SOME THOUGHTS ON SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN AND US POLICY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 29, 2013
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: January 21, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Some Thoughts on Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan and US Policy
FROM:
Robert Blackwell
NIO/USSR
EXTENSION
I NO.
NIC-00239/88
DATE
21 January 1988
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
1.
Acting Chairman/NIC
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
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2 8 JAN 19139
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SI-AT
The IZETOSTentral inteingene
Washington, D.C. 20505
National I ntelligence'Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intelligence
Deputy Director Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
NIC-00239/88
21 January 1988
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan and
US Policy
1. The evidence regarding Soviet intentions about Afghanistan since the
summit remains ambiguous. Recent Soviet words and deeds could represent
either yet another attempt to reduce the international costs of Afghanistan or
a genuine effort to signal their intent to find a way out of Afghanistan even
if it means that their clients leave with them.
2. While logic and some evidence can be presented to support these two
interpretations (a better case can be made that they will stay), we can't say
with confidence which view is correct. Current Soviet activity could lead
them toward either objective and, indeed, probably is intended to do just
that, giving the leadership the flexibility to get the maximum political
leverage possible from its rather weak cards and putting the onus on Pakistan
and the US for brokering a solution.
3. This strategy has caused some disarray in US policy. The US has sent
mixed signals about its assistance to the resistance and seemingly, backed away
from pushing the Soviets on formation of a new government to rule in Kabul.
The Soviets have, moreover, been able to avoid making any unambiguous
commitments to leave--getting mileage out of their stated intentions without
taking any irreversible actions.
4. The policy implications of this for the US seem to be pretty
straightforward. We don't have to do anything until we know for sure.
5. Soviet Seriousness?
A range of opinions exists within the Intelligence Community on this
issue. State/INR is more inclined to see recent Soviet statements as
indicating that the Soviets have decided to get out even if it means
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sacrificing the Afghan Communists; the only arguments at State are over
whether they will do so unconditionally or whether they will try to get a deal
that permits the USSR and its clients some role in a post-withdrawal regime.
DIA and CIA/SOVA believe that there has been some movement in the Soviet
position but aren't sure that the Soviets have made an irrevocable decision to
get out. (See Attachment 1 for a brief discussion our most recent Community
meeting on the subject and Attachment 2 for the Warning Report of our 1
December special meeting on Afghanistan.)
6. I lean more to the DIA and CIA view. Recent Soviet rhetorid on
withdrawal has been stunning and is hard to dismiss out-of-hand. (See
Attachment 3 for illustrative sample.) Yet, impressive as much of it is, the
Soviet position is not logically consistent with my reading of Soviet
interests. Withdrawal has been linked only to halting foreign assistance to
the resistance; the composition of the new Afghanistan government, to judge
from its absence in Soviet statements, is not a precondition for settlement.
--However benign one's assumptions about Soviet policy and "new
thinking", such a position does not reflect real Soviet interests and
hence is not credible. Moscow cannot be agnostic on or uninterested
in the composition of the Afghan government and its policy
inclinations toward the Soviet Union.
--If the Soviets have really decided to sacrifice the Afghan
Communists, Gorbachev will still want to know who he will be dealing
with and get some commitments from them (and guarantees from Pakistan
and the US) about maintaining friendly (diplomatic and economic)
relations with the USSR.
--Without this, Moscow would run the risk of the "bloodbath" and
"chaos" it says cannot be permitted and more importantly open up
Soviet policy to the vicissitudes of the unknown--something no Soviet
leader would do! Gorbachev and others can only calculate that the
positives outweigh the negatives if they have a handle on how bad
things could get.
7. Moscow's seeming lack of concern with this possibility suggests that
the Soviet leadership is assuming that a Communist-dominated coalition
(possibly including elements of the resistance) will be around for sometime
yet and that Soviet policy remains in fact more smoke than fire. Acceptance
of such a regime within or outside of Afghanistan is not in the cards.
--It does not accord with political or military realities inside
Afghanistan;
--Such a solution would not produce what Pakistan requires above
all--return home of the some 3 million refugees now living in
Pakistan.
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8. Only when it is evident the Soviets will accept less than this
outcome will their rhetoric about withdrawal have substance.
--The Pakistanis, in my view, are right in judging that the best test
of Soviet intentions is whether or not Vorontsov travels to Islamabad
to "talk turkey" about alternative regimes in Kabul.
--If he does not go, or if he does and that is not an important item
on his agenda, we can conclude that the Soviets have not yet made the
hard decisions to get out.
--It will be almost impossible to put together any
resistance-dominated coalition to govern and keep order in Kabul
without Pakistan's assistance.
9. Background on Shifting US Position.
Until the last few months, it had been privately understood by all
parties in the dispute that the US and Pakistan would not sign the Geneva
accords until there was a new resistance-dominated regime in Kabul to rule
during the period of Soviet troop withdrawals. Several months ago, however,
we unilaterally changed our position, delinking Soviet troop withdrawal from
the issue of who is in charge in Kabul.
--The change was motivated in part by a State Department judgment
that Pakistan cannot create an alternative Afghan regime. (This
judgment is arguable; the Pakistanis, who are much closer to the
situation than we are, think they have to.)
--There was also concern that the Soviets would only use negotiations
about an alternative regime to prolong its presence in Afghanistan or
alternatively to try to win in negotiations what it had been unable
to win on the battlefield. (These are, of course, legitimate
concerns, if you assume Moscow is not serious about getting out.)
--The policy rests on an assumption (most in the community would
accept) that the PDPA regime would inevitably unravel as soon as any
serious withdrawals began whatever the formal commitments given about
assistance to the resistance.
10. Our "new thinking", however, appears to have created more problems
for us than it solved. Specifically,
--If we get the kind of a settlement we are asking for, the current
Kabul regime would remain in place to preside over at least the
beginning of Soviet troop withdrawals, even if aid cutoff and the
withdrawal commenced at the same time. (We need to be alert to the
possibility that the Soviets may calculate that their clients could
hold their own when Soviet troops withdraw at least for a "decent
interval" if outside aid was, in fact, cut off.)
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--Such an agreement, moreover, could trigger provisions for providing
for a substantial flow of money for development and relief to the
Soviet clients in Kabul by the UN and other relief agencies (this
would be politically impossible to sell in the US) and would not
provide any impetus for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan to go home.
--It has placed us at odds with Pakistan which wants to get whatever
hold it can on a new Afghan government to ensure that its interests
(particularly concerning the refugees) will be protected.
This
suggests that there isn't going to be any meeting in Geneva in
February or, if there is, it won't be the final meeting.
--The Soviets have taken advantage of the situation to make it appear
that the US rather than the USSR is now the main obstacle to getting
a settlement and ending the war. While this is not a new tactic, it
seems to have more resonance now and, thus, could if not challenged
effectively strain the Western consensus on Afghanistan.
11. Conclusion. Our task should be to get on the same note and avoid
doing the Soviets' work for them. At present they are still able to "have
their cake and eat it too"--talk withdrawal and keep their clients in charge.
Only as they are forced to deal politically with those who have fought them to
a standstill on the battlefield will the contradictions in their policy become
evident and the hard choices (stay and fight for a long time or get out)
unavoidable. If they have to assume the political costs of setting a date and
negotiating over what is to follow the PDPA, they will not have many clients
left to protect and the momentum for withdrawal will be irresistable. If, on
the other hand, the rhetoric is all smoke, the failure to engage their
opponents will be evidence enough, and it won't be hard for us to put the onus
for lack of movement back where it belongs.
Attachments As Stated
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/ ttc,i-&-d%
Robert Blackwell
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NIC-00239/88
21 January 1988
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan and
US Policy
DISTRIBUTION:
orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - DDI
1 - AC/NIC
1 - D/SOVA
1 - CF---JNE/DO
1 - C/SE/DDO
1 - D/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/USSR (Chron)
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Attachment 1
Excerpts from NIO/USSR January 1988 Warning Report
Afghanistan: There has been a further evolution in the thinking of at
least some elements of the community since our special warning meeting on this
subject in early December. Then, all agreed that while the Soviet position
appeared to be evolving, we had no unambiguous indications that they had made
the hard decision to settle for less and get out. Now State/INR believes,
primarily as a result of what Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said publicly
during his recent trip to Kabul, that the Soviets have made the decision to
get out. They still disagree among themselves about whether the decision'to
do so is conditional or not: some believe that they will still insist on at
least some role for themselves and their clients in an alternate regime, while
others maintain that they will not. The rest of the community agrees that
there appears to have been a further evolution in Soviet thinking since the
summit, but continues to be skeptical that the Soviets are really intent on
getting out. They read the significance of Shevardnadze's remarks in Kabul
differently than State and cite developments like the Khowst offensive and
Soviet efforts to establish new economic links to Afghanistan's provinces as
evidence that the Soviets are still intent on consolidating Communist rule.
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 2(605
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
NIC-04994/87
7 December 1987
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report on Afghanistan
1. The Intelligence Community's Sovietologists met on 1 December to
discuss whether recent statements by Soviet officials signify a serious intent
to abandon the Afghanistan Communists and will so signify at the upcoming
summit. The community was virtually unanimous that there will be no major
surrises in Washington because, rhetoric aside, Moscow has not made any
decision to get out (some think they never will). Most analysts, nonetheless,
are now more inclined than in the past to conclude that Soviet policy is
evolving and a minority project that Moscow will eventually settle for less
than a Communist dominated regime when it leaves. NIO/USSR leans more toward
the latter view and believes there is a fair chance that Gorbachev will
communicate a further evolution in Soviet thinking on Afghanistan during the
visit.
2. BACKGROUND: Recent statements by high-ranking Soviet officials about
Afghanistan--specifically, about Moscow's desire to be out of Afghanistan by
the end of 1988, its alleged interest in an Austrian-type treaty to guarantee
Afghan neutrality, its professed willingness to have former King Zahir Shah
convene a Loya Jirga in order to create and lead an interim coalition
government to rule during a year-long phased withdrawal of Soviet troops--have
already created considerable interest in the policy community about Soviet
intentions. Are the Soviets seriously looking for a way to end their military
Involvement, even if it means scaling back Soviet objectives there? And, how
will they play this issue during summit discussions next week? In order to
get some sense of where the intelligence community stands on this issue,
NIO/NESA put the topic on the agenda for his regular November warning meeting
and I convened a special meeting on 1 December. NIO/NESA will be reporting
separately on the views held by the intelligence community's South Asian
analysts. What follows in this report represents primarily the views of the
Intelligence community's Sovietologists.
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. 3. .The intelligence community has addressed this issue before, when some
senior policymakers concluded not long after the Geneva summit that the USSR
wanted out of Afghanistan. In SNIE 11/37-86, Soviet Tactics on a "Political
Solution" in Afghanistan, published in January 1986, the community judged
unanimously that Soviet moves at that time were not authentic indications of
increased interest in a settlement, but rather part of an effort to divide the
coalition of countries and forces opposing them. While this is still the
prevailing view, the community now seems more uncertain and divided in its
views.
4. DISCUSSION: Most of the community's Sovietologists agreed with
CIA/SOVA's assessment that the Soviets have not yet made the hard decisions
necessary to leave Afghanistan. In the view of the clear majority, the
Soviets are still trying to have their cake and eat it too--i. e., get out,
but in a way that leaves a communist-dominated regime still in power. They
think recent Soviet statements stem mainly from Moscow's desire to minimize
the impact of its latest defeat at the UN and to create a better atmosphere
for the forthcoming summit and subsequent INF ratification process. They do
not anticipate any major surprises at the Soviet-US summit because they think
Moscow will want to see how Afghan President Najib's efforts to forge a
leaner, meaner Peoples Democratic Party (PDPA) fare and await the outcome of
planned US-Soviet and Soviet-Pakistani consultations as well as the
US-Pakistani controversy on the nuclear issue before undertaking any major
policy reassessments. These analysts also stress the political risks at home
for Gorbachev if he really pushes to get out, arguing that for any Soviet
leader, the risks of getting out will never outweigh the costs of staying
until the job is done.
5. At the same time, however, many community analysts believe that
Moscow's position has evolved in the last 12 months and project that it could
change further, to the point where the Soviets might eventually conclude that
a Communist-dominated government is not essential to securing Soviet
interests. In fact, all analysts agree that they will have to sacrifice the
PDPA if they are ever to get any kind of viable political settlement, because
the resistance will not agree to a settlement which gives the Communists any
real power, even in an interim coalition regime. These analysts believe that
the Soviets are not at this point yet, but in their view Soviet assessments of
the problem are becoming more realistic and their pressure on their clients in
Kabul to pursue "national reconciliation" is--whatever the
intention--undermining the PDPA regime.
6. INDICATORS: How will we know? If the Soviets really want out, the
community judges that the Soviets would do more of what they are already
doing, but at a stepped-up pace. They might indicate in a more authoritative
way that they could accept a neutral interim coalition in Afghanistan to rule
during a period of Soviet troop withdrawals and begin negotiations toward that
end. Alternatively, they could engage in open negotiations with the Peshawar
seven,
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Or they could announce and implement real,
albeit, small troop withdrawals (as opposed to the sham withdrawal conducted
last year), Finally, they could raise publicly their interest in an
Austrian-style arrangement that would ensure the neutrality of a post-PDPA
Afghanistan. Such moves would put the Soviets on the road to "going home" and
make a reversal in course much more difficult.
7. OUTLOOK: Whether, in fact, Soviet policy will move in this direction
is unknown to us--and perhaps to them. NIO/USSR believes the Soviets are
working their way through the problem of looking for a way out without knowing
when, if, or how they might actually do it. The costs--political or most
importantly military--are not so great that they have to leave. Their military
position is far from weak, although increased difficulties have been
encountered during the past year. The Soviets are in no danger of being
driven out or under the gun to make a rash or risky political decision to
leave.
8. Odds are the Soviets assess the situation this way as well. But
NIO/USSR, however, would not be as categorical as the community view in
*ud in that the Soviets have not decided to ?o home and si nal this at the
summit. eir s a ements
and to some extent actions increasingly have
the smell of putting the Soviets poTitically on the slippery slope of
withdrawal, even if originally intended only as a tactical 9ambit. Continuing
to play around with such gestures could leave the Soviets with no clients to
protect and very little political position to defend. If their real intention
Is to stay until their ally can stand on its own feet (however improbable that
might seem to us), it is poor tactics and strategy to be offering up--however
hedged--a 12-month timetable, most of the government ministries, and even more
forthcoming hints that will be hard to take back politically and
propogandistically.
9. Either way, Gorbachev by design or omission will probably use the
summit to signal more clearly Soviet intentions. Even if a decision to get
out and sacrifice the Afghan Communists (heretofore a cardinal Soviet
interest) has been made, Moscow is not going to pull out precipitately,
without some guarantees that its other (and possibly now more important)
fundamental interest--an Afghanistan that cannot be used by the US for actions
inimical to the USSR--will be preserved. The Soviets almost certainly would
want to negotiate this with us directly. They would also want US support for
any effort to negotiate a deal with the Pakistanis and the resistance,
something they will in the end have to do if they want to create a semblance
of order, in Kabul at least, after they leave and allow for some form of state
relations with a post-PDPA regime. If, on the other hand, Soviet statements
continue to be tantalizing but ambiguous, I would agree that the skeptics are
right, and that we are seeing nothing more than a more sophisticated game of
smoke and mirrors.
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Robert Blackwell
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IMMEDIATE
FRP: 2 56
NIO/USSR
INCOMING
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2186
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2527
RUSEKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1783
BT
CONFIDENTIAL MOSCOW 00843
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL US UR AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN'S
PAST AND FUTURE
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY
2. EMBOFF MET JANUARY 13 WITH ORIENTAL INSTITUTE
AFGHANISTAN WERTYURIY-4GANKOVSKIY',WHO
WARNED DF4THE DANGERS7OF'rLEBANIZATION"
OF AfGHANISTAN-AND-WECESSITYFOR BOTH'
U.S,AND WVIET,UNION TO-TAKE4STEPS TO-
PREVANTAkg1DOODBATHAFTERSOVIET TROOP
WITPORAWAGANKOVSKIY,ANOTED THA74,m,
SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD COME
ABOUT BECAUSE "LEFT EXTREMISTS"
HAD COME TO POWER IN AFGHANISTAN,
BUT NOW THERE WAS A THREAT THAT
"RIGHT EXTREMISTS" LIKE GULBUDDIN
HIKMATYAR MIGHT SEIZE POWER:
THE U.S. HAD BEEN "RIGHT" TO CON-
CENTRATE ATTENTION ON SOVIET
TROOP WITHDRAWAL, BUT THAT "IN
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES" URGENT
ATTENTION NEEDED TO BE DEVOTED
TO THE PROBLEM OF REABSORBING
YMPKCEDENtEDNUMBERSOVREFUGEES
Ai4DtCREATING A7MECHANISICID tNIT
WITIONGJDF.iSCORES"1
THE BREAKUP OF AFGHANISTAN INTO
FIEFDOMS WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY, -
WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE U.S. AND
SOVIET UNION WITH "TEN PROBLEMS
INSTEAD OF ONE."
END SUMMARY.
NC 7499196
MOSCOW 00843
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AFGHANISTAN'S PAST: THE LEGACY OF THE "LEFT
- EXTREMISTS."
3. EMBOFF MET JANUARY 13 WITH INSTITUTE OF
ORIENTAL STUDIES, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
DEPARTMENT HEAD, YURIY GANKOVSKIY. THE
MEETING WAS PROPITIOUS, GANKOVSKIY SAID,
BECAUSE AN AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT SEEMED
INCREASINGLY POSSIBLE. GANKOVSKIY, HOWEVER,
WAS CONCERNED THAT THE TRAGEDY OF AFGHANISTAN'S
PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE. HE OFFERED SOME
REFLECTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN'S RECENT HISTORY
IN ORDER TO PUT THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE.
AFTER THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION "LEFT EX-
EXTREMISTS" HAD SEIZED PO . THESE PEOPLE --
HAD INTO TRAGEDY. HE
HIMSELF HAD HEARD HAFIZULLAH AMIN PROCLAIM
IN PRIVATE MEETINGS THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE
OFFERED POOR HUMAN MATERIAL FOR THE
MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY. THEY WERE
POOR, ILLITERATE, AND BADLY EDUCATED.
AMIN HAD SAID "WE ONLY NEED FOUR MILLION
(OUT OF A POPULATION OF SIXTEEN MILLION)
AFGHANS TO CONSTRUCT SOCIALISM." GANKOVSKIY ...)
NOTED THAT UNDER THE TARAKI-AMIN REGIME
PEOPLE HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND EVEN EXECUTED
FOR REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM
CENSUS-TAKERS. MEMBERS OF SEBGHATULLAH:w
JADEDDI AND SAYID AMED GAILANI'S FAMILIES-HAD,
EEN MURDERED. IT WAS NO WONDER THEY HAV:.p?4
ENTERED-THEOPPOSTTION'AND WERE NOW IN
' ESHAWAR. ,GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT THE "CRAZY
POLICY" or THAT ERA HAD SOUGHT TO "LIQUIDATE
ILLITERACY BY LIQUIDATING THE ILLITERATES."
IT WAS THIS INCIPIENT-GENOCIDALSITUATIOWlk Vt7N..7.7W,
PRECIPITATED SOVIET INTERVENTION.Of
4. UNFORTUNATELY, "COMRADE BREZHNEV DID
NOT THINK THROUGH THE FULL IMPLICATIONS
OF SuviErINTE IO' " THE SOVIETS
HAD A SIMPL STIC NOTION THAT BABRAK KARMAL,
A BETTER EDUCATED AND MORE POLISHED FIGURE
WITH LEGITIMATE POLITICAL CREDENTIALS,
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00843
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL US UR AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN'S
COULD BE GIVEN A CHANGE TO SUCCEED. GANKOVSKIY
SAID THAT THE POINT OF HIS REVIEW OF
AFGHAN HISTORY WAS TO NOTE THAT THERE WERE
GREAT DANGERS AHEAD FOR BOTH THE U.S.
AND,-THE SOVIETS ONCE TROOP WITHDRAWAL BEGAN.
THE SOVIETS HAD- SOUGHT TO LIMIT THE, NUMBERS
OF TROOPS COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN AND THUS'
HAD BEEN ABLE.TO DO LITTLE MORE, '
THAN HOLUZSOMCITIES AND ROADS.:'nWITH THE
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS THERE WAS A
GREAT DANGER. OF A BLOODBATH ANDLTkE;
"LEBANIZATIONY.OF-AFGHANISTAN.
AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE: THE THREAT OF "RIGHT
- EXTREMISM"
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5. WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS,
THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. THERE
WAS THE DISTINCT THREAT OF A "RIGHT EXTREMIST
LIKE HIKMATYAR" TAKING POWER. THIS WOULD
UNLEASH A BLOODLETTING ON THE SCALE OF
TARAKI AND AMIN. THERE WAS ALSO THE
POSSIBILITY OF IRANIAN EFFORTS TO "EXPORT"
THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION TO AFGHANISTAN.
(COMMENT: GANKOVSKIY DID NOT DWELL ON THIS
AND SEEMED TO GIVE IT LITTLE CHANCE OF
SUCCEEDING. END COMMENT) ULTIMATELY,
AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BREAK DOWN INTO A SERIES
OF FIEFDOMS. SOME OF THE WARLORDS
WOULD TURN TO THE CHINESE, SOME TO
PAKISTAN, SOME TO THE U.S. AND SOME
TO THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WOULD BE DISASTROUS.
"IN THAT CASE WE WOULD BE FACING TEN PROBLEMS
INSTEAD OF ONE." _GANKOVSKIY OBSERVED THAT
BRITISHROLICY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,
WH,iCH:HAUMEFENDECITHE-NATIONAL,INTEGRITY
PF,AFGHANISTAWASA-,BUFFERBETWEEN'RUSSIA
ANDJHE-tMPIRE,--HAD BEEN VERYA11iSE..
-'AANDTHE't'SOV I ETiiUMION14A0-:2SOMETHING
TRIgLEARWEROWTHI S - Aem.
REFUGEES AND ETHNIC POLITICS
6. GANKOVSKIY NOTED THAT THE PROBLEMS
POSED BY AN AFGHAN SETTLEMENT WERE IMMENSE.
THE U.S., HE SAID, HAD BEEN RIGHT TO KEEP
ATTENTION FOCUSED SQUARELY ON THE QUESTION
OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL. NOW, HOWEVER,
IT APPEARED REALIZATION OF THAT GOAL WAS
IMMINENT. IT WAS URGENT77THATY,BOTH THE ?
somm AND'LLS,.'aIDES BEGIN THINKING ABOUT
WHAT*OULD BE NECESSARY TO.IPROMOTEHSTABILITY
AND:PEACE AFTERWARDS. "IN THAT REGARD, HE
NOTED THAT AN UNPRECEDENTED NUMBER OF
REFUGEES WOULD BE RETURNING TO AFGHANISTAN.
"TO WHAT WILL THEY RETURN?" THE MECHANICS
OF TRANSPORTING AND REABSORBING THESE
REFUGEES REPRESENTED AN ENORMOUS UNDERTAKING.
TNEFSOVIETSCOULDPROVIOE,AGOODItlEAtrw AID
ANDASSISTANCE, BUT THIS 'WOULD INEVITABLY
RAISE CONCERNS.N-THEAYESTABOUT THE' '
"SOVIET PRESENCE:" .THERE WOULD BEA NEED
FOR OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION.
7. PART OF THE RECIPE FOR AVOIDING A
BLOODBATH, ACCORDING TO GANKOVSKIY, WAS
TO RECOGNIZE AHAT,AFGHANISTAN-tWAS
"WOLTIETHNIC ETY-: -4-UNFORTUNATELY ,
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ETHNIC COMMUNITIES
WERE BAD. THE LAST TWO HUNDRED YEARS OF
AFGHAN HISTORY HAD BEEN DOMINATED BY
PASHTOONS. IN PARTICULAR, THE DURRANI.
TRIBE. (BIO NOTE: GANKOVSKIY IS AN
EXPERT ON THE DURRANI AND HAS
WRITTEN ABOUT THEM. END BIO NOTE.)
DURRANI PRE-EMINENCE HAD BEEN SHATTERED
BY THE RISE TO POWER OF THE PDPA.
GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT IT WAS INEVITABLE THAT
THERE WOULD BE SOME SCORE SETTLING BETWEEN
AFGHANS. IN ORDER TO HELP PUT A BRAKE ON
THE PROCESS, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE
C ONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 00843
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP92T00306R000200020031-6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP92T00306R000200020031-6
A,W^
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/10/24: CIA-RDP92T00306R000200020031-6 '
CONFIDENTIAL
88 7499196 SCO
PAGE 004 NC 7499196
TOR: 150859Z JAN 88 MOSCOW 00843
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL US UR AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN'S
THE "ETHNIC AS WELL AS THE POLITICAL MAP INTO
CONSIDERATION." GANKOVSKIY OFFERED NO
FURTHER SPECIFICS, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
A RANGE OF PERSONAL CONTACTS, FAMILY
TIES AND TRIBAL CONNECTIONS, AS WELL AS
SIMPLE WAR-WEARINESS MIGHT ALSO SERVE TO
LIMIT THE VIOLENCE AFTER THE SOVIETS
HAD LEFT.
COMMENT
8. AS IN OTHER RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH
SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS, GANKOVSKIY OPERATED
FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT SOVIET TROOP
WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AND LARGELY
ACCOMPLISHED THIS YEAR. HIS FOCUS WAS
MAINLY ON QUESTIONS WH/CH HE FEARED WOULD
THREATEN THE PROCESS OR CREATE DANGEROUS
INSTABILITY AFTER THE FACT. THE POSSIBLE
DANGER OF IRAN/AN ACTIVITY AND MORE
SERIOUSLY THE THREAT OF "LEBANIZATION"
MAY BE THEMES THAT WILL INCREASINGLY
FIGURE IN SOVIET PRESENTATIONS ON
AFGHANISTAN. IT DOVETAILS WITH SHEVARDNADZE'S
REMARKS THAT ALL SIDES WILL HAVE TO PLAY
A PART IN PROMOTING AN ALL-AFGHAN POLITICAL
DIALOGUE AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.
9. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
MAT LOCK
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
(".'"'
CONFIDENTIAL