SQUEEZE PLAY ON AFGHANISTAN--AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00306R000200020021-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: February 17, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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17 February 1988
MEMORANDUM: Squeeze Play on Afghanistan--An Alternative View of
Soviet Intentions
1. Contrary to widespread assumptions in the West, the
Soviets are not seeking a face-saving way to withdraw their forces
from Afghanistan. Their aim is rather to set up the US and Pakistan
for political warfare denunciations of their responsibility for
the failure of negotiations next month under UN mediator Diego
CordOvez. In this way, -theSoviets will seek to 'stimulate growing
opposition in the US, Pakistan, and.internationally-to further
military and political assistance to Afghan resistance forces.
Moscow's longer-term objective is to gradually isolate the resistance
fighters from their foreign supporters and, by this means, to
reduce the costs of ongoing Soviet military and political commit-
ments, gain time to overcome the weaknesses and vulnerabilities
of the Kabul client-regime, and._eventually make possible phased
unilateral reductions of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan.
2. The Gorbachev leadership's strategy has been based on the
assumption that Pakistan's growing frustration with the presence of
some 3 million Afghan refugees and ?armed Mujaheddine fighters on
its territory constitutes the weakest and most exploitable link
in the foreign front supporting the Afghan resistance. Since
Gorbachev's accession to power three years ago, Moscow has relied
on the calculaticin that adroit Soviet diplomacy eventually would
be able to pressure and cajole President Zia into breaking with
Washington and striking a deal with Kabul that would allow him
to expel the.Afghan refugees, thereby removing a serious threat
to Pakistan's political stability and territorial integrity.
3. A complete withdrawl of Soviet forces has never been
acceptable to the Soviet leadership. They have long recognized
that their weak and ineffective client regime in Kabul could not
hold off the mujaheddine for more than a few months. Soviet
military efforts to stop the flow of weaponsto the resistance
have largely failed in-the last few years. .Gorbachev therefore
recognized early on that the Soviet predicamentin Afghanistan
could be eased only through political maneuvers to undermine
domestic and international support. for US and Pakistani assistance
to resistance forces. He never entertained the.option of
withdrawing Sovietforces and cutting his losses; nor was he
willing to accept the risks and costs of a major expansion of
the Soviet military commitment.
4. Gorbachev's principal. objective has been to reduce the
liabilities of what he accepted as. an essentially open-ended .
commitment.required by the imperatives of-Soviet security and global.
geopolitical interests. In contrast to the stolid, Slogging approach
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of his three predecessors, Gorbachev has evolved a strategy of
indirection which places much higher priority on political-diplo-
matic maneuver to isolate and divide his adversaries and attack
their political capacity to sustain a long-term challenge to
Soviet predominance in Afghanistan. Gorbachev's most forthright
expression of his resolve to "stay the course" was-contained in
his Vladivostok speech in July 1986. He warned that if foreign
intervention in Afghanistan continues, "the Soviet Union will not
leave its neighbor in the lurch. Our internationalist solidarity
with the. Afghanpeople as well as the security interests of the
Soviet Union rule this out absolutely."
In view of this unambiguous assertion of Soviet political
and Security interests in Afghanistan, it strains credulity.tol?
suggest that Gorbachev may have advocated liquidating the -commit-
ment and cutting Soviet losses. It is highly unlikely, moreover,
that he has .attempted to carry out a major .retrenchment only to
have this course blocked by opposition from senior military and
party leaders. Claims by Soviet officials to Westerners that the
Soviet military is unwilling to concededefeat and that.party.
_hardliners are concerned about.the ideological and security implica-
tions of a Soviet withdrawal almost certainly represent the
familiar Soviet tactic of "good cop, bad cops." Gorbachev himself
invoked this' hoary ploy in his meeting with nine senior-members of
Congress during-the Washingtem summit when he declared,?"We have _
our conservatives, too." Gorbachev and. Shevardnadze, however,
have encountered stubborn resistance to their scenario from
factions within the Afghan communist party, particularly the Khalqis,
who, are more doctrinaire and nationalistic than Najibullah's Parcham
faction and strenuously oppose the "national reconciliation" policy.
The Squeeze Play in Action
6. Gorbachev's 8 February statement which for the first time
established a'specific date. for beginning .a Soviet troop withdrawal
was the final move, in a two-year scenario designed to set the stage
fora squeeze play. He declared that this action has fulfilled ?
all the "necessary conditions for signing the settlement agreement
in the very near future."' In a transparently unctuous tone,
Gorbachev said "we would not like to think that some states or.
political figures might want to be held accountable by the Afghan
nation and other nations for' scuttling a settlement." Pravda
declared on 12 February that "Never 'before has the situation in .
and around Afghanistan been as open for a settlement as it is now."
, 7. The Soviets have thus carefully prepared the ground for
-charging that Washington has reneged on its putative pledge to
terminate military assistance to Afghan.resistance-forces simul-
taneously with the beginning of the pullout of Soviet troops. . -
They, are eagerly anticipating-the political:dividends of calling
what they view as an American bluff. Pravda observed that the US
and Pakistan have long portrayed Moscow's failure to establish A
withdrawal timetable as, the, main stumbling block and have exploited
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this for years to "block Soviet peace initiatives." The Soviets
are operating on the assumption that Washington will either support
Pakistan's refusal to sign an agreement with the Kabul regime or
contrive other ways to evade a commitment to end assistance to
the mujaheddine. Red Star recently called attention to President
Reagan's State of the Union message which srioke "bluntly about the
administration's resolve to continue supporting the 'freedom fighters'"
in Afghanistan, as well as in Nicaragua, Angola, and Cambodia.
Pravda pointed out that the White House comment on Gorbachev's
statement "dodged the question" about the timing of a cutoff of
US aid to the resistance.
. 8. . Moscow. islreadTto aim a similar indictment at Pakistan
for repudiating its. commitment to join Kabulin -signing.the Geneva
accOrds.. According to TASS, First Deputy ForeignMinister Vorontsov
told Pakistani leaders last, week that a refusal to sign the accords
"would be. tantamount to frustrating the entire Afghan settlement,"
the consequences of which would be "a fresh flareup of the armed
conflict.and bloodshed.." On 16 February, Gennadiy Gerasimov accused
the Zia government of "executing further elusive maneuvers in a
stubborn attempt to obstruct the signature of the Geneva documents"
by insisting on a new "transition government" in Kabul. .
? 9. -The timing .of Gorbachev's 8,February statement announcing
.a- long-withheld timetable for withdrawal was decisively influenced
by an assessment that statements by.Secretary Shultz and President
Zia in January, had played into Soviet hands and created the most
favorable conditions in, three years for a squeeze play. In a news
conference on-7 January, Secretary Shultz.seemed. to imply that the
Administration will contend that it is not obligated by the Geneva
accords to end US military assistance to the mujaheddine 60 days
after the agreements are signed and a Soviet withdrawal is to begin.
The Secretary -indicated that Washington intends to wait in order to
ensure that there is "a certain inevitability" and "no turning back"
in the Soviet withdrawal before US.assistance ends. He asserted
that if" the Administration is satisfied' thatthe Soviet withdrawal
is proceeding on schedule, "Under those circumstances, we will
certainly meet the things that we have agreed to in the Geneva
process." -
10. If Secretary Shultz's remarks were ambiguous and open to
different interpretations; President Zia used interviews with
.American journalists in the first half of January to lay out his
position in clear and inflexible terms. He bluntly stated that he
would not sign an agreement with the Najibullah regime because he
did .not consider it to be "legitimate." Zia also called for the
creation of an "interim government," saying "all.factions of Afghans
must get together." Pakistany.s official response to Gorbachev's
statement hardened Zia's stance by demanding that the Kabul regime -
be replaced by a "legitimate, responsible,-broad-based government"
and by contending that this.is an "indispensable aspect" of any
settlement.
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11. The Soviets, of course, are fully aware that Zia is
trapped by the adamant refusal of Afghan resistance leaders to accept
any settlement that does not depose the Kabul regime. This uncom-
promising:stance forced Zia to declare last month-that he will not
-sign the Geneva accords until a "neutral government" replaces the
Najibullah regime. Zia's dilemma is that if he fails to win the
cooperation of the resistance leaders, Pakistan will be left with
3 million refugees and armed resistance fighters on its territory.
Gorbachev's strategy is to exploit this dilemma in order to blame
Zia and US support for him for the collapse of negotiations. This
design explains Gorbachev's blunt statement that "We are convinced"
that Soviet withdrawl is not "linked with the completionof-efforts
to .set up a new, coalition government in Afghanistan, i.e., with
bringing the policy of national reconciliation to fruition." On
departing. Islamabad on 11 February, Vorontsov drove the point
home by declaring that "Any delays in the signing of the Geneva
accords will mean only one thing, and that will be a delay in the
withdrawalof Soviet forces." He smugly added, "we don't know who
will be willing to take that responsibility." - -
12. In sum, the Soviets are confident that they have succeeded
in maneuvering Washingtonand Islamabad into a no-win corner. They
believe they have manipulated the Geneva negotiations in a way that
places Afghan resistance leaders in the position of exercising a
veto over US and Pakistani policies. The Soviet scenario, of course,
assumes that the mulaheddine will adhere to the stand they took
in. immediately rejecting Najibullah's January 1987 national recon-
ciliation plan that called for the inclusion of resistance leaders
in a coalition government.. These leaders played their assigned
role in the squeeze play scenario when they declared that they
"will continue to fight until Najibullah is thrown out and a.complete
Islamic government is established in Moslem Afghanistan."
13. If this assumption about mujaheddine behavior proves to
be incorrect and the Pakistanis manage to secure the resistance
leaders' cooperation in a joint US-Pakistani policy, the Soviets
could shift tO tactics of. forcing an impasse over the timing of
the termination of US military- assistance to the: resistance.
Shevardnadze made the most explicit statement of the Soviet position
on this issue during his visit to Kabul early last month. He
clearly implied that US assistance must end before Soviet forces
begin to withdraw. He argued that the "obligation on the cessation -
of external interference will come into force" 60 days after the
Geneva accords are signed. And he insisted that the US has agreed
to "cease aid to the armed.groups waging combat operations in
Afghanistan against the people's authorities." Shevardnadze
then contended that "It is with the coming into force of this
obligation that the withdrawal-of Soviet troops will begin."
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14. Finally, if the US finesses the timing issue in a way
that disarms the Soviet scenario, the-Soviets'will anticipate that
the announcement.of a US cutoff of assistance 60.ddys after the
accords .are signed will demoralize the resistance fighters and
aggravate rivalry and open Conflict among the seven Major resistance
groups. They will also hope that a US cutoff will push the .
Pakistanis into curtailing their support.for the resistance and
.striking a.deal with. the Kabul. regime in. order to clear the way
for the returnof Afghan refugees and-fighters. The.Soviets
at that point may inject a further and highly disruptive issue
by adopting,Najibullah's two "conditions". for a withdrawal of
Soviet forces: (a),.The mujaheddine's training camps in Pakistan
must.be-dismantled. before a withdrawal begins;:- (b) The Mujaheddine
should extend to_the.Afghan army the ceasefire that he-claimed.
one key resistance leader has already offered to Soviet troops
once they .begin to withdraw. . Najibullah told an American journalist
last month that "We are actually looking_for-this objective."
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