UNCLASSIFIED VERSION OF NIE ON "THE FUTURE OF SOVIET SCIENCE"

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
20 December 1985
During my four and a half years as Director of the Office
of Science and Technology Policy, I have urged that the US
scientific community develop a good understanding of Soviet
basic sciences. Knowledge of their strengths and weaknesses
should be a helpful guide to those who establish policy about
US support of science and to those in the scientific community
who carry on the research. Moreover, our understanding of
Soviet science should help prevent inadvertently fulfilling
Soviet needs through transfer of supporting technology.
The attached Study was prepared with my encouragement. It
is based solely on interviews with approximately 100 U. S.
scientists.
I commend the Study to your attention and suggest further
studies of this type by the scientific community.
George A. Keyworth II
Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy
,~, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 _.... _ I rnNC i
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
The Director of Central IntelliQena
National Intelli~ena Council
NIC #06000-85
MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board Principals
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Unclassified Version of NIE on "The Future of Soviet Science"
The Acting OCI has authorized me to transmit to you the attached draft of
the captioned Study for consideration at NFIB on 12 December 1985.
Herbert E. Meyer
Attachment:
As stated
CONF TIAL
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ....... 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
A STUDY OF SOVIET SCIENCE
4 December 1985
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ..................
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Scope Note
Key Judgments
I. Research Environment
-- Concentration
-- Rigid Hierarchy
INSET -- Freedom of Communication
-- Political Factors
-- Military and Industrial Influence
-- Science to Technology Transition
II.
INSET -- Concept, Theory, and Application
Policy
III.
Resources
--
Funding
--
Instrumentation
IV.
The Soviet Scientist
Compared with Western Counterparts
Importance of Western Science
Participation in Military, Government,
and Party Activities
Education
INSET -- Discrimination in Science
V. Soviet Scientific Research
-- General Considerations
-- Relative Strengths and Weaknesses
VI. Future
Annex: Formal Organizational Structure
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ..1 ...._.....__ I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Scope Note
This study addresses the sector of Soviet society at the very leading
edge of future technology development--the sciences. The sciences, under
which we include fundamental and applied science, are concerned with the
discovery and conceptual development of new laws of nature and the
preliminary steps taken to explore possible applications of these
discoveries.
Science, and in particular fundamental science as distinguished from
applied science, is so far removed from weapon systems, products, and
processes that have an obvious effect on our relations with the USSR that
it is difficult to convey with clarity the far reaching and long term
effects it has on societies. However, science serves as the well-spring
of new concepts and theories from which new technologies, and finally
products and processes, evolve. An understanding of Soviet science,
consequently, can provide the first indications of fundamentally new
approaches to problems of defense and the economy. These early
indicators can serve to alert the U.S. to areas where the Soviets are
particularly strong and where surprises may likely be in store. More
generally, an overall sense of the state of Soviet science, as well as
how it couples to industry, can contribute a background of reality
against which to evaluate the viability of intended policies and programs
initiated by the communist party.
The intent is to develop, in a broad sense, an understanding of the
current health of Soviet science and to speculate on the implications of
its current and likely future course. This entails an understanding of ,
the environment within which Soviet science is conducted, in addition to
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
a general assessment of the relative strength of Soviet scientific
research in various fields of science as compared with that in the US.
We have tried to identify and discuss the implications of the striking
differences between the Soviet and US research environments in such areas
as organization and management, resources, science policy and education,
and the nature of the Soviet scientist.
We have limited this study primarily to science sponsored by the
Soviet Academy of Sciences, and furthermore, primarily to the physical
sciences; we have also collected data and impressions on applied science
in industrial research institutes as well. We believe, however, that the
environmental factors identified are generally applicable in describing
the conditions for all of Soviet science. In addition, we have explored
somewhat the transition of science and technology to industry.
Much of the information presented here is derived from interviews
with nearly 100 active US scientists (from November 1984 to May 1985) in
approximately 10 fields of physical science who have knowledge of Soviet
science through visits with colleagues in the Soviet Union (the time
frame of the visits ranged from about 10 years ago to the present),
personal contacts with Soviet scientists at international conferences, or
familiarity with Soviet scientific literature.
From the interviews with the scientists, a set of common themes was
identified and judgements were made on the status of research. These
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 __-- _._._ ... .. 1.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
themes were supplemented by and compared with information from emigre
reports and a limited number of direct interviews with emigres who were
also active scientists. Finally the judgements were cross-checked
against several other studies/reports/surveys. We found the themes to be
largely consistent among these various sources.
We do not attempt to provide an indepth analysis of Soviet scientific
capability, rather we have focused on the research environment, policy,
resources, and scientists which affect science in the Soviet Union.
This study is intended to break the ground toward developing an
understanding of Soviet science, and serve as a basis upon which further
analysis may build a more complete and detailed picture.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 __ _ 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
1.. Soviet science may undergo a gradual evolution over the next two
decades which could result in a more effective system for responding to
the technology needs of the country. Over the next decade, party policy
initiatives from the new generation leaders designed to focus Soviet
scientific talent on economically and militarily relevant research could
result in a reduction or leveling off of Soviet research in areas of
fundamental science having little or no obvious applications. Beyond
that time, an improved technology base could result in a significant
reduction in the problems imposed by their traditional lack of
instrumentation and computing power. This coupled with their massive
applied science effort could allow them to more easily overcome future
technical deficiencies in their military systems and civilian products,
thus increasing their competitiveness.
2. The transfer of science to technology and application is
difficult for the Soviets because of:
- An incentive system which doesn't strongly support technical
innovation and implementation.
- Restricted communication.
- A rigid hierarchical bureacracy which does not easily allow
inter-ministry scientific projects.
3. It is likely that the new generation of Soviet political and
scientific leaders will institute substantive changes in the Soviet
system affecting both the S&T administrative bureauracy and the research
environment which could improve the science to technology transition
problems and the inadequate instrumentation infrastructure:
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
We expect that substantial impact resulting from any changes will
be slow and gradual, and that the current research problems wil l
likely continue for the next 10 years.
Beyond that time, however, if the new generation of leaders is
successful in instituting changes, we may expect to begin to see
substantial impact on their technology base.
- Many new leaders in the scientific community are also of the new
generation and have made their careers in applied science. They
may be expected to perpetuate any changes over at least two
decades.
4. There will probably be a further shift of Soviet scientific
research toward applied sciences in the future:
Should the Soviets be successful in improving their ability to
move science to technology and application, the expected
increasing focus on applied science combined with their
demonstrated ability to come up with new scientific concepts
could lead to an increased likelihood that the US may be
surprised by an unanticipated applied scientific development.
The occurence of such a surprise in applied science could in a
short time impact on militarily and economically important
technologies.
This shift will probably substantially affect the Soviet Academy
of Sciences and result in a reduction or leveling off of
fundamental science particularly experimental science although a
smaller core of scientists can be expected to continue to produce
world class scientific results.
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ..... _.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
- Some areas of fundamental science that have traditionally been
closely coupled to applications, such as condensed matter physics
and semi-conductors, may in fact receive greater emphasis.
- A greater reliance on the West for fundamental scientific
research can be expected in the future.
- Even after the technology base begins to substantially respond to
the new policies, vigorous Soviet efforts to acquire Western
technology can be expected to continue.
5. The best Soviet theorists have capability comparable to that of
their Western counterparts in all fields of physical science.
6. The scope and quality of Soviet theoretical research is largely
comparable to that in the West.
The Soviets are particularly noted for their strength in
turbulence, plasma physics, laser physics, mathematics, and
astrophysics.
The Soviet lack of large-scale scientific computers for
computational physics may limit their contribution in the
future.
US scientists have attributed the Soviet absence in, for example,
the band theory of conduction to inadequate computer power.
7. The best Soviet experimentalists are just as good intellectually
as their Western counterparts:
The Soviets have been lauded for their contributions in materials
science and laser physics.
They are, however, frequently limited by problems with quality,
availability, and maintenance of instrumentation.
,~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
- Nevertheless, they frequently surprise Western scientists with
the quality of the data they obtain with relatively crude
equipment and often demonstrate a deeper physical insight.
8. The scope and quality of Soviet experimental research is
generally not on a par with their theoretical research. The Soviets have
been conspicuously absent in some fields, in large part due to the lack
of necessary techniques and equipment.
- Such has been the case in surface physics, where the availability
of ultra-high vacuum techniques is essential.
- Lack of sophistication in vacuum and cryogenic technology has
limited Soviet contributions in low temperature physics.
- While ultra-fast laser spectroscopy has been a major interest in
the US. the Soviets have been slower to achieve extremely short
time resolutions.
9. The presence of just a few very bright scientists can, and has,
made the difference between very significant Soviet contributions in a
field and the virtual absence of a Soviet contribution. Even in cases
where there is a significantly poorer Soviet contribution, as in
biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, specific
examples within the broad field, such as biophysical chemistry and
protein conformation, can be found which are regarded as world-class by
Western scientists.
10. Soviet scientists generally show an overall excellence in
mathematics education which exceeds that of their Western counterparts.
This has:
- Contributed to excellence in theoretical physics.
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
- Allowed them to circumvent inadequate computer capability,to some
extent, thereby allowing analytic solutions where Western
scientists would be more likely to pursue a numerical solution.
- Allowed adequate numerical results to be obtained on computers of
comparably lesser capability in some cases.
11. Should state-of-the-art computers become available to the
Soviets, the possibility of a surge in Soviet scientific computation
capability exists because of their excellence in mathematics:
- This surge could be mitigated to some extent because of the need
for special programming knowledge and experience.
12. Soviet scientists are often the first to come up with a new
scientific concept, but generally lag the West in fully developing the
idea. Such has been the case, for example, with the Tokamak for
controlled thermonuclear fusion and optical phase conjugation which can
be used in correcting atmospheric distortion of electromagnetic wave
propagation.
13. Restricted freedom of communication is a fundamental flaw in the
Soviet scientific research environment that results in:
- Reduced synergism among scientists.
- Duplication of effort despite central planning.
- Slow diffusion of new ideas and technologies.
- Errors resulting from inadequate peer review.
14. The best Soviet students have had depth, breadth, and quality of
scientific education comparable to that of their US counterparts. They
generally have greater mathematical expertise than their US counterparts,
however.
~~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
15. Because teaching and research are largely separated
institutionally, the interchange of ideas between researchers,
professors, and students is reduced:
- Soviet awareness of this situation has resulted in efforts to
decrease the separation, but the problem persists.
- Students often need substantial retraining to participate
effectively in a research institute.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 __
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
I. Research Environment
1. The formal organizational structure of Soviet scientific policy,-
administration, and research entities has been described at length in
other studies. For the interested reader, the essential elements of this
structure have been briefly summarized in the annex to this study. The
fundamental perspective that should be carried into the following
chapters is the critical role played by the leading members of the State
Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and the Soviet Academy of
Sciences (AN SSSR)* (see Figure 1 and the foldout, figure 2) in
formulating, coordinating, and executing Soviet science policy as defined
by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Concentration
2. In the Soviet Union research activity is highly concentrated
organizationally and geographically. The Academy dominates the republic
academies both in terms of numbers of people and the overall quality of
research (see Table I). Similarly, the Moscow area dominates the other
major scientific centers (Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Kiev). Politburo
member V. V. Grishin recently noted that over half the scientific
personnel of the Academy are located in Moscow's research institutes and
laboratories and nearly 35 percent of all doctorates and 30 percent of
all candidates of science are in Moscow.
*Unless otherwise specified, Academy will refer to the AN SSSR as
distinct from the republic academies.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Table I
Manpower in the Academies of Science*
(1983 figures)
Scientific
Academicians** Workers Doctors Candidates
Academy System 2,955 129,000 10,300 60,300
Fraction in
Soviet Academy
of Sciences
25% 40% 50% 40%
* the academies represent about 10% of the country's scientific manpower
** including corresponding members
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Rigid Hierarchy
3. Many characteristics of the Soviet research environment which
have a strong impact on the effectiveness and efficiency of how research
is conducted in the Soviet Union can be tied to the rigidly hierarchical
lines of authority. Of central importance is the strong role of the
institute director. The director has vast authority in deciding what
projects will be undertaken, by whom, and what resources will be made
available, as well as authorizing travel to scientific meetings,
especially those overseas. The influence is so extreme that the
director's own scientific or ideological views can dominate those of all
the researchers in the institute. This was the case for example with
V. V. Belousov's suppression of work on plate tectonics in geology.
Throughout an institute, there is a tendency toward ossification because
of the pervasive inability to challenge superiors even, in some cases, on
the technical validity of an argument. The management structure in the
institutes tends to be very shallow with sometimes ten or more laboratory
chiefs reporting to one director. The director spends most of his time in
committee meetings with financial and administrative matters and has
difficulty in effectively providing technical direction for the
laboratory chiefs. Furthermore, a director can easily remain in place
for life. Consequently, the suppressing effect on the younger, upcoming
scientists is "like ice on the water."
4. Conversely, in the hands of a strong scientist/administrator,
such as Lev Landau was, an institute can greatly flourish, developing a
tradition of excellence. Furthermore, the director can shield
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
researchers from the bureaucracy, allowing considerable autonomy in what
projects may be undertaken once the researcher gains the director's
suppo~^t. This leads to a general trend in which it is easier for Soviet
scientists to work off-the-beaten-track and maintain funding over many
years than it is for their US counterparts.
5. The strong hierarchical lines, which run not only through the
institutes and the academy structure but also through the various
industrial ministries, lead to a severe isolation of institutes and
laboratories. This isolation hinders Soviet ability to carry on "big
science," such as the construction of large, forefront high-energy
particle accelerators. Many design/production bureaus and research
institutes do not want to join large cooperative projects because it is
not clear who will get the credit for the work. This has been part of
the reason why large Soviet accelerator construction projects generally
are completed after the Western research community has already explored
the accelerator's attainable energy range.
6. Soviet attempts to deal with the problem of organizational
isolation have included the establishment or proposal of special
interministry organizations that can coordinate and direct large projects
which cut across organizational lines. These concepts include:
- Scientific research institutes similar to the Paton Electric
Welding Institute, which cut across ministerial lines and can
conduct applied research, engineering, and technology design.
- Interbranch Science-Production Associations (NPOs) and similar
S&T centers that promote collaboration of scientific,
educational, and production establishments in the development and
diffusion of key technologies.
?i Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
- Temporary project teams, developed to solve long-term complex S&T
problems or to design new equipment and technology. If
successful, they may be changed into NPOs. The August decree
explicitly calls for the creation of such ad hoc collectives, and
the USSR Council of Ministers in January 1984 adopted a
resolution regulating their formation and operation.
7. The isolation also severely restricts Soviet ability to
participate in the rapidly expanding multidisciplinary fields where, for
example, biology and laser spectroscopy come together. In this case, the
organizational isolation is aggravated by a restricted freedom of
communication of scientific research (see inset on Freedom of
Communication).
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
INSET
Freedom of Communication
An essential element of the Western scientific research environment,
which can greatly contribute to the quality and rate of progress of
science, is the capability to effect rapid and broad dissemination of
ideas. This characteristic, which appears to be missing in the Soviet
Union, is a fundamental flaw in the Soviet research environment. There
are numerous reports of highly restricted communication between
researchers, even to the point where scientists in a given institute may
be unaware of relevant work going on in their own institute. Many US
scientists have noted their Soviet counterparts asking for copies of
Soviet papers which were apparently difficult for the Soviets to obtain.
Access to scientific literature varies from institute to institute, but
many examples of poor access have been cited. Furthermore, access to
photocopying machines is highly restricted, requiring the authorization
of a supervisor for each use. The use of electronic mail systems has been
very rare and limited in access and coverage. In addition, travel
between institutes for collaboration, especially inter-city travel, is
restricted.
This lack of broad and easy communication leads to a number of
effects. Since the wide dissemination of new ideas is slow, this results
in a slow movement of the scientific community into new fields as well as
the slow diffusion of new technology to different research groups. It
also leads to an inefficient use of people due to duplication of effort.?
Productivity is reduced due to the reduced synergism among scientists,
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
both from an intellectual sharing perspective and from a joint.
experimentation perspective.
This difficulty is alleviated to some extent because of the high
concentration of workers in Moscow, where results tend to be propagated
through seminars held at the institutes rather than through journal
articles. However, attendance at these seminars tends to be restricted
only to persons from a few of the leading institutes in a given field.
All publications such as journal articles must pass through a series
of committees before being published. This includes a special party
censor and a censor who screens the material for sensitive
military-related technical information. As a result, scientists heavily
edit their own articles prior to submission for publication.
The Soviet solution to these problems has been to establish a
centralized management structure which links a network of S&T information
organizations into a single system. This system, known as the "State
Scientific and Technical Information System" (GSNTI), is made up of a
hierarchy of thousands of institutions involved in activities such as
collecting, translating, indexing, abstracting and disseminating primary
S&T sources. The GKNT (State Committee for Science and Technology) is
responsible for the supervision of the GSNTI, including its several
all-union (national) information agencies. The most important national
agency, the All Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information
(VINITI), handles most of the literature in the natural sciences and
technology. Other important agencies include the All Union Center of
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 __.. 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Scientific and Technical Information (VNTITS) and the All Union
Scientific Research Institute of Interbranch Information (VIMI), which .
manages defense-related materials.
End of Inset
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
8. The size of Soviet scientific research institutes is one of the
first and strongest impressions noted by visiting scientists. Many of
the main research institutes are very large by US standards, with 500 to
several thousand workers. The productivity in Soviet institutes is low
compared to that of the US. This is due to the necessity of devoting
large numbers of people and amounts of time to instrument design,
construction, and maintenance. 'Nevertheless, in a lab to lab competition
between a Soviet and US lab, the Soviet lab can sometimes obtain results
faster than the US lab through the sheer size of the effort that can be
marshalled for a given topic.
Political Factors
9. The party bureaucracy plays an important role in staffing
institutes with scientific personnel. The hiring decision is not made
solely by the director, but rather the director, the secretary of the
party organization, and the personnel department collectively make the
decision. Often factors such as party membership, social activity, and
nationality play a more important role than scientific qualifications.
10. Party membership becomes an increasingly important issue to
career advancement as the level of institute director is approached. The
ability to obtain approval for projects within an institute or funding
for an institute from the academy depends to a large extent on the "old
buddy" system. At the institute director level and higher, the lack of
party membership becomes more and more conspicuous, and positions of
higher authority are almost always filled with party members.
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ......... .
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Military and Industrial Influence
11. The Soviet military has three basic mechanisms for tapping the
talent'in the Academy. A formal means is through the Applied Problems
Section directly under the Presidium of the Academy. Through this
mechanism, problems of interest to the military are brought to the
attention of the Presidium which can then allocate resources from within
the Academy's institutes to work on the problem. A second formal means
is via research contracts negotiated directly with an institute.
Although we have no direct indication of the number of military contracts
taken on by the Academy, V. V. Grishin, Moscow party chief and politburo
member, recently noted that "every year over 11,000 contracts between
scientific research institutes and design bureaus and enterprises are
implemented. The third, but more informal means, is through individual
consulting agreements.
12. Scientific research done under military contract is probably
attractive to many researchers because it allows them access to better
funding and equipment, some of which they can use for their own
fundamental research projects. It is avoided by some, however, because
it limits the scientist's ability to travel and meet Westerners.
13. Virtually all research institutes, particularly in the physical
sciences, have some fraction of their budget, which varies from institute
to institute, allocated for military-related work. Many institutes have
a closed section (e. g. a floor, or building) that is devoted to
military-supported work.
"~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Science to Technology Transition
14. Incorporation of new scientific ideas into a development and
product/process phase is difficult in the Soviet system. Formal review
and approval must take place through the laboratory, institute, academy,
and state committee levels of management. Implementation would then be
called for through a Ministry directive. Line managers, however, often
ignore the directive for fear of not meeting short-term quotas as
specified in the current plan. Furthermore, administrative boundaries
are strict and tend to separate the functions of academy, branch
ministry, and university research, compounding the difficulty of
integrating these efforts. Science-Production Associations (NPOs,
nauchno-proi2vodstvennyye obyedineniya) have been established to try to
smooth this transition. These associations, however, have been in
existence for 15 years and have not been successful. Academy President
A.P. Aleksandrov recently called for more lateral communication between
industry and Academy research institutes. To improve the Academy's
participation in applying the results of research into production, CPSU
General Secretary Gorbachev, at the June 1985 Central Committee
Conference on S&T Progress, endorsed the new "technical center" concept
developed by the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The technical centers
consist of an institute, a design bureau, an experimental works, and a
pilot production plant. The director of the institute carries out
supervision of the center. Six of these centers have been established in
the Ukraine the technical centers have been also endorsed by USSR Academy
president Aleksandrov and leading economist Academician Abel Aganbegyan.
Independently, examples have also been cited of large teams of engineers
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ..i .. _
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
going to a research institute for several months to pick up a new process
or technique. Conversely, research laboratories have been set up at .
plants; the Zil factory in Moscow has a laboratory where scientists from
the Kurchatov Institute and the Scientific Research Center for Industrial
Lasers come to test the use of lasers in the auto industry. Recent
changes have been made which allow production quotas in the current plan
to be reduced for a period of time following the introduction of a new
instrument or process to encourage risk-taking through implementation of
technical innovations.
~~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
CONCEPT, THEORY, AND APPLICATION
. CONCEPT --~ .THEORETICAL .
. EXPERIMENTAL
. DEVELOPMENT VERIFICATION
Examples of Topics First Conceived in the USSR, but
Pushed Further in the West
Tokamak for thermonuclear fusion
Inflation Theory in Cosmology
Optics:
Optical Phase Conjugation (.having implications for correction of
atmospheric distortion of electromagnetic wave propagation)
Interaction of Fast Laser Light Pulses with Semi-conductors
Non-Linear Laser Techniques for Driving Chemical Reaction Pathways
Brillouin Back-Scattering (scattering of light from sound waves)
Gerber-Markusev Methods for Velocity Inversions in Seismology
Radio Frequency Quadrupole Accelerator
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
One widely held view among US scientists is that the Soviets are
often the first to come up with a new scientific concept. US
experimentalists often find that a new measurement they have made has
already been predicted by a Soviet theorist. Beyond the initial
conceptualization, however, the Soviets begin to lag. They are generally
slower to work out the details of a complete new theory from the initial
concept. The Soviets, for example, were the first to note property
changes of materials on the nanosecond time scale when illuminated by
short light pulses. They attributed the property changes to phase
transitions. Later, the US working with picosecond resolution showed the
changes to be due to a rapid melting and recrystallization in an
amorphous state. There is a large effort in this area in the US now, in
part because of possible applications to semiconductor doping
technology. Finally, the movement of new theoretical developments into
applications has been particularly ineffective. We believe this is
largely due to the strong split between theoreticians and
experimentalists and the inadequate supply and maintenance of
experimental equipment.
End of Inset
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ..1 _ _ _ I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
II. Poles
15. Decrees from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, (CPSU), and their implementation within the government, state the
intended directions for current and future Soviet scientific work.
Pronouncements from the 26th CPSU Congress indicate the high priority
being attached to scientific and technical progress as a means for
fulfilling the economic and social development of the country. During
that congress it was stipulated that S&T research in the future should be
even more supportive of the economic and social needs in the Soviet
society. With the general goal of increasing industrial efficiency and
labor productivity, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of
Ministers issued on 28 Aug 83 a joint decree "On Measures on the
Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress in the National
Economy" which calls for increased demands on Soviet science to support
the raising of Soviet standards of machine outputs, equipment,
instruments and other products to the highest world levels.
16. The trend toward pushing science to support economic needs was
already present in the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) with the
implementation of a state integrated scientific and technical program. A
total of 170 state comprehensive scientific-technical programs were
established by Gosplan (State Planning Committee)*, GKNT, and the Academy
and incorporated as a component part of the 1981-1985 development plan.
These programs allow scientific workers to focus their efforts on
* See the Annex for a discussion of the organizations involved in
Soviet S&T policy formulation, administration, and execution.
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
developing and rapidly introducing into practice more advanced equipment
and production methods. The majority of the programs pursue the
development of the machine-building base (see Tables II & III). Most of
these programs are under development for inclusion in the 12th Five Year
Plan (1986-1990).
17. It is within this context that one can look at the Academy and
ask what effect these programs will have on the Academy's research. The
clear implication is that applied science will be heavily favored over
fundamental science in the programs backed by the CPSU. Furthermore,
according to Academy vice president V. A. Kotel'nikov, "There does not
need to be such a large increase in the number of those working in
scientific institutions as took place in previous Five Year periods."
Given the demand for applied research, greater pressure will be exerted
on scientists in the institutes of the Academy to pursue applied research
at the expense of fundamental science. Since the Academy now performs
about 50% of all fundamental science, this portends a gradual reduction
or leveling off of the fundamental scientific research effort in the
Soviet Union.
18. The Academy has in the past been able to exert a substantially
independent force in Soviet society largely through the great respect
accorded academicians and, in some cases, through the personal actions of
its internationally recognized scientists. This resulted in the ability
of the Academy to protect its scientists pursuing fundamental science
from party demands for research that can be directly tied to application.
The percentage of academicians who are party members has been rising
steadily since the 1950s when the percentage was 33~. With the 26 Dec 84
+~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Table II
Priority S&T Topics in the 11th 5-Year Plan*
Biotechnology and genetic engineering
Anticorrosion protection (new lacquer coverings, new methods of
electrochemical protection)
Highly filled polymers and composites
Powder metallurgy
Powerful superconducting magnet for industrial MHD electric power
station
Fast Breeder reactors and thermal neutron reactors for both heating
and power
Robotics
Automation of scientific research and computerized design
Microelectronics and microprocessors
Plasma technology
Fiber optics
Industrial lasers
* Tables II and III illustrate the applied nature of the research we
believe the party and government will be heavily supporting. This is
not a comprehensive list of topics and is not meant to imply that
fundamental research will be unfunded.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 __
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Table III
. Targeted S&T Pro rams Assigned to Academy of Sciences System
PROGRAM
LEAD AGENCY
Lebedev Physics Institute
Scientific Research Center
for Industrial Lasers
Powder metallurgy,
composites & coatings
Experimental industrial
powder metallurgy for the
nuclear metallurgy complex
Optical fiber light guides
with low optical losses
Superconducting magnetic
systems for industrial MHD
electric power stations
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
Institute of Problems of
Material Science
Institute of Metallurgy
Lebedev Physics Institute
Institute of High Temperatures
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ........... .
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
.Academy membership elections, the fraction of academicians who are party
members has exceeded 70%. There is little doubt that the influence of
the party on Academy affairs will likely increase in the future for it
now has sufficient strength to greatly influence future decisions made by
the Academy membership.
19. These statements on S&T progress as a means of improving
economic output are not new ideas, having been stressed throughout Soviet
history. There has not since Brezhnev, however, been a leader in power
long enough and with solid enough a political base to really push through
to fruition the necessary changes. With the accession of the younger and
dynamic Gorbachev, we expect these changes to move more rapidly from
rhetoric into substantive action. The ability of Gorbachev to push for
action from a strong position of power is underscored by his recent
success in getting two strong political allies, Ligachev and Ryzhkov, who
are relatively young, promoted directly to the Politburo, bypassing the
usual candidate stage.
20. Gorbachev himself stressed the essential role of S&T progress in
socio-economic development in an 8 May 85 speech at the Kremlin Palace of
Congresses celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's
victory in the Great Patriotic War:
"The party considers the main task of the present is to
substantially accelerate the socioeconomic progress of Soviet
society...What it amounts to primarily is the intensive and
dynamic growth of the national economy, which relies entirely on
the latest achievements of science and technolo It is the
basis that will make it possible to ensure the further growth of
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
the people's well-being, to strengthen the economic and defense
potentials of the country and comprehensively to perfect
developed socialism...
The principal way to achieve this goal is scientific and
technical progress. The rate of our development and the course
of economic competition with capitalism will depend to a decisive
extent on how we resolve the problem of accelerating scientific
and technical progress and on how efficiently and how timely we
apply the achievements of science and technology in the national
economy."
21. These ideas were reiterated at a special S&T conference held on
11 June 85 in the CPSU Central Committee. In a speech delivered at the
conference, Gorbachev specifically noted the role of science in the
acceleration of scientific and technological progress:
"Comrades, the frontline of the struggle to accelerate the
scientific and technological progress in the national economy
advances through science... One can be proud of the pioneering
achievements in space research, mathematics, mechanics,
thermonuclear synthesis, and quantum electronics... At the same
time, comrades, we can and should obtain incomparably greater
achievements from science. We should take a new look at the tasks
of science based on the requirements of our time, the
requirements that science be turned decisively toward the needs
of social production... It is from these positions that all links
in the chain that binds science, technology, and production ought
to be analyzed and strengthened."
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 ..i __
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
We believe that Gorbachev gave only lip service to fundamental science in
his comments and that the true thrust of his program will be demands for?
relevant applied research.
22. Furthermore, concrete indications of substantive change occurred
in the Academy with the establishment of the Department of Information,
Computer Technology and Automation in March 1983 under Ye.P. Velikhov
who, like Gorbachev, is from a new generation. This is the first new
Academy department to be created since 1968. There have also been
decrees introducing provisions allowing short term falls in plan
production when technical innovations are introduced. Furthermore, a
recent joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR
Council of Ministers called for a change in the wage structure for
scientific workers and engineers, increasing their salaries and adding
bonuses for innovation. This measure was also intended to reduce the time
of development and introduction of new technology and equipment.
23. Although we do expect changes to occur more rapidly in
attempting to solve some of the traditional problems of the centralized
Soviet system in regard to S&T progress and its impact on the Soviet
economy, there will nevertheless be tremendous inertia to overcome. In
addition, the continued influence of some "old guard" non-progressives
and the collective decision-making process will serve to make real
improvements take place slowly and gradually.
24. The combined party pressure for applied research, the newly
created department in the Academy, and the advent of younger men to
leading positions in the Academy who are oriented more towards applied
work, should succeed in shifting the Academy toward a much more applied
"~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
orientation. This shift will likely be perpetuated by the entering young
generation of leaders who might be expected to remain in power for .
several decades. This implies that in addition to the directed and
intended impact of Academy contributions to the economy, there will be a
long term deterioration of Soviet fundamental science unless specific
measures are taken to bolster and protect this aspect of Soviet science.
It should be noted, however, that some areas of fundamental science that
have traditionally been very closely coupled to applications (e.g., solid
state and semi-conductor physics) may in fact receive greater emphasis.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
III. Resources
Funding .
25. Financial resources for conducting research in the Academy
institutes are available through several mechanisms--the formal Academy
budget, contract research, and consulting fees. We estimate that about
90 percent of the research conducted by the higher educational
institutions is done under contract and that most of this is applied
research.
26. Because Soviet official statistics report annual expenditures
only for total science, the distribution of spending by R&D stage (i.e.,
fundamental, applied, developmental) is uncertain. Soviet scholars, using
unknown methodologies to calculate expenditures for individual R&D
stages, provide disparate estimates of the distribution of R&D
expenditures. These estimates, although seemingly consistent in their
coverage of fundamental research as defined in this Estimate, appear to
incorporate different definitions of activity in applied R&D. Therefore,
we can estimate expenditures only for fundamental science.
27. Several Soviet authors have estimated that expenditures for
fundamental research range from 9 to 14 percent of the total published
science series. (See Table IV) By applying these ratios to official
Soviet statistics, we estimate that 1984 expenditures for fundamental
science probably totaled between 2.4 and 3.7 billion rubles. It should be
noted that official Soviet statistics on science spending include a broad
range of R&D work including work done in the social sciences and not
included in the traditional Western concept of R&D. Based on our
knowledge of Soviet accounting systems, we believe that this total
~q Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Table IV
Breakdown of Fundamental vs Applied Science Fundin
(Percentages of 100; Total Science Budget)
Percent Ruble
Fundamental Applied/Developed Total Total
Total 9 2,475,0008 91 25,025,0008 100 27,500,000,OOOR
Academy 4.5 1,237,5008 1.5 412,5008 6 1,650,0008
Branch 3.6 990,0008 86.4 23,760,0008 90 24,750,0008
VUZ .9 247,5008 3.1 852,5008 4 1,100,0008
Percentage of Academy fundamental vs applied is therefore 4.5:1:5 or 75/25
*The uncertainty in these numbers is considerable -- typically plus or
minus 20%.
1. Nine percent of total budgeted R&D is fundamental research (several
sources) ( 91% is applied/developmental)
2. Fundamental research is split 50% academy, 40% research, and 10% VUZ
(Academy economist Varshavskiy)
3. Twenty three precent of VUZ R&D is fundamental and 77% applied
(Academy VP Kotchikov explaining VUZ research)
4. Ninety percent of total R&D allocations go to the branch sector
(Gorbachev at 11 June Conference)
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 i
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
includes civilian and the majority of military fundamental research. A
recent Soviet published source indicates that of this total, about 50%
was spent by Academy of Sciences institutes, and the remaining 50% by
ministry scientific organizations and by high education institutions.
The academy share of expenditures for total fundamental research has
decreased from an estimated 70% in the early 1970s to 50% in the 1980s.
28. The level of review for approval of funding for major scientific
projects within the Academy is generally a function of the ruble amount
of the project:
Project Cost (rubles) Level of Review
1/2 million Institute Director
1 million Academy Level
Over 1 million Council of Ministers (U)
29. The contract and consulting research, as well as problems
presented to the Academy's Applied Problems Section, are generally for
applied research with more obvious applications to the sponsoring
industry or military service. The Section of Applied Problems is the key
link between military objectives and the fundamental research conducted
by the Academy of Sciences, coordinating and monitoring all military
related programs within the Academy. The main goal of this Section is to
study all scientific research areas and to seek technology that could
support military interests or be applied to weapons systems. The amount
of contract work done by the Academy has increased steadily since the
1960s. Soviet sources report that between 1960 and 1970, income from
contracts grew from 8.5 percent to 12.6 percent of the Academy budget. US
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
scholars estimate that today contracting provides 20k to 25~ of the total
budget. ,
34. Funding, however, is not the major difficulty in putting
together a new research plan. The problem is getting the people and
equipment required for the project entered as a part of the plan.
Instrumentation
31. Science drives, and is driven by, technology. As much as new
scientific principles are incorporated into new instrumentation and
products, advances in experimental science often depend on advances in
instrumentation technology.
32. There is a widespread lack of experimental equipment, parts, and
maintenance personnel in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the overall
quality of the instrumentation is often far below that of Western
laboratories. Even where Western equipment is available in Soviet
laboratories, the equipment is often in disrepair because of the absence
of spare parts or personnel to repair the equipment.
33. Research equipment is extremely hard to obtain. Generally, it
is necessary to develop and maintain the equipment at the institute.
This uses up a large fraction of the institute's time and personnel. In
some institutes as many as half of the personnel are technicians devoted
to building and maintaining instrumentation. This function is served to
a large extent by private industry in the US. In the USSR, there is no
private sector pushing science through the development of new
instrumentation. Some institutes have alleviated the equipment/manpower
shortage problem by developing a large in-house shop. These institutes
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
have gained some measure of self-sufficiency by not only building their
own equipment, but also manufacturing equipment for outside use to
generate funds (e.g. small accelerators for medical purposes at the
Institute for Nuclear Physics in Novosibirsk).
34. Emigre scientists have indicated that the formal means of
obtaining equipment and other resources from sources outside their own
insititute are so cumbersome that ways of working around the system have
been widely developed. This "underground" bartering system introduces
some flexibility into the otherwise rigid research environment.
35. This lack of instrumentation support not only slows the Soviet
research effort, but in some fields, leaves Soviet experimentalists
unable to effectively participate in forefront research. They are unable
to compete in many new experimental areas (e.g., molecular biology)
because they do not have as responsive an infrastructure of equipment and
services as is available in the US. Marked increases in publications
have been noted from specific institutions when they have been able to
obtain new pieces of Western-built equipment.
36. Lack of computing power is endemic in the Soviet Union and
constitutes a severe handicap in their research capability. Soviet
computers are typically not very powerful (the workhorse for Soviet
computation, the BESM-6, is comparable to widely used US personal
computers) and have severe reliability problems. Technicians needed to
maintain these computers are in short supply. The use of scientists'
time is inefficient because of the lack of adequate computing power that
in some fields severely hinders their participation in forefront
research.
,~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
37. There is a general shortage of office space for scientists.
Most theorists, even at some of the best institutes, work in their
apartments and come in to their institutes only once or twice a week.
Consequently, they have reduced opportunities for informal interchanges
of ideas with the experimentalists and other theorists.
38. In some cases, even basic supplies have proven to be significant
stumbling blocks. A US scientist reported that in his role as chairman
of an international conference held in the Soviet Union, he was
responsible for the distribution of the conference proceedings. He was
told that the sponsoring institute did not have enough paper allocated to
it in the five-year plan to publish the proceedings.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
IV. The Soviet Scientist
39. Science as a profession is highly respected in the Soviet Union..
Senior. scientists generally receive higher salaries and better benefits
than people in other professions. The theoretical sciences stand above
experimental sciences in prestige, and in particular physics has been
referred to as the "queen of Soviet science." Recent changes in the wage
structure now give equal pay to both experimentalists and theorists.
Compared with Western Counterparts
40. For most fields of theoretical physics, senior Soviet scientists
are on a par with their Western counterparts in terms of depth and
breadth of capability. Senior Soviet experimentalists in virtually all
fields, although on a par intellectually with their Western counterparts,
are generally unable to contribute to the advancement of their field at
the same level as their theorist colleagues. This is because of the lack
of adequate experimental instrumentation. Many of the secondary Soviet
scientists and candidates are given tasks of an unimaginative nature,
e.g. laboriously measuring the physical properties of various new
arbitrary combinations of materials.
Importance of Western Science
41. Soviet scientists, both theorists and experimentalists, are
keenly aware of US experimental work and value it highly since the scope
and depth of Soviet experimental work is not as great as that in the US.
Some Soviet theorists have even expressed concern to US counterparts
about the credibility of Soviet experimental work in some fields (a
widely held view among US theorists and experimentalists). Nevertheless,
US scientists have noted that visiting Soviet experimentalists are often
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 _.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
able to join international collaborative experiments and, even though
they have never worked with some of the advanced instrumentation, they
quickly become fully contributing members. This probably reflects the
close scrutiny the Soviets give to Western literature, including
instrumentation manuals. The Academy is known to have access to
unclassified Western scientific data bases via computer.
42. Soviet scientists very highly prize the opportunity to travel
abroad to conferences, universities, and laboratories not only for the
material learned and the feedback on their own work, but also for the
peer recognition of their work. Soviet scientists feel that the West
does not appreciate the value of Soviet scientific work. In meetings
between US scientists and their Soviet counterparts, the visiting US
scientists are left with the feeling of having been completely drained of
information.
Participation in Military, Government, and Party Activities
43. Many senior Soviet scientists serve in advisory capacities to
the military and have used their military connections in rising through
the bureaucracy. Furthermore, some military scientists study or
participate in research within the Academy institutes. Many Soviet
scientists, however, completely shun military--and even
applied--scientific work because this destroys their opportunities for
travelling abroad and restricts the already limited means they have for
communication and publication.
~~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
44. The Academy is regularly drawn upon as part of the Soviets' S&T
collection effort from the West and, although the practice is distasteful.
to many Soviet scientists, these scientists respond to S&T collection
requirements during trips to technical conferences abroad.
45. Many senior Soviet scientists serve in high level government and
party positions. For example, G.I. Marchuk, who was formerly an Academy
vice president and headed the Academy's Siberian Department is
currently director of the GKNT. His predecessor at the GKNT, V.A.
Kirillin, had also been an Academy vice president. Yu.A. Ovchinnikov, who
is a vice president of the Academy, is a candidate member of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Academy president,
A.P. Alexandrov, is a full member.
Education
46. The best Soviet students who have come to the US have had depth,
breadth, and quality of scientific education comparable to that of their
US counterparts. One difference which has been unanimously noted by US
scientists is that the preparation of new Soviet candidates (PhD
equivalent) in analytic mathematics is generally better than for their US
counterparts.
47. Soviet universities tend to have more upper level specialized
laboratories (e.g., in fluid mechanics, turbulence, lasers) than US
universities. Their large scientific manpower pool enables them to add
these specialized labs to the curriculum even though adequate equipment
is often lacking. In the US, the equipment can generally be obtained,
but there are not enough people to teach the labs.
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
48. Access to computers in the universities, both large mainframes
and personal computers, is very limited. According to a Soviet magazine
article, the number of computers in pre-university Soviet schools in
1983-84 was two. The Soviets have begun, however, to introduce
compulsory courses on computer technology and programming into all
primary, secondary, and vocational schools in September 1985.
Furthermore, they intend to set up special classrooms in 200 middle
schools, each with 15 to 20 personal computers, during the 1986-1990
five-year plan. This, however, will have a negligable effect on
increasing Soviet computer literarcy because this only represents an
average of less than one personal computer per 1,000 students.
49. Teaching and research are fairly distinctly divided with
teaching taking place largely in the universities and fundamental
research in the academy institutes. Some institutes award candidate
degrees for research within the institute and a small amount of
fundamental research takes place in a few select universities (e.g.
Moscow State University). Because of this overall separation of teaching
and research, active researchers generally have little contact with
teaching and students, and vice versa. Furthermore, scientists teaching
in the higher educational institutions lose touch with the excitement and
vitality of forefront research, making it more difficult to convey these
qualities to the students. Attempts have been made to get the
researchers more involved in teaching but the physical separation of
university and institute facilities has strongly hindered this effort.
The large number of candidates who receive their degrees in the
universities require substantial retraining to become productive in the
institute research environment.
?i Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 1 _.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
50. Students have the freedom to apply to any institute or.
university. Although they may choose the field they want to pursue, each
year tt~e number of people for each field is determined by the government
and then competitive examinations determine the cut-off. The entrance
examinations are crucial and are taken at the institute to which the
student is applying. Failure to be accepted within two years generally
results in the student being called into military service. The
university entrance examinations for physics are separated out from the
other subjects and given first because the field is so prestigious that
the competition is very high. This staggering of examinations provides
to the students who fail an opportunity to try other fields.
51. Decisions on the filling of faculty positions are strongly
influenced by outside effects: ethnic origin, general ideological
standing, and personal connections. Faculty positions are routinely
filled by the universities own graduates which contributes to the lack of
cross-fertilization among universities.
52. The party plays a strong role even in the granting of candidate
degrees. As a formal part of the general examinations (even for the
advanced degrees), a candidate must pass an oral section on political
history and philosophy.
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Discrimination in Science
Discrimination against ethnic and regional groups in research
institutes and in entering higher level educational institutions, though
not an official policy, is widespread and takes on an almost systematic
nature in the Soviet Union. This discrimination is perhaps most acute
and most universal in the case of the Jewish group. Ironically, Jews
make up a significant portion of Soviet scientists and intelligentsia.
The discriminatory policies have reduced the effectiveness of the
contribution of Jewish scientists and caused large numbers of them to
leave the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s during the period of
eased emigration policy. Furthermore, there are indications that Jews
are being systematically excluded from entrance into the good technical
schools irrespective of their ability. Although this filtering of Jews
will certainly prevent highly qualified people from entering the Soviet
scientific community, there is no firm evidence as yet that this has
measureably reduced the productivity of Soviet science. This is due in
part to the large pool of people available to draw on for scientific
careers. In addition, in the case of mathematics, where discrimination
has been particularly high, the Soviets have been successful in the past
in identifying exceptional talent at an early age and pushing its
development. We expect them to be able to continue such targeting in the
future. It is nevertheless clear that the West, and in particular the
US, has gained some exceptionally good Jewish scientists in recent years,
largely as a result of discrimination in the Soviet Union. (U)
~q Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
V. Soviet Scientific Research
General Considerations
53,. The scope and quality of fundamental scientific research in the
Soviet Union has to a large extent been determined by the conditions of
the research environment discussed in previous chapters. Most notable is
the striking difference in scope and quality between theoretical and
experimental work in virtually all scientific fields.
54. The scope of Soviet research in theoretical physics is by and
large similar to that of the US. The quality is as good as the US in
most fields and perhaps better in a few fields that have been traditional
Soviet strengths (e.g. turbulence, laser physics).
55. The scope of Soviet experimental science has frequently been
limited by the availability of instrumentation, computers, and major
research facilities. The effort has been further hindered by lack of an
adequate infrastructure for servicing the available equipment and for
developing new equipment that can advance the limits of knowledge. The
quality of experimental work has correspondingly suffered and, if nothing
else, the interesting discoveries are generally made by Western
scientists simply because the equipment was available to them. Western
scientists, however, are frequently surprised by the quality of Soviet
scientifc results obtained with relatively crude equipment. The Soviets
compensate by paying much closer attention to theoretical details and
often demonstrate a deeper scientific understanding of the problem than
is common in the West. One American theorist who spent several months in
the USSR characterized the research he saw as "modern science in an
underdeveloped country"-- a tribute to the skills and talents of Soviet
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 i _ ~
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
experimentalists. In addition, when hard currency is available, much of
the laboratory instrumentation can be obtained from the West, although
problems with maintenance still remain.
56. The Soviets have been conspicuously absent in some fields, in
large part due because of the lack of necessary techniques and
equipment. Such has been the case in surface physics, where the
availability of ultra-high vacuum techniques is essential, and in low
temperature physics. This inadequacy probably resulted in the
establishment in 1980, probably at Velikhov's insistence, of the Center
for Vacuum and Surface Science. US scientists have attributed the Soviet
absence in the band theory of conduction, and theoretical high-energy
physics Monte Carlo gauge theory calculations to inadequate computer
power.
57. Given the frequent inadequacy of the available tools for doing
forefront experimental research, the organizational difficulties in
maintaining and building these tools and the societal bias which places
the theorist on a higher intellectual plane than the experimentalist, and
the differences in salary and benefits, it is not surprising to find the
toughest competition for entrance to universities and institute research
positions to be for positions in theoretical physics.
58. The excellence in mathematics demonstrated by Soviet scientists
has contributed to excellence in theoretical physics. The Soviets often
produce sophisticated theoretical solutions to problems in analytic form
where the US typically would rely on numerical computer solutions.
Examples exist in the field of hydrodynamics where accurate solutions
have been obtained on computers of significantly lower capability than US
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
computers through insightful choices of boundary conditions and clever
mathematical techniques, or efficient programming. Such was the case,
for example, with a Soviet calculation of the magnetic field-induced
compression of a thermonuclear fusion target that the Soviets suggested
might have commercial power applications. The Soviets have been
essentially forced into the position of having to rely on clever
theoretical approaches to computer calculations because of their lack of
the most advanced computer systems. On the other hand, it can also be
suggested that if state-of-the-art computers do become available to them,
a potential exists for a surge in their computational capability that
could go beyond the effects of just the improved computer capability.
Such a surge, however, might be mitigated or slowed by inadequate
preparation to handle advanced programming techniques used for
supercomputers.
Relative Stren the and Weaknesses
59. Beyond these overall trends which have afar-reaching impact on
many fields, it is difficult to find a means of summarizing the relative
status of science in the Soviet Union as compared with that of the US.
Even in cases where there is a significantly poorer Soviet contribution,
as in biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, specific
examples within the broad field, such as biophysical chemistry and
protein conformation, can be found which are regarded as world-class by
Western scientists. Furthermore, we note that, despite the poor overall
performance in molecular biology, the Soviets are currently investing
heavily in this field. Another example of this non-uniformity across a
field is in fluid dynamics, which we have assessed as being comparable to
the US. Current Soviet work in experimental plasma physics, particularly
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
in their fusion energy program, is not keeping pace with the West. On
the other hand Soviet experimental work in shock physics is greatly
respected. In contrast, some field areas have traditionally had massive
resources allocated to them, such as oceanography, but the overall
results produced have not greatly impressed Western scientists. The
presence of dust a few very bright scientists can, and has, made the
difference between very significant Soviet contributions in afield and
the virtual absence of a Soviet contribution.
60. We expect Soviet work in a number of theoretical fields to
suffer in the future as a result of inferior large-scale scientific
computing capability. Fields such as fluid dynamics, astrophysics, and
some calculations in high energy and condensed matter physics will become
increasingly computer intensive in the next five years -- as much as 25~
of astrophysical work may be based on computer simulations in this
timeframe. Fields such as astrophysics and high energy physics will
likely suffer further under the party and government pressure for
relevant applied research. On the other hand, condensed matter physics,
because of its close connection to semi-conductors and electronics, and
molecular biology, because of possible genetic engineering applications
in agriculture and other areas, may receive considerably greater
support. This may be particularly true for molecular biology given
Ovchinnikov's active role in this field, and considerable influence in
the party and the academy.
61. The interest, or value, of Soviet work to Western scientists may
not necessarily reside in the sophistication of the research as in the
access to data unavailable through any other source, such as in geology.
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
This has also been the case in oceanography, where the huge fleet of
Soviet oceanographic research vessels has gathered avast amount of
data. ?And in materials science, the Soviet brute force approach to
research has resulted in a wealth of data on physical properties of new
materials with possible application to, for example, new lasers.
62. With these points in mind we can nevertheless ask where the
Soviets stand relative to the US in a given field of science in an
overall sense. We are relying largely for this comparison on the
assessment of primarily US, and to some extent European and emigre
Soviet, scientists. Table V summarizes these subjective overall
assessments for the limited set of fields on which we have focused in
this study.
?i Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Table V
Relative Strength of Specific Fields of Science Compared to the US
Field
Comparable Weaker
Mathematics X --
Atmospheric Physics X
Oceanology
Theoretical X
Experimental X
Materials Science X
High Energy Physics
Theoretical X
Experimental X __
Fluid Dynamics X
Condensed Matter Physics
Theoretical X
Experimental X
Astrophysics
Theoretical X --
Experimental X __
Molecular Biology __ X
Laser Physics
Theoretical X
Experimental X
Computer Science X
Note: An arrow indicates the estimated direction of change of the
future relative status where we are reasonably confident.
Some fields have not been divided into theory and experiment
because of lack of data.
The Soviets were not found to be grossly stronger than the US
in any of these fields.
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 l
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
VI. Future
63. We expect that the ongoing Soviet drive for scientific and
technological progress directed toward meeting specific economic and
military needs will play a major role in shaping the nature of their
science over the next 10 to 15 years. The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev as
General Secretary of the CPSU represents the beginning of the transfer of
power from the "old guard" to the younger political leaders. The
initiatives for accelerating S&T progress which began formulation in the
late 1970s will now begin to receive the political support from the top
leadership required to implement necessary changes in the Soviet system.
These changes may be slow and gradual, as Gorbachev faces a bureaucracy
with a substantial "old guard" element. He has already, however, shown a
surprising ability to accelerate political allies into top leadership
positions.
64. Several changes have already taken place over the last several
years. These include: the creation of the Academy Department of
Information, Computer Technology, and Automation in 1983; changes in the
wage structure for scientists and engineers; new monetary incentives for
technological innovation; allowance for adjustments in plan quotas to
allow for down-time during the introduction of new technologies; and the
creation of cross-disciplinary/interministry groups with the authority to
coordinate large technical projects. We expect such changes to continue
to receive support from Gorbachev and his allies in the future, providing
the necessary backbone for what had been hollow rhetoric in the past.
65. The implication for science, as a whole, will be a gradually
shifting emphasis further toward applied research, even within the
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 i
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
premier organization historically dominating fundamental Soviet
science--the Academy. Younger men such as G. Marchuk, Ye. Velikhov and
Yu. Ovchinnikov who have to a large extent climbed to the top because of
their work in applied science, are gaining positions of great
responsibility in terms of science planning and management within the
GKNT and the Academy. Velikhov is reported to be in weekly contact with
Gorbachev, serving in essence as his science advisor. Fundamental
scientists had dominated the academy leadership from 1960 until
recently. These men can be expected to influence strongly the nature of
Soviet science for at least the next decade and the results of their
influence will continue into the years beyond.
66. In the short term, the emphasis on applied research will further
focus the attention of the high quality scientists in the Academy on the
priority economic and military problems of the country. In terms of
manpower, however, this will be a small addition to the already enormous
Soviet applied science effort.
67. In the long term, given the smaller fraction of scientists
devoted to fundamental science, we expect to see a gradual reduction or
leveling off in Academy fundamental science having little or no obvious
applications and consequently in the pool of new ideas generated by
Soviet scientists. The Soviets may feel that with easy access to Western
literature on fundamental science, they can accept a minimal fundamental
research effort in order to accelerate their drive for technology
development. We expect, consequently, an increasing Soviet reliance on
Western science, as well as technology, as a source of new ideas. This .
will come at the price of reduced international prestige and there will
be a time-lag before the Soviets can be pick up and exploit Western
science.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
__ _
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
68. Regardless of the extent to which applied science encroaches on
the Soviet fundamental science research effort, basic research in general
will continue to suffer from two major handicaps which we believe will
remain largely unremedied over the next decade.
69. The first handicap is the lack of the necessary tools for
conducting research particularly in experimental science. This includes
instrumentation, computers, large-scale research facilities and the
people and parts needed to maintain them. Although the Soviets have
demonstrated the ability to do surprisingly good research with equipment
considered relatively crude by Western standards, the lack of abroad
infrastructure for producing and maintaining high quality, reliable
instrumentation will slow their progress and continue to absorb the time
of large fractions of the personnel of their research institutes. In
some cases, the lack of sophisticated instrumentation and/or computer
support may completely exclude them from effective participation in
forefront research. This lack of equipment may be alleviated to some
extent when the equipment can be purchased in the West, although the
problem of the availability of parts and maintenance personnel will
remain. The structural and incentive changes that the new, younger
political leaders are exploring, even if successful, will probably not
begin to show a major effect on the instrumentation problem for another
10 years.
70. The second problem, that of restricted communication and travel
among scientific researchers, is a particularly thorny issue for the
Soviets. The strong penchant for secrecy and sharp institutional
boundaries that are at the heart of the communication problem are
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 i
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
unlikely to loosen in the near future, and if there is a further shift
toward applied science, are likely to tighten even further. The
importance of the control of information in Soviet society is so high,
and the threat from uncontrolled publications so great, that a vast
opening up of communications is almost inconceivable. As a result, even
with the help of a centralized scientific information distribution
center, duplication of effort, reduced synergism among scientists, and
the slow diffusion of ideas and techniques will continue to hamper Soviet
scientific research.
71. Even though the research environment has led to many negative
effects, there may be some effects that are advantageous to the Soviets.
Several factors suggest that the probability of Soviet technological
surprise, resulting from work in the leading edge areas of applied
science, may increase in the future. This prospect stems not from any
particular strength or excellence of Soviet scientific research, but
rather from the systemic conditions under which it operates.
72. It has been widely noted by US scientists that the Soviets
frequently work in areas considered to be off-the-beaten-track by Western
scientists. Furthermore, Soviet scientists working in these areas can
often get continuing support over many years. Although much of this work
never leads anywhere, it is from these areas that an unexpected
development might arise, as well as from the Soviet brute force approach
to exploring scientific problems. If the Soviets do move even further
toward applied research we would expect some of their best scientists to
spend more time on applied problems. Fundamental science in areas not
pursued by the Soviets but still needed to fuel applied science
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
developments will continue to be available to the Soviets through Western
literature, but will come at the cost of a delay in the assimilation of "
fundamental science into their scientific community.
12. The lack of adequate computing power and instrumentaion
available to Soviet scientists has imposed constraints upon them that
force careful study of a problem in order to deal with it within those
constraints. This has created an environment that puts a premium on
analytical mathematical ability, physical insight, and insightful design
of experiment. Thus Soviet research is characterized by cleverness of
approach and design. They are often able to squeeze more performance
from their computers and instrumentation than that which is normally
associated with the level of technology embodied in that equipment.
Thus, given upgraded computers and/or instrumentation, a surge in Soviet
performance beyond that expected is likely. The probability of
technological surprise will increase faster than their level of
technology and further, technological surprise is more likely to manifest
itself in the form of clever designs based on technology inferior to that
of the West's than on technological breakthroughs.
73. Over the next decade, we see Soviet science overall as
transitioning to an even greater focus on applied science that can
directly contribute to economic growth and military strength. Despite
its problems, Soviet science constitutes a formidable force in many
fields and should be closely monitored~if for no other reason than its
vast size and potential, and because of the high priority attached to
scientific and technological progress by the Soviet leadership.
Nevertheless, we expect Soviet science to continue to be hampered by low
~~~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
productivity compared with that of the West as a result of the existing
research environment. It will be of crucial importance to the US and its
allies-, however, to observe to what extent the new generation of Soviet
leaders is successful in modifying and changing the Soviet scientific
research environment over the next ten years, thereby releasing its
enormous potential. The consequences of such successful political and
administrative initiatives will be felt for decades to come.
,,, Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Formal. Organizational Structure
Basic scientific research in the Soviet Union, as with most
activities, is centrally planned. The organizations responsible for
policy guidance, administration, and performance of research are embodied
in a rigid hierarchical structure which provides a mechanism whereby
Communist Party Central Committee policy initiatives can directly
influence the direction, scope, and level-of-effort in all fields of
research. (See Figure II)
The USSR Council of Ministers serves as the top administrative body
of the government responsible for day-to-day operations of the economy,
and the development of an integrated economic plan, which includes basic
science. It is also responsible for reflecting broad policy initiatives,
as set forth by the Party, in its planning and administrative
activities. The Council of Ministers exercises its responsibililty for
planning and administrative duties through a series of state committees,
reporting to the council, which are oriented toward specific functions
(e.g. finance, planning, supply, S&T).
The primary players who coordinate the overall scientific research
plan for consideration by the Council of Ministers are the State
Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT, an All-Union state committee
under the Council of Ministers chaired by G.I. Marchuk) and the Presidium
of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (AN SSSR, A. P. Aleksandrov,
President). The State Planning Committee of the Council of Ministers
(Gosplan) and the Ministry of Finance participate with the GKNT and
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 Finurp iT
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
Soviet Science Planning and Management Structure
.CP of the USSR.
.Presidium.
.Supreme Soviet.
.Council of Ministers.
.Republic.
. Party
.Republic.
. Soviet .
.Collegium. .Republic.
.GKNT. .GOSPLAN. .GOSSNAB. .GOSSTROY. .GOSKOMIZOBRETENIYA. Council.
. Ministry .GOSSTANDART.
.of Finance. HIGHER CERTIFICATION COMMISSION (VAK)
.Presidium.
------- AN SSSR -------------------------------------
.Industrial. Academy .Ministry of Higher. Republic .
Ministry and specialized Academy
Secondary Education
. Research .Institutes. .Research. .Institutes.
The abbreviated committees under to Council of Ministers are:
GKNT - State Committee for Science and Technology
GOSPLAN - State Planning Committee
GOSSNAB - State Committee for Material and Technical Supply
GOSSTROY - State Committee for Construction Affairs
GOSKOMIZOBRETENIYA - State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries
GOSSTANDARD - State Committee for Standarts
VAK - Higher Certification Commission
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
the AN SSSR in setting the overall funding levels. For projects which
require major resource allocations, other committees under the Council of.
MinistErs, such as the State Committee for Construction Affairs
(Gosstroy) and the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply
(Gossnab) also participate.
The GKNT is charged with the coordination of a unified state S&T
policy. It prepares S&T forecasts, drafts a list of major S&T problems
to be solved during the next five-year plan, develops proposals with the
AN SSSR and Gosstroy for inclusion in the five-year S&T plans and longer
range S&T programs, and works with Gosplan and the Academy in developing
proposals for the introduction of R&D results into the economy. The GKNT
has little direct managerial control over the actual conduct of institute
research.
The AN SSSR plays a pivotal role in the planning, management, and
conduct of fundamental science in the Soviet Union. In addition to the
overall planning functions performed in collaboration with the GKNT noted
above, the AN SSSR maintains direct managerial control over the bulk of
the fundamental research programs in the country. We estimate that about
50~ of the research conducted in fundamental science in the Soviet Union
takes place in the scientific research institutes of the Academy system,
with the remainder taking place mostly in the universities and other
institutes of higher learning (VUZy) under the Ministry of Higher and
Specialized Secondary Education, and to some extent in the research
institutes of the industrial ministries. In addition, the AN SSSR by
charter is given responsibility for overseeing and coordinating all
fundamental scientific research in the country,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
 l
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5
although its direct managerial control only extends to its own
institutes. Thus the research plans of the Union-Republic Academies of
Sciences, for instance, must be passed through the AN SSSR via its Union
Republic Academies of Science Coordination Council. (See Figure)
Each Academy institute generates a proposal for its own research plan
which forms the substance for the deliberations of the upper levels of
the AN SSSR (department, section, and presidium) and the GKNT in
formulating the overall research plan for the country.
?~ Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 :CIA-RDP92T00277R000200170002-5