and
the new government won international recognition,
Thailand would be pressured to cut off aid and
safehaven for the Khmer Rouge, though we believe
that it would hesitate to do so. Likewise, we believe
that Beijing would be unlikely to sacrifice improved
relations with ASEAN, particularly Thailand, by
refusing to compromise on agreement modalities and
The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
believes that Sihanouk and Hun Sen are more likely to reach an
accommodation before any substantive four-party negotiations
occur, let alone reach agreement. The relationship that has
developed between Bangkok and Beijing makes it unlikely that
Bangkok would accept a solution the Chinese oppose. (s NF)
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becoming isolated with the Khmer Rouge. The chief
advantages of such an outcome include:
? The Khmer Rouge will have to continue its struggle,
without the cloak of legitimacy provided by its
participation in an internationally approved
government.
? Those countries that give material, political, and
moral support to the coalition government are not
tarnished by having to support the Khmer Rouge as
well. (s NF)
The chief disadvantages of such an outcome include:
? The Khmer Rouge, though weakened, will feel
compelled to resume an armed struggle against the
coalition government.
? A wedge might be driven between China and Thai-
land on the one hand, and the rest of the ASEAN
countries on the other, should Beijing and Bangkok
continue to support the Khmer Rouge.
? Thailand will face a difficult problem both in
handling the camps on its soil that are controlled by
the Khmer Rouge, and in dealing with Chinese
pressure to continue covert support for the group.
? Prospects fora Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Soviet
rapprochement could be damaged. (s NF)
Less Likely Alternatives
The Vietnamese Withdraw Leaving the PRK in
Phnom Penh.' If all negotiations fail, Vietnam would
withdraw unilaterally, banking on a moderately
strengthened PRK, possibly joined in a de facto
alliance with the non-Communist resistance, to con-
tain the Khmer Rouge. This withdrawal would allow
Vietnam to declare that it had met the international
condition for the resumption of favorable economic
and trade ties. Although most of the advantages in
such an outcome would seem to flow to the Vietnam-
ese, there are broader adverse implications:
? In effect, there would be no early end to the struggle
inside Cambodia, and the chances of a Khmer
Rouge return to power would improve.
? More than 250,000 Khmer refugees would remain
in limbo in Thailand.
9 Under any reasonable outcome in Cambodia, it is highly likely
that Vietnam would find a way to keep a residual force in
Cambodia. Hanoi would seek to protect its own security and to
bolster the morale of the PRK share of whatever government runs
the country. (s NF)
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? The PRK's international legitimacy probably would
increase with the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops,
and those countries that give support to the resis-
tance would be vulnerable to charges of undermin-
ing regional stability.
? China's participation would be absent, and an op-
portunity for partial Sino-Vietnamese, as well as
Sino-Soviet, rapprochement would be delayed. (s NF)
Hanoi Suspends Its Withdrawal. Although less likely,
it is also possible that Hanoi could cut short its troop
withdrawal if the Khmer Rouge were to make signifi-
cant military gains over the next year or two. Under
this scenario, Hanoi would maintain a substantial
number of mainforce units east of the Mekong River.
As a result of this outcome:
? There would be a de facto partition of Cambodia,
with Vietnam controlling the eastern provinces and
the Khmer factions battling west of the river.
Prospects for an early diplomatic settlement involv-
ing genuine Khmer reconciliation would be dashed.
? Vietnam's hopes for dramatically increased econom-
ic and political intercourse with the West and Japan
would be sidetracked, although some countries
would continue to expand their contacts.
? Vietnamese relations with the Soviets could be
strained, though Moscow probably would not reduce
or cut off military and economic assistance in order
to preserve its military facilities in Vietnam.
? Sino-Vietnamese relations would remain hostile;
Cambodia and the Spratly Islands could be flash-
points for further military clashes.
? Thailand privately might accept a partition as long
as Vietnam's forces remained distant and the
Khmer refugees were repatriated. Overall ASEAN
resolve to press Hanoi would continue to weaken
despite Vietnam's violation of its pledge to with-
draw. (s NF)
Challenges and Uncertainties in a Postagreement
Environment
An agreement in itself will not solve Cambodia's
problems, nor will it necessarily produce an accept-
able long-term outcome. Any government in Phnom
13
Penh over the short term will be inherently unstable.
For example:
? In a four-party coalition government, the two stron-
gest components?at least in the beginning?will be
rival Communist factions?the PRK and the Khmer
Rouge?whose competition for supremacy could
seriously threaten the non-Communist elements.
? In a government that excludes the Khmer Rouge,
the non-Communists have few equities to bring to
bear at the outset, and their long-term survival
would depend heavily on their ability to avoid
infighting and to build informal alliances. (s NF)
An agreement is also only the first step in returning
peace and order to Cambodia. The new government
will immediately face a number of serious challenges,
including:
? Containing a resurgence of the Khmer Rouge,
especially in the countryside. How will the new
government counter the Khmer Rouge's grassroots
organizing abilities?
? Defining Prince Sihanouk's role. Will he wield real
power and influence? Will he be an effective ruler
capable of unifying the country?
? Setting up and staffing the government. How will
the power and positions be distributed?
? Formulating policy. How will policy decisions be
made and implemented?
? Establishing a unified armed forces. How will exist-
ing forces be integrated and who will command
them? (s NF)
Given these difficulties, we believe that the outlook
for Cambodia in the first few years following any
agreement will be highly uncertain. There will be a
serious potential for civil war, fragmentation of the
country, renewed foreign involvement, and a major
resurgence by the Khmer Rouge. International over-
sight will be critical in detecting early signs of trouble
and in preventing or alleviating the worst excesses
that might otherwise occur. (s NF)
International Ramifications
The actual course of events in Cambodia over the next
few years, particularly the outcome of any agreement,
has significant international implications. The full
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ramifications cannot be known with any certainty, but
we can outline some of the more important potential
consequences. They include:
? ASEAN. Divisions within ASEAN could 'become
more pronounced without the unifying influence of
the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The vary-
ing ASEAN reactions to the informal meetings held
in Jakarta demonstrate how close to the surface
intra-ASEAN tensions already have become. Indo-
nesia, for example, will likely become more assertive
in seeking to exercise leadership, particularly in
expanding ties to Indochina. In addition, ASEAN
increasingly will focus on economic issues and prob-
lems. Trade frictions are likely to arise as the
member countries?who are already competing
with each other?seek to expand their markets.
? Vietnam. Vietnam's international isolation is likely
to be eased, and its prospects for trade will be
improved. However, a settlement will not be a
panacea for Vietnam's domestic ills.
? China. The consequences for China will depend on
Beijing's role in an agreement. If Beijing's actions
encourage a resolution and if China helps to control
the Khmer Rouge, its standing in the region is likely
to be enhanced. Beijing may also gain political
capital by stressing that its continued political pres-
sure on Hanoi and Moscow were instrumental in
bringing about an agreement. However, China's
standing could suffer if it is isolated with the Khmer
Rouge or if it is perceived as blocking an agreement.
? Soviet Union. Moscow will try to capitalize on a
settlement to improve its relations?especially eco-
nomic?with the ASEAN countries. The credibility
of Gorbachev's commitment to resolving regional
conflicts would be enhanced.
? Sino-Soviet Relations. An agreement could pave
the way for a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.
? An agreement could contribute to the resolution of
the Cambodian refugee problem.
Implications for the United States
US interests will be variously affected depending on
the precise nature of the outcome in Cambodia.
Secret
Nevertheless, we can point in general terms to a
number of important potential implications. Among
these are:
? Khmer Rouge participation in a coalition govern-
ment would make US support and assistance diffi-
cult to justify. It might make some gains, possibly
substantial ones, that could alienate many Ameri-
cans and prompt considerable criticism of US
actions. Its exclusion from a settlement could strain
US relations with Thailand and China. Beijing's
? unwillingness to cut off military assistance to its
client could lead to serious frictions and confronta-
tion. Thailand might well side with China, further
exacerbating tensions.
? In the event negotiations break down, and Vietnam
withdraws unilaterally, a number of US friends and
allies might accept Hanoi's client, the PRK, as a
fait accompli in Cambodia. Indonesia and Malaysia,
for example, appear willing to accept the legitimacy
of such a regime and recognize it after a Vietnam-
ese withdrawal. Hanoi is also likely to break out of
both its regional and international isolation in such
an event. Washington would be forced to argue
against PRK claims of legitimacy and would be
subjected to criticism if it chose to continue provid-
ing support to the non-Communist resistance.
? The non-Communists could be the biggest losers in
a settlement. They will be militarily impotent and
politically vulnerable after an agreement. They
might serve largely as window dressing for a regime
dominated by Communists. Sihanouk himself, given
his dearth of military forces and able civilian
administrators, is likely to feel pressures to side with
the PRK and even connive with Hanoi at times to
maintain his leading role. Vietnam most likely hopes
for such an outcome, and would undoubtedly gain
much from such an arrangement. Only China and
the Khmer Rouge are likely to object loudly. Wash-
ington could quickly become isolated and have its
choices narrowed considerably.
? A settlement could contribute to a reappraisal in the
region of the respective roles of the United States,
? China, the USSR, Japan, and others, to the possible
detriment of US interests. Regional perceptions of a
less threatening USSR could also alter attitudes
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toward Soviet involvement in the region?on such
issues as the US bases in the Philippines and
nuclear-free zones?in ways unfavorable to the
United States. Although a political solution of the
Cambodia problem would ease Thai concerns by
removing a major source of regional instability, we
believe Thailand would look to the United States to
help deal with the uncertainties that a settlement
would generate. The Thai would Probably seek
renewed and strengthened assurances of support
from their US ally as well as increased military
assistance to counter unease over any deals reached
with the Vietnamese.
? Over the longer term, however, we believe Thai-
land's relations with China have roots deep enough
to outlive the Cambodia problem. Bangkok probably
would also work to shore up aspects of the China
relationship unrelated to Cambodia?such as fledg-
ling economic ties?to ensure Beijing's interest in
continued cooperation.
? An active Japanese role in the settlement process
will improve Tokyo's political image and increase its
economic access to a postsettlement Indochina. The
French also hope to expand their economic and
political influence. (s NF)
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Oeta et
Annex
Who Are the Khmer Rouge?
Pol Pot
Director, Academy of National Defense
Pol Pot led the inner circle of Khmer Rouge leaders
that ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 and is
considered to be principal director of the Khmer
Rouge's genocidal regime. He no longer holds any
prominent titles and keeps out of the public's view to
decrease international criticism of Khmer Rouge
activities. But, he remains the dominant Khmer
Rouge military official. (s NF)
Pol Pot is a clever and capable revolutionary; he
appears to be a blend of ideologue, fanatic, and
opportunist. Widely considered an organizational ex-
pert rather than an intellectual, he has been willing to
leave the limelight to others and to occupy himself
with the work of organizing the party and war efforts.
Pol Pot reportedly advocates the Khmer Rouge's
absolute return to power with Prince Sihanouk as a
figurehead. (c NF)
Pol Pot was born about 1925 in Kampong Thum
Province. He received his early education in a Bud-
dhist monastery and local technical schools. He went
to France in 1949 to attend a vocational school, but
his scholarship was cancelled because of his leftist
political activities. Upon his return to Cambodia in
1953, Pol Pot moved to Phnom Penh to work as a
teacher and journalist. Active in leftist journalist
circles, his activities led the government to arrest him
in 1956. By 1957, he apparently became a member of
the directing committee of the Cambodian Commu-
nist Party (CCP), and in 1960, he was elected to the
standing committee of the CCP's central committee.
A year later he was elected deputy secretary of the
party; in 1963, he was elevated to party secretary.
(c NF)
From 1963 to 1975, Pol Pot spent most of his time in
the Cambodian countryside where he served in a
number of positions. He was the chairman of the
military committee of the party central committee
17
from 1970 to at least 1976. In April 1976, he was
elected prime minister, but later took a leave of
absence and was not heard from until September
1977 when he was identified as secretary of the
Communist Party of Kampuchea's central committee.
After Vietnamese troops successfully invaded Cambo-
dia and installed the People's Republic of Kampuchea
(PRK) regime in January 1979, Pol Pot fled the
country. (c NF)
Since January 1979, Pol Pot has been located primar-
ily along the Cambodian-Thai border where he has
directed guerrilla operations against the PRK-Viet-
namese forces. After Khieu Samphan replaced him as
prime minister of Democratic Kampuchea in 1979,
Pol Pot became chairman of the Supreme Commis-
sion and commander in chief of the National Army of
Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot remained command-
er of the military forces until August 1985 when the
supreme military council was abolished and he was
appointed head of the Academy of National Defense.
(c NF)
Pol Pot reportedly suffers from high blood pressure
and malaria, but rumors of serious health problems
are unsubstantiated. (c NF)
Khieu Samphan
Vice President, Coalition Government of Democratic
Kampuchea
Khieu Samphan serves as vice president of the
anti?Vietnamese Coalition Government of Democrat-
ic Kampuchea (CGDK). He also serves as the Khmer
Rouge's foreign minister, although he shares control
with Pol Pot and other leaders. (s NF)
Khieu has attempted to cultivate a moderate and
pragmatic public image. He has acknowledged that
the genocidal practices of the Khmer Rouge during
1975-79 were wrong, and maintains that the Khmer
Rouge now supports a democratic government in
Cambodia after Vietnam withdraws its troops. (s NF)
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Khieu was born on 27 July 1931. Some Cambodians
and foreign officials have characterized him as
impressive and intellectual. Others, however, say he is
a man of only mediocre intelligence?quiet, passive,
and definitely without leadership traits. (c NF)
Khieu received a doctorate in economics from the
University of Paris in 1959, and some of the economic
policies and programs enacted later by the Khmer
Rouge appeared in theory in his doctoral dissertation.
After his return to Cambodia, Khieu was elected to
the National Assembly and appointed to the Cabinet
in 1962. Five years later he fled Phnom Penh and
joined the insurgency, having been publicly labeled as
one of Cambodia's five top Communists. From 1967
until Democratic Kampuchea was established in
1976, he held a variety of posts with the Khmer
Rouge forces, including that of commander in chief of
the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed
Forces. He served as chairman of the Khmer Rouge's
three-man State Presidium and as chief of state,
largely a ceremonial role, during 1976-79. In August
1985, he reportedly replaced Pol Pot as formal head
of the Khmer Rouge. (c NF)
Ieng Sary
Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs
One of the most influential Khmer Rouge leaders,
Sary heads the Khmer Rouge force headquartered in
Thailand, south of Aranyaprathet along the Thai-
Cambodian border, and serves as the Khmer Rouge's
link to China. He was invited to Beijing earlier this
year to discuss Chinese concerns over the lack of
military progress made by the Khmer Rouge in the
past nine years, but we do not know whether he
actually attended these meetings. (s NF)
While the Khmer Rouge regime held power in Phnom
Penh, Sary defended its official policies of self-
reliance and self-imposed isolation. Since that time, in
an effort to mollify critics of his government's past
policies, Sary has admitted that excesses?especially
human rights violations?did occur while his govern-
ment ruled in Phnom Penh. He contends, however,
that they were not organized by the Khmer Rouge
leadership, but were a result of actions by rank-and-
file Vietnamese infiltrators. (c NF)
Secret
Sary was born on 1 January 1930 in either the
Cambodian province of Prey Veng, or more likely,
Tay Ninh Province, South Vietnam. In the early
1950s he studied in France with Pol Pot and joined
the Communist party there. After his return to Cam-
bodia in the late 1950s, he became a teacher and
continued his involvement in Communist activities. In
1963 he dropped from sight after one of Chief of State
Sihanouk's more serious confrontations with the left.
His subsequent activities are largely a mystery until
1971, when he appeared in Beijing as a special envoy
from the "liberated" area of Cambodia. In this
capacity, he accompanied Sihanouk on several trips
abroad in 1972 and 1973. In November 1973 he
returned to Cambodia where he became special advis-
er to the office of the deputy prime minister. In 1974
he visited North Vietnam, China, and the "liberated
zones" of Laos and South Vietnam. Sary escaped
from Phnom Penh before it was occupied by the
Vietnamese in January 1979. (c NF)
Son Sen
Vice President of Democratic Kampuchea
Supreme Commander, Democratic Kampuchea
National Army
Son Sen assumed his current position following the
retirement of the notorious Pol Pot. Sen, who studied
in Paris with Pol Pot in the 1950s, reportedly has close
ties to him and served as overseer of the Khmer
Rouge's security apparatus during Pol Pot's regime.
Sen, who reportedly represents the "moderates" with-
in the Khmer Rouge, has been its representative on
the Coordinating Committee for National Defense
under the CGDK since its inception in 1982. (c NF)
Sen, an experienced field commander, has been
described by fellow CGDK members as an effective
leader and is considered by Prince Sihanouk to be one
of the best Cambodian military experts. He has met
with Prince Sihanouk to discuss military strategy and
to resolve problems between the two groups. Sen also
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supported other coalition leaders efforts to convince
Sihanouk to reverse his resignation in June 1987 and
again in February 1988. (c NF)
Born in South Vietnam about 1930, Sen received the
equivalent of a bachelor's degree in education in
Paris. After returning to Cambodia in 1956 he was a
primary schoolteacher and political agitator until he
went underground in 1963 to escape arrest. Along
with many other Khmer Rouge officials, he was
considered dead until he emerged in the early 1970s.
From 1970 to 1975 Sen served as chief of the now
defunct People's National Liberation Armed Forces
of Cambodia, and as a Politburo member until the
Communist Party of Kampuchea was dissolved in
December 1981. He was secretary general of the
Supreme Commission of the Democratic Kampu-
chean Army from December 1979 until it was abol-
ished in August 1985. He also served as deputy prime
minister in charge of national defense for the Khmer
Rouge from August 1975 until his recent promotion.
(C NF)
Ta Mok
Vice Chairman, Chief of General Staff, National Army
of Democratic Kampuchea
Associated with Pol Pot since at least the early 1960s,
Ta (Elder) Mok played a crucial role in consolidating
Pol Pot's power in the regional commands during the
purges of the 1970s. Although Mok's overall health
has suffered from his loss of a leg in a landmine
explosion in 1983, he continues to exert significant
influence in Khmer Rouge affairs. (s NF)
According to several accounts, Mok is a capable,
experienced military leader who elicits both fear and
respect from his subordinates. Some foreign military
officials describe him as a charismatic commander
who is well known for spending considerable time with
the troops. As a member of the Southwest Party
Committee, he helped purge the Khmer Viet Minh
during 1971-73. In 1973, Mok purged, and then
succeeded the deputy secretary of the Southwest
Region. He subsequently purged his predecessor's
associates throughout 1974-75, and when the region
was split in 1975, Mok was named secretary of the
region that retained the Southwest name. From 1975
until 1979, Mok led purges of each of the East, West,
19
and Northwest Regions, and named himself secretary
of each area. He was appointed to his current posi-
tions in December 1979, and continues to command
Khmer Rouge forces in the Northern Region border-
ing Thailand. (s NF)
Mok, whose real name is Choeun, is in his late fifties
or early sixties. The "Ta Mok" alias came from the
Ta Mok Elementary School in Phnom Penh, where
Mok has been a teacher. Mok has used several other
aliases, including Chhit Choeun, Nguon Kang,
Thieun Chhith, and Eaik Choeun. (c NF)
Thiounn Prasith
Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Thiounn Prasith has been a prominent spokesman for
the Khmer Rouge. Prasith attributes Cambodia's ills
to the Vietnamese, including the atrocities committed
by the Khmer Rouge. He has tried to approach US
officials to express appreciation for Washington's
position concerning the Vietnamese invasion of his
country. (s NF NC)
Prasith was born on 3 February 1930 into a family
with palace ties. Like many Khmer Rouge members,
he was educated in France. Deeply involved in under-
ground activities in both France and Cambodia, he
joined Prince Sihanouk's front organization when
Sihanouk was ousted as Chief of State in 1970.
Prasith was based in Beijing until the Communist
victory in Cambodia in 1975. (c NF)
Prasith has three brothers who have also been associ-
ated with the Khmer Rouge. (c NF)
Nuon Chea
Chairman, Standing Committee of the Democratic
Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly
Nuon Chea is one of the three top leaders of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea. A shadowy figure with close ties
to Pol Pot, he is rumored to be one of the top
contenders to succeed Pol Pot, but he has not been
seen in several years. Since his 1979 ouster from
Cambodia, Chea reportedly has been headquartered
along the southern Thai-Cambodian border with Pol
Pot. (s NF)
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Born about 1927, Chea is one of the few Khmer
Rouge leaders with a higher education; he has been
described as a hard liner on most issues. Chea studied
law at Thammasat University in Bangkok in the early
1940s. At that time he joined the Communist Party of
Thailand and later transferred to the Communist
Party of Indochina. In 1955, Chea (then known as
Long Reth) was responsible for organizing a national
workers association; the effort ultimately failed be-
cause of alleged government repression. In 1960,
Chea was elected deputy secretary general of the then
new Communist Party of Cambodia. His prominence
in the party was first acknowledged officially in
March 1972, when he was identified as a vice chair-
man of the High Command of the National Libera-
tion Armed Forces, and as chief of its political
department. Chea became a member of the People's
Representative Assembly when it was established in
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March 1976. In September of that same year, Chea
was named acting prime Minister while Pol Pot was
on leave for health reasons. In September 1977, he
was named deputy secretary of the Communist Party
of Kampuchea Central Committee and was Pol Pot's
deputy. Chea was confirmed as Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the People's Representative
Assembly at a special congress in December 1979.
(c NF)
Although Chea rarely travels outside of Cambodia, in
June 1975, he traveled with Pol Pot and Foreign
Minister Ieng Sary to Vietnam for border discussions.
He also led a Khmer Rouge delegation to North
Korea and China in September 1978. (c NF)
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