THE ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCES AND THE PALESTINIAN UPRISING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00277R000600170002-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOFORN
The Israel Defense
Forces and the
Palestinian Uprising (U)
A Defense Research Assessment
Defense Intelligence Agency
DDB-2680-328-88
April 1988
S'erCec
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NOFORN
The Israel Defense Forces and
the Palestinian Uprising (U)
A Defense Research Assessment
This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document
Prepared by the Middle East' Africa Division,
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency
Authors:
Middle East Military Capabilities Branch,
Confrontation States Section
Information Cutoff Date: 24 March 1988
Classified By: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: OADR
25X1
DDB-2680-328-88
Secret
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The Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Uprising (U)
KEY JUDGMENTS
(C/NF) The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) faces one of the most severe challenges of its 40-year
existence. Its training, equipment, and doctrine had not prepared it for the large-scale Palestinian
uprising that began on 9 December 1987. In addition:
? The IDF's leadership consistently underestimated Palestinian popular resolve and
steadily resisted efforts to turn the Army into a policing force.
? IDF readiness was marginally reduced in the early phases of the uprising, and was regained
principally through extensive use of reserve forces in the Occupied Territories.
? IDF troop morale has suffered from ambiguities on acceptable uses of force.
Future morale levels will be determined by levels of public support and the
length of units' duty in the Occupied Territories.
? The potential exists for a much higher level of violence, with the greatest danger
coming from Palestinian use of firearms and the IDF's likely severe response.
? The uprising has exacerbated tensions between civilian and military authorities.
These tensions will probably increase as the uprising continues.
? The IDF will be able to contain major disturbances as they occur and fulfill its
primary duty of defense against outside threats, but it will not be able to guarantee
a permanent return to the status quo ante in the Occupied Territories.
(Reverse Blank)
ni
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Tactical Evolution
1
Readiness
Leadership Grumblings
7
Morale and Discipline
7
Money
8
Outlook
9
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SECRET/NOFORN
LEBANON:
< Golan -
Northern)Heights
SYRIA
(C) IDF commands, each led by a major
general. The occupied West Bank is the
responsibility of Maj Gen Mitzna's Central
Command, the occupied Gaza Strip that of
Maj Gen Mordechai's Southern Command.
Mediterranean
Sea
Gaza
Strip
i
1
?
West Ban
*Tel Aviv!
Jerusalem
Central
Amman
*Beersheba
JORDAN
Southern
(C) A demonstration in the West
Bank town of Nablus in February.
Bold individual initiative, an IDF attribute
that had brought repeated success on
the battlefield, was ill suited to combat
rock- and bottle-throwing youths
without resort to lethal force.
NMI
vi
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UNCLASSIFIED
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The Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian Uprising (U)
(C/NF) The IDF is the most powerful military
force in the region, with the capability of de-
feating any combination of Arab forces arrayed
against Israel. IDF troops have been organized,
trained, and equipped to combat Arab armies in
conventional warfare and Arab guerrillas in low-
intensity conflict. The IDF has soundly defeated
its enemies in several wars and has over time
greatly reduced the guerrilla threat to Israel. Is-
raeli soldiers have not, however, been adequately
trained or equipped to deal with large-scale civil
disturbances.
(C/NF) Although Israeli intelligence and secu-
rity services suspected in November 1987 that
increased tensions in the Occupied Territories
were leading to a new round of unrest, they were
surprised by the intensity and scope of the up-
rising that began in December. For the most
part spontaneously and through experimentation,
Palestinian children and youths hit upon meth-
ods of successfully challenging Israeli occupation
forces which the IDF proved ill equipped to
handle.
Tactical Evolution
(C/NF) From its beginning on 9 December
1987 through the end of January 1988, the Pales-
tinian uprising came in waves of violence usu-
ally lasting for about 2 weeks, interspersed with
relative calms of about 10 days. Periods of in-
tense rioting died out, due to such factors as fa-
tigue, weather, and religious holidays, and usually
reappeared in response to specific events, such
as the announcement of impending deportations
or the visit to Israel of the US Secretary of State.
By February, after each side had measured the
strengths and weaknesses of the other, the up-
rising settled into a pattern of frequent flashes
of violence with much shorter periods of relative
quiet.
(C/NF) Measured in terms of intensity of vi-
olence and numbers of Palestinian fatalities, the
uprising unfolded in six fairly distinct phases
through late March. Phase I, from 9 to 23 De-
cember, was a period of violent demonstrations
on a daily basis. In Phase II, from 24 December to
2 January, the unrest diminished and a tense calm
prevailed. Widespread violence returned during
Phase III, from 3 to 15 January, initially more
intense than in Phase I. Another decrease in vi-
olence came during Phase IV, from 16 to 28 Jan-
uary, a period marked by a few large disturbances
interspersed with periods of tense calm. During
Phase V, beginning on 29 January and continu-
ing through 22 February, violent confrontations
increased and the Palestinian death toll rose again.
Phase VI started on 23 February with the first re-
ported Palestinian use of firearms against the IDF
since the uprising began.
(C/NF) The response of the IDF's leadership to
the initial stages of the uprising can be character-
ized as consistent underestimation of Palestinian
popular resolve and steady resistance to the gov-
ernment's perceived attempts to turn the Army
into a police force. The IDF, which in the Oc-
tober 1973 War had within days adapted its ar-
mor and air tactics to lessons learned at heavy
cost, was slow to make the adjustments neces-
sary to meet large-scale civil unrest in the winter
of 1987-88. No Israeli troops were dying, the cost
in readiness seemed manageable, and it appeared
that calm would return before long. The IDF's
leadership continued to oppose the establishment
of a large military internal security apparatus, be-
lieving that such an organization would be prone
to corruption and morale problems. Senior
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commanders also wanted to remain leaders of
fighting men, not police chiefs.
(C/NF) Although the IDF had traditionally
maintained a small security presence in the Oc-
cupied Territories, the maintenance of order had
primarily been the responsibility of the Border Po-
lice ? a 4,500-man force most IDF leaders held
in mild contempt. At the outbreak of the upris-
ing, the ranks of the Border Police were about
73 percent Jewish, 23 percent Druze, and 4 per-
cent other minorities. The quality of the Jewish
conscripts directed to the Border Police is consid-
ered low, the force being a convenient dumping
ground for delinquents and the undereducated.
Maj Gen Arnram Mitzna, commander of the IDF's
Central Command, had for some time seen the
need to improve the force and direct higher qual-
ity conscripts in larger numbers to its ranks. His
program was moving slowly when the uprising
began. To IDF leaders, policing the West Bank
and Gaza Strip was a task to which the Border
Police, not frontline troops and reservists, were
best suited.
Phases I and H (9 December-2 January)
(C/NF) Maj Gen Mitzna admits that the IDF
had no doctrine for dealing with the uprising
when it began. The IDF confronted rock-throwing
crowds with old tactics of small foot patrols;
small, often single-vehicle, mounted patrols; and
reliance upon the threat or use of firepower in
times of trouble. These methods had been suffi-
cient to show IDF presence and to respond to
isolated bombing incidents, Molotov cocktails,
stabbings, stones thrown at Israeli vehicles by
small groups of boys, and occasional medium-size
student demonstrations. Throughout Phase I of
the uprising and into Phase II, the IDF was react-
ing to the unrest as it would have to widespread
terrorism. The Army tried to project its presence
at every sign of trouble and bring every incident
under control by force.
(C/NF) IDF training programs have centered
on the use of firearms. IDF rules of engagement
(ROE) for confronting hostile crowds were spe-
cific: In life-threatening situations troops were to
fire in the air, then to shoot at the legs of demon-
strators, and to resort to direct fire only when
they were in clear and present danger of harm or
death. Interpretation of the ROE by junior com-
manders on the ground differed widely, however.
In addition, the IDF and Israeli courts have long
classified the throwing of Molotov cocktails as ter-
rorism, and the IDF's ROE have sanctioned the use
of live fire against firebomb throwers and against
fleeing "terrorists." When it became evident in
the early days of the uprising that targeting fire-
bomb throwers in large crowds was leading to
more politically damaging Palestinian deaths, the
IDF withdrew the authorization to shoot anyone
throwing a Molotov cocktail.
(C/NF) Small patrols of four to six men, with-
out riot gear and often dismounted, were easily
isolated by large Palestinian crowds and resorted
quickly to lethal force. By the end of the upris-
ing's first phase, 22 Palestinians had been killed by
IDF fire ? 15 in the Gaza Strip and 7 on the West
Bank. The deaths were giving rise to further vio-
lent outbreaks, and Israel's and the IDF's images
were suffering worldwide. The logic of the situ-
ation clearly dictated the commitment of larger
forces, the employment of new tactics, crowd-
control training for all troops involved, and large
quantities of riot gear.
(C/NF) By the end of Phase I of the uprising,
IDF strength had doubled on the West Bank and
tripled in Gaza. Elements of all three active-duty
infantry brigades were committed to the Occu-
pied Territories, with the Givati (84th) Infantry
Brigade concentrating on the Gaza Strip, and the
Golani (1st) Infantry and 35th Para Brigades con-
centrating on the West Bank. These forces and
territorial units were supplemented by troops un-
dergoing training at IDF schools. Some effort was
made to move about in larger formations, but
small patrols still predominated. There was not
enough riot gear to go around. By the end of the
month, the IDF's stockpiles of visored helmets, ba-
tons, rubber bullets, and tear gas were depleted,
and efforts were underway to acquire new gear.
Although the IDF announced a special program
for riot-control training at its schools and train-
ing installations, no comprehensive training for
troops committed to the security mission was be-
gun. Extended curfews, mass arrests, and fatigue
brought the lull of the last week of December, and
1 January ? the dreaded "Fatah Day" ? passed
without large-scale violence.
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Phases III and IV (3-28 January)
(C/NF) As the IDF's leadership congratulated
itself on keeping the lid on through Fatah Day, it
planned a gradual reduction in forces committed
to the Occupied Territories. Phase III of the up-
rising, almost 2 weeks of renewed widespread
rioting, interrupted these plans beginning on 3
January. It was at this point the "beatings" pol-
icy was put into effect, although it was not until
19 January that Minister of Defense Yitzhak Ra-
bin outlined it publicly in response to a reporter's
question. Tactics were now to charge and dis-
perse demonstrators with baton blows. The ob-
jective was to seize control of the situation and
break the will of the crowd to advance. The new
tactic led to widespread abuse and world con-
demnation as intense as that during the shootings
early in the uprising.
UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) Minister of De-
fense Yitzhak Rabin,
retired general and
Labor Party member.
Rabin has primary respon-
sibility for dealing with
the uprising. IDF sol-
diers, he said, "are not
trained to discharge po-
lice duties that place them
in confrontation with
women and children."
(C/NF) Troop levels in the Occupied Terri-
tories grew. Reservists had been used in the
Occupied Territories since the beginning of the
uprising, but with the activation and deployment
to security duty of at least some elements of
the 609th Infantry Brigade in mid-January, the
IDF reluctantly crossed a threshold in commit-
ment. Scheduled training for units of the 609th
was canceled; instead, the units received perfunc-
tory crowd-control training and were committed
to the Occupied Territories. Total forces on the
Gaza Strip increased to at least 42 companies from
10 separate units ? both active-duty and reserve.
(C/NF) The unprecedented troop levels, how-
ever, created an unmanageable command situa-
tion. The old territorial brigade structure
provided for a brigade commander of colonel rank
with three subordinate lieutenant colonels. As a
remedy, the IDF now divided the West Bank into
three areas of operations, two with a brigadier
general and one with a colonel in command, and
put the Gaza Strip under the operational com-
mand of a single brigadier. Each had his own
brigade structure. Most of these officers were
appointed on such short notice that they had
little time to study the situations in their areas
and commands or develop methods of operation.
Over time, however, the presence of these senior
officers contributed to a measure of continuity
and stability as reservists rotated into the Occu-
pied Territories.
(C/NF) It appeared to the IDF that the policy
of blows, together with the massive troop pres-
ence and collective punishments, had quieted the
unrest. The second wave of widespread rioting,
the uprising's third phase, had run its course by
15 January. During this phase, 17 Palestinians
were killed by IDF fire ? 11 in the Gaza Strip
and 6 on the West Bank. Phase IV of the uprising,
from 16 to 28 January, was a period of infrequent
disturbances and reduced shooting incidents.
Phase V (29 January-22 February)
(C/NF) The advent of Phase V of the upris-
ing and renewed, large-scale demonstrations at
the end of January found the IDF better prepared
to deal with large crowds. The Palestinians were
also learning, however, and were less intimidated
by batons and rubber bullets. Widespread, often
indiscriminate or vengeful beatings increased, and
shooting deaths rose, as well. The use of riot gear
was common, but troops were getting only 1 day's
crowd-control training before deployment. A def-
inite correlation could be discerned between the
number of shooting deaths and units' experience
in the Occupied Territories. The use of deadly
force was higher when a unit first reached its area
of operations, and diminished after it had been on
station for a week or more.
(C/NF) By the first week of February, the IDF
felt confident enough to reduce its forces in
some areas of the Occupied Territories. In the
Gaza Strip, for example, troop levels plummeted
from a high of about 42 companies to about 15.
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UNCLASSIFIED
(C) "We recognize each [Palestinian] casualty
as a failure for Israel," said an IDF general
in mid-January. Despite the "beatings"
policy, Palestinian shooting deaths ? like
this one in late February ? increased, as
did international criticism of Israel.
Reservists now made up about half of the forces
committed to security duty. Although a contin-
gency plan probably existed for a general callup of
reserves, the need for reservists to release active-
duty troops for regular training and duty in the
north was met by extensive use of "Order 8"
callups. This order provided the IDF with a mech-
anism by which it could avoid the legal require-
ment that individual reservists receive 30 days'
warning before activation other than in emergen-
cies. The order, which requires reservists to
appear within 24 hours for duty of indefinite du-
ration, allows for callups without the publication
of an emergency situation.
(C/NF) With four to five times the normal
complement of troops in the Occupied Ter-
ritories but less force presence than in Jan-
uary, the IDF's tactics had evolved in February.
Mounted patrols of 10 or more riot-equipped sol-
diers moved through populated areas, and large
formations stood watch around targeted refugee
camps. The IDF would not get involved when
it was not necessary, but when involved would
move in force. It abandoned much of its attempt
to reopen shops closed in observance of corn-
Drawdown of IDF Troops
in the Gaza Strip (U)
Number of Companies
Unit
26 Jan 1988
9 Feb 1988
Golani (1st) Bde
3
2
Givati (84th) Bde
9
3
609th lnf Bde
3
3
(Reserve)
ADA School
1
646th Armored Bde
3
643d In( Bde
9
401st Armored Bde
4
4
460th Armored Bde
1
0
828th School Bde
6
3
933d Naha! Bde
3
Total
42
15
CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN
mercial strikes, and put emphasis on quick
response to disturbances, heliborne dispatch
of riot-breaking squads, and better intelli-
gence work.
(C/NF) Some differences existed between tac-
tics and deployments in the Gaza Strip and on
the West Bank, principally due to relative popula-
tion densities, amount of area to be covered, and
differences in approach between commanders of
the Southern and Central Commands. Maj Gen
Mitzna, with a few large towns and about 450
small villages to contend with on the West Bank,
emphasized small patrols and quick reaction to
large disturbances. Maj Gen Yitzhak Mordechai,
with two major towns and a few densely packed
refugee camps to oversee in the Gaza Strip, em-
ployed larger concentrations of force.
(C/NF) The IDF, which had been unable or un-
willing to devise tactics synchronized to the gov-
ernment's policy, had changed the mission from
ending the uprising to containing it. It seemed
always, however, to be one step behind the Pales-
tinians, from whom it was unable to regain the
initiative.
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nation of resistance between the Gaza Strip and
the West Bank. The government placed limita-
tions on the import of money from Jordan to the
West Bank in an effort to dry up outside financial
support for the uprising. The major Palestinian
youth group was outlawed, procedures for
detention were streamlined, and lower level com-
manders were authorized to rule on administra-
tive detentions for up to 6 months without trial.
Roundups of suspected organizers so increased
the number of Palestinian prisoners that another
IDF prison had to be established in the Negev.
Sporadic restrictions on the media were designed
to reduce Palestinian incentives to demonstrate,
as well as to give the IDF a freer hand and miti-
gate the effects of world criticism.
(C/NF) Deliberate steps to break the spirit of
the uprising were principally economic. Fuel de-
liveries to the West Bank were interrupted fol-
lowing the burning of a tanker truck, forcing the
closure of service stations. Full payments of taxes
were demanded before issuance of the many doc-
uments and permits necessary for business in the
Occupied Territories. The IDF closed produce
markets, prohibited the movement of goods from
selected villages, and welded shut shops partici-
pating in commercial strikes or merely located in
the neighborhood of violent incidents. Additional
measures to make life difficult for the ordinary
Palestinian supporters of the uprising included
the cutting of direct telephone links to foreign
countries, electricity outages to selected commu-
nities, and frequent night raids for searches and
mass arrests.
(C/NF) Uncoordinated and ad hoc IDF re-
sponses characterized the earlier phases of the
uprising. Coordination and calculated intensifica-
tion were essential features of government and
IDF measures in the sixth phase. By March, a sig-
nificant portion of the IDF had made the transi-
tion from bewildered and hastily deployed troops
to a full-fledged army of occupation. The Israelis
had become accustomed to international censure
for their handling of the uprising, and had long ex-
perience with the shortness of media-fed Western
memories. In March, the IDF was exhibiting new
determination to cut off the uprising at its roots.
In Chief of the General Staff Lt Gen Dan Shorn-
ron's view, the IDF had regained the initiative on
the tactical level, but the Palestinians retained the
strategic initiative. As long as the IDF could not
fire at anyone who entered the street, he main-
tained, that basic situation would not change.
(C/NF) By late March, after more than 3 months
of unrest in which scores of Palestinians had
been shot dead in the streets, hundreds had been
wounded by IDF fire, and thousands had been
beaten, only one Israeli soldier had died in the
Occupied Territories at Palestinian hands. There
had been and will continue to be, however, costs
to the IDF. Some of these costs are minor, short-
term, and readily observable. Others may be ma-
jor, long-term, and less discernible.
Readiness
(C/NF) The IDF's readiness was marginally re-
duced in the early phases of the uprising. Active-
duty units normally training or on duty on the
northern borders and in the occupied "security
zone" in southern Lebanon bore the brunt of the
first weeks of the unrest. The loss in training av-
eraged 3 weeks per unit, and during the deploy-
ment in the Occupied Territories of active-duty
formations ? particularly elements of the Givati,
Golani, and 35th Para Brigades ? forces in the
north were thinly stretched. Observers reported
that no infantry brigade was present on the Golan
Heights for surprisingly long periods of time.
(C/NF) According to Maj Gen Uri Sagi, com-
mander of IDF Ground Forces Command, the
active-duty units were already in a high state of
training when deployed to duty in the Occupied
Territories, and the time served there was not suf-
ficient to reduce their fighting edge appreciably.
His assertion is in line with the view that con-
flict situations contribute to units' performance
in combat. Although another view contends that
skills deteriorate without combined arms training,
it would probably require a number of months of
unrelieved duty in the Occupied Territories be-
fore a significant degradation in a unit's combat
capability would become evident. By its rotation
of reservists and reserve units into duty the IDF
showed its determination not to let that happen.
The reserve units lost an estimated 2 or 3 days'
training by deployment to the Occupied Territo-
ries. Normally, reservists spend much of their 40
to 45 days of annual active duty in operational
roles rather than training. In early March, reservist
duty was extended to 50 days. Later in the month,
the IDF was considering extending reserve duty
even further and calling reservists for special duty
in the Occupied Territories for several months at
a time to help ease the pressure on active-duty
units. Precedents for this type of callup were set
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during the War of Attrition along the Suez Canal
two decades earlier.
Leadership Grumblings
(C/NF) The Palestinian uprising has not been
the IDF's finest hour, and has given rise to or ex-
acerbated a measure of resentment and dissatis-
faction among the senior leadership. The IDF's
leaders believed from January on that current tac-
tics were working in the short term. Most senior
commanders appeared convinced, however, that
the mission of restoring calm or containing unrest
only kept the lid on the pressure cooker created
by more than 20 years of Israeli occupation and
would be no substitute for the required political
solution in the long term.
(C/NF) Chief of the
General Staff Lt Gen
Dan Shomron. His
early months as the IDF's
top commander were
consumed by the Lavi
fighter aircraft controversy.
Shomron has been faulted
by officers for sitting
on the sidelines while
Defense Minister Rabin
made crucial decisions
on the IDF and for
contributing to a sense
of drift on crucial IDF
issues. Of the uprising,
Shomron has said, "There
is no magic trick to end
the situation."
UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) Although the IDF enjoyed an excellent
security posture against external threats in De-
cember 1987, no time was a good time to have
to deal with a popular uprising in the Occupied
Territories. From an internal perspective, its com-
ing when it did was particularly unpropitious.
IDF leaders had hoped that the tenure of Lt Gen
Shomron as Chief of the General Staff would rein-
vigorate the services and bring progress on
important questions of doctrinal changes, pro-
curement priorities, and force modernization.
Shomron's first months on the job, however, were
consumed in preoccupation over the Lavi fighter
program. They were also characterized by such
image-tarnishing incidents as an IDF commando
operation in Lebanon that hit Lebanese militia-
men instead of its Palestinian target, an hours-long
ambush of a Givati patrol in the "security zone" in
southern Lebanon by a guerrilla band that with-
drew in good order, and a single guerrilla's hang-
glider attack inside Israel proper that killed six
IDF soldiers in a Nahal militia camp. Some senior
IDF commanders were also disturbed by Shorn-
ron's tendency to allow Defense Minister Rabin to
make decisions they believed were the province
of the IDF's top general.
(C/NF) Many commanders believe that the
IDF is putting its reputation on the line to buy the
politicians more time to avoid facing the difficult
questions of the exchange of land for peace con-
nected with the peace process. Their instinctive
reaction to protect their troops from the abuses
of the civilian leadership has caused some strain.
When stories of indiscriminate beatings mounted,
for example, the commander of the IDF's South-
ern Command went on record with a comment
that it was the politicians who sent the soldiers
to the Occupied Territories and who were now
picking on "exceptional cases" to attack the IDF.
(C/NF) IDF leaders find themselves in a no-win
situation. They have the ability to project force
into any area of the Occupied Territories and to
suppress any disorders, but this is only military
and geographical control ? not a victory that pro-
duces even an interim solution. There are, to be
sure, IDF commanders at all levels who relish the
opportunity to punish Palestinians. As the com-
mander of Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip put it,
however, "Each death of a demonstrator is a de-
feat for the IDF." And each defeat for the IDF is a
defeat for its leaders.
Morale and Discipline
(C/NF) The IDF has traditionally been the
most respected institution in Israeli society, im-
measurably affecting the individual soldiers' self-
image. The IDF is, however, a fighting force,
not a quasi-police force. Since the beginning of
the uprising, the IDF's young troops ? trained
to confront armed enemies on the battlefield ?
have been humiliated in confrontations with
Palestinian women and children. For some, the
beatings policy acted as a safety valve short of
lethal force for venting their frustrations and the
anti-Arab passions that the uprising has exacer-
bated. Others reported a sense of shame and
debasement.
(C/NF) Reports of widespread physical abuse
of Palestinians became more frequent beginning
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in January, when the beatings policy was insti-
tuted. Troops had been instructed to conduct
themselves with both firmness and restraint, an
apparent contradiction in terms. Signals to the
troops were mixed. On some occasions, Defense
Minister Rabin issued statements that force was
to be used only to disperse rioters, while on an-
other he said that, "Anyone who tries to attack a
soldier should know that the soldiers have license
to use all the means at their disposal to defend
themselves." Senior officers in the Gaza Strip pri-
vately outlined a rationale for bone-breakings ?
to "treat the rioter like a dog, not a symbol to
his people" ? and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir
commented publicly that the only reason the up-
rising had lasted as long as it had was the restraint
shown by soldiers. None of this confusion con-
tributed to high troop morale.
(C/NF) Toward the end of February, after
worldwide reporting of such notorious cases as
the burying alive of four Palestinians, Attorney
General Harish informed Defense Minister Rabin
that the excesses had become too widespread to
be dismissed as "exceptional irregularities," and
instructed him to issue precise guidelines on the
use of force. On the 23d, Lt Gcn Shomron issued
a directive that under no circumstances was force
to be used as punishment, and that deliberate hu-
miliation and damage to property was forbidden.
Abuses continued, but now the IDF ? particularly
commander of the Central Command, Maj Gen
Mitzna ? began to remove from command, de-
tain, and prosecute transgressors more frequently,
especially in cases that drew press attention. The
troops only gradually learned what was expected
of them. Both the political leadership and the ma-
jority of IDF commanders were willing to turn a
blind eye to the excesses as long as results were
being achieved. The absence of broad disciplinary
measures against large numbers of soldiers is fur-
ther evidence that the conduct of the troops was
not contrary to the wishes of either the civilian or
the military leadership. Adverse foreign publicity
and the resulting pressure from Rabin were the
major factors in pushing the IDF toward remov-
ing the ambiguities on how troops should con-
duct themselves.
(C/NF) Outright refusals to obey orders have
been few. On 31 December, 160 reservists up
to the rank of major collectively refused to serve
in the Occupied Territories ? a development
that had begun before the uprising and for which
precedents had been set in the Lebanon war. Se-
nior officers are more concerned about "the wild
ones" who will resist control on their use of force
than about soldiers who refuse to serve or who
are morally torn about their duties.
(C/NF) An early February report by the IDF's
Behavioral Sciences Department concluded that
if troops continued to carry out their current
duties in the Occupied Territories, their behav-
ioral patterns would be affected. Senior officers
disagreed. They admitted that the morale of
one unit, the 933d Nahal Brigade, was low, but
because of the 25 November 1987 hang-glider
attack, not because of duty in the Occupied Ter-
ritories. On 22 February the IDF's chief psychol-
ogist released the results of a survey of troops
serving in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank.
Seventy percent did feel that their fighting abil-
ity was impaired by their policing role, and 65
percent reported witnessing harsh actions against
Palestinians. Significant as a measure of morale,
however, was the fact that fully 92 percent ex-
pressed full confidence in their officers.
(C/NF) Aside from unit cohesion and confi-
dence in officers, there appear to be two princi-
pal determinants to the future morale of IDF
soldiers in the Occupied Territories: the feeling
that they are carrying out a necessary task that
represents the will of the nation, and the duration
of their security duty. Opinion polls in Febru-
ary and March determined that a majority of Is-
raelis believed that the current policy or an even
harsher policy should be pursued in the Occupied
Territories, and that the IDF should do the job.
The chief psychologist's survey found, however,
that 60 percent of the soldiers surveyed believed
that they would have difficulty with duty in the
Gaza Strip and on the West Bank if it continued
for 6 months or more. In early March, the IDF lim-
ited individual tours in the Occupied Territories
to 40 consecutive days.
Money
(C/NF) The Palestinian uprising is costing Is-
rael money ? in lost revenues, lost tourism, lost
Arab and reservist labor, and increased expendi-
tures. By the end of February IDF leaders re-
alized that they were committed to a long stay
in the Occupied Territories and that new funds
were required. No precise estimate of costs had
been made, however. The defense establishment
had already reportedly estimated that it would fall
$600 million short of what it needed to meet IDF
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requirements over the next 3 Israeli fiscal years
? even after cancellation of the Lavi program.
(C/NF) In addition to line items such as emer-
gency procurements of riot-control equipment,
expenses will mount for realignment of training
schedules and the commitment of individual re-
servists and reserve units. Military vehicles, food,
fuel, spare parts, and the building of temporary
structures all require support.
(C/NF) The financing of additional reserve
callups is particularly nettlesome. The IDF is al-
lotted a maximum number of reservists' days that
can be paid for by Israel's social security system.
Days in excess of this amount are supposed to be
funded from IDF and Ministry of Defense funds.
The IDF's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1988-
89 actually called for a 3-percent reduction in re-
serve callups compared to Fiscal Year 1987-88.
This forecast has now been overcome by events.
In February, the IDF reportedly demanded an ad-
ditional $30 million to cover expected expenses.
According to the Israeli press, treasury circles ini-
tially scoffed at the demand. The IDF does not
want the cost of its duty in the Occupied Territo-
ries to be taken from its already tightened sched-
uled procurement and training budget.
(C/NF) The Ministry of Finance realizes that it
will not be able to resist a demonstrable IDF need
for additional funds. The costs, when viewed in
perspective, are not catastrophic. They do not
entail the expensive ordnance and equipment of
armored warfare with artillery and air support. As
Defense Minister Rabin commented, "What does
one need here? Sticks and more soldiers, that is
all... The matter is unpleasant but cheaper than
any other military action." Despite initial Finance
Ministry resistance, by March the groundwork
had been laid for supplemental IDF appropriations
for the next budget year.
Outlook
(C/NF) There have been several recent re-
gional examples of military forces using all the
means at their disposal ? including artillery, ar-
mor, and airpower ? to suppress rebellions and
popular uprisings quickly, resulting in often ap-
pallingly high civilian casualties. However high
the number of Palestinian deaths through March,
IDF measures in response to the uprising have
not been excessive by the standards of the Middle
East ? where Israel is located. IDF measures have,
however, been excessive by the present standards
of the West ? with the democracies of which Is-
rael wishes to be identified.
(C/NF) The IDF's senior leadership is in agree-
ment that the Army could have put down the dis-
orders within days even if it had met the upris-
ing with significantly less force than the Jordanian
or Syrian armies have employed against internal
threats. Most of them are also in agreement that
they do not want to lead an IDF that would em-
ploy such methods. The price of the IDF's rel-
ative restraint is that the uprising will not end
quickly. Conversely, the longer the uprising lasts
the greater the possibility that it will progress to
higher and higher levels of violence, escalating
from widespread disorders to armed insurrection.
(C/NF) The IDF will be able to contain distur-
bances of the sort it has already dealt with as they
occur and even prevent some before they occur,
but it will not be able to force a return of the
Occupied Territories to their pre-December rela-
tive tranquility. Temporary lulls in the unrest and
even long periods of relative quiet are likely to
occur, but a page has been turned and the Oc-
cupied Territories will never be the same. As an
IDF colonel put it, "These people have discovered
their power. They will never forget it." Israel's oc-
cupation of the West Bank and Gaza ? for more
than 20 years maintained at relatively low cost ?
will become more costly. The costs, not all mon-
etary, will weigh most heavily on the IDF.
(C/NF) The IDF's offensive and defensive
readiness will be degraded, but probably not sig-
nificantly, even if the level of unrest increases.
The unrest has had no appreciable impact, it
should be remembered, on two key elements of
Israel's military superiority?its airpower and ar-
mored forces. Although the Army's operational
staying power can continue for months, the IDF
will encounter problems. The IDF is in the
Occupied Territories for the duration, and its
large commitment there will complicate deploy-
ments in the north and reserve callup and training
schedules. Hardest hit in the long term may be re-
serve unit training, as the IDF places priority on
training for active-duty units. Reserve training had
already been negatively affected by budget con-
straints before the uprising began. Mobilization
of large reserve forces is central to IDF doctrine
for conventional warfare, and the IDF will strive
to prevent significant degradation of reserve unit
readiness. The extension of reservists' duty from
9
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the previous 40-45 days to 50 days in early March
was as much an attempt to maintain training lev-
els as it was a way to provide manpower for oc-
cupation duty and free active-duty units for other
assignments. The IDF will also attempt to pro-
ceed with large, planned exercises, as it did in
the Southern Command in March.
(C/NF) The IDF will have to assign priority
to equipping and training troops for crowd con-
trol ? an issue the IDF has long avoided. It
will have to devise intelligence methods and ap-
paratuses more suitable to its current mission
in the Occupied Territories than those of the
Shin Bet. The IDF will continue to seek tech-
nological crowd control solutions, although exot-
ically equipped command cars and heliborne nets
are probably not effective answers to low-tech
Palestinian stones in narrow alleys. "The gravel
launcher," wrote a respected Israeli military cor-
respondent, "will not bring us salvation." The IDF
will design its deployment of forces in the Occu-
pied Territories in a manner that ensures that the
maximum number of active-duty units are avail-
able for duty in the north and for combined arms
training. Throughout February and into March,
units along the Lebanese border, on the Golan
Heights, and in the "security zone" were still
thinly stretched. Competing Palestinian factions
outside the Occupied Territories are likely to in-
crease infiltration attempts in efforts to show they
are bearing their share of the struggle, in which
case IDF resources will be further stretched along
the Jordanian and Egyptian borders, as well as in
the north.
(C/NF) The IDF will continue to seal off vil-
lages and refugee camps, arrest large numbers of
suspected agitators, impose long curfews and col-
lective punishments, and make additional efforts
to limit press activities ? all to prevent demon-
strations before they happen. In cooperation with
other elements of the state, it will take additional
steps to break the will of the Palestinian popula-
tion to sustain the uprising. These measures are
likely to expand from relatively limited to massive
scopes, especially in anticipation of commemora-
tions ? both Palestinian and Israeli. The IDF will
continue to resist movement toward the forma-
tion of a large, permanent internal security force
other than the Border Police, which it will en-
deavor to strengthen.
(C/NF) The government expects some spill-
over of West Bank and Gaza Strip unrest to Is-
raeli Arabs within the pre-1967 borders, and some
has already occurred. The IDF must plan for the
possibility of significant Israeli Arab involvement
in the uprising in the future, a development that
could severely tax the Army's already strained re-
sources. The IDF must also consider that, in the
event of conventional warfare, its rear areas will
not be as secure as previously.
UNCLASSIFIED
(C/NF) The first IDF death in the Occupied
Territories since the uprising began in
Bethlehem on 20 March. Increased Palestinian
use of firearms will bring a severe IDF response and
change the nature of the uprising.
(C/NF) The potential exists for a much higher
level of violence. The danger increases daily that
a small patrol of inexperienced troops, cut off in
a narrow alley, will unleash a fusillade that will
kill and wound large numbers of people. As IDF
tactics have been evolving on the basis of lessons
learned, so have Palestinian tactics. The Palestini-
ans must maintain the uprising's momentum, and
once the IDF develops measures that effectively
counter one method of resistance, the Palestini-
ans will develop another. Commanders and troops
will face difficult choices in the event, for exam-
ple, of a massive curfew violation by men, women,
and children.
(C/NF) Settler activity constitutes another po-
tentially explosive ingredient. Militant Jewish set-
tlers were already involved in some shootings
of Palestinians, vigilantism, and other provocative
acts before mid-March. Keeping the roads to set-
10
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tlements open is burdensome for the IDF, and
settlers have been dissatisfied with IDF perfor-
mance in this area. Palestinian violence against
settlements may not be far off, and the IDF will
find itself in the middle. Conscripts and reservists
from Tel Aviv and Haifa may come to identify their
hardships in the Occupied Territories with settler
demands for protection. Some Jewish extrem-
ists, particularly Kach party members and some
settler groups, see in the provocation of more
lethal Palestinian violence eventual justification
for mass expulsions of Arabs from the Occupied
Territories.
(C/NF) The most ominous potentiality is Pales-
tinian use of firearms against the IDF. The Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO), which has
come to play an important role in the uprising
since its spontaneous beginnings, tried to take the
high road and ruled out the use of firearms in the
Occupied Territories during its initial phases. Al-
though Palestinian use of firearms was sporadic
and uncoordinated through March, a variety of
factors ? such as fatigue, frustration with meth-
ods so far employed, IDF successes, or compe-
tition between factions ? could contribute to a
rise in armed incidents. The IDF response to the
killing of the Israeli soldier on 20 March was rel-
atively restrained. More IDF deaths will doubtless
bring a higher Palestinian death toll, as reservists
become more apprehensive of any Palestinians ap-
proaching them and some troops seek revenge. In
addition, mainstream or dissident PLO operations
within Israel could cause a spillover of IDF ire into
the Occupied Territories.
(C/NF) If and when the Palestinians resort to
the widespread use of firearms or clearly terror-
istic acts against Israelis, the IDF's use of lethal
force will increase. Public support for IDF ac-
tions ? already strong ? would most likely also
increase, as would the Army's resolve. "The pa-
tience we exercise in handling disturbances will
not apply to war against terror," commented Lt
Gen Shomron. "A war against terror will be waged
with all the power at the IDF's disposal." Some
commanders and policymakers might even wel-
come such a development. As Minister of De-
fense Rabin observed, "On television screens it
would then no longer look like a revolt of civilians
against the military, but like a battle of terrorists
against the military." Fighting an armed insurrec-
tion while simultaneously suppressing demonstra-
tions and controlling a hostile population would,
however, pose profound new problems for the
IDF and for Israel.
(C/NF) The external military threat to Israel
has diminished significantly since the 1970s. The
state of war between Israel and Egypt ended in
1979, Iraq is immersed in war with Iran, Syria is
debilitated by economic problems, and Jordan is
too weak to take on Israel alone. The IDF en-
joys qualitative superiority over its actual and po-
tential Arab enemies, and the gap is expected to
widen. As the IDF's role as an army of occupa-
tion acquires an importance to the political lead-
ership ranking with its role as defender of the
state against outside threats, however, the IDF's
self-esteem will decline. In the words of an Israeli
officer, "The damage to our reputation has been
done." The Israeli doctrine of havlagah, a con-
cept that called for the use of force only when ab-
solutely necessary, seemed but a dim memory in
Lebanon in 1982. The IDF's already sullied ideal of
tohar hanehsek, the "purity of arms" governing
soldierly behavior, may not survive a long Pales-
tinian uprising. Ultimately, the tensions associated
with occupation duty could affect unit cohesion.
(C/NF) Whatever the course of events in the
Occupied Territories, the IDF's leadership will do
its duty and will not overstep the limits placed
upon it by the civilian authority. Senior IDF com-
manders, however ? many of them oriented to-
ward the Labor Party and in favor of territorial
compromises ? will find ways of making their
views known. Tension between the government
and the IDF will probably increase as the upris-
ing continues. Political figures, especially on the
right, have already found and will continue to find
in the IDF a convenient scapegoat open to crit-
icism for not ending the uprising quickly. Some
IDF commanders who have previously offended
prominent politicians, such as Maj Gen Mitzna,
may be particularly vulnerable.
(C/NF) According to the IDF's Chief of the
General Staff, "There is no chance of reaching a
solution through military force with the limita-
tions we impose on ourselves." At present, vir-
tually the entire IDF leadership believes that the
causes of the uprising require a long-term politi-
cal solution. None is optimistic that such a solu-
tion is coming any time soon.
(Reverse Blank)
11
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Secret
?
(U) Each classified title and heading has been properly marked; all those unmarked are
unclassified.
(U) Word processing was provided by Ms. Ruth Monahan.
(U) This study has been fully coordinated with the Directorates for Estimates and Current
Intelligence.
(U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to
the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-8C1), Washington, D. C. 20340-0001. Requests for
additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to
DIA (ATTN: RTS-2E), in accordance with DIA Manual 59-1, Intelligence Dissemination/ Reference
Services.
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P014
1
NPIC/IEG/SWA/NE BR
6545
DIA/VP
C754
1
USAFCA
P055
25
CIA/OCR/DSD/DB
6551
DIA/VP-SO/P
C756
1
9020 MIGP MIBN (S)
P077
2
STATE 1NR/NESA
6552
6 0I0/0I-66
C759
1
INSCOM/HUMINT
P079
2
STATE INR/PMA
6563
DIA/D1-56
C764
1
HQDA
P081
1
STATE INR/EC
8564
DIA/JSI
C766
1
HQDA DAMI-FIC
P085
5
STATE
6575
DIA/DB-1
C768
3
ITAC (LIBRARY)
P090
S
NSA/T515/CDB
6589
DIA/JSW
C786
1
HODA DAMI-F1W
P091
1
NSA REP DEFENSE
6591
DIA/DI-5
C819
1
5TH SEG(A)
P100
3
NAT SEC COUNCIL
6593
DIA/DB-10
P109
1
PFIAB
6598
DIA/DB-2
U.S.
NAVY
P111
1
WH SIT ROOM
8602
DIA/OSCI-16
P127
1
US SECRET SERVICE
6603
DIA/DB-6
0007
NSIC HQ (NSIC-220)
P702
3
CIA/NIO/GPF
6612
DIA/DB-502
0012
1
OP-611
P7I4
3
IC STAFF
6617
DIA/DB-3
6150
1
CMC (INTP)
P716
1
NAT INTEL COUNCIL
8620
DIA/DB-8
0202
NAVWARCOL/LIB
9008
1
RISC
8623
DIA/D6-86
0249
NAVPGSCOL
Q043
1
AFMIC
6626
5 DIA/DB-8C1
0301
1
07-092 (001)
9420
1
FTD/SIIS
6635
DIA/D6-8D
0900
3
NAVOPINICEN
9591
1
FSTC-AIFIC
6638
DIA/JSI-50
0971
OP-009P
9619
1
ASIC REDSTONE
6642
DIA/JSI-5
0979
1
NSGA OPS/34
R135
2
USIA
8644
DIA/D6-5D
S030
1
FRD LIB OF CONG
6645
DIA/DB-503
U.S.
AIRFORCE
6670
DIA/DB-5
244 GUST'S
456
COPIES
6671
DIA/DB-50
0003
1
HQ USAF/INXX
8674
DIA/DB-58
0017
1
USAF/INA(RAND-W)
6676
DIA/DB-562
0044
2
AFIS/INUA
6677
DIA/OB-5C
0054
1
HQ AFIS/INA
DISTRIBUTION LIST (MICROFICHE)
DIA
6331
8352
6686
6604
8892
ARMY
C299
C307
C417
C500
1
25
1
1
1
1
1
I
1
DIA/RTS-2A2
DIA/RTS-2F5 STOCK
DIA/D8-70
DIA/OS-I (EUCOM)
USDA() TEL AVIV
19419 ARMD ODE
2416 INF DIV
7TH INF DIV
TRADOC
C600
C605
C768
C772
U.S. AIRFORCE
0100 15
0555 1
0706 1
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED
6010 1
160TH SP OPS AV GP
1ST SOCOM
ITAC (LIBRARY)
HQDA DAMI-F10
TAC 480 RTG/INPPD
6916 ELEC SEC SQ
HQ ESC/INAM
COMMANDS
SUCCOR
H101
1005
1040
K300
L051
OTHERS
P002
9591
24 COSTS
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
63
USAFE 497RTG (IRC)
USCINCCENT
SOCCENT
IPAC (LIBRARY)
544 I05/101
NPIC/IB
FSTC-AlEIC
COPIES
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/04: CIA-RDP92T00277R000600170002-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/04: CIA-RDP92T00277R000600170002-1
Seeret ?
DDB-2680-328-88
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/11/04: CIA-RDP92T00277R000600170002-1